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The origin of this research is a myth. As far as I recall, I came up with this idea of 
studying city water infrastructures as a midway to combine my archaeology background 
and the new pursuit of STS and urban history. But my father insists that he is the one who 
crafted the theme in one of our many conversations. Either way, I owe a great deal to my 
parents, whose integrity, compassion, patriotism, and thirst for knowledge never cease to 
amaze me. Living up to their expectation is not easy. With this dissertation completed I 
hope I am half way there. 
Six years ago, I decided to come to Georgia Tech for my PhD study. It turned out 
to be one of the best decisions I have ever made. I am most fortunate to study under 
Hanchao Lu, whose speak-only-when-you-have-the-material philosophy put this research 
on a solid ground. Dr. Lu never said no to my wildest ideas, yet he somehow effortlessly 
imparted his down-to-earth view of scholarship. Looking back, it almost seems magical. I 
enjoy great mentorship from John Krige, Laura Bier, Joe Brown, John Tone and many 
others inside and outside HSOC who took interest in my research and sit through hours 
when I rambled on about my disorganized thoughts. To this I am most appreciative. I am 
equally grateful for the friendship I had with my fellow graduate students, whose wisdom 
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This dissertation explores the water technologies in Shanghai from the mid-
nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century and in what ways the infrastructures – the 
drainage system, the water supply, culverted rivers, the water closet, and the water-carriage 
sewer system – played a role in the shaping of the cityscape, economics, and politics of 
Shanghai. While previous scholarship has engaged the social aspect of city water 
engineering, especially with respect to hygiene and its relation to growing state 
intervention, this dissertation focuses on the engineering work itself, indicating that the 
concept of being modern might be an aspiration, but it was the material and practical 
aspects of water engineering that laid the ground and set the rules for government 
intervention. Only within the spatial and economic limits allowed by the engineering 
feasibility could the authorities materialize political influence. 
Following the Introduction, Chapters 2-5 discuss components of the engineering 
system in Shanghai – drainage, waterworks, culvert, and sewage treatment. An exhaustive 
look at the technical details provides us with better explanations as to why foreign 
technologies were accepted and in what context decisions were made by authorities. 
Despite these works being the embodiment of state-of-the-art Western knowledge, what 
facilitated their local adoption were practical and mundane concerns. Chapters 6-8 discuss 
how economics competition and political struggle prior to WWII played out in the context 
of growing engineering sophistication between actors such as corporations, consumers, 
political authorities from the city to the state, and from Chinese to foreigners. Chapter 9 
offers a criticism about the ill-fitting, conventional concept of modernity for China studies 
 xiii 
and calls for a new theoretical framework within which the question of development could 
be answered in light of the incremental improvements in engineering practices. 
The thesis of this research is to propose the concept of hydraulic modernity. The 
contention here is that practical aspects of the technocratic-engineering system of city 
water dictated the pattern of engineering works and consequently influenced how political 
and economic capital were organized for the system to achieve greater capacity and 
homogeneity, the two criteria used to measure the development of a system in this 
dissertation. The former indicates the maximum output of an engineering system and the 
latter points to the reduction of the number of heterogeneous interest groups inside a 
technocratic-engineering system in order to lower the risk of malfunction. Modernization 
of Shanghai was not driven by top-down infusion of knowledge, etiquette, and ideology, 
but a process of meticulous interconnection of layers of technocratic-engineering systems, 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 This dissertation tells a story. It starts in the 1840s and ends at the 1950s lasting a 
little more than a century. The story takes place in Shanghai, the commercial hub of China 
under the influence of colonial powers, but the protagonists are not politicians or military 
men who are often the ones most decorated in history. The narrative of this dissertation is 
technology-based. It is about water and associated technologies – drainage, water supply, 
waste disposal, the sewer system, and treatment plants, etc. It is about the initiators of these 
novelties – engineers, businessmen, sanitarians, etc., and about the role these technologies 
played in shaping Shanghai’s cityscape and in making modernity the enduring ideology 
that dominated the embattled Middle Kingdom for the rest of the century. 
 Technologies for managing water in urban settings are not traditional subjects for 
historians, especially for those who study modern China. The reasons are twofold. On the 
one hand, China does not enjoy the same abundance of historical records on this matter as 
do Western countries. Frequent regime change throughout the twentieth century surely did 
not help. On top of this, the business data of early Chinese water companies is both 
incoherent and spotty. Today another challenge is that access to these materials in China’s 
national and municipal archives is shrinking. The nature of the gaps in the Chinese 
historical data leaves historians with only one choice: to examine Western enterprises in 
China – especially in treaty ports such as Shanghai where the foreign presence clearly 
influenced the cityscape.  
To focus exclusively on Western enterprises, however, means relying on an 
outdated methodology, one which had been shaken and criticized extensively by the work 
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of Paul A. Cohen. In his book Discovering History in China, Cohen criticizes the 
interpretation that once dominated the American intellectual world of China studies. That 
interpretation is that it was the West that played the active role in this period, and China 
took a much more passive or reactive part.1 To focus on water-related technologies is 
significant and challenging because this is a field where several elements were required to 
initiate changes – engineering expertise, accounting skills, effective municipal authorities, 
and surplus capital for investment. While China of the nineteenth century had few, if not 
none, of them, the West had them all. To tell a story about technology is thus to tell a story 
of how the West impacted the Chinese unilaterally. In that sense, a technology-based 
narrative seems like the resurrection of what was deemed as a “biased” style of research 
that has long fallen out of popularity. 
1.1 Literature Review 
 Practical difficulties regarding access to materials, compounded by a methodology 
issue that could be intellectually risky, create constraints for historians who dare to explore 
water-related technologies in China. So far there have been only two major works that 
address this subject matter. Kerrie L. Macpherson offers one of the finest elaboration on 
the development of public health in Shanghai between 1843 and 1893. Macpherson tracks 
down the birth of the first waterworks and first hospital in Shanghai, and attributes their 
success to Shanghai’s unique human resources. Missionaries, sanitarians, physicians, 
science translators, educators, foreign and local merchants, traditional Chinese medical 
practitioners, and administrators of the Municipal Council – Shanghai gave them the 
                                                 
1 Cohen, Discovering History in China, 9. 
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platform that sped up technology spillover. Together these elites, both foreign and Chinese, 
formed a pragmatic governing body that brought about rapid change in cityscape and in 
administrative skills. One of the great features of Macpherson’s work is that the 
effectiveness of technology and knowledge were not predetermined by their nationality, 
but was assessed based on how well it could be situated at local sites and in what ways it 
could advance the shared goals of governing.2  
Ruth Rogaski examines public health issues from a rather different angle, which is 
by and large based on an etymology of hygiene in China and the way elites used this 
imported idea to assert control. Rogaski picks Tianjin as the site of interest because Tianjin 
was not only subject to the influence of western powers, but also was in close contact with 
the Japanese. A Japanese military presence had been in the city since the end of the Boxer 
Riots. Japanese technological prowess made a convincing case for the Chinese elites that 
modernity had little to do with race but more to do with organization of the government. 
Rogaski coins the concept “hygienic modernity” to interpret the marriage between 
intellectuals and government, between an ideology favoring science and the expansion of 
administrative power, and between a vision of the state and individuals. These conjunctions 
of discourse and politics manifested themselves in various measures taken in China’s 
management of public health throughout the twentieth century.3  
Recently, Chinese historians have also showed some ambition in attempting to 
explain rather than to describe technological development. But the results of these attempts 
are still limited. For example, Cunchao Jiao and Yexin Chen explain the slow adoption of 
                                                 
2 Macpherson, A Wilderness of Marshes.  
3 Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity.  
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plumbing fixtures and cesspools in Shanghai. Why were the British who had already 
witnessed the benefit of the technology at home reluctant to install more flush toilets in 
Shanghai? Jiao and Chen conclude that the stagnation in deploying these technologies was 
due to a profitable contract with nightsoil workers; the foreigners in Shanghai found merit 
and practicality in the old Chinese way of removing refuse, in contrast to the general 
Western conception of governance and hygiene.4 
 Social historians also frequently touch upon this matter of nightsoil as a way of 
discussing the interaction, or co-construction, between transplanted technologies and local 
conditions. Hanchao Lu depicts an early morning scene in Shanghai, in which residential 
alleys were awoken by the cries of nightsoil workers, and human-generated wastes were 
orderly removed from the residences to the nightsoil dock by hundreds of these coolies. 
Zhiliang Su and Shanmin Peng provide a summary of the development of public restrooms 
in Shanghai, suggesting their indispensability to urban modernization. Yinbo Gu describes 
the founding of the Beijing Waterworks Company and the contributive efforts of the Qing 
administration and nationalist merchants, making the Beijing waterworks an unusual 
success without immediate assistance from foreigners. In the case of the Hangzhou 
waterworks Wei Zhao and Hong He demonstrate that the founding of the waterworks did 
not lead to wide consumption of running water when the cost of piping and the high water 
rate were prohibitive for many. Lihong Du examines the backlash from nightsoil workers 
that the Beijing government faced when it decided to take over the nightsoil business in 
the 1930s. Kyu-hwan Sihn also explores the turbulent reform of human waste management 
                                                 
4 Jiao and Chen, “Reasons for Rejecting the New System of Nightsoil Disposal by Shanghai Municipal 
Council”. 
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in Beijing during the 1930s. Sihn analyzes the attitude of the police force, the struggle 
between urban and rural concerns, and government power at stake in the battle over 
nightsoil. Feng Xu’s case study is based on a series of events in 1943 in rural Shanghai, in 
which the government-backed nightsoil workforce faced tremendous challenges when 
peasants reacted with physical and legal obstructions as they assumed that their agricultural 
interests were being undermined. Poon Shuk-wah looks at an unsuccessful reformation of 
waste management in Guangzhou and argues that despite the lack of actual improvement 
for undesirable public latrines, and despite the failure of substantial change in the 
organization of the labor force, the Chinese government managed to change citizens’ 
conceptions of an urban culture that moved towards a focus on hygiene and proper 
manners.5 
 The historians above can be categorized into two groups: one that focuses on the 
evolving universe of thought and believes that the change of cityscape resulted from a 
change of ideas among intellectual and political leaders, while the other emphasizes the 
social reality which was unfavorable to change and is keen to explain why certain water-
related technologies stuttered or did not make as much of a difference as previously 
thought. Rogaski and MacPherson represented the former. They both place the discussion 
of water-related technologies in the framework of medicine. Both rely upon records of 
physicians, translators, and later sanitarians and characterize these figures as the initiators 
of large engineering undertakings. Lu and Jiao and Chen represent the latter. They would 
                                                 
5 Hanchao Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 189-198; Su and Peng, “Gongce Bianqian yu Dushi Wenming”; Gu, 
“Beijing Waterworks Company”; Zhao and He, “A Research into Drinking Water in Hangzhou”; Du, “The 
Reform of Waste Disposal Management in Beijing City in the 1930s”; Sihn, “Official Management of the 
Nightsoil”; Xu, “Research on the Dispute over Cleanliness in Pudong District”; Poon, “Minguo Shiqi 
Guangzhou de Fenhui Chuli yu Chengshi Shenghuo”.  
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argue that despite the presence of new technologies, life of ordinary people remained 
largely untouched. Lu’s and Jiao and Chen’s work deal with the traditional, labor-intensive 
nightsoil management in Shanghai and offer their own explanations for why it remained 
undisturbed. Lu hints at a chain of social interactions that was hard to displace, and Jiao 
and Chen look at economic incentives for maintaining the status quo.  
The shortfall of previous research in this area is clear. Social historians are good at 
explaining the lack of changes but are not as good at explaining why and how the 
technologies eventually took over. Those who prioritize intellectual progress might be 
doing justice to the medical men and women regarding their role in a still-evolving 
scientific climate, but to see large engineering undertakings as a natural result of a change 
of mindset is simply ignoring the complexity and difficulties in manifesting ideas into 
reality. In other words, what we need is a technology-based narrative that can overcome 
the shortcomings of the two existing approaches. It should be able to not only track and 
explain how imported novelties became culturally acceptable to the Chinese and were 
mechanically integrated into the cityscape, but it should also be able to straighten out, to 
the fullest extent possible, the causal relationship between scientific ideas and engineering 
undertakings, with due attention given to engineers residing in Shanghai and their 
irreversible transformation of the city. 
1.2 Pitfalls in Defining Modernity 
In this dissertation, I put forth the idea “hydraulic modernity” as the central thesis 
based on the empirical data presented. But before elaborating on that argument, it is 
essential to first define the meaning of “modernity”. Modernity, the word, has origins in 
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the fields of art and religion where it is rhetorically used to signify the rupture of styles and 
ideas during the Renaissance and the Reformation eras. In the fields of history and 
sociology, particularly in the subdiscipline of the history of technology, modernity is 
associated with a host of phenomena that took hold in Western societies beginning in the 
early nineteenth century – industrialization, urbanization, wage labor, the division of labor, 
consumerism, secularism, etc. 6  Due to its loose definition, modernity was commonly 
applied to a political concept of a society’s level of development; meaning a historical 
sequence of improvements where the rest of the world follows the same steps of the West. 
This temporalized framework suggested that non-Western societies were at the beginning 
of a universal process rather than at the bottom of a global hierarchy that the West 
dominated through its absolute advantage in economic scale, finance, technology, and 
political influence. It indicated a natural progression of society where the same level of 
development could be reached all across the globe, sooner or later. Modernity, in such a 
progressive sense of the term, has been part of politicians’ favorite repertoire whereas 
historians, sociologists, and anthropologists have spent years scrutinizing the relation of 
modernity, time, and space. 
Zygmunt Baumann offers a philosophical explanation regarding this situated 
concept of modernity. He contends that the leading characteristic of modernity is the 
changing relationship between space and time. Modernity starts when space and time are 
separated from living practices and from each other. Human desire for velocity sparks 
ingenuity, imagination and resourcefulness. Time in its modern sense becomes the focus 
and the pursuit while space is subject to change, domination, and conquest. Baumann uses 
                                                 
6 Valade, “Modernity”. 
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the metaphor of solids and liquids in his contention about the nature of modernity. The 
modernity of the nineteenth-century is physically akin to a solid – it is in rigid form, it has 
clear spatial dimensions, and the flow of time is irrelevant to it; the late twentieth-century 
modernity, however, is more sensitive to time like a liquid. Late twentieth-century 
modernity is characterized by mobility and inconstancy. It tends to break into smaller units, 
mirroring the social disintegration and plural interpretations of modernity by individuals. 
The “norm” of modernity, as was conceived a century ago, falls apart when technologies 
transformed activities such as war into processes full of ephemeral engagements, rather 
than committed efforts that demanded close administration and control. This 
transformation is best shown by the preference for missiles and air force over boots on the 
ground, representing the ability to penetrate space via time versus actually occupying the 
space.7 Anthony Giddens has a similar point of view in line with this concept of separating 
relationships between time and space. Giddens suggests that the separation of time and 
space is critical to the extreme dynamism of modernity. It detaches social activity from its 
embedding in the particularities of contexts of physical presence. It provides the gearing 
mechanisms for rationalized organization. Giddens points to the example of maps created 
by Western travelers and explorers and suggests that space can be established 
independently of any particular place or region through this cartographic technology. 
Locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant 
from them while the relations that determine the nature of the locale are distanciated and 
concealed.8 
                                                 
7 Bauman, 1-2, 8-14. 
8 Giddens, 17-21. 
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Other scholars see modernity from a more practical perspective. James Ferguson 
argues that old-fashioned modernity goes wrong when thinking about time as a linear axis. 
For Ferguson, the non-linear disjuncture is particularly pronounced in the post-World War 
Two period. Ferguson contends that history is not a teleological unfolding or a gradual rise 
through a hierarchical progression. The variety of modes of development in Asia and 
Africa suggests that modernity is plural and fragmented and its history is marked by 
contingency. Ferguson deconstructs the concept of modernity by de-temporalizing the 
historical narrative, suggesting that the status and condition of different people and nations 
may change over time, but not always in a progressive way. This observation shifts the 
focus of modernity from serialized progression to the enduring hierarchy, exclusion, and 
abjection within the global community. “As understandings of the modern have shifted in 
this way,” Ferguson writes, “the vast majority of Africans today who are denied the status 
of modernity increasingly come to be seen, and may even come to see themselves, not as 
‘less developed’, but simply as less.”9  
Couze Venn and Mike Featherstone also take notice of the slow and uneven pace 
of change of social institutions in non-Western cultures. They suggest that cultures work 
in pragmatic ways rather than according to the rationalist re-descriptions generated by the 
discourse of modern governance. There exists a world of subjectivities made up of values, 
beliefs, and sensibilities that operate alongside and outside regulatory institutions. The 
assemblages of these mechanisms, with their multiplicity, specificity, and mobility, 
provides spaces and resources for resistance to hegemonic forces. Yet, these mechanisms 
are constantly under the threat of neo-liberal interventions which seek to homogenize them 
                                                 
9 Ferguson. 
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to make them amenable to economic calculations and governance. Time is therefore not 
essential. Locality is, and so is social structure.10 
Although both explanatory approaches seek to reach a fuller understanding of the 
developmental process in the West and around the world, the convergence of the two could 
be problematic to investigating the history of modern China, the colonization of which 
never reached the level of that of British India. The resulting epistemology might force that 
investigation to conclude with a preconceived institutionalization of knowledge and society 
that perhaps only fits the reality of nineteenth-century Europe, its colonies to a lesser 
extent, and later, the United States.  
The first approach prioritizes time over space. It creates a historical narrative that 
favors the progression of knowledge over time and plays down the potential mutation of 
knowledge during its diffusion from one place to another. The second approach rejects the 
model of ever progressing time and brings attention back to the non-Western places where 
the promised development is yet to be delivered. Since it focuses on how the global 
hierarchy is maintained through perpetual Western influence long after colonialism, this 
perspective attributes development or underdevelopment to local social structures.  
Here is why using the term “modernity” without certain qualifications could be 
problematic when these two priorities are joined together. Taking note of social structures 
tends to be followed by an analysis of social actors in the process of development that seeks 
to find out which of them facilitate changes and which of them impede it. The task of 
identifying structures and actors is easier in the context of the Cold War as nation-states 
                                                 
10 Venn and Featherstone.  
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have become the norm of the international community. But problems arise when this 
method is applied to late imperial and early Republican China because it is difficult not to 
attribute the initiation of change to Chinese elites and dominant foreigners, and setbacks 
and obstructions to the masses, while the reality is that foreign and Chinese institutions 
blended. As historical investigations of the nineteenth and twentieth century cannot evade 
the unit of the nation-state, the story of development is given an undertone of a political 
battle where a clear-cut line existed between nationals of the East and West. Not only is 
this belief historically inaccurate, but the misconception is further compounded by the 
overruling power of the idea of modernity, which negates the role of geography. Many see 
the transfer of knowledge from the West to the rest of the world as a process little bounded 
by geographic specificity. Knowledge is seen as being produced as a whole by individuals 
under certain institutional conditions, and it can be exported as a whole. When it reaches 
the destination, it can be unpacked in its entirety, absorbed by similar local institutions, and 
utilized by those institutions and people as designed.  
But “local” in the case of late imperial and early Republican China has more than 
one meaning. In this research, I do not mean the native population, as in “the Chinese” in 
the context of the “West vs. China.” The local here refers to European and American 
expatriates who had spent decades in Chinese treaty ports such as Shanghai and Tianjin 
and had grown used to those environments and conditions. It might be true that Europeans 
living in Europe saw Shanghai as nothing more than a dot on the map connected to global 
trade by increasingly fast shipping, a foreign port to be increasingly penetrated and 
dominated by Western influence. But those who actually lived in Shanghai might not agree 
with such a radically reductionist view. They too were the beings of locality. Their 
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understanding of the natural world was shaped by the conditions of the soil and the river, 
the location, climate, altitude, and other geographical specificities. Their take on scientific 
knowledge could deviate from the institutionalized orthodoxy and be subject to local and 
regional variation. In such cases, their knowledge would be pre-modern, not in the sense 
of pre-modern vs. modern or the non-West vs. the West, but rather as the kind of knowledge 
that existed in Europe before the scientific revolution spread a different version, such as 
germ theory and chemistry during aeration.  
This character of pre-modernity in the diffusion of knowledge is not of a 
philosophical nature, but is rather a result of logistic difficulties. Anthony Giddens 
mentions symbolic tokens as the creation of disembedding mechanisms – the “lifting out” 
of social relations from local contexts of interaction forces their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space.11 Although money today might be a good example for 
Giddens, because it is largely independent of the means whereby it is represented, 
knowledge cannot be seen in the same way. Knowledge is neither symbolic nor a token. 
Paper currency itself is worthless, but knowledge is of concrete content. Issuance of money 
and its value are arbitrated by forces and institutions beyond the scope of individuals. 
Comprehension, interpretation, internalization, and application of knowledge, however, 
are activities carried out on the individual level, especially in places such as urban China 
at the turn of the twentieth century where public education was not widely available and 
the majority of Western expats did not undergo formal education in their youth. Shanghai 
and China sat at the periphery of knowledge production and Europe was the center. When 
new discoveries were made in Europe or when new scientific and medical theories came 
                                                 
11 Giddens, 21-27 
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into being, it took time for the impact to be felt on the other end of the continent. Scientific 
journals needed to be read and shipped. New thinking needed to be discussed. Local 
conferences needed to be held. Funding for such organizations was intermittent.  
Without schools, universities, guilds, societies, publications, and other elements of 
the European-style institutionalization of knowledge production, scholarly debate in 
Shanghai, as will be shown in the following chapters, often unfolded in a much less rigid 
manner. Older generations of Shanghailanders found it easier than in Europe to hold on to 
their outdated scientific beliefs. A handful of individuals were able to stall any 
paradigmatic shifts. Their seniority added to their advantage in guarding the incumbent 
understanding of the natural world, which came from their firsthand experience of living 
in Shanghai for years, even decades. This is especially obvious in the case of cleansing the 
Yangkingpang Creek that is discussed in Chapter 4. The older foreign residents insisted 
that sewer gas could give rise to a cholera outbreak, some thirty years after the discovery 
of Vibrio cholerae as the pathogen. What can we make of the stubborn believers of miasma 
theory? How do we categorize them in history if the labels we are familiar with were so 
often used with unintended connotations and the tendency of overgeneralization? Were 
they modern because they were British, or were they pre-modern because their “science” 
was outdated? 
Knowledge is not something that always descends to specific localities without any 
adaptation. Knowledge is a part of the production of space before the locality is irreversibly 
changed by institutional infrastructures that induces flows of information that can be 
defined and regulated from afar, like the system of primary, secondary, and post-secondary 
education today. Therefore, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
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Western knowledge in the East tended to be less centralized, less consistent, and less 
authoritative than in the West. It tended more often to meet immediate practical needs than 
to follow disciplinary doctrines. This observation on how knowledge was put to use applies 
to both Westerners and Chinese in Shanghai. The unstable regime of knowledge at the time 
was not always a result of the resistance of indigenous wisdom to Western medicine and 
philosophy. The instability was also caused by a lagging diffusion and slow awareness of 
new discoveries, faulty scientific inference by local scientists, and contingent influencers 
residing inside the local political and scientific institutions – all of which pertained more 
to Westerners overseas than to the Chinese. Therefore, it is problematic when knowledge 
is treated by historians as intrinsically Western or modern, and thus unvarying, as if 
Westerners across the world subscribed to the same prescription of knowledge, or that the 
only circumstances when changes and adaptations occur is when the non-Western culture 
or actors are involved. Being a Westerner in the East did not qualify one as transcendently 
modern. The separation according to the nation-state is artificial. The opposition of the East 
and the West is political. The framework of modernity in historical research is intrinsically 
flawed because it tends to be too value-laden to be objective and too rhetorically powerful 
to be useful. 
1.3 Problems with Hygienic Modernity 
The reason why this research does not move beyond the term modernity is that 
despite all its indefiniteness, it is still encompassing, transformative, and conveys an 
imagined cityscape that most readers are instantly familiar with. That transformation of 
Shanghai from a muddy hub to an economic engine is indeed a large part of what this 
dissertation intends to break down, understand, and represent. For these tasks, modernity 
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is the most convenient and necessary term. This, however, does not mean that the term 
could be used without us reflecting upon its content and scope. In this section, I will outline 
the content of hydraulic modernity and explain why this new term is complementary to the 
already popular idea hygienic modernity, which was first coined in 1999. 
“Hygienic Modernity” is a concept presented in Ruth Rogaski’s award-winning 
book, and it has a major influence in the field of modern Chinese history. Rogaski uses 
modernity to refer to two aspects during the transformative century China experienced – 
from the late imperial era to the heydays of communism. The first is the evolvement of 
conceptualization of health and hygiene – how it changed from self-cultivation to science 
and disease control – with a critical turning point introducing the Japanese neologism eisei 
through the Japanese occupation in Tianjin after the Boxer Rebellion. The literal meaning 
of eisei, “defending the life,” bore a strong hint of militarism and the Foucauldian concept 
of “bio-power”, and the growing popularity of the eisei coincided with a period where 
factionalism, wars, and foreign occupation dominated China’s political stage.12 Rogaski 
then moves from hygiene as idea to hygiene as public policy in the second half of her book 
and argues that hygienic campaigns were integral to the process of nation building, not 
only because mundane practices were tied to the rise and fall of the entire nation, raising 
the awareness of collectivism among an undereducated public, but also because the hygiene 
regime needed state intervention.13 The hygiene regime thus became a testing ground for 
the ambition and effectiveness of growing state power, from the Nationalist days to the 
Communist era.14 Rogaski seems to be purposeful trying to keep the concept of modernity 
                                                 
12 Rogaski, 16. 
13 Rogaski, 302, 163-4, 
14 Rogaski, 234-236, 287-290. 
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as broad and flexible as possible. As a result, the contents and implications of the term 
change as the book proceeds. In the first half, modernity seems to be about medical theories 
and prescriptions from the West and that of scientific merit; in the second half, the 
synchronization of individual values and behavior and the will of the state is taken as a sign 
of modernity, hinting at the psychological aspect of nation-state building.  
Overall, modernity in Rogaski’s perception is an aspiration that the Chinese looked 
up to and the image of the West and Japan that Chinese elites tried to imitate. In the shadow 
was Chinese pre-modernity: the phenology-based medicine that could not stand the test of 
clinical trials and a society where people did not seem to be bothered by the absence of 
state power. The two themes are conflated under the banner of modernity, but they are 
considerably different from each other and should not be explained with the same social 
dynamics. The displacement or weakening of Traditional Chinese Medicine and the 
emergence of a centralized state hungry for power over individuals and influence among 
commoners were processes rooted in different contexts, practiced by different actors, 
unfolding in different realms, arising out of different concerns, and they set out to address 
different issues. It is questionable whether or not lumping them together with a fluid 
definition of modernity furthers our understanding in any meaningful way.  
Medical practices could evolve without fierce promotion by state power. Small 
groups of multilingual elites, including missionaries such as John Fryer, were able to 
initiate changes. It is hard to determine whether the motivation of the promotional activities 
of foreigners in China was for spreading the gospel of modern science, for proving the 
merit in their religious beliefs, for market share and profit, or for all of the above. But in 
general, this transition of pharmaceutical business took place in the realm of the market. It 
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was, in the end, people’s choice what type of medicine they trusted more. It was thus 
difficult to tell whether it was the intellectual progression of medicine and science, inspired 
by the vision of modernity, that led to acceptance and increasing consumption of Western 
medicines, or whether it was the observable effect, lowered cost, and growing availability 
of these novelties that created a generally friendly market. But one thing is for sure, without 
the growing market, the call for modernity in medicine was unsustainable. Elites’ 
interpretation of the equalization of individual health and national power did not guarantee 
a smooth translation of meanings among commoners. When transactions happened, it was 
unlikely that this vision was what individual consumers were thinking, considering the 
level of education at the time and the limited capability of state propaganda. State 
intervention, on the other hand, operated in a completely different universe. The Republic 
of China was constantly on the verge of war due to foreign aggression and internal 
factionalism. This was what made a powerful central government imperative – it was of 
practical needs. Healthy bodies were needed for soldiers. Intense mass mobilizations were 
needed to keep the public mentally and socially prepared for conflict. Hygiene campaigns 
were merely a part of this trend. They were neither the cause, nor the result of it. It is 
difficult to measure the effectiveness of campaigns such as the New Life Movement during 
the Republican years and others during the communist years because none of them was set 
up for attainable goals. Politicians cared about the act of acting, yanking their chain of 
command, tightening the grip of administration, preparing the country for the worst. Unlike 
developments in medicine, this had little to do with market forces. The purposelessness of 
many of these campaigns proves that they had little to do with hygiene either.  
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In the story Rogaski tells, the pursuit of Chinese politicians and intellectuals was to 
make China Western/Japanese. The Chinese elites adjusted institution to mirror those of 
the West and of Japan, they translated Western scientific treatises, introducing Meiji 
thoughts on hygiene, hoping changes in society and in people’s mindsets would follow as 
a result. These efforts brought far less than ideal outcomes because it was the wrong recipe 
to follow. These actors knew the goals, had the intention and ambition, but these alone 
were insufficient. Without the participation of market forces, without vibrant 
entrepreneurship and consumerism, without the presence of permanent hygienic 
infrastructures, the good will of social elites was meaningless. That is the reason the 
influence of Japan in Tianjin became the lynchpin to carry the narrative on. According to 
Rogaski’s categorization of modernity, Japan was the only actor that possessed both up-to-
date medicine and a high level of state power. Among all foreign powers, Japan’s 
occupation in north China was most forceful and institutionally intrusive. Without a robust 
market economy that met people’s need from bottom up, the transformation desired by the 
Chinese elites thus must go through the point of top-down power – Japanese occupation. 
No other authorities at the time provided executive power at a similar level and with a 
strong Japanese regime. Part of the public health agenda could be achieved through the 
mechanism of state power, such as vaccination. Vaccination was the practice that needed 
the least organic forces and social consensus. Vaccines were a purchased product from 
overseas. They could be distributed easily. The successful implementation of vaccination 
needed state power more than it needed market forces. Of all campaigns mentioned in 
Rogaski’s book, vaccination seems to be the only story of success with measurable results. 
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In short, Hygienic Modernity is more about what the Chinese intended to do rather 
than what was done. It reveals the metamorphosis of elites’ agenda over time, rather than 
showing how ordinary people came to accept the things and thoughts that were once so 
alien. Modernity according to Rogaski is so flexible that it can unite activities of a very 
different nature as one. As a result, “hygienic modernity” reconfigures economic and 
industrial development where intricate technological exchange happened between the 
Chinese and foreigners as a linear process of cultural adjustment largely on the Chinese 
side.  
1.4 Hydraulic Modernity 
Hydraulic modernity covers a different theoretical territory. To avoid the pitfalls of 
artificial construct of the nation-state as actors on the ground and of seeing knowledge as 
the invariant Western production, I would argue that modernity is not a conglomerate of 
abstract thinking, such as values, scientific beliefs, and nationalistic ideology that the state 
and individuals held in common. Rather, modernity is the tangible result of doing, without 
a set of pre-determined ideologies or political concepts. Modernity is the technocratic-
engineering system itself, the operational logic of which is not imposed upon by external 
actors such as politicians or the state; rather, it is generated from within. It is defined by 
the material and practical aspects of the technocratic-engineering system – scale, 
physicality, effectiveness, interconnection, geographical context, engineering 
sophistication, financial sustainability, and the model of subscription. These aspects alone 
are forceful enough in shaping the ways in which governments assert, create, expand, and 
visualize their power as long as they need these infrastructures. They also set the spatial 
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and economic limits for any authorities and have the political influence confined within the 
range of engineering feasibility.  
Hydraulic modernity is a form of modernity that is rooted in and is expressed 
through urban water engineering projects. The technocratic-engineering system first 
appeared in industrial cities, making hydraulic works one of the most critical components 
of modernity. The systems were also the most multi-functional in their employment, and 
they were the most critical to the survival and well-being of the populace. Therefore, 
hydraulic modernity was among the most definitive factors in the making of cityscapes, 
government, and economic patterns. In the case of Shanghai, all authorities that ruled or 
partly ruled the city – the British, the French, the Nationalists, the Japanese, and the 
Communists – shared the ambition of holding onto the entire technocratic-engineering 
system. The two Chinese governments even made attempts at social engineering that aimed 
at revolutionizing hygienic conducts and economic activities. The structure they intended 
to achieve mirrored the pattern of mechanical engineering of city water. This political 
scheme was not the outcome of a trendy ideology driven just by the development in science, 
medicine, and philosophy. Instead, it was the material and practical nature of engineering 
a system that provided the frame of reference, stimulus, and momentum for such political 
movements. The steel tower at the center that dispersed water to the immediate 
neighborhood, the rate meter that quantified each drop of consumption, the sewer system 
that simplified the manual management of nightsoil… the existence of engineering works 
convinced authorities that their administrative goals were within reach. In colonial 
Shanghai, hydraulic modernity was the blueprint intellectuals and politicians borrowed for 
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their vision of the city and the country. Engineering laid the groundwork for society, 
literally, not the other way around. 
In this dissertation, the development of hydraulic modernity is measured by two 
criteria: capacity and homogeneity. First, capacity was an indicator of the maximum output 
that engineering projects could produce in their respective missions. An example of 
capacity was the largest amount of water a waterworks could fashion in a day, or the most 
waste the centrifugal pump could remove before its first pause for maintenance. Notice that 
capacity could also be applied to non-mechanical arrangements, such as measuring how 
much water could be delivered or how much nightsoil could be shipped away manually by 
coolies every day.  
The increase in capacity associated with hydraulic modernity does not mean that 
old practices disappeared when the new technologies became available. The increase was 
materialized through addition rather than by elimination. To help a city sustain a population 
as large as possible without exhausting its environmental endowment, various methods 
could be employed. While water was pressurized for delivery to the hydrants for residents 
to collect, others were still pleased with buying water brought to their doors by the coolies. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, it could be inferred that cesspool, septic tanks, 
and water-carriage sewers coexisted next to each other. In places where vacuum wagons 
were too expensive to contract, nightsoil coolies laboriously carried out their mission of 
emptying pits and tanks. Therefore, this research does not see every advent of a new 
technology as a departure from the pre-modern past. Instead, it seeks to recover the 
technologic and economic context in which decisions were made. It seeks to understand 
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why the technocrats at the time believed that these solutions, which were often a 
combination of something old and new, were to maximize the capacity of the system. 
The second criterion for the development of hydraulic modernity is homogeneity. 
Within a technocratic-engineering system of water, there were often multiple actors 
involved in multiple procedures. For example, along the chain of traditional nightsoil 
business were residents, coolies, peasants, foremen, the contractor, and the municipal 
government, each performing a few tasks in facilitating the shipment of nightsoil. 
Residents were obligated to show up at dawn to give the commodes to coolies. Coolies 
moved the buckets of ordure to the ports and sold them to farmers. Foremen were 
responsible for keeping the nightsoil business in order within an assigned area. The 
contractor offered a handsome deposit to be granted to run the lucrative business. The 
government weighed bidders against each other to decide on the most qualified and capable 
person and spent the deposit on keeping the streets clean. Given the number of actors with 
heterogenous interest to pursue, the system faced the risk of breaking down when one or 
more actors failed to fulfill their duties. For example, a resident who failed to wake up early 
tended to dump the waste into drains or rivers. A coolie unhappy with his salary tended to 
engage blackmailing for tips. Peasants needed less fertilizer during winter, leading to a 
large amount of unwanted waste stranded near the city. Foremen fought with one another 
when frictions happened on the border of their areas. The contractor might be mired in 
trouble for running a too exploitative ring. The government, foreign or Chinese, tended to 
make decisions that favored business profit over quality of public health. In other words, 
even though it might provide an acceptable capacity of waste removal comparing to the 
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water-carriage system, especially when the population was small and the season was right, 
the manual system was considerably more susceptible to glitches and errors. 
Homogeneity of hydraulic modernity refers to the reduction of number of actors or 
procedures to safeguard the operation of a technocratic-engineering system. It could be 
achieved through technological innovation or through political restructuring. In the case of 
the nightsoil business, a system that moved wastes from the water-closet, through sewers, 
to the treatment plants would effectively circumvent the interference of interest groups in 
the middle, i.e. coolies, foremen, and the contractor, and put the waste matter of an entire 
city under government control. Or, a state-owned company could step in and get rid of the 
old labor system by putting coolies on the government payroll. The more homogeneous the 
system was, the fewer steps where malfunction could arise. From the chaotic and 
inconsistent policies during the final years of the Qing dynasty to the central planning of 
the People’s Republic of China, the perfection of hydraulic modernity was not achieved by 
indoctrinating and educating the individuals in the state’s goals. 15 It was achieved by 
eliminating heterogeneous actors in the chain of command. Under the Communists’ rule, 
such measures even included banishing private ownership of companies altogether.  
Therefore, the history this dissertation tells is not about a kind of creative 
destruction the British brought upon the Chinese. Quite to the contrary, it is about an 
endless search for the most practical, the most effective, and the most cost-efficient solution 
regardless of where the possible measures came from. The advent of water supply in 
Shanghai did not spell the death of the water coolies’ business. Nightsoil remained to be 
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collected and shipped away as fertilizers until the 1980s despite the creation of the water-
carriage system in the 1920s. As David Edgerton points out, culture has not lagged behind 
technology, rather the reverse; the idea that culture has lagged behind technology is itself 
very old and needs to be revised.16 The narrative of hydraulic modernity deals not so much 
with technology as the material expression of social meanings. Rather, this research is 
about how the technocratic-engineering system of city water was built and used by a variety 
of regimes and actors in the pursuit of greater capacity and higher levels of homogeneity. 
1.5 Source Materials 
 Various type of source materials are used for this research. The first type is the 
English-language newspapers published in Shanghai; chief among them is The North-
China Herald. The Herald was launched by British dealer Henry Shearman in 1850 five 
years after the creation of the British Concession in Shanghai. Beginning on July 1, 1864, 
The Herald became a daily newspaper. The Herald posted a record of every meeting of the 
Municipal Council. Every round of back and forth between directors was carefully 
documented. It also reported on the Land Renter’s Meetings and Ratepayers’ Meetings. 
Even the annual meeting of the Shanghai Waterworks Company could be found in its 
pages. The Herald was also a major source for the foreigners at the time to learn about 
news happening around the world, especially at home in Britain and in America.17  
 The second type of material comes from the Shanghai Municipal Archive. 
Although access to certain material was subject to government censorship, the Archive still 
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serves as a critical source for administrative data. It was particularly useful in finding the 
record related to Chinese businesses such as the Inland Waterworks Company and the 
Chapei Company of Electricity and Waterworks, as well as their correspondence with 
numerous authorities. The Archive is also the home of municipal administrative data for 
the Republic era and the Communist era, thus covering a field that was not so closely 
attended to by The North-China Herald. 
 The third type of material comes from the National Press Index Editorial at the 
Shanghai Library. This database is where popular readings during the late Qing and 
Republic era are kept –gossipy magazines, pamphlets, handouts, illustrations, story books, 
etc. The collection at the Shanghai Library thus sheds light on aspects of society that 
traditional press and municipal records do not pertain to and provides historians with an 
unfiltered reflection of public opinions at the time. 
 The fourth kind of source is local gazetteers. In the 1980s, Shanghai saw a growing 
volumes of such work produced by the Shanghai Academy of Social Science. China has a 
long tradition of compiling local gazetteers, but the ones written in the 1980s are 
specialized work on civil engineering, public works, utilities, disease control, and 
environmental protection. These gazetteers preserve firsthand knowledge of those who had 
worked in the field and tap inside information of the related municipal departments. Local 
gazetteers could be politically charged in some sections, but they are generally considered 
quality sources for empirical data, census, and business records. 
 Finally, this research uses archival primary and more recent secondary scholarly 
sources on city water. Scientific treatises published in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
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century on issues such as water supply and sewage treatment are among those sources. 
Many of them can no longer be seen as scientifically sound, but showing the flawed 
arguments is part of the efforts to recover the intellectual context in which major decisions 
were made in the past. The research of current scholars on the history of water technologies 
in other British-ruled regions will also be of interest to this dissertation.  
1.6 Chapters  
This dissertation is organized roughly in chronological order. Chapters 2-5 deal 
with the emergence of the various system of water-related technologies in colonial 
Shanghai, which began from the building of drains in the 1850s, to the expansion of water 
supplies in the 1880s, to culverting Yangkingpang Creek in the 1910s and to the 1920s 
when the water-carriage system of waste disposal was fully established in the International 
Settlement. Chapters 6-8 examines the actors and their actions in the context of city water 
engineering, such as how the British authorities used water infrastructures to expand 
territory and administration, how the Chinese merchants capitalized on their knowledge of 
water technologies in the struggle for sovereignty, and how water infrastructures provided 
the Nationalist government with a vision for, and the instrument of, effective governance. 
Chapter 9 is devoted to theoretical discussion regarding the shortcomings of the 
conventional concept of “modernity” and the advantages offered by the framework of 
hydraulic modernity. Chapter 10 is an epilogue that goes over the history of water supply 
and sewage disposal from the 1920s to the 1950s, with an emphasis on the viewpoints and 
ambitions of the Communists and the Japanese.   
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In more detailed summary, Chapter 2 (Drainage) tells the story of the early British 
attempts to build drains in their settlement at Shanghai. The British snatched a piece of 
land near Shanghai after the Opium War. For a long while, they struggled with the basic 
need for infrastructure. When it rained, water stayed. The British, out of sanitary concerns, 
needed to drain the swamp. The building of drains and gutters were at first done by 
individual property owners. The construction was so disorganized that the Municipal 
Council had to hire an engineer to craft a new general scheme, which evolved into a 
proposed reservoir, and later a scheme for waterworks, to flush the ill-designed drains. This 
was the beginning of an era when engineers became increasingly indispensable to the 
burgeoning city. 
Chapter 3 (Waterworks) discusses the creation of the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company, one of the most important subjects in this dissertation. The old measures of fire 
prevention practiced in Shanghai were problematic and made it urgent for the British to 
build a new system to provide pressurized water. Struggles unfolded over whether the 
water supply should be provided by a private or public enterprise. The Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, a private undertaking owned by shareholders rather than the local 
government, eventually won out and successfully put fire incidents in Shanghai under 
control. Yet the very nature of the Company that helped it win the contract left SWW’s 
relationship with local authorities in a delicate balance.  
 Chapter 4 (Culverting) goes over the history of the Yangkingpang Creek, a major 
river that flowed between the two foreign concessions. The Yangkingpang had been a 
major nuisance since the 1850s due to busy traffic. Although there had been cooperation 
between the two concessions in dredging the polluted river, the British and the French 
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could not agree on a final solution. The debate over the Yangkingpang revealed an uneven 
understanding of various schools of early-20th-century medical theories among foreigners 
in Shanghai. The culverting in 1914 not only ended the era of incongruous medical science 
in Shanghai, but also pushed forward the democratic process on the British side when the 
plural vote came under scrutiny after it was used repeatedly to obstruct the popular decision 
of culverting. 
 Chapter 5 (Sewage) discusses the problem of human-generated waste disposal. 
China had its own custom of handling nightsoil, which was to transport the urban waste 
back to the suburban farmland. The British authorities were never interested in displacing 
the practices more than reducing its offensiveness with regulations. The completion of the 
waterworks in 1883 posed a new challenge. The Municipal Council at first banned any use 
of water closets, but then had to lift the ban in 1914 when the buildings in Shanghai got 
taller and nicer. The Municipal Council spent another few years on evaluating the 
effectiveness of septic tanks but finally accepted the water-carriage sewer system and 
treatment plants with Active Sludge Process as the solution to the waste nuisance. By the 
end of 1920s, all parts of modern water-related technologies could be found in Shanghai. 
 Chapter 6 (Municipality) turns the focus to the inner working of the International 
Settlement of Shanghai. The profit-driven, private nature of the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company and the public concerns of the Municipal Council of the Settlement merged and 
clashed on many occasions regarding the water supply. When the Company needed to 
expand its service to the Chinese to survive, the Council helped with promoting it. The two 
sides worked together on regulating the laundry shops in the Settlement. However, every 
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time the Council revealed its intention to acquire the waterworks, the Company set up all 
sorts of legal and financial barriers to prevent it from happening.  
 Chapter 7 (Politics) takes a look at the top-down and bottom-up political activities 
of the Chinese and their connection to the Chinese water companies, including Inland, 
Chapei, and Western Waterworks. Among them, Chapei played a particularly active role 
in the Republic’s ambitious campaign of taking back control of the British roads beyond 
the Settlement because the British administrative power over these roads was founded on 
their ability to supply water over long distances. On the other hand, with the rise of Chiang 
Kai-shek and the KMT, China entered a time of nationalism property owners were 
encouraged to resist British control over water supply issues, such as rate surcharges and 
installing meter systems. 
 Chapter 8 (Change) discusses the changes water technologies brought to Shanghai. 
Water supply was critical to up-to-date disease control in Shanghai in 1932. Traditional 
Chinese Medicine had its own way of treating cholera, but the 1932 anti-cholera campaign, 
when all parts of the city united around a central authority, was a clear turning point away 
from the herbal tradition. The water closet had become prevalent in popular literature. It 
was referred to in gender awareness and in political sarcasms. Familiarity with the water 
closet became an indicator of wealth and education. Public restrooms were even used as a 
social space where uncensored sexual and political dialogue took place. Hygienic behavior 
of the Chinese underwent visible changes. 
 Chapter 9 (Conclusion) is where I go over the term modernity, as is defined by 
Anthony Giddens. Giddens offers a series of elements of modernity that can be spotted in 
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the story told by this research, although applying them in the history of the late nineteenth 
century in China takes serious tailoring of their meaning. The conventional concept of 
modernity tends to emphasize the cancellation of space, intellectuality shared across the 
globe, and the powerful nation-state as the primary actor. Hydraulic modernity, however, 
takes the notion back to its roots when the conceptualization of modernity was less about 
the three features just mentioned – but was more embedded in geographic specificities of 
locality, bodily experience of comfort and convenience, and the multitude of grassroots 
actors in place of the nation-state.  
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CHAPTER 2. DRAINAGE 
When Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough anchored his fleet on the Wusong River 
on June 13, 1842, he saw on the right bank a tower, with flanking batteries on a tongue of 
land at a bend of the river. Finding the water on one shore shoaled three feet, inundating 
about two hundred yards from the bank, the General decided to take on the other shore, 
with batteries that covered the regular landing-place near the village of Wusong. At six 
o’clock on the morning of June 16, the warships moved to the appointed stations against 
heavy and well-directed fire and managed to silence the defense in hours. By the time the 
English troops landed at noon, the Chinese force, four to five thousand strong, had fled 
Suzhou of Jiangsu Province, with another portion falling back upon the neighboring city 
of Baoshan, then disbanded.18  
The Chinese admiral Chen Huacheng 陈化成 (1776-1842) died in combat. At the 
age of seventy-six, Chen fought the invaders with every ounce of strength. He ordered 
rounds of shelling when the British ships approached. Although he kept losing artillerymen 
to the formidable foreign cannons, Chen fired dozens of rounds himself and allegedly 
inflicted damage upon two steamers. His leg was broken in the explosion, and his chest 
pierced by bullets; he died facing the ground, blood gushing out of his mouth. When the 
remaining soldiers saw the death of Chen, they cried bitterly and retreated. Wusong fell 
into the hands of the Englishmen, but her devoted defender, Admiral Chen, was soon made 
a hero. Upon his funeral, the Wusong natives poured their hearts out with odes, poetry, and 
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tears. The beloved late admiral was known for his integrity, discipline, and generosity. His 
loyalty was uncommon among the late Qing officials. The fact that he saw himself as one 
of the community was even rarer. A native folk ballad went: “Mandarins and soldiers suck 
on the marrow of the commoners, while His Excellency Chen drinks none other than the 
water of Wusong River.”19 The source of drinking water was indicative for one’s identity. 
In an agrarian society, sharing a water source was a symbol of belonging and a sign of 
commonality. Little did the British soldiers know that the water of Shanghai was tying their 
fate to that of the Chinese.  
On June 19, the British troops boarded the steamers and headed south towards 
Shanghai along the Wusong River, with one column, Madras horse artillery, left on the 
ground. Hugh Gough was cautious with his move towards Shanghai, not because of the 
reported five thousand troops defending the city, for they were no match for his firearms, 
but because of the fact that Wusong village was connected to Shanghai also by a road. He 
was concerned about the possible abduction of valuable property when the Qing troops fled 
north. By pushing from both land and water, the General was in hope of intercepting the 
retreat and keeping Shanghai the commercial town it was. To his surprise, occupation of 
Shanghai was much easier comparing to the battle three days ago. Shots were heard on the 
way, but by the time his troops landed close to the city, Lieutenant-Colonel Montgomerie 
was already in possession of the place – he entered Shanghai unopposed as the Chinese 
authorities and troops evacuated the city the previous evening.20 
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General Gough was greeted by a city abandoned by its wealthiest elite. Middle class 
and shopkeepers kept the city in order. Gough was able to induce many of the most 
respectable Chinese to take charge of large establishments, mostly pawnbrokers. “Shanghai 
appears a rich commercial city,” reported Gough, “with good walls in prefect repair, on 
which but few guns were mounted, and these all at gateways. The walls are three miles and 
a quarter in circumference; the population I understand to be from 60,000 to 70,000 souls. 
A very considerable trade is carried on at Shanghai. Its position as a commercial city 
nothing can exceed, being situated within sixteen miles up the [Wusong River], up which, 
for several miles above the city, ships of large burden can be brought with great facility.” 
Gough ripped Shanghai of its defense by destroying iron, powder and military stores and 
by embarking the four hundred and six guns they had taken along the way since the battle 
of Wusong. 21 
The battles of Opium War later moved on to Zhenjiang and Nanjing. The Celestial 
Empire had no choice but to sit at the table for negotiation. As a result, Shanghai would 
become one of the first five treaty ports opened to the world by the Treaty of Nanjing, and 
would rise to fame for her cosmopolitanism and depravities in seventy years. The river that 
ran across the city, the one that Admiral Chen drank from, the one brought the British 
troops in and connected Shanghai to the Yangtze River miles north, would later be known 
to the westerners, and to the world, as the Huangpu River. 
2.1 Geography of Shanghai 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
 34 
 Shanghai sits near the exit of the Yangtze River, the longest river in Asia. The 
Yangtze runs 3,915 miles from the Tibetan Plateau covered in snow to the cerulean East 
China Sea, then to the Pacific. Shanghai was founded on alluvial plain, which came into 
formation over centuries, and was known for her flat landscape and fertile country. Robert 
Fortune, botanical collector of the Horticultural Society of London, the one who famously 
“stole” the secret of tea from China, described Shanghai as he saw it during his trips in the 
1840s: 
“As an agricultural country, the plain of Shanghai is by far the richest I have 
seen in China, and is perhaps unequaled by any district of like extent in the 
world. It is one vast beautiful garden. The hills nearest to Shanghai are 
distant about thirty miles. These have an isolated appearance in the 
extensive plain, and are not more than two or three hundred feet high… All 
the rest of the country was a vast level plain, without a mountain or a hill to 
break the monotony of the view. The soil is a rich deep loam, and produces 
heavy crops of wheat, barley, rice, and cotton besides an immense quantity 
of vegetable crops, such as cabbages, turnips, yams, carrots, eggplants, 
cucumbers, and other articles of that kind, which are grown in the vicinity 
of the city. The land, although level, is generally much higher than the 
valleys among the hills or the plain around [Ningbo]; and consequently, it 
is well adapted to the cultivation of cotton, which is, in fact, the staple 
production of the district.”22 
The English settlers found a scenery they were familiar with – township 
neighboring a major river. “At Shanghai,” one wrote, “the river is as wide as the Thames 
at London Bridge.”23 It was the Huangpu River, the waterway connected Shanghai to the 
Yangtze, the one that brought Western invaders upon the city, but also business 
opportunities. Unlike the Pearl River in Canton, Huangpu River was deep enough for large 
vessels, which made Shanghai the perfect place for transaction, storage, and refreshing. 
Seventy-five miles west to Shanghai was Lake Tai, the third largest freshwater lake in 
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China that takes up 869 square mile with an average depth of 6.6 feet. Lake Tai was known 
for its peaceful scenery. It supplied fresh water to the surrounding cities like Suzhou and 
Wuxi. During the nineteenth century, these cities were still far more administratively 
important than Shanghai. The British in Shanghai soon found the waterway that led to 
Suzhou, and then Lake Tai. In the early days, the English called it the Wusong. Later it 
would be named after its destination, the Suzhou Creek. Suzhou Creek and Huangpu 
merged at a point one and half mile north to the old Chinese city. Together they would 
make up the boundaries of the future British settlement, with the Suzhou Creek winding 
on the north and the Huangpu defining the east. 
The actual city of Shanghai was surrounded by water flowing along the ditches 
passing under the walls. During the Ming dynasty when Japanese pirates infested the 
coastline, walls were erected and moats were opened out to defend the city against 
harassment. The design of these establishments followed the law of nature as the moats 
brought water in and out of the city following the ebb and flow of the Huangpu River. Four 
water gates, three on the east and one on the west, were constructed to control the flow of 
tide. Residents were supposed to drink the fresh water when the Huangpu grew and to 
discharge the waste in it when the river declined. However, by the time the British arrived, 
some three centuries after the walls were built, the water gates were left in poor condition. 
It could no longer be operated the way it was designed. Mud had accumulated around them 
and half-filled the several ditches. Three channels stretched from east to west. They were 
known to Chinese as pang, something inferior than river. These channels received the 
supply from the Huangpu River on the east, passing the moat under the wall, and extended 
to the western suburbs. All the channels were quite dry at low tide, yet numerous stone 
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bridges were constructed over them. The landscape of Shanghai resembled vascular 
network where there were simply too many smaller channels to be properly named. 24 
 
Figure 1 – Map of Shanghai. In the center is the walled Chinese city. To its east side 
is the Huangpu River. The small creek to the north is Yangkingpang. The British 
Concession sat north to the Yangkingpang. Source: “ART. II. Description of 
Shanghai”, The Chinese Repository, Nov 1, 1847: 529. 
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 In November 1945, the British in Shanghai and the Daotai of Shanghai, the regional 
magistrate, entered an agreement of twenty-three principles. This agreement would be later 
known as Land Regulation. These regulations served as the mini-constitution of then the 
British Concession. It laid down the price of renting the Concession, rules for property 
right, sanctions for running business, regulations for buildings, preserving the Chinese 
cemeteries, and many other fundamental regarding the bilateral relationship and the 
functioning within the Concession. The British Consul initiated the cause, but the Land 
Regulation underwent several major changes. The administrative institutions of the British 
Concession began to take shape as the time went by. The Land Renters’ Meeting, and later 
the Ratepayers’ Meeting, became the legislative sector that made policies into law. The 
Municipal Council, the governing body of the area, was born after the military conflict 
with native rebels in 1853. During the second revision of the Land Regulation, the Daotai 
was not consulted. He was presented with the rules as had been decided by the consuls of 
Britain, France, and America. His approval was not even sought for. 25 The American 
Concession joined the British Concession in 1863, thus forming the International 
Settlement. The Settlement remained to be governed primarily by the British, with only 
one American director sitting on the board of the Municipal Council. The Settlement had 
a core area that sat in between the two major creeks of Shanghai and vast northeast section 
along the Huangpu River where the American Concession used to be. 
 As for trading and currency, the British had been minting silver coinage in London 
since 1863. These coins were issued by the Hong Kong government for use in the Colony. 
They later ran a mint in Hong Kong for two years from 1866 to 1868. The British dollar 
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became popular in China because the silver coinage was easier to carry than a string of 
copper cash. In China, the British dollars were accepted at their intrinsic value as silver. 
Since in China there was no fixed currency and the value of silver ingot was determined 
by supply and demand, the British found it difficult to fix the value of their dollar. Silver 
ingot, known as “sycee” weighed in the unit of tael, was the currency in China. One sycee 
equaled fifty taels. One tael weighed 1.3 ounce of silver. The value of the British dollar 
varied in accordance with the prevailing rate of silver. For the most part of the late 
nineteenth century, one dollar equaled four taels of silver. The Chinese also used copper 
coin called cash. One cash equaled one thousandth tael of silver.26 
2.2 No Drainage in the “Model Settlement” 
 The British did not settled in the walled city and lived side by side with the Chinese. 
They rent their own land north to the old city across a river. Shanghai soon became a 
popular spot in the Far East where thousands of ships went by the coastline of China paid 
their duly visit to the burgeoning portal city before entering the Yangtze. In return, the 
British businesses in Shanghai offered them their warmest welcome. By the late 1850s, 
miles north to the muddy walled-up Chinese town, business were booming, recreations of 
European taste sprawling. A casual visitor would find here well-arranged streets, 
commodious offices and godowns, a forest of shipping in the river, and the busy hum of 
commerce in the streets. In the rear of the Settlement, a race course was built to cater to the 
affluent. For sailors, however, the options were limited. They roamed the Settlement till 
they were weary and bored. They drank a pint of cold water from the river before they 
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returned on board their ships, tired and hungry. At the time there was only one boarding 
house for the use of all the seamen in the port and a few low Chinese grogshops in the rear 
of the Settlement where drunkenness and irregularity were not uncommon. 27 
 Lack of accommodation for sailors caught people’s attention after one of such 
“casual visitors” lamented the situation and suggested that if not probably addressed the 
shortage in housing might lead to corrupted behavior among young sailors. Weakened 
moral condition of Western seamen was after all detrimental to the spread of gospel. “The 
vast realms of China”, someone wrote in The North-China Herald, a popular local English 
newspaper, “are destined to be opened up and a more enlightened civilization and a purer 
faith gradually introduced, cannot be carried on without the aid of Sailors.”28 The remedy 
lies in the establishment of one or more well-regulated licensed boarding houses under 
proper police control – a good “Sailors Home” supervised by a committee of gentlemen 
and established under Consular and Municipal sanction. The editor of The North-China 
Herald expressed their appreciation of the advice because the functioning of a maritime 
regime depended on the laboring of sailors, and since the commerce at Shanghai was bound 
to grow, it made sense to have such establishments erected. “Sailor’s Homes,” read the 
editorial comment, “are becoming very general in the large ports of England and American 
and the Model Foreign Settlement of Shanghai should not be behind in doing a good turn 
to our ‘Hearts of Oak’ to whom we are so much indebted for the possession of it.”29 The 
February 25, 1859, a public meeting was held at the Shanghai Library before noon where 
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practicability of building a “Sailor’s Home” was considered. 30  Whether the boarding 
houses were built in the end was unclear, but the term crafted by the editor left a lasting 
impact on the young treaty port.  
The term “Model Settlement” kept Shanghai moving forward. Decades later, 
Shanghai would be known to the world as the model settlement of Asia, but it was unheard 
of before 1858.31 Almost immediately, the term took on a different meaning. Originally, 
the word “model” alluded to the prospective of Shanghai becoming the beacon of Christian 
morality that shone over the backward oriental empire; but the term was quickly adopted 
by those who had long been grumbling about the undesirable sanitation in Shanghai. One 
contributor to The North-China Herald wrote: “They say this is Model Settlement. It may 
be in some points, but it has its faults.” 32 What he was complaining about was the lack of 
real drainage. 
2.3 Shanghai’s Drainage Problem 
 Built upon alluvial plain, Shanghai was endowed with the worst possible geology 
for proper drainage. Sewers that the Europeans were used to, that of Roman style – tunnel 
made of bricks, spacious enough for people to walk through – was difficult to build in 
Shanghai. For ages, Shanghai natives relied on natural waterways to drain the city. One 
describe Shanghai’s geography for drainage as following: 
“It appears that Shanghai is situated upon a flat alluvial plain surrounded by 
Creeks and Canals and isolated pieces of water, but the latter are not of a 
large extent, and the former being mostly affected by the Tide and 
sometimes leaving stagnant water for several days together, vegetable 
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substances being created in and about them with great rapidity in 
consequence of the natural fertility of the Soil, the moisture in the ground 
and the heat of the Climate. It also appears that no adequate or systematic 
provision is made for the drainage of the town, consequently stagnant and 
putrid water in a state of fermentation may naturally be expected to result 
from this latter cause.” 33 
Fear of disease-causing miasma worried the British. Malaria seemed to be always 
around the corner. According to one of the authors of The North-China Herald in 1850: 
“The frequency of fever in this community, may be in some measure attributed to the want 
of thorough drainage. Not to mention the annoyance experienced by [everyone], in the 
daily perambulation of this locality, from the bad odour of uncovered ditches and drains, it 
is well known, that the miasma carried by such sources is highly detrimental to health, so 
that due regard for its preservation should, alone, counsel the community to take early 
measures to remove the causes of, perhaps, much illness to the residents.”34 
 Starting from 1852, the Committee of Roads and Jetties, the department in charge 
of building roads and drains under the supervision of Municipal Council, took on the matter 
of poor drainage in Shanghai. In order to keep filthy ponds away from properties, the 
Committee order the property owners to elevate their compounds. The instruction triggered 
complaints, citing authorities’ indifference to the cost of such changes upon which the 
owner would bear. The Council’s reckless decision also put the policy-making process 
under question because interest parties were not involved in the creation of such policies. 
The Council and the Committee were also accused of filling up the drains that were built 
for sanitary reasons. The existing drains, however ineffective they were, remained the basic 
infrastructure to keep the compound dry. “Our Gardens,” complained by the same resident 
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calling for improved drainage in 1850, “now getting into something like order, will again 
become river mud; our pockets will be considerably lightened by the unavoidable 
expenses; and our ears, in summer, again saluted with a chorus of frog.”35 Foreign residents 
in Shanghai demanded that the Committees under the Municipal Council be held 
accountable. They believed that the Committee of Roads and Jetties should not have any 
power to expend money for sewage purposes unless a special vote by the ratepayers was 
convened at a public meeting. 36  
 In June 1852, the Committee of Roads and Jetties moved away from the ditches 
already built by individual property owners, and began to call for sewers to be built under 
all roads planned. The first public meeting was held at the British Consulate on July 3, 
1852.37 One week later, at the second public meeting for the same purpose, the subject of 
drains was fully discussed and the resolution was passed that a system of drains would be 
built in the British Settlement in Shanghai. The scheme was to be designed by British civil 
engineer Joseph Gibbs. In his letter, Gibbs suggested that houses in Shanghai were not 
supplied with water by either wells or conduits. To keep the drains in a proper state, a 
continual scour was necessary. Scouring had been his biggest concern. Gibbs warned the 
foreigners in Shanghai against large drains because such drains without continually 
scouring would be enlarged and elongated cesspools and would perpetuate disease. Gibbs 
suggested to replace the existing sluice with well-adjusted doors to enable the scouring of 
canals so that they were kept free from mud. Gibb offers two major recommendations to 
the Municipal Council. The first was drains to be formed of well-glazed pottery or other 
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hard tough durable material; the second was that the upper or commencing end of drains 
were to be placed so low as to be capable of receiving sewer water from the river during a 
part of all ordinary tides. The sluices were to regulate the inflow of water and to control 
the height. By this means these drains may be cleared from any deposit twice every twenty 
four hours.38 Unfortunately, the Council followed neither of them. 
It was not until almost two years later that the Council began to act on Gibbs’ 
scheme. In April 1855, the Council passed a resolution that a circular be sent around asking 
for information as to the position of drains in the different properties in the Settlement, 
providing knowledge for a comprehensive plan to solve the problem of drainage.39 Relying 
on cooperation from private property owners, the scheme developed at an unsatisfactory 
rate. By the end of the 1850s, streets in Shanghai were still often covered by dirt and water, 
especially during rainy seasons. “Every pedestrian in Shanghai knows how ‘horribly 
muddy’ some of our roads have been during the late rains,” one resident wrote in 1859, “In 
many places the ground is covered with water whenever there is heavy shower or continued 
rain, and there on the surface it remains stagnant, for days or weeks to evaporate and fill 
the surrounding regions with deadly miasma. This ought not so to be, either on the roads, 
or on the grounds that are enclosed of due regard is to be had to the health of the resident 
community.”40 The public’s patience was wearing thin. During the meeting of foreign land 
renters on June 16, 1860, the formation of a complete and uniform system of drainage 
topped the list of wanted public improvement. To reduce the cost of turning so many 
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existing drains into one entirety, the British had to turn to local laborers.41 In May 1861, 
the Council began an opening bidding and attracted numerous local contractors. Shanghai 
became a hotspot of construction as male laborers around flocked to the city looking for a 
job. 42 
2.4 Technical Challenges of Building Drains 
 The task of building a drainage system turned out to be a difficult one. Up to this 
point, most drains or drainage facilities were either built by property owners themselves, 
or by Chinese labors contracted by the Municipal Council. Downspout began to make their 
appearance in some of the buildings. Open ditches were conveniently built along the road 
according to the plan. But due to the flatness of land in Shanghai, building drains required 
more engineering expertise than the Council and the public had imagined. As many of the 
ditches did not have an ideal gradient, they ended up not working properly. Downspouts 
and other metal channels might be helpful for some, but they tended to injure the adjacent 
buildings by letting the storm water erode into foundations. 43 One contributor to The 
North-China Herald points out the technical difficulties of the work:  
“We are planted, and vegetate here in a marsh. Consequently there is little 
or no fall for water towards the river (the great natural sewer). We are liable 
to inundation by high tides - which would of course increase the quantity of 
surface water. Our soil is a clay, through which water percolates but slowly. 
Hence no system of simple surface drainage is of use. … When we look at 
the excessively level nature of the ground, we find there would be hardly 
sufficient slope in a long drain, say one from the head of the Mar-loo to the 
Yangkingpang, to enable even clean water to run freely over the numerous 
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inequalities which would necessarily be in its lower surface; to say nothing 
of those which would arise from an accumulation of filth.”44  
Some British even looked up to the Chinese, despite all their glaring evil and foul 
habits. They said when the British Settlement first built on this farmland, drainage was not 
a prominent problem because “the Chinese irrigators made the drainage wonderfully 
effective of the flat around” before they were recklessly filled up by the Municipal 
Council.45 Land renters were at fault too. When a piece of land was purchased, the owner 
tended to fill up the ditches without providing any substitute. That was how the drainage 
problem developed to such extent. This had been more especially the case in the western 
part of the Settlement.46 The drains built since the 1860s were epidemically dysfunctional. 
It was mentioned that along the Maloo, the main street at the time (later the famous Nanjing 
Road), gutters were choked up with putrid water. 47  Feverish epidemics loomed upon 
foreigners every summer with such poisonous odor filling the air. It was around this time 
that the foreign residents in Shanghai started to call for help from a professional civil 
engineer. “In securing the service of a Civil Engineer,” as one resident put it, “light and its 
antagonistic element, water, may both be controlled and directed by the same magic 
hand.”48 
 The Municipal Council, however, was not interested in help from outside. A Road 
Inspector was appointed by the Watch Committee to oversee the drainage project. Apart 
from that, the board members mostly relied on their own experience. With Joseph Gibbs’ 
earlier scheme at their disposal, they did not even bother discussing the candidates for a 
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possible municipal engineer (Gibbs was indeed a civil engineer, nonetheless he lived in 
Britain and had never visited Shanghai). In April 1862, the Watch Committee reported to 
the Council that Shakloo Road would be made the main street inside the Settlement. This 
road, running north-south across the entire Settlement, would have drains built under the 
surface so that the storm water was to be carried south to the Yangkingpang, north to the 
Suzhou Creek. Another two roads, Suzhou Road and Sikh Road running north-south 
parallel to the Shakloo Road, will have drains built along with them. Due to shortage of 
bricks, the Watch Committee had to planking over the wide and deep ditch as temporary 
measure until this shortage of supply was resolved. Once the three passages was built, they 
would be tidal drains, scoured by river two times a day through the flood gates at 
Yangkingpang. Tide would keep drains sufficiently free from noxious exhalations for 
purposes of health, even in hot weather.49 
 At this meeting where the operable scheme of drainage was finally rolled out, Mr. 
Smith, one of the board members, offered an ill advice to the Council. Smith was called on 
for his scheme for a section of the large barrel drain along the center of Barrie Road. He 
remarked that this drain had been working for the last six years, and that there was neither 
a deposit in it, nor an accumulation of filth where it empties into the Yangkingpang. He 
explained that each tide at its flood dilutes the drainage of the whole neighborhood and 
ebbs with the mixture down the river. He also said that it was not requisite to obtain a fall, 
but that the tide would be more effectually perform what the slight fall would fail to do.50 
This advice was in contradiction with Gibb’s early suggestions, but no one at the meeting 
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seemed to understand the peril. Smith’s advice would later become the biggest technical 
obstacle that the Council struggled with for years. 
What had been planned by the Committee would cost Tls. 132,000 altogether, 
including three types of oval drains of different sizes – 3 by 5 ft. being the large one 
employed in the Shakloo and Suzhou Roads , etc., 1.5 by 2.5 the medium used in the Sikh 
Road , etc., and all the streets from East to West.51 Relying on loans rather than higher 
taxes, the work soon began in spring. At first, it was going well. By the end of August, the 
construction of the main street, both Shakloo Road and the drain was completed. After 
testing the work with water, the inspector found the result to his satisfaction.52 It was not 
long, however, before the Council found themselves caught by a tightened finance. Dealing 
with the pond of stagnant water amidst the construction, the Road Inspector suggested 
small ditches be built to connect the new drains. To clear out puddles on land that belonged 
to no one, the Council had to hire contractors, which added to the already high cost.53 By 
the end of 1862, the Council was running out of money. The advertisement of loans for 
drainage in 1861 was not received well by the public. The response to this appeal fell far 
short of their expectations, and a sum of only Tls. 20,000 was realized. Those who invested 
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in bonds earlier in 1862 ended the agreement by the end of the year. The Council had no 
options but to sustain the project with Tls. 25,000 in the form of short term loans.54  
Status of land ownership in Shanghai added difficulties to the project. In early 1863, 
after the three main drains were finished, the Municipal Council found trouble in requesting 
property owners to connect the drains they built themselves to the municipal ones. The 
ideal procedure would be that the connection be done when the construction of main drains 
was still underway so that the road did have to be opened up again once the municipal 
drains were in place. However, the Council found no such attempt for immediate 
connection was being made in streets where public mains were being laid. The Council 
then offered a temporary discount for those who would pay for the work upfront. It would 
be their responsibility to notice the inspector and to mark the spot for connection so that 
contracted coolies could be prepared for the work during the construction. Once the grace 
period was over, property owners needed to pay in full price to connect the drains.55 
Property owners, however, could not care less about the discount since they were able to 
find their own contractors and coolies to connect the drainage at the time and price they 
deemed suitable. Meanwhile, at the Chinese village inside the British Settlement (uncertain 
which part of the Settlement this refers to, but most likely Sinza in the north on the bund 
of the Suzhou Creek), the Health Inspector were busy urging Chinese houses to adopt 
measures at once to drain their land so that nuisance like muddy puddles would not be seen 
everywhere after every rainfall.56 Yet warning was the only leverage the British authorities 
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had over native residents. They, after all, did not have to rent land from the Municipal 
Council. 
2.5 John Clark and the Scheme of Arterial System 
Three years after the first calling for a civil engineer was seen in the press, with 
technical difficulties appearing at every construction site, the Municipal Council finally 
reckoned with the fact that the drainage project could not be done without the professional 
instructions from an engineer. In the fall of 1863, a newly arrived Englishman, John Clark, 
was appointed the Municipal Engineer, the first man to hold this title. Before coming to 
Shanghai on July 25, 1863, John Clark worked for the Great Northern Railway Company 
in the Great Britain. During the last two years of his employment, he was principal 
Assistant Engineer. For some time prior to his departure from England, he was engaged in 
visiting and inspecting works, expecting them to be of use after his arrival. John Clark 
assumed municipal duty on August 18. His arrival eased the pain of the embattled 
Municipal Council, who now came to realize that “the supervision of an experienced 
Engineer would have been desirable from the period at which the recent system of drainage 
commenced.”57  
Shortly after becoming the Municipal Engineer, Clark took on the mission of 
improving the existing drainage. At a meeting in September, Clark expressed his opinion 
that the present system, with slight alteration in the bottom of the drains, would suffice for 
a more comprehensive scheme. It was then decided by the Council that all connection with 
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the main drainage must be made by the Municipal Council with the expense charged to the 
parties benefited.58 The measure was to correct the earlier policies that aims to encourage 
immediate connection with lower prices. The arrival of civil engineer seemed to have 
empowered the Municipal Council to assert authority over the drainage matter. John Clark 
was swift in correcting some of the earlier mistakes. For example, the gradient of drains. 
When drains were under construction in 1864, Clark specifically ordered the one that ran 
under the Jiangxi Road across the Chinese houses to obtain as much fall as possible. This 
move indicated a clear departure from the earlier practices that just left drains without 
proper slope as long as they could be reached by river tide.59  
While Clark was righting the wrongs, the original drainage scheme proposed by the 
retired Road Inspector was still underway, carried out by the contracted labors across the 
Settlement. Clark later began to realize that ongoing construction must come to a full stop. 
At a meeting in April 1865, Clark complained that when he was hired, he was under the 
impression that no attempt at any regular drainage had been made. But upon his arrival, he 
found that a desultory and unconnected series of drains were already laid down at vast 
expense. The existing system of “surface drainage” is a threat to public health. Clark 
proposed the abolishment of entire system: “After your predecessors had expended upon 
[the current system] sixty five thousand Taels, it became my duty to endeavor to utilize it, 
and to execute what the future requirements of the settlement imperatively demanded, in a 
similar manner… I now admit with reluctance, that after persevering trial and experimental 
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observation, I have arrived at a conclusion that the present system cannot be made to suit 
the wants of the settlement…”60 
As John Clark saw it, drainage in Shanghai was troubled by two issues. The first 
was the cost. The current system, according to his estimation, would be too expensive to 
build and maintain once the settlement and its drainage extended westwards because as the 
population grew, the Settlement would need such drains of increased breadth, entailing a 
much higher price given they were made of bricks. The beds of the creeks would grew 
higher, meaning that in order to keep an adequate fall, more houses needed to be raised 
above the sea level. Therefore, the current scheme was financially unsustainable. The 
second was Shanghai’s flatness. At the central district of the settlement, all the present 
drains are too high for the house drainage from either side, unless the road and compounds 
be considerably raised to give the required fall. The problem with insufficient fall was not 
new to the Council. They had been recommending the raise of property owners’ 
compounds for proper drainage since the 1850s. Apparently, as was demonstrated in 
Clark’s report, few of them followed through. If these drains needed to be opened and 
attended by hand to clean out the filth, than the cost of maintenance would be one-fourth 
of the original cost of them.61 
Clark then educated the Council about a system that was commonly used for towns 
situated in flat countries or below the level of the sea – the system he intended to carry out 
on his arrival before running into the patchwork that already existed – it was called the 
“Arterial system”. Two main sewers, egg-shaped, three feet three inches high, would have 
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extended from the Bund up the Ningbo and Fuzhou Roads respectively; uniting before 
passing under the Defense Creek, and afterwards terminating on the bank of the Suzhou 
Creek at a pumping station, with tanks, engines, etc. complete. Under all the other roads, 
fifteen-inch glazed stone-ware pipes (area 176.71 inches) would have been laid at the 
proper gradients; taking all drainage and sewerage from the houses to right and left, and 
discharging into the two main sewers. The main sewers could be flushed from the Huangpu 
River, and the stone-ware subsidiary sewers from the Yangkingpang, Suzhou Creek, and 
Huangpu River. Clark also suggested that the cost of this scheme would be much lower in 
that only the main sewer would be expensive to build, with bricks, labor, and the cost of 
engine. The glazed pipes can be obtained from England.62 
What John Clark brought to Shanghai was the latest development in sewer building. 
The Council wanted to have obtained his service in the 1850s, but the knowledge of how 
to build a drain in its best form was not yet developed when the British in Shanghai began 
their constructions. The design of egg-shaped drain was invented by British engineer John 
Roe. It was endorsed by sanitarian Edwin Chadwick in his 1842 Report on the Sanitary 
Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain because Chadwick was convinced 
that water went through the egg-shaped drain at a relatively high velocity. The design was 
put in use on a larger scale when Joseph Bazalgette was building the integral sewer system 
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for London in the late 1850s. Roe’s egg-shaped sewers were applied to minor branches, 
while the main sewers were circular.63 In a sense, there was no real shortcut for the crooked 
path the British in Shanghai went through in their building of drains. 
2.6 E. H. Oliver and the Scheme of Reservoir 
The meeting held in early April 1864, where John Clark provided the Council with 
the amazingly detailed drainage scheme, was supposed to leave an imprint on Shanghai’s 
layout. It sure looked so when the Land Renters’ Meeting quickly came into action at the 
end of the same month, by deciding that the British Settlement would introduce a proper 
system of drainage by means of glazed stone-ware pipes.64 However, the municipal records 
suggested otherwise: Arterial System plan was not implemented. By the spring of 1868, 
four years after Clark’s scheme was proposed and three years after his brief tenure as 
Municipal Engineer ended, no main drains were built running from west to east as was 
suggested by him; instead, seven main drains in the undermentioned roads comprised the 
backbone of Settlement’s drainage system – the Sichuan, Jiangxi, Henan, Shandong, 
Shanxi, Fujian and Hubei Road – all of which went north-south, with outlets into the 
Suzhou Creek and Yangkingpang, which was obviously extension of the old pattern prior 
to 1864.65  
During this period, the population of the International Settlement grew 
substantially. In 1853, the Settlement housed a population of five hundred, less than 0.01% 
of the total population of Shanghai. By 1865-1866, 13.4 percent of the people in Shanghai 
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dwelled in the Settlement.66 After almost two decades of planning and construction, the 
existing drains seemed no better than receptacles of filth. They had to be dug out at intervals 
and had the thicker muck carted away. One of the defects in design that resulted such 
insanitation was that the level of the drains was too high to incur the pressure of water, 
even at spring tide, river water could not reach the outlet and go through them at all. 
Besides, some earlier features designed to prevent the clogging turned out to be doing the 
opposite. The Shandong Road drain, for example, was found to be from eighteen inches to 
two feet lower at some parts than at others, a possible design following the idea of “trap 
holes”, the consequence being an accumulation of deposit in each of the lower portions.67 
The young Municipal Surveyor, E. H. Oliver, resumed the responsibility of 
supervising drainage and other public works. He told the Council in his 1868 report that 
the defective gradients of the sewers in many instances damaged their utility. Oliver agreed 
on Clark’s condemnation on the deficiency of current system, but did not support his 
predecessor’s advice about the abolishment of the entire system. That was because a 
complete do-over would cost Tls. 200,000-250,000, noting that Tls. 65,000 had already 
been spent by Clark’s predecessors. Oliver suggested that the only course to be pursued is 
to endeavor to utilize the existing drains as far as practicable. Oliver put forth a plan that 
would make use of the existing drains, particularly the seven mains, but would bring water 
from sources other than natural rivers to scour them and to keep them clean. He suggested 
the construction of a reservoir – a large one, capable of supplying sufficient water to flush 
the drains, that the defective gradients be remedied where necessary by relaying the sewers. 
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When the sewers were once laid, with a regular fall from the center of the Settlement 
towards their outlets, little difficulty would be experienced in keeping them clean by 
flushing them with water at regular intervals. The expenditure that was constantly incurred 
for cleansing would thus be saved. Oliver proposed the construction of altogether 11,200 
feet relaying drains at the cost of Tls. 28,000, about merely one-tenth of the estimated cost 
in 1864.68 
Oliver proposed subsequently to the Council the scheme of reservoir, which would 
be likely built at the head of the Jiujiang Road, connected to an 8-inch iron pipe that went 
across the center of the Settlement. At every cross street it is proposed to have plug on the 
pipe, to which a hose could be connected for conveying water to any of the wells in case 
of fire. As the reservoir would be on a higher level than any of the roads in the Settlement, 
the water would have sufficient pressure to force its way through the required length of 
hose. The size of the cistern was to be 40 x 20 x 12 ft., capable of holding 60,000 gallons 
or 12 hours supply for one fire engine. The water would not only be useful for extinguishing 
fires, but also for flushing the main sewers, nearly all of which have a fall from the Jiujiang 
Road, and for watering the streets in summer. Oliver estimated that the cost of this scheme 
– 4,500 feet of piping and other related apparatus, one 10-horse power engine and freight, 
fitting up the engine and laying the pipes, and the reservoir made of bricks – would cost 
ratepayers Tls. 9,370, not including firemen’s wages and rent of ground needed for the 
reservoir.69 
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The ideal site for reservoir, according to Oliver, needed to fulfill two requirements. 
First, it must sit at a relatively central point within the British Settlement so that each corner 
of the Settlement could be reached at a reasonable cost for infrastructure. If such spot could 
not be found, the reservoir located outside the Settlement would have to be connected to 
the central point by pipeline, which would incur higher cost and consequently a higher tax 
rate imposed upon the ratepayers. Second, the reservoir needed to be close to at least one 
source of water. This problem might seem easy to deal with at first glance because 
Shanghai was, after all, surrounded by rivers and creeks; however, it took more than just 
spotting a river nearby. It was due to the multiple usefulness of this reservoir that the source 
of water must meet more than one standard – it was to be ideally free from pollution of 
sewage and drainage, good enough for the community to drink; the volume of this source 
should be relatively independent from tidal influence so that enough water could be 
provided even when tide of the Huangpu retreated. It was for those concerns that Oliver 
picked the head of the Jiujiang Road – it was at the center of the Settlement; its adjacency 
to the Defense Creek, a relatively stagnant river that ran north-south, cutting into the east 
part of the Settlement, would not only provide the future reservoir with adequate water, but 
prevent the shortage when tide was low as most water in the Defense Creek stayed in the 
city. Unfortunately, the features that made the Defense Creek an ideal source also led it to 
its deterioration and, eventually, its demise. By October 1868, months Oliver’s proposal, 
the Watch Committee had found that the Defense Creek rapidly shallowing due to mud 
accumulation at the bottom. The Watch Committee suggested that the original site needed 
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to be abandoned in favor of one upon the Suzhou Creek, which ran along the north side of 
the Settlement. This change of site would incur additional Tls. 4,000 for pipeline.70  
  The Watch Committee saw this change as an opportunity to advance more 
infrastructural development in Shanghai. The Committee suggested to the Municipal 
Council at a meeting that the chief purposes of building a reservoir were the efficient 
flushing of the drains and the permanent supply of water to the firewells. If a reservoir was 
to be rendered really useful to the town, its consummation could only be the first step 
towards establishing regular waterworks. The Committee in fact had before them a formal 
scheme of waterworks, which was prepared at the request of the former Council. Once 
built, it would be capable of supplying six million gallons of water on a daily basis. The 
original estimated cost was £153,000 before it was reduced to Tls. 250,000, not including 
rent for land and cost of transporting more than 5,000 tons of the necessary plant. The 
original plant was located at the Defense Creek as well. Now that the reservoir needed a 
new site, the Committee intended to merge the tasks by tapping the purest water source in 
Shanghai. 71  
The locale chosen by the Committee was Longhua Pagoda, where another creek 
met the Huangpu River, more than six miles away from the Settlement. A plan of such 
scale could only come to fruition if it was able to receive consistent funding from more 
than just the current Municipal Council; if the enterprise could not be funded until the very 
end, the already incurred expenditure would render in vain. As for the ownership of the 
potential waterworks, the Watch Committee acknowledged that such works must be 
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opened for private enterprise. However, the Committee also suggested that if adopted as a 
public measure, it would be necessary for the Municipal Council to seek permission from 
the Land Renters to issue a loan of at least half a million of Taels. Due to the costly nature 
of the matter, the Council proposed to take no further action until opinions and instructions 
were made at the next Land Renters’ Meeting.72 
2.7 General Scheme of Drainage 
 In the following years, however, no reservoir of the recommended scale by the 
Watch Committee was built. It was thrown out at the Land Renters’ Meeting, thus the 
laying of drains continued. 73  E. H. Oliver was made the new Municipal Engineer, 
overseeing more egg-shaped brick drains being built on the west as the Settlement extended 
while some old ones being dug out and replaced. In their place would be the earthen drain 
pipes. The conditions were particularly bad for drains built by the native in the Chinese 
village in the north of the Settlement. The Municipal Council was informed that the present 
Chinese drains had neither brick nor stone bottoms; it was simply earth, and to utilize these 
drains would be equal in cost to making new drains. Not only that they could not be 
integrated into the system under construction, but to remove the accumulated filth from 
them by manual labor was costing the ratepayers two Taels for each ten feet. It was 
suggested that it would be better to obtain earthen drain pipes and placed them in the 
present beds.74 The Council made several attempts of acquiring such articles from local 
manufacturers, but did not have any luck. After the Watch Committee stated that the there 
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was no prospect of obtaining such supply from the neighborhood of Nanjing, the Council 
was suggested to order the pipes from Hong Kong or England. Finding those received from 
Hong Kong were inferior, the Council moved on to order a supply of drain pipes from 
England under a limit of Tls. 2,000. Meanwhile, one of the Council members offered to 
explore the possibility of making these pipes near the Poyang Lake, the lake close to 
another British Settlement in the middle Yangtze where many pottery workshops sat 
around.75  
Eventually, the order of these articles was placed, and the tender went to a company 
located at Blaydon Burn near the Tyne River at northeast England – Joseph Cowen & Co., 
one of the largest brickyard in the world known for its excellent quality. The pipes occupied 
was as large as 20 Keels of Coal, and they took months to make.76 Meanwhile, the Council 
in Shanghai passed a new regulation – Bye-Law XIV annexed to the Land Regulation, 
which required water spouts to be affixed to every house or building in, adjoining, or near 
to any street.77 
While the earthen pipes were in the making, the ratepayers was worrying about the 
bottomless cost of the drainage system. The budget of 1871 appropriated Tls. 18,400 for 
drainage items. It was considered highly necessary by some ratepayers that before going 
further, a plan should be submitted, and schedule of works be executed and proposed, 
published. E. H. Oliver, however, was not able to provide them with the scheme of drains. 
He promised to do so in October, 1870, but failed ‘owing to the want of some information’. 
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By this point, Tls. 55,000 had been wasted before John Clark came, Tls. 6909.15 spent in 
the Municipal year of 1867-68, Tls. 8213.85 in 1868-1869, and Tls. 20,606.31 in 1869-70. 
The ratepayers generally felt that before paying more, they should be able to see a furnished 
schedule. One ratepayer, unpleased to see the large part of the debt that they were now 
paying off was incurred through drainage works, questioned the Municipal Engineer’s 
devotion and qualification in this project. He suggested that in the present system, the 
resident Engineer followed out a plan not his own, and for the success of which he would 
not feel responsible. Was it not, too, this system which required an engine to be provided 
last year, to pump up water for the flushing of a portion of the drains? Since it was so 
difficult a matter to determine, it would have been wise to have spent some money in 
getting the advice of several men of experience, with reference, particularly, to the nature 
of the soil here. Another ratepayer claimed that the drains of the Sichuan Road in front of 
his property was working fine until being disturbed by the current work, which only added 
to the doubts about how the construction was carried out. The Chairman then asked for a 
show of hands for the resolution – that the Council (incoming) be requested to pledge 
themselves that no general scheme of drainage be further proceeded with, until full plans 
and schedules thereof be complete, and exhibited in the Council Room for a period of no 
less than 14 days, which shall be duly notified by advertisement so as to enable objectors 
to call a special meeting to discuss it if necessary. By a margin of sixteen to eight, the 
resolution was carried.78 
The report from the Municipal Engineer was published shortly after the meeting. 
E. H. Oliver expressed his frustration owing to the repeated changes of plans dictated by 
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the ratepayers and land renters in the past few years. He lamented the abandonment of 
reservoir on the basis of cost, and then, to avoid as much as possible the necessity of 
flushing, recommended the sewers to be made of longer size, thus necessitating a larger 
expenditure than he estimated in earlier report. He now estimated the cost of completing 
the present system of drains to be at least Tls. 54,600, which included completing main 
drains of Hubei and Sichuan Roads, as per budget, Tls. 15,000, drain-pipes and brick drains 
for all the main roads running East and West, not at present drained, about 2,640 chang, 
Tls. 39,600. Oliver suggested that before any additional drainage east and west is 
commenced, it was very important that the gradients of the main sewers should be made 
as accurate as possible. In answering skepticism rose from the previous meeting, Oliver 
was full of confidence: “I am glad to report that the relaid sewers have, up to the present 
time, answered extremely well, and I think will still further be improved if the Council 
carry out the bye-law (XIV) new regulations, making it compulsory to provide guttering 
along house eaves abutting on public thoroughfares, having down-pipes connected with 
the sewers.”79 
                                                 
79 “Municipal Council: Report of the Public Works’ Committee. Report by Municipal Engineer”, The North-
China Herald, Oct 04, 1870: 261. 
 62 
 
Figure 2 – Drainage Scheme in Shanghai by the 1870s. Source: Mou Zhen-yu, “The 
Management of the Water Environment in Shanghai Foreign Concession at the 
Early Period”, Historical Research in Anhui (Anhui Shi Xue), No. 2, 2010: 11-17.  
2.8 Drains for Chinese Properties 
With Oliver’s report reassuring ratepayers on the progress, the Municipal Council 
was empowered to advance the project with bolder moves. Starting from early 1871, the 
Council set out to fill in the so-called drains in some of the Chinese streets, which due to 
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their shabby design had become virtual cesspools.80 But the sentiment was not shared by 
all land renters, particularly by those whose properties were effected under the ongoing 
construction. Their complaints continued. They argued that the Chinese drains might be 
very bad, but still they had a certain effect, and took off the water. After the Council’s 
adjustment, water was staying in some of the houses from the back street. The Council had 
filled up the old drains without putting in new, and all the superfluous water from the 
surface of the road now ran under the houses, and remained there in a pestiferous state. 
What the Council needed to do was to leave the drainage as it was, merely to take off the 
surface ditches. But they had now succeeded in flooding large portions of land which 
before were drained.81 Later that year, the Oliver had to agree to leave the private drains 
alone in the Chinese quarters. As unpleasant as they were, there was not yet municipal 
drains to replace them.82 
The technical setback at the Chinese quarter did not stop the Municipal Council 
from attempting to assert more authority into the business of drainage. In August 1873, the 
Watch Committee suggested that Bye-Law VIII, attached to the Land Regulations, should 
be acted upon with a view to maintaining a sound sanitary condition in the Settlement, and 
to preventing as far as possible the overcrowding of Chinese houses. The Bye-Law in 
question states:  
“…it shall not be lawful to erect any house within such limits, or to rebuild 
any house in the Settlement, until a drain or drains be constructed of such 
size and materials, and at such level, and with such fall as upon the report 
of the Surveyor, made to the Council, shall appear to be necessary and 
sufficient for the proper and effective drainage of the same and its 
                                                 
80 “Summary of News”, The North-China Herald, Feb 08, 1871: 83. 
81 “Public Meetings: Rate-payers’ Meeting”, The North-China Herald, May 12, 1871: 338. 
82 “Municipal”, The North-China Herald, Sep 13, 1873: 213. 
 64 
appurtenances; such report to be made within fourteen days after notice is 
given to the said surveyor of the proposed erection or re-building.” 83  
In the recent execution of such regulation, however, the Watch Committee realized 
that many parts of this law, despite the good intentions, remained impracticable. For 
example, the Bye-Law did not state who was to give the notice of erection of new buildings 
to the Surveyor, nor did it define any penalty for not giving such notice by property owners 
themselves. It was unclear whether this duty of reporting fell upon the Police, who had by 
far never exercised their power in such manner. It also appears unreasonable to expect that 
owners of property would allow their land to be vacant and to be unprofitable until the 
Municipality had afforded them the means of drainage. The property holders would either 
to go to a great deal of expense in connecting with Municipal sewers not within one 
hundred feet of the property, or they drained into a cesspool.84 Finally, regarding the 
Chinese quarter, the order that people intending to build Chinese houses within the 
Settlement shall communicate with the Engineer, was a good one; though it would be 
frequently inoperative. In the back quarters of the Settlement, where the building of new 
Chinese houses was most likely to occur, there were no municipal drains to connect with. 
The bye-law became a dead letter.85  
Given the inoperable nature of the newly introduced Bye-law VIII, the sanitary 
condition of Chinese quarter grew alarming to the medical men in Shanghai. In May 1874, 
a letter signed by nine physicians was presented at the Council’s meeting:  
“We have come to the conclusion, after careful observation, that as long as 
natives are permitted to congregate in badly built houses crowded together 
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on low-lying and undrained land, it will be impossible to maintained in 
Shanghai those conditions which are essential to health, or to control the 
ravages of epidemic disease should it arise. We consider it our duty to 
remind the community that an epidemic, as for example of cholera, might 
at any time present itself, while there is a continual risk of smallpox and 
other diseases which we know to be constantly prevalent, breaking out with 
unusual violence.”86 
The medical men pressed on the Council the necessity of limiting the number of houses to 
be built on an assigned space, prescribing the minimum width of the streets to be 
constructed in newly erected quarters, settling a standard of construction with regard to 
sanitary needs, beneath which standard no house should be erected, and finally insisting 
upon the elevation and drainage of every plot of land prior to the beginning of building 
operations. In order to be able to act on these regulations, a raise in taxes on Chinese 
properties was proposed – the general municipal rate on rentals of native houses situated 
in the English Settlement, east of Henan Road, shall be 10 percent, instead of 8 percent, 
chargeable on native houses in the native quarters, to pay for the additional police 
supervision and sanitary inspection.87  
This suggestion was seriously debated at the following Municipal Council meeting 
in May 1874. One of the directors, Thomas W. Kingsmill, said that a somewhat similar 
resolution was brought before London three hundred years ago. The Act, as all others 
passed in defiance of the principles of political economy, proved ineffective. Kingsmill 
suggested that the foreign settlements at Shanghai at the present day were in a position 
similar to old London. Raising taxes hurt prosperity, and Shanghai was all about trade. 
Kingsmill said, “We had not come to Shanghai to reside in pleasant places; none of us 
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looked upon it as a paradise or likely to become one, but what we required were facilities 
for trade, and this was best left to the natural course of events.” The Chairman of the 
Council, Seward, suggested that the amendment could not become operative without the 
consent of the Chinese authorities. The Consuls would have to go to the Daotai and ask his 
assent, who most certainly would refuse. In face of such a refusal, nothing could be done. 
Director E. M. Smith said that with proper regulations, and proper supervision by 
inspectors of nuisances and so on, the Settlements could be kept in such a state that no one 
could find anything to grumble at. More money and energy should be applied to the Mixed 
Court and its co-operation in making Chinese conform to the regulations. If four or five 
cases were thus taken before the Mixed Court, in a very short space of time the Settlement 
would be changed. In the end, although many shared the sanitary concerns, the resolution 
on raising taxes on Chinese properties was postponed.88  
2.9 Death of E. H. Oliver 
 The attempted tax for sanitation did not succeed. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Municipal Council began considering such measures marked the outstanding progress from 
two decades ago. Back then, the Council did not have any effective authorities over 
property owners. Drains had to be built by property owners themselves. Municipal drains 
were so problematic that the trust was shaky in the authorities and in the engineer. By the 
1870s, the Municipal Council had gained substantial experience in governance and had to 
a great extent improved its image in public. This certainly could not be done without the 
help of the Municipal Engineer. 
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In the next two years, E. H. Oliver went on with the general drainage scheme, 
overseeing all ongoing construction on the west side of the British Settlement. He worked 
laboriously and never let go a chance to inspect the arising challenges. In December 1875, 
Oliver was accompanied by two directors of the Council during his inspection of a new 
line of drains arranged to prevent the encroachment of the Suzhou Creek on the north.89 
This appeared to be the last occasion when he was fulfilling his duty as Municipal Engineer. 
He died suddenly on the morning of January 16, 1876, at the age of thirty-six.90 The post 
of Municipal Engineer was not one which gave scope for a brilliant display of talent. The 
thorniest matters Oliver dealt with laid beneath the roads, yet his other achievements were 
even less known: Oliver was credited as designer of the Seamen’s Church in Shanghai, a 
neat small church of 200 people with gothic windows of colored glass; he was also known 
for his instructions on architecture and engineering amidst the building of the Chinese 
Hospital in Shanghai.91 During his ten-year tenure working for the British Settlement, 
Oliver did not join clubs of any kind in Shanghai, which was unusual for foreigners in 
Shanghai, nevertheless reasonable considering his young age. To this day, no image of his 
could be found. The cause of his unexpected death remained a mystery. 
The idea of public health surely had changed during Oliver’s tenure. When he first 
started out the Municipal Surveyor in March 1866, the Municipal Council possessed no 
resource to facilitate his job apart from the salary. He had to rent a horse and dogcart, $5 a 
day, at the generosity one of the board members. Oliver broke the shafts in an accident, 
                                                 
89 “Public Meetings: Municipal Council for the Settlements North of the Yang-king-pang”, The North-China 
Herald, Dec 09, 1875: 578. 
90 “Deaths”, The North-China Herald, Jan 20, 1876: 45. 
91 “The Seamen’s Church”, The North-China Herald, Aug 31, 1867: 227; “Public Meetings: The Chinese 
Hospital”, The North-China Herald, Apr 12, 1870: 259. 
 68 
tried repair the injured vehicle, but it broke again while being used by another gentleman. 
Oliver was accused in court of negligence because the shafts he replaced the original ones 
with were worthless. The Council had to step up to pay the $78 claimed by the defendant.92 
Ten years later, the Council was contemplating the idea of levying higher taxes for the 
purpose of proper drainage and sanitation, which was a testimony to the changing role the 
Municipal Council and how the expansion of infrastructure like imported earthen drain 
pipes, with ratepayers’ financial interest involved, made the idea of public health a common 
cause.  
2.10 Conclusion: Expertise 
When the British came to Shanghai in the middle nineteenth century, they did not 
harbor any re-determined vision that resembled the ideology of modernity. The first 
mission was to survive the alien climate and pestiferous land. The idea of building a “Model 
Settlement” surfaced from a most trivial matter, yet it was used immediately to instigate 
infrastructural building in Shanghai.  
The Municipal Council in the 1850s had little power. Property owners were 
arranging their houses and drains their own way. While having a scheme acquired from 
Britain, the Council did not have the authority to even enforce proper connection to the 
mains. This was a time when the Chinese houses had the better drains. These drains were 
made for the flat, rivery land of Shanghai and was able to carry away the impurity with the 
help of tides. 
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The appointment of Municipal Engineers John Clark and E. H. Oliver helped create 
the scheme of arterial system. But drains continued to be built upon the inconsistent manner 
due to insufficient municipal fund. Their flaws began to show in the 1860s when lack of 
gradient and accumulation of filth began to concern medical men in Shanghai. Oliver 
proposed a reservoir for the purpose of scouring the drains with plenty of water. The 
scheme was suspended due to unfavorable finance, but later evolved into one of the 
underpinnings for the conceptualization of a permanent waterworks. 
The period covered in this chapter marked an important transformation in hydraulic 
modernity. For about two decades, the British in Shanghai had been constructing drains 
based on none other than commons sense. Drains were believed to be structurally simple 
and straight-forward enough to be built by lay person. This turned out to be a serious 
mistake. Any kind of civil engineering required expertise. The Chinese were able to thrive 
on the seemingly impossible land because over time they had harnessed forces of nature 
and adapted to the uneasy geography of Shanghai. To survive on a land to which they were 
far less embedded, the British needed more than common sense to create anything of large 
scale. The fact that the Municipal Council began recruiting specialist from overseas showed 
that the city had entered a stage of development where expertise was needed before a 
system of engineering works could be conceived. Anthony Giddens points out that respect 
for technical knowledge usually exists in conjunction with a pragmatic attitude towards 
abstract systems. People made “bargain with modernity”, the nature of which was governed 
by specific admixtures of deference and skepticism, comfort and fear.93 In the story of 
drainage building in Shanghai, the respect to technical specialism among foreigners in 
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Shanghai was not a creation of spill-over of science because by the mid-nineteenth century, 
the primary education, even in Britain, was far from being institutionalized to generate the 
impact needed. The British did not come to the East with unshakable faith in technical 
expertise. It was learned through trial and error in their own practices and was inspired by 
the primitive, yet useful, infrastructures of the Chinese. 
The lesson the British learned from building a drainage system was that expertise 
was the first and foremost element in the creation of modernity. This progression seemed 
irreversible. Despite the untimely demise of E. H. Oliver, the general scheme of drainage 
continued. Within a month of Oliver’s death, the Municipal Council sought out to Charles 
Hawksley, a far better recognized hydraulic engineer based in England, who approved of 
Oliver’s early plans.94 The position of Municipal Engineer would remain vacant for some 
twenty years, during which the engineering of drainage and water supply for the city of 
Shanghai would be led by a private venture, the Shanghai Waterworks Company. 
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CHAPTER 3. WATERWORKS 
 Calls for waterworks in Shanghai first popped up in the 1860s. The mood was best 
showcased in a report in 1864, in which the Chinese were believed to be different in their 
ways of consuming water because they have existed for so many centuries without good 
water: “They that use filthy, standing, ill-colored, thick, muddy water, must needs have 
muddy, ill colored, impure and infirm bodies. And because the body works upon the mind, 
they shall have grosser understandings, dull, foggy, melancholy spirits, and he really 
subject to all manner of infirmities”. But the same could not be applied to foreigners. It 
was necessary to erect a waterworks just for the sake of foreign residents.95 
At the 14th regular meeting of the north-China branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 
in 1864, a paper titled “The Water We Drink in Shanghai” was presented by its author, 
Robson Lamprey, a physician who served the garrison in Shanghai. Lamprey said that in 
the water of Shanghai at least two kinds of impurities were easily found. First was “Nitrate 
of Lime”, derived from sewers and surface drainage. This material in small quantity was 
able to give good water unpleasant taste noticed in the river water. Second was alluvia 
matter, which gave water its muddy character. The Huangpu River contained from 20 to 
25 grains per gallon of such matter suspended in it. Lamprey suggested that the Chinese 
had developed their own methods of water consumption to prevent transmission of disease. 
They boiled water before using. For foreigners in Shanghai, Lamprey recommended the 
filtering process, during which river or lake water ran through animal charcoal, reducing 
the level of impurity and particularly the risk of fever, dysentery and cholera. He also 
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recommended collecting rain water in Shanghai. Once properly collected, filtered, 
preserved in jars, and filtered again before use, it would be far better than lake or river 
water.96  
Overall, Shanghai in 1860s was a dangerous place to live in. An extensive report in 
1869 written by physician R. Alex Jamieson shed light on the unfriendly environment. The 
“elements of disease and death” lurked in the air in the water. Fierce heat of the summer 
sun and the sudden and unexpected changes of temperature made people sick. While some 
agronomists might find recycling human-generated waste as fertilizer valuable, Jamieson 
accused the suburb of Shanghai of being “reeking fields covered from time to time with 
human excreta.” He pointed a series of chief causes of sickness: contagion, deficient water 
supply, including impurity in the supply, defective drainage, malarious air from the wet 
ground, overcrowding and defective ventilation, and prolonged retention of the dead before 
burial. Correcting them was Municipal Council’s duty and was right within its authority. 
He brought up the concept of “Public Medicine,” or “State Medicine” and wrote: “I have 
little doubt that the time will shortly arrive when the growing extent and importance of the 
settlements will induce the public to appoint a properly qualified health officer” 97 
This prediction came true. Visible change already took place when Edward 
Henderson, a British-trained medical man, was appointed the Municipal Surgeon. An 
Englishman born in 1840, Henderson received medical training at Edinburgh Academy and 
University and obtained his degree of M. D. Ed. in 1864. He came to Shanghai four years 
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later at the age of twenty-eight in hope of a decent job. Upon his arrival, he joined the 
medical firm founded by a Shanghai-based physician and became a partner of his. 
Henderson soon became an extremely popular figure among foreigners in Shanghai.98 
Although he was not yet given the title Municipal Health Officer, Henderson could often 
be seen attending the Council’s meeting when the directors were in need of consultation 
on medicine. His job as Municipal Surgeon required him to offer medical services to the 
members of the Municipal Council and troops inside the Settlement. But he was also in 
charge of the inspection of nuisances and drainage, and the sanitary condition of public 
buildings. Bearing duties of both Surgeon and Health Officer, Henderson was only paid 
for the former. In 1870, the Council added a grant of Tls. 500 under the Sanitary 
Department of the budget as a reward to his service, making Health Officer, for the first 
time, paid staff of the Municipal Council.99 
Henderson played a critical role in the establishment of water supply in Shanghai. 
Kerrie MacPherson argues that he and other physicians in Shanghai and China pioneered 
the campaign for a pure water supply.100 But the waterworks in Shanghai was more than 
just bringing potable water to urbanites for better health. When the scheme of waterworks 
was under discussion in 1869, it was expected to take on at least three tasks – to flush the 
drains so that no filth could stay, to quench the thirst of a growing foreign population, and 
to contain the ravaging fire problem inside the settlement and beyond. As this chapter will 
reveal, fire incidents might have played a bigger role in the creation of water supply. 
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3.1 British’s Shanghai Fire Brigade 
 On January 31, 1853, a fire took place in a principal street of the walled Chinese 
city of Shanghai at night. Forty houses were destroyed. This was the earliest record of 
major fire incident in Shanghai since the advent of The North-China Herald. Following the 
tragic loss of lives and property, one well-traveled Chinese living in Shanghai appealed to 
the foreigners for help. In his letter to the editors of The Herald, the native named 
“Indigena” suggested that although China had its own fire engines, aka ‘water-dragons’, 
they were of little or no service during a conflagration. He said that during his recent stay 
in England, he had the opportunity of seeing some of the fire-engines there used, the 
structure and working of which exceeded all praise. He suggested that foreigners who were 
noble-minded and generous-hearted might set up an establishment in Shanghai, with 
station house, English fire-engines, and brigade. He was hoping that the Chinese officials 
would be provoked to follow the example and be a little more prompt and liberal in 
providing means and measures for the benefit of their own people.101  
 During the late nineteenth century, Shanghai had seen the creation of a handful of 
prototype Chinese fire brigades. These brigades were often subdivision of a charity group, 
the self-organizing force within the community headed by prominent local merchants. In 
case of fire, these brigades would strike the gong loudly, gather the crowd, and lead them 
to the scene to help with the fire.102 For the foreigners in Shanghai, the misfortune of the 
native were not their primary concern. The Shanghai Municipal Council did not authorize 
the purchase of a powerful fire engine for use in the foreign settlement until early 1864 
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when their own settlement started to suffer from fire-induced property loss. It was also 
suggested that a regularly organized fire brigade be formed. With clothes adapted to enable 
them to penetrate and the axes and saws that could tear down buildings and limit the flame, 
they were expected to do a better job than their part-time predecessors, the policemen.103 
But the Council was unable to find enough people to make of a separate unit. It was then 
decided that these men of the fire brigade would perform constable duty until the occasion 
of a fire occurred.104 
A fire breaking out in the Maloo in June 1865 caused great loss of property. The 
number of foreign police available for fire, sixty of them, were too few to take charge of 
the fire engines. Superintendent of Police suggested a Volunteer Fire Brigade be 
established. At the breaking out of a fire, the members of the Volunteer Fire Brigade would 
be called by the police as far as practicable, and the Brigade would be the only one to direct 
the pulling down of houses with the necessary ropes, hooks, axes and such to arrest the 
progress of the fire. 105  But the Council could not even pay for the cost of such 
establishment. The directors intended to leave the matter of expense in the hands of the 
insurance companies, who would certainly benefit from the creation of such group. In the 
end of 1865, the Watch Committee was in contact with a host of insurance offices for the 
purpose of organizing a Fire Brigade and was expected to lay before the community a 
scheme for that purpose.106 
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 Shanghai’s first Hook and Ladder Company, was formed in the summer of 1866. 
The foreman of the Company, a former foreman of a fire brigade at New York, would be 
leading the thirty-one men registered under the Fire Department at the Municipal Council. 
The Company would be called the “Fire flies”; on assembling, the word of command would 
be “Hook it,” to which all present would reply “Axe.” The younger members of the corps 
were called lads, and the rest ladders. The major task of this Brigade was not putting out 
the fire, but to arrive at the scene promptly upon hearing the alarm and tear down buildings 
with the six axes, six hooks and ladders, and a truck with ponies that were assigned to them. 
Their duty was partly recorded in the general advice for fire safety at the time:  
Don’t man the pumps, it’s awful work my dear 
And here you get no shillings and no beer 
But while such arduous toil as this you shirk 
Carry an axe, it always looks like work 
If skippers aren’t before you, take the hose 
And don’t the least mind other people’s clothes 
Don’t try to put it out, the place is slow 
And fires are some excitement as you know107 
The French Municipal Council at the time was open to admit the British Fire Brigade, 
allowing operation within the limits of their Concession, but the Chinese authority seemed 
uninterested in such arrangement. The Company could not do duty there unless specially 
requested.108  
By October 1866, upon the arrival of the two fire engines ordered earlier by the 
Municipal Council, the Fire Brigade finally came into its full formation. It consisted of 
eighty members. The Hook and Ladder Company that came months before also became a 
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part of it. The Council purchased the engines from Augustine Heard and Oc., the biggest 
American trading company in China, and was about to receive additional supply of hose, 
leather and web from the United States. The Engine stationed in the British Settlement had 
been named “Shanghai No. 1” by the residents of this settlement, and the other “Shanghai 
No. 2” in the former American Settlement (northeast part of the International Settlement). 
On the alarm of an outbreak of fire being given, the Police on duty would summon as many 
members of the Fire Brigade. They would ring the bell in the church compound, continue 
to attend at fires, and act jointly with the Fire Brigade.109  
3.2 Shanghai’s Fire Problem 
Shanghai’s unique geography kept haunting the city. Although surrounded by 
rivers and creeks, the residents often found these waterways running dry or shallow when 
the tide was low, leaving the fire engines with little water to pump. In an earlier scheme, 
the superintendent of police once recommended that one of the Engines be placed on a boat 
and kept afloat so that it would be able to provide a stream up to two thousand feet long in 
any direction.110 In the end, the Municipal Council decided to build “firewells” across the 
Settlement where water for emergency was stored. According to this scheme, all major 
junctions within the British Settlement, where most valuable properties were located, 
would be fashioned with enough water in case of fire.111 
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The newly formed Fire Brigade soon proved its worth. On the evening of January 
10, 1867, between 9 and 10 p.m., a fire broke out in the block of houses to the west of 
Fujian Road, bordering the Yangkingpang. Both the engines and many members of the 
Hook and Ladder Company were quickly on the spot. Although at one time it seemed likely 
that the whole block of buildings between the Hubei and Fujian Roads must have gone, the 
fire got under control after consuming merely one section of the block.112 In November, 
another large fire broke out in a godown at Tung-ka-doo, a southeast port of the Chinese 
settlement. Because the building was used as a storage of oil, the stockpile continued to 
fuel the flame. The godown next to the building on fire also contained large amount of oil. 
Six Chinese fire engines were employed, directing their tiny streams at once. The British 
Fire Brigade joined in later and eventually put out the fire the next evening. The losses 
experienced by the Chinese merchants were heavy, but the Daotai acknowledged the 
services of the Fire Brigade by a letter: “His Excellency the Daotai wishes to express his 
sense of the valuable exertions of the Fire Brigade at the great fire at Tung-ka-doo. He 
considers that their efforts were displayed in such a manner as to knit faster the bonds of 
international amity.” As a token of gratitude, the Qing official sent a present of four sheep 
and two boxes of wine to the Brigade.113 
The scheme of firewells was faced with technical obstacles. Municipal Engineer E. 
H. Oliver designed them in a way that when the tide flowed into the drains, the firewells, 
connected to the main drains, would also be filled with water. However, these wells could 
not be filled properly in that only at two seasons in the year the tide were of sufficient 
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height to go through the drains. This idea had to be abandoned. Oliver then proposed to the 
Council two possible plans and the Council picked up the following one: to form in 
different parts of the Settlement seven reservoirs, each capable of containing eighteen hours 
supply of water for one fire engine’s continuous pumping. Some could be open reservoir 
and underground hardwood reservoirs to save cost, but at least four needed to be of brick, 
with a timber covering occupying the sites rented for the purpose. The total cost would be 
around Tls. 7,950. Comparing to the second scheme of a central reservoir, of which the 
estimated cost was Tls. 9,370, the first scheme was obviously more cost-effective. 114  
By 1870, the Shanghai Fire Brigade had developed to a group comprising 150 men. 
During a torch-light parade of the Brigade in the summer of 1870, the 150 foreign men 
were asked whether they would be willing to join the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, to which 
they gave a unanimous shout of assent.115 Meanwhile, in the Chinese settlement in the 
south, manpower was spent on something else. When, for example, a summer fire in 1870 
burned down a large portion of Chinese buildings at the junction of the Canton and Fujian 
Roads, a shed was erected at the site of the incident. For several days Taoist priests had 
been performing religious services to the God of fire, with a view to aver similar calamities 
in the future. Several private families also have been holding special services for the same 
purpose – to propitiate the deity who was supposed to have control of fire.116  
The International Settlement, however, was not since immune to tragic accidents. 
The year 1870 was marked by one fire after another. At some point, three fires occurred 
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within the matter of a week – three Chinese hongs were burned down in Fuzhou Road, six 
houses were burned down at the junction of the Canton and Fujian Roads, and another near 
the French Cathedral, by which some 150 houses were destroyed.117 Some of the most 
important buildings in the Settlement were also affected, including the British Consulate 
at the Bund. About midnight on the night before the Christmas Eve, 1870, the night 
watchman observed smoke issuing from the roof over the southeast corner of the British 
Consulate. The fire was caused by cinders carelessly raked from the grate of the room 
dropping on the supports of the floor. Half an hour after the first alarm, the room was 
shrouded in the accumulations of smoke. The gentlemen in the various departments of the 
Consulate who were on the spot hastened to secure property and papers that were deemed 
valuable, which included numerous important registers. Soon the smoke permeated the 
whole building. The staircase was burning. People had to escape from the verandah by a 
ladder. The Shanghai Fire Brigade were more tardy than usual in coming up. The 
companies did not arrive till the whole building was in a blaze. The fire engine, Shanghai 
No. 1 could not bring a stream on the fire. By 3:30 a.m. the fire had done its worst, burning 
down the roof of the Consulate with loud crashes.118 
After the destruction of the British Consulate, the Municipal Council became more 
interested in securing a stable water supply. The Shanghai Steam Navigation Company (S. 
S. N. Co.) imported from Yarrow and Hedley of London a steam river launch in 1872. 
During the trial trip round the harbor, the Fire Brigade was capable of throwing two streams 
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of water about 200 feet vertically.119 But in the inner part of the Settlement, foreigners had 
to depend on the firewells.  
3.3 Firewell and Its Problems 
The poor condition of the firewells were not unheard of. The first problem was its 
very limited capacity. When the Fire Brigade was in the course of extinguishing the fire at 
the Lane Crawford Co’s auction rooms and godowns in Jiangxi Road in February 1875, it 
occurred that the supply of water in the firewells were short, and that the water that was 
there was in a foul and dirty condition, containing much mud. The fire resulted in Tls. 
50,000-60,000 worth of property loss. The Council believed that the speedy exhaustion of 
the water resulted from more than the usual number of engines stationed on the scene.120 
The second problem with firewells was that their locations were not always clear 
to every firefighter. On September 10, 1879, a fire incident claimed the life of four Chinese 
residents in the Settlement, making it one of the most tragic in the early history of the 
Settlement. At the beginning, a native policeman observed smoke issuing from the upper 
windows of a ship in the Guangxi Road. Flames then burst through the doors below. The 
policeman alarmed the neighborhood and ran to the nearest police station to dispatch the 
telegraphic news. The Fire Brigades were speedily on the spot, but then they ran into 
difficulties obtaining water. While the policemen were at the back of the premise busying 
obtaining water from a well, the fire engine was trying to obtain water from the pond in the 
adjacent compound of the Polytechnic Institution. Just when the firemen were about to 
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make a hole through the bamboo fence for the hose, the watchman of the Institution told 
them there was now no well there or water to be had on the premises. Upon learning this, 
the foreman ordered the engine to be removed to the Defense Creek. The information 
provided by the watchman, however, was false, and by the time when the fire engine was 
relocated to a proper source of water, fifteen minutes had been wasted, during which the 
fire progressed greatly. The body of a man was found protruding from the debris of the 
shop in which the fire had originated. The removal of this led to the discovery of three 
other bodies, all within a few feet of each other. They were subsequently identified as 
poultry dealers, who at the time were sleeping in the room. When they rushed downstairs 
with a view to escape by the front door, they were overpowered by the smoke and flames.121 
Yet the British authorities kept building firewells larger in size. By 1879, sixty-one 
firewells could be found within the limits of the International Settlement, of which the 
depth of water varied from 7.5 to 16.9 feet.122 Some of them were so large, like the one at 
the junction of the Fuzhou and Shanxi Roads, it comprised ten chambers and took months 
to build.123 By the late 1870s, the Fire Brigade tested the India-rubber hose to accommodate 
to the growing horsepower of fire engines.124 But despite the glamorous appearance of the 
Shanghai Fire Brigade, the premium for fire insurance had not been lowered materially 
since the creation of the Brigade. The ineffectiveness was indisputably clear. 
3.4 Fire Premium Remained High 
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In 1868, two years after the Fire Brigade and the Hook and Ladder Company was 
formed, it was reported that rates of premium on fire policies were still strangely 
prohibitory. The primary source of the price hike was the Chinese houses, most of which 
were not only largely made of wood but poorly structured.125 The situation remained such 
for another two years. From 1866 to 1870, at least 436 Chinese houses within the limits of 
the Settlement had been on fire against 13 foreign ones, meaning that the larger part of the 
expenditure on the Fire Department were used for the benefits of the Chinese living inside 
the Settlement. At the time, the Fire Department could only obtain at most Tls. 2,000 a 
year, which was not sufficient if the service was to be improved and expanded. Therefore, 
it was brought up at the Municipal Council’s meeting that since the Chinese residents 
benefited disproportionately from the setup of the Fire Brigades, the Daotai should be the 
one who funded the organizations to their finest state, or helped erect iron tanks twenty or 
thirty feet from the ground, as was done in the French Concession, to give a strong head of 
water.126 The proposal was certainly unrealistic considering that Chinese living inside the 
Settlement were by no means under the jurisdiction of the Chinese magistrate. The 
Municipal Council of the International Settlement in the end had to look inside the 
community to find additional source to make up for the growing expense resulted from a 
larger Fire Brigade and their better equipment. 
The matter of who should bear the cost of fire prevention infrastructures had been 
under discussion numerous times. In 1867, months after the formation of the Shanghai Fire 
Brigade, it was pointed out at the Municipal Council’s meeting that lack of water could be 
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removed by the introduction of more firewells and the acquisition of steam fire engines, 
which could only be paid for when the revenues were satisfactory. The purchase of a steam-
powered fire engine alone would require Tls. 2,000.127 The total sum could be unfair to 
those who did not had any land or houses in Shanghai and whose tax paid to the Council 
would be employed for the protection of properties of others. The ideal situation, therefore, 
was believed to be that the sum would be covered by the contributions from the insurance 
companies at Shanghai. The chief engineer of the Fire Department, in addressing the 
money required for a new bell tower and other necessary means to fight fire, urged the 
insurance companies of Shanghai follow the example of companies in England by 
supporting the cause because it was to them that the cause of fire prevention was most 
valuable.128 For the newsmen and the general public in Shanghai, it was only reasonable 
that the insurance companies ought to pay up the cost of improvement in fire control.129  
However, the insurance companies did not share this view. Their opinion on this 
matter was best illustrated by the 1875 exchange between the Shanghai Fire Brigade and 
the Royal Insurance Company at Shanghai. For years, the Fire Brigade had suggested to 
the Company the desirability of their making some contribution. The Company, however, 
did not consider such municipal expenditure fell within the scope of an insurance 
company’s business. Seizing on the latest occurrence of fire at a Japanese office building 
in March 1875, the Brigade suggested that the service they provided that had prevented the 
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spread of fire and serious loss of insurance companies like the Royal and should receive 
more recognition. To this, the manager of the Royal Insurance Company replied:  
“We note with pleasure that the Fire Brigade rendered very efficient service 
at this fire, and we shall, of course, be glad to contribute our quota of the 
expenses of the Brigade turning out and extinguishing the same. The usual 
method of apportioning these expenses is to divide the amount pro rata over 
the insurances covering property endangered by the fire, and the value of 
the uninsured property also in risk of the fire. Any further general support 
to the Fire Brigade, it is out of our power to render, because, as we have 
previously advised you, the English companies have very determinedly set 
their faces against any such payments, as they consider donations or 
contributions of this kind do not fall within the scope of an Insurance 
Company’s business. We could not, consistently with our tariff obligations, 
act singly in the matter.”130 
What could be inferred from the statement was that a large portion of Chinese 
buildings, facing higher risk of fire, yet uninsured, should not be of the Company’s 
concern. The fact that insurance companies like the Royal were willing to offer limited 
contribution to the Fire Department could be interpreted as a demonstration of the 
limitation of private enterprises’ interest in municipal and public matters because they were 
after all profit-driven, not responsible for the greater good of the entire community; 
however, in all fairness the situation at Shanghai did pose a challenge for companies of 
such kind. Given that Chinese residence took up the majority of incidents of fire, and given 
their relatively low financial standing, unwillingness to insure their properties, and 
problematic structure and material of their buildings, it would make little economic sense 
if insurance companies paid for the expenditure of the entire Fire Department.  
Therefore, the solution to the fire problem in Shanghai laid beyond the scope of a 
self-sufficient virtuous cycle that involved property owners, insurance companies, and 
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municipal authority. To rid of the easily bottled-up firewells, Shanghai needed a network 
of water under pressure that traveled through every point of commercial interest in the 
Settlement. “When are we going to have anything done about waterworks?” asked one 
contributor of The North-China Herald as early as in 1871, “Successive Councils have 
introduced the subject, shied at it and passed it on to their successors, who are really hand 
it over with equal delicacy to their successors.”131 It looked that with defective drainage 
and uncontrolled fire, the need of building a system of water supply finally became 
pressing. 
3.5 Finding the Right Scheme 
 It had become imperative by the middle of the 1870s that Shanghai needed a 
waterworks. For more than half a decade, a project for this purpose was consistently 
obstructed due to its exorbitant cost. The issue of waterworks was first brought up in a 
Council’s meeting in 1869 when a director named Yates proposed the Council to authorize 
the construction of the works in accordance with the plan given by E. H. Oliver. Yates 
suggested that provided the cost did not exceed Tls. 65,000, the Council should be able to 
obtain the required amount by issuing debentures with rate of interest and time of payment 
that the Council found expedient. This motion stirred up waves of opposition among other 
directors. Some argued that the Council could not spare such amount on account of its 
current revenue. Even when the waterworks was built with loans, the water rate generated 
through subscription might only be able to pay for the interest, but no the capital. Others 
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argued that the proposed intake at Suzhou Creek was too easily exposed to contamination 
from the town. This would only lead to worse health of the community, not better.132  
It is worth noting that it was brought up at this meeting that European residents 
already had their own fresh water supply. It was a small establishment capable of 
fashioning water for the hundreds of foreign subscribers. The coolies employed by this 
company would make delivery to the door and collect a ticket in exchange for certain 
amount of water. The rate varied from $60 to $140 per annum depending on the amount of 
water consumed.133 Therefore, a municipal waterworks was set to be disproportionately 
beneficial to the Chinese living at the back of the Settlement. The 1869 plan of waterworks, 
although drawn at a moment when the Council was in need of large amount of water for 
flushing the drains, won no allies other than Yates. The motion was put to the meeting and 
could not find a single seconder.134 
 Although the motion was not approved, the idea of building Shanghai a waterworks 
was not entirely abandoned. Municipal Health Officer Edward Henderson was ordered to 
contact scientists in Britain as early as in the spring of 1870 in discussion of the best source 
of water provided a waterworks was to be built in the near future. Water sampled at more 
than a dozen locations were sent to London for analysis. The specialist that the Municipal 
Council sought out for help was Edward Frankland, member of the second Royal 
Commission on the Pollution of Rivers who studied London’s water quality for decades. 
Dr. Frankland is chemist to the Registrar-General, and was one of the principal witnesses 
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examined before the Royal Commission appointed to report on the London water supply 
in 1869. He was also known for making special analyses of various samples of the Thames 
water, thus was trusted to weigh on the issue of Shanghai’s water supply. The water of the 
Huangpu River and Suzhou creek was, according to Dr. Frankland, ‘tolerably soft’, 
meaning that it contained little lime salt. Water then was divided into three classes 
depending on how much organic matter they contained - reasonably safe, suspicious or 
doubtful, and dangerous. Frankland was happy to inform the Municipal Council that none 
of the samples of the Shanghai water contained chemical evidence of previous sewage 
contamination. They were all considered safe.135 
 The result of Frankland’s analysis was published in The North-China Herald on 
January 11, 1871, together with a memorandum by Henderson. Water of the Tianshan Lake 
in the west countryside was agreed by both being of best quality for household uses, 
followed by the river at Songjiang, a county at the upstream of the Huangpu River. But the 
two experts disagreed on whether the Suzhou Creek, or the Longhua Pagoda should be the 
next in line. 136 The public chimed in. Some suggested that the Suzhou Creek was too 
narrow and slow flowing that it would easily succumb to accidental pollution when the tide 
was not right. Songjiang, the upstream county along the Huangpu River, was a place where 
deflected drainage of the upper districts through the numerous creeks flowed into the 
Huangpu in that neighborhood. A supply from Songjiang would invariably carry the waste 
of upper districts into the Settlement and exposed the foreigners to the pollution. Tianshan 
Lake, on the other hand, although it was as pure as the Loch Katrine in England, it had the 
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disadvantage of being situated at too low a level to permit of the water being led down by 
its own gravitation.137 
It was then up to the Council to select the site for the waterworks based on not only 
the chemical quality of water, but more importantly, the engineering feasibility and the 
estimated cost. E. H. Oliver took occasion during his furlough in early 1872 to visit many 
of the more important waterworks in America and England. He reported to the Council that 
basing his calculation on a consumption of 1,000,000 gallons a day, he proposed three 
schemes – 1. From Fenghuang Shan located in Songjiang County; 2. From Longhua; 3. 
From the section of the Huangpu River near Yangtszepoo at the east end of the 
International Settlement. Fenghuang Shan was the farthest and Yangtszepoo was the 
nearest, so the estimated cost was Tls. 514,814, Tls. 397,529, and Tls. 295,386 respectively. 
The Council, with little surprise, favored the Yangtszepoo scheme. 138 
3.6 Municipal Scheme Failed 
The enthusiasm for the waterworks did not last long. To keep great interest in such 
an expensive project was not easy. The matter of waterworks did show up again until the 
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Meeting of Ratepayers held on May 18, 1875, two months after the office of Mitsubishi 
Bank was burned down. It was at this meeting that the Council was asked to take the 
initiative in the matter by obtaining tenders from responsible firms for carrying out the 
proposed works.139 A group of residents furnished a scheme. They were confident that it 
would succeed but only to see it firmly rejected by the Municipal Council, who affirmed 
that they and they alone should take up the water question.140 
The Municipal Council shot down a private scheme. It contracted Laidlaw and Sons 
Co., a major iron pipe manufacturer in Glasgow, Scotland, to draw a plan, including budget 
and floor plan. Laidlaw and Sons Co. might be the expert in water supply, but they were 
not immune to difficulties in operation. The senior partner of the company, who had taken 
the matter of water supply in Shanghai under his immediate charge, was prevented by 
family affliction for lengthened period from attending much to business, causing much 
delay to the work.141 The Company were also short of the local knowledge about Shanghai. 
The fact that no agent of theirs seemed to have come to Shanghai for surveying suggested 
that the plan was entirely produced based on what was sent to them, most likely early 
reports written by the Municipal Engineer. Furthermore, the devoted young engineer, 
capable public servant of the Settlement, E. H. Oliver, died in January 1876. Such major 
disruption must have added to the uneasiness of the long-distance communication.  
Therefore, when the Municipal Council finally received the letter from Laidlaw and 
Sons Company in March 1877, they were in no better position in evaluating the scheme of 
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water supply. Three months later, the entire scheme was published in The North-China 
Herald for the public to review. The works designed by Laidlaw and Sons Co. would 
consist of three settling reservoir, each 200 × 150 × 12 feet, three filters, each 160 × 80 × 
8 feet, and one pure water reservoir, 160 × 80 × 15 feet, with cast iron columns and girders 
and strong roofing, covered with earth sown with grass. Two sets of horizontal engines 
were arranged, one 15 H.P. for pumping water from river to settling reservoirs and filters; 
and one 30 H. P. condensing engine for forcing the water into the town. The water would 
be conveyed to the town through main pipes, which would be 14 inch in diameter; other 
smaller pipes varied from 12 to 8 inches in diameter. The overall estimated cost was 
£66,800, of which the pipes alone would cost £29,430.142  
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Figure 3 – Details of Laidlaw and Sons Co.’s scheme. Source: “Miscellaneous: 
Shanghai Water Supply”, The North-China Herald, Jun 16, 1877: 595. 
The scheme drawn by Laidlaw and Sons Co. was not founded on a definite location 
of water source. It was again up to the Municipal Council to decide on this matter. The 
acting Municipal Surveyor reminded the Council that it would be much more convenient 
and economical to have the works situated within the limits of the Settlement. He, after 
correcting the wrongs in the original scheme, concluded that the plan would cost less than 
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E. H. Oliver’s estimation in 1875 if the works was erected on the Suzhou Creek. The 
surveyor went on to ask for the Municipal Council’s permission of giving R. Laidlaw & 
Son all the information they asked for, concerning the population, quantity of water 
required, position of creeks, levels, etc.143 
The 1877 scheme was under public scrutiny for nine months. In March 1878, the 
Council finally sought for the approval of ratepayers to proceed with the plan. James Hart, 
one of the directors proposed the motion that the Council be empowered to accept Laidlaw 
& Sons’ tender for the construction of waterworks and to raise the requisite funds by the 
issue of debentures. Hart said it had been some time since the Council and ratepayers was 
in possession of the plans. If they obtained the water from Longhua, the cost would be Tls. 
355,000; from the Suzhou Creek, or from Yangtszepoo, Tls. 250,000. The Council 
intended to establish a compulsory water rate to fund the construction throughout. But 
difficulties might lie within the Chinese residents, from which the Chinese authority would 
most likely prohibit tax of this kind to be levied. If the Council was unable to obtain 
adequate funding, the scheme had to be undertaken by private enterprises.144  
In opposition there was Kingsmill, who condemned the vagueness of the current 
scheme. He suggested that even when compared to that plan rejected by the Council in 
1875, the papers of Laidlaw & Sons could not even be viewed as a tender – “They did not 
know sufficient about the work to be taken in hand at Shanghai, to make a tender. They did 
not know where the water was to be brought from, and all they had done was to say that 
they would do something if they could get the people of Shanghai to bind themselves to 
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them and nobody else.”145 Kingsmill contended that if the Council really wished to do 
anything with respect to waterworks, they must proceed on a very different principle. They 
should themselves know what the required, should define the point of intake, and give plans 
and specifications in detail for the whole of the works. When this was done, they could 
then place the work on the market for tenders.146 
The frustration from the ratepayers were not hard to understand. After decisively 
rejecting a possible private enterprise, the Council was utterly unprepared for the task. The 
Laidlaw and Sons’ scheme did not pay any attention to the special geographic conditions 
of Shanghai and entailed no estimation on the financial sustainability of the project. The 
Council, on the other hand, not only failed to provide in time the necessary information, 
rendering the plan useless, but was entirely ignorant in handling technical issues. For 
example, one director questioned the possibility of one of the proposals – the Longhua 
scheme as its location required the Council to build a road in connection between the 
waterworks and the Settlement. Since this road must be built beyond the limits of the 
Settlement, it would need the permission from the Chinese authorities. Considering there 
was no such likelihood, the Longhua scheme had to be abandoned. This was done after the 
Company spent lengthy analysis and estimation on the Longhua plan. As director R. W. 
Little put it, it seemed that the Council did not wish to pass the proposed motion. He 
proposed an amendment, that the word “not” be inserted between the words “be” and 
“empowered,” in the resolution, which would then read that the Council be not empowered 




to accept Laidlaw and Sons’ tender. The chairman put the amendment to the meeting, and 
it was carried. A municipal scheme of water supply was thus put on hold indefinitely.147  
3.7 Creation of the Shanghai Waterworks Company 
From the first failed attempt in 1869 to the debacle in 1879, the Municipal Council 
was unable to make any progress in supplying the Settlement with adequate water. The 
drainage system in Shanghai was still seriously defective. Buildings of the Settlement were 
still under the threat of fire. Now that the 1879 ratepayers meeting humiliatingly ended the 
Council’s full control over water supply issue, the field was again open to private 
contenders. 
In January 1880, a group living in Shanghai took the cause into their hands. After 
the 1879 ratepayers meeting, this group of gentlemen initiated a Joint Stock Company for 
the purpose of constructing a complete system of waterworks for Shanghai. The Company 
was to be based in London, England. Most shareholders would be based in Shanghai, but 
the rest in London. This scheme had some chief features. The works were to be of the most 
approved modern design and construction, and of a capacity to meet future as well as 
present requirements. The water would be taken from the Huangpu River at a point 
considerably below the Settlements and Shipping. The water supplied would be thoroughly 
filtered. Mains and service pipes would be laid down in all streets when demand exists. 
Hydrants for the purpose of extinguishing fires, and for the sanitary and other public 
requirements, would be placed in suitable positions throughout the Settlement. The water 
would be supplied under what is known as the “Constant Service System”, and under such 
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pressure as would admit of consumers having it laid on in all rooms in their houses; the 
public and private hydrants and fire plugs in case of need, at any hour of the day or night. 
Provision would be made for an ample supply of water for all Municipal and domestic 
purposes. It was also proposed, as part of the constitution of the company, to give the 
Municipality the right to purchase the Company’s works, or to lease the water supply, on 
equitable terms to be mutually agreed upon.148 
This group of gentlemen, to whom Shanghai and China would owe its first 
waterworks, came from all stripes of society. Alexander McLeod, the president of the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company, was born in the Isle of Skye, Scotland. He had a humble 
background. When in London during his early years, he received his education at the 
charity Bluecoat School at Christ’s Hospital in London. In 1864 the young Alexander 
joined the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. At the age of twenty, he came to 
Hong Kong. Two years later, he joined Gibb, Livingston & Co. in Hong Kong(仁记). 
McLeod worked his way to the partner of the Company in 1872, and then proceeded to 
Shanghai. When the Shanghai Waterworks Company was commenced, McLeod was under 
forty whilst becoming the president. 149  Robert Ernest Wainewright was a preeminent 
lawyer in Shanghai. Contrary to McLeod, Wainewright was born to a wealthy family. His 
father was a member of a firm of solicitors. A Londoner and a lawyer by birth, Wainewright 
was educated at the North London School, and at University College, London. He came to 
Shanghai in the early 1870s to join a law firm where his great endowments as a lawyer put 
him in the front rank. Wainewright had been involved in many of the high-profile cases 
                                                 
148 “Public Meetings: Municipal Council”, The North-China Herald, Feb 05, 1880: 97. 
149 “Obituary: Mc. Alex. McLeod”, The North-China Herald, Jan 06, 1912: 18. 
 97 
since his arrival at Shanghai. By the 1880s, he was thought the nominal leader of the 
Shanghai bar. Inside of what would later become of the Shanghai Waterworks Company, 
Wainewright would operate as the legal adviser who drafted contracts and represented the 
Company in various legal cases. 150 Robert Mackenzie was a good friend of Wainewright. 
He was the head of the firm of Mackenzie and Co. in Shanghai. Mackenzie, born in 
Forfarshire, Scotland in 1836, was first taught the business of a farmer, and then accepted 
the stewardship of an estate in Ireland. While he was working there, his brother James 
Mackenzie, who had already established the company in Shanghai, asked Robert to join 
him. He came to Shanghai in 1861 at the age of twenty-five, working for Mackenzie & 
Co., who were doing a large business for the British Navy as ship-chandlers, auctioneers, 
and contractors. Tall, bright, young, handsome, Mackenzie partook in many social 
activities in Shanghai and became a popular figure in the Rowing Club, the Race Club, the 
Fire Brigade, and later the Municipal Council, where his connections were further 
solidified.151 S. D. Webb was an American businessman who had become member of the 
Municipal Council since 1874. After returning to the U. S., Webb would later become 
president of American Asiatic Association in New York.152 H. R. Hearn was director of 
North-China Insurance Company since 1880, also a socialite among the Shanghailanders 
– he was member of Shanghai Racquet Club, Shanghai Cricket Club, and later Shanghai 
General Chamber of Commerce.153 
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The Provisional Committee of Shanghai Waterworks presented their proposal to 
the Municipal Council in February 1880.154 The scheme was in competition with other 
three. By the middle of June 1880, all four were shown to the public in The North-China 
Herald. With the exception of McLeod’s plan, all were drawn on the supposition that the 
ratepayers would authorize the Council to provide a water supply for the Settlement.155 
These three schemes, although disagreed on daily consumption and water rate, shared two 
things in common. First, all of them agreed that the water intake was to be at the Huangpu 
River. The section below the harbor, in other words north to the settlement, was relatively 
free of chemical substance and the suspended matters could be easily rid of with various 
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kinds of filters. It seemed that after ten years of back and forth the contention about the 
best source of water finally came to an end. The second thing was that none of the three 
plans was financially self-sustainable on its own. The extremely high upfront cost could 
only be paid off in the long run with more municipal revenue. Thus, this economic factor 
alone was able to put McLeod’s scheme ahead of the game. The capital of their proposed 
company had been fixed at £100,000 (Tls. 400,000), in share of £20 each, and will be 
offered for subscription in Shanghai and in London. The 8% interest on capital, the sinking 
fund for maintenance and renewal, and the working expense in general added up to Tls. 
65140; meanwhile the income – 2.75% on the rental of foreign houses, 3.66% on the rental 
of Chinese houses, and the amount paid by the Council for municipal purposes like water 
roads, flushing drains and extinguishing fire, plus some extra income from the French 
Concession – stood at Tls. 65,902.50.156 Therefore, not only was the initiation of the 
proposed waterworks did not ask a penny of public money, but it was set to sustain itself 
if the market was properly covered. The Municipal Council, unlike in other occasions, 
needed to pay for the water of municipal usages. But this surely was not considered 
outrageous by most foreigners who believed that government too was obliged by the rules 
of market.157 
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 The scheme drawn by the Provisional Committee of the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company, after five weeks of intense negotiation with the members of the Municipal 
Council, had prevailed by the end of summer. On December 16, 1880, the shares of the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company were allotted for the first time. As was planned, 5,000 
shares were issued, each worth £20.158 The Provisional Committee of the company was 
disbanded in January 1881, and the formal contract between the Council and the now 
Shanghai Waterworks Company was signed shortly after, stipulating that the waterworks 
must be finished in five years.159 
 On February 28, 1881, the Shanghai Waterworks Company held its first general 
meeting. The meeting did not take place in Shanghai, but at the new Exchange Buildings, 
George Yard, Lombard Street, in the city of London. It was reported at the meeting that 
the application for shares amounted to something considerably beyond the number to be 
allotted, and the large number of shares applied for were by the native bankers and 
merchants of Shanghai. When McLeod had the Company arranged in London, it was in 
fear of the insufficient fund came out of Shanghai alone; as it turned out the interest in the 
undertaking in China was unexpectedly great. Progress had been steadily made in Shanghai 
as the land necessary for the waterworks and the water tower had been secured. Contracts 
for the necessary pipes, pumping engines, and boilers had been completed and the first 
shipment of such would be made early March. But the technologically challenging portion 
of work would have to wait till the arrival of the chief engineer J. W. Hart.160 On June 24, 
                                                 
158 “Stock Quote 4 – No Title”, The North-China Herald, Dec 16, 1880: 575. 
159 Shanghai Municipal Archive, Minutes of SMC, Vol. 7, 391; “Public Meeting: Municipal Council”, The 
North-China Herald, Jan 27, 1881: 70. 
160  “Clippings”, The North-China Herald, Apr 08, 1881: 361; “The Shanghai Waterworks Company 
(Limited)”, The North-China Herald, Apr 19, 1881: 376. 
 101 
1881, J. W. Hart arrived at Shanghai by the mail steamer Yangtse. Two months later, he 
began his work, with roads opened up and pipes laid, all being done under the authorization 
of the Municipal Surveyor.161 The waterworks in Shanghai was finally on its course of 
realization. 
3.8 Building the Water Supply 
 What the Shanghai Waterworks Company had in plan was a conglomeration of 
state-of-the-art British engineering technologies. Laidlaw and Son Co., despite losing the 
bid for the general scheme of water supply earlier, managed to win the contract for pipes. 
They would be supplying about 27,000 pipes for Shanghai, from a diameter of 20 inches 
for the mains, to the smaller sizes for the service pipes, weighing altogether over 5,000 
tons. The two pairs of horizontal compound condensing engines would be provided by 
Hathorn, Davey and Co., a British manufacturer of steam engine based in Sun Foundry, 
Leeds. Each pair of these engines was designed to raise 75,000 gallons of water per hour 
to the height of 100 feet, into the water tower in the Settlement. One of these engines was 
to be of Davey’s patent automatic class, by which speed varied with the amount of water 
consumed by means of an automatic valve. The same class of engine was working at some 
waterworks in England, like in Croydon, a town south to London, and abroad, and had 
given the highest satisfaction everywhere. The other was of the rotative class, the high and 
low pressure cylinders being placed on separate bed plates, with the flywheel between 
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them. There were to be three large Cornish boilers, with centrifugal engine, and other 
accessory machinery.162  
 
Figure 4 – Engine Room 1 at the Yangtszepoo waterworks. The three large Cornish 
boilers can be seen inside the room. Courtesy of the Author at Shanghai Technology 
Museum of Water Supply 
The real challenge, however, was dealing with the Municipal Council. For one 
thing, all construction done within the Settlement needed to be sanctioned by the Council. 
Shanghai Waterworks Company’s effort of laying pipes in the Settlement put the already 
fragile drainage system under stress. During the process, numerous complaints were filed 
by foreign banks to the Municipal Council. The Council in some occasions had to intervene 
and mediate plans for compensation.163 But struggling with the technical flaws amidst the 
construction was nothing compared to a complete overhaul demanded by no other than the 
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Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Edward Henderson. By April 1882, Henderson suggested to 
the Council that the unusual humidity and heat in Shanghai during summer would give rise 
to the tropical fever when the infestation of germ was hard to subdue. The filth hidden in 
the soil of Shanghai could be disturbed by the ongoing pipe-laying and these matters would 
spread into the air through evaporation, breathed in by foreigners, causing various kinds of 
diseases. Therefore, Henderson urged the Council to revoke the permit given to the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company so that before the weather turned warm in the following 
months, the constructions across the Settlement would be held in abeyance. Henderson’s 
advice received support from the medical community in Shanghai, many of whom signed 
on the letter presented to the Council. By the end of April, the Council informed the 
Company that the extension of permit would not be granted to them based on concerns 
about public health, and the current permit granted to the Company would expire after May 
5. No work involving opening the ground should continue after this date.164 
                                                 




Figure 5 – Chinese coolies laying water pipes. A hydrant can be seen on the left side. 
Source: Wan, 1910. 
 This proposed overhaul, which could last for up to four months, irritated the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company. When the Company entered the contract with the 
Municipal Council, the former guaranteed the completion of a general system of water 
supply for Shanghai in five years or they would be liable to a penalty of £5,000, enforced 
by the Council. If what Henderson proposed became customary, the Company would 
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expect to lose one-fourth of its time and became more likely to be fined. At the meeting of 
the Municipal Council in the following month, the Company complained that the action of 
the Council, if persisted in, would subject the Company to a considerable loss and that it 
would be necessary to modify Clauses 2 and 16 in the Deed of Covenant, to provide for an 
extension of time for the completion of the Works.165 The Company suggested that the risk 
to public health of the work was blown out of proportion by the Health Officer. Some of 
the ditches for laying pipes were merely two and half feet deep, hence only the surface of 
the road was dug up. Even hazardous elements existed, the effect of them would be very 
limited.166 The demands met the Council’s downright refusal, who claimed that it retained 
absolute right to hold back the permit and to follow Henderson’s instruction, which was 
backed by almost the entire medical community.167 
Interestingly, some of the residents were in strong support of uninterrupted work 
and they saw the current situation of the Shanghai Waterworks Company as “a very hardly 
used body of men”. Among these voices were the residents on the Bubbling Well Road, 
the road which extended beyond the limits of the Settlement yet under the authority of the 
Municipal Council. The Bubbling Well Road, unlike the roads inside the Settlement, was 
relatively new. The demand for pure water for domestic purposes were desperate. Many 
residents saw the agricultural pursuits of the peasantry near them, particularly the usage of 
human waste, contributive to the likelihood of the outbreak of fever. Comparing to that, 
what the Waterworks Company planned to do would in no way materially increase the risk 
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for health. Rather, spending the summer without fresh water supply would pose some real 
danger to the neighborhood.168  
Henderson, however, insisted that the health of the community would suffer, should 
the Council permitted the Waterworks Company to continue to lay their pipes in the streets 
of the Settlement. At the Municipal Council’s meeting in June, Henderson elaborated on 
the reasons why such activities should stop during summer: 
The principle of avoiding, as far as possible, any disturbance of the soil in 
malarious districts is well established, and is, at the present date, usually 
acted on by sanitary authorities. The diseases which are supposed in such 
localities to originate on the soil, as a result probably of a fermentative 
process in the animal and vegetable matter which it contains, are the various 
forms of malarial fevers, diarrhea, dysentery, and it is said, cholera. Last 
year, with an unusually high general death rate, dysentery assumed in 
Shanghai, in one or two instances an uncommon malignancy of type; 
malarial fevers were prevalent, especially among those living in the 
outskirts of the Settlement; out of a total of 111 deaths from all causes, 
thirteen deaths were registered to cholera. We have literally no winter, and 
there is reason to fear that such a complete absence of cold weather may 
render the hot season now before us unusually trying - in other words - may 
favor the development of those forms of disease which are usually 
encountered in Shanghai during the summer months.169 
Same medical thinking was apparently shared by the doctors at England. The Reuters 
reported that in Queen of the British Empire’s most recent visit to Riviera, southeast of the 
England, it was urged by the local authorities that all work that entailed the disturbance of 
soil should cease: “Dr. Budd, who knew more about fever than any living member of our 
profession, used to lay the greatest stress on the danger of disturbing old accumulations of 
possibly infected soil. It is like the turning up of ground wherein the seeds of noxious 
growth lie inert because they chance to be buried too deep to germinate. When brought 
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near the surface they burst into activity. It would be well… to refrain from disturbance of 
any kind in the neighborhood where Her Majesty proposes to sojourn.”170 The doctor 
mentioned in the piece was William Budd. Budd’s epidemiologist views remained 
influential after his death in 1880. 
 Henderson won. By the middle of June, the Waterworks Company had halted all 
ongoing works. They were also ordered to seal the excavated road for the time being. As 
the Company had trouble summoning a labor force that could meet the urgent need, they 
turned to Council for help, and expressed the willingness to pay for the cost incurred by 
these works.171 The water supply in Shanghai was subsequently built in such fashion with 
all excavation being avoided during summer time. Against all odds, the Company managed 
to finish the project before the agreed deadline. 
3.9 The Opening of Shanghai Waterworks 
On a summery Friday afternoon in 1883, the city of Shanghai was graced by 
arguably the most powerful Qing official at the time, Li Hongzhang. General Secretary Li 
was the Viceroy of Zhili, the province surrounding Beijing, the Empire’s capital, the most 
high-profile reformer during the Self-Strengthening Movement, and the founder and de 
facto commander-in-chief of the Qing navy, the Beiyang Fleet. Li Hongzhang was invited 
by American Consul General to pay a visit to some of the principal foreign industries of 
Shanghai. The tour started at half past three. The General Secretary had his first trial of a 
European open carriage. The party first drove to Russell & Co.’s silk filature where Li was 
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told that five hundred and fifty women were employed, besides a large number of men. Li 
asked the foreigners whether the Chinese learned their duties quickly and inquired about 
the form of contract under which the foreign employees were brought about. He visited the 
reeling room, godowns and engine rooms.172 
 After a brief refreshment, Li Hongzhang left for the waterworks of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company. Here Li was greeted by McLeod, the president of the Company, 
Wainewright, their legal adviser, and J. W. Hart, the Engineer-in-Chief. Li was of great 
spirit when he was invited to come out on to the bridge where the water was turned on to 
the cylinder, then to the water tank. Li had fully explained to him the course which the 
water took, the system of filtration, and the manner in which the water was pumped up to 
the tank. Li examined the machinery closely and passed a great deal of intelligent criticism 
on all he saw. Just as he admittedly confessed that a European open carriage was far 
superior to customary Chinese way of conveyance, Li Hongzhang was highly gratified at 
his visit at the waterworks. He openly expressed a wish to have similar enterprise started 
at Tianjin. Upon leaving, he tendered his good wishes for the success of the enterprise and 
his hope that the promoters would reap a rich harvest and that the Company, under his 
auspices, would take advantage of this establishment to extend their operation into other 
Chinese cities.173 
Before the coming of Chinese General Secretary, the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company had a perfectly successful trial of the pumping engines on May 23 already and 
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filled the tower situated at the heart of the International Settlement.174 Neither did General 
Secretary know that he was not the one who launched the waterworks into full-scale 
function. Days after his visit, an overflow from the mains was caused by the test scouring, 
and flooded part of Jiangxi Road where the Company’s headquarter was located, so the 
Company had to postpone the service.175 It was not until the next month, August 1883, that 
the Shanghai Waterworks Company began supplying water to the Settlement. By that time, 
numerous applications had been made to have water laid on to private houses, and the 
Company had been executing these orders as quickly as possible. As for the laying of water 
pipes throughout the Settlement, it began even earlier. But on a symbolic level, with the 
erection of steel water tower on the Jiangxi Road, the symbiosis of foreign technology and 
Chinese authority persisted.  
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Figure 6 – Water Tower. Source: Sun, 1909. 
The stagnant number of subscribers worried the shareholders of the Company after 
its completion, but for the Municipal Council, selling water to the Chinese was not of their 
interest. Possessing a general system of water supply served two municipal purposes: to 
extinguish fire and to flush the drains. The existence of waterworks had proven its value 
shortly after its establishment. On the morning of July 26, 1883, a fire broke out in a large 
ship at the southwest corner of the junction of Henan and Canton Roads at 3:30 p.m. Fifteen 
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minutes later, volumes of flame were issuing from every window of the corner ship. This, 
weeks after Li Hongzhang set the waterworks in motion, was the first fire at which the 
Waterworks Company’s appliances have been brought into use. At first, the hydrants were 
used to keep the firewells supplied with water; later on, when the hoses were fastened 
directly to hydrants, the water was turned into its full force. The supply of water throughout 
was abundant, and the stream was as high and as far as they could with a manual engine.176  
Since the beginning of 1883, the cost of fire insurance started to decline. The North 
British & Mercantile Insurance Company had been lowering their charges for insurance 
against fire ever since May 1881, two months after the first general meeting of the Shanghai 
Waterworks’ Company was held in London. “There can be no doubt” stated the agent of 
the insurance company in The North-China Herald, “that the reduction in rates authorized 
by the Home Fire Offices in the following May was largely brought about by the prospect 
of shortly seeing in active work the excellent system of water supply which now exists.”177 
As for scouring the drains, it was established by the medical community before the 
inception of waterworks that when the foreigners in Shanghai were able, through the 
projected waterworks, more thoroughly to flush the sewers, the occurrence of what was 
known as the “Shanghai Fever” would be reduced.178 The Municipal Council purchased 
water from the Shanghai Waterworks Company on a monthly base, and a large quantity 
was regularly used in scouring the drains. 
3.10 Conclusion: Globalization 
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Drainage problem alone was not enough reason to build a costly waterworks. 
Neither was concern over clean potable water for a small population. Nevertheless, the idea 
of public health was gaining ground in Shanghai. The Municipal Council created the 
salaried position of Health Officer for the task, but it was not until the fire incidents became 
so common that the Council proceeded with the waterworks scheme. 
The British authorities formed a fire brigade in 1866. To extinguish the blaze, fire 
engines pumped water from firewells that were situated at key locales across the 
Settlement, holding barely enough water to use. Firewells were cheap and easy to build, 
but premium of fire insurance remained outrageous. After consulting with chemists in 
London, the Municipal Council chose Yangtszepoo – of abundant clean water and well 
within the Council’s jurisdiction – as the intake and the site for the waterworks. 
From 1875 to 1879, the Municipal Council tried to create a municipal scheme of 
water supply but failed. The contracted Scotland-based pipe manufacturer had too little 
local knowledge to create a practical plan. A group of Shanghai-based foreign 
entrepreneurs thus took over and formed the Shanghai Waterworks Company in 1881. By 
1883, the waterworks and the water tower had become the monument of Western power, 
commanding great amount of attention and aspiration from the officialdom and the 
business world of China. Upon the completion of waterworks, hydrants were erected in 
replacement for firewells and drains began to be frequently scoured.  
The creation of water supply in Shanghai was an example of globalization, but not 
the intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way 
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that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.179 
The conventional wisdom suggests that under globalization local events were connected to 
other localities at an indefinite distance away via an abstract system of information and 
symbols. This is best represented by the mechanism of global finance in which, for 
example, a debit crisis in Greek is able to hit the Eurozone and the US dollar holders in 
China will receive an instant boom in value. However, engineering technologies work in a 
context from which it cannot be disembedded.  
As is shown by the case of water supply in Shanghai, local transformation must 
take place within the realm of locality. Laidlaw and Son Co. lost the bid because they failed 
to send their agents to Shanghai to obtain firsthand knowledge of geography. The Shanghai 
Waterworks Company managed to erect the establishment because they recruited an 
engineer from Britain and J. W. Hart, the Engineer-in-chief, who spent time in Shanghai, 
studying local environmental conditions before rolling out his final scheme. Engineers 
operated in a different universe of knowledge from those that could be described as an 
abstract system. They were trained to see the specificities of the local, rather than 
overruling them with general principles. The fact that the Shanghai Waterworks Co.’s 
establishments were a mixture of foreign industrial installments can be interpreted as the 
diffusion of technologies. But these machineries themselves were not at the heart of the 
“knowledge”. Machineries were imported and transplanted as black-boxed expertise to 
perform designated tasks – engines were used to take in water from the river, pipes to 
convey water, hydrants to let out water when needed. They were components of engineer’s 
vision. The process of globalization, therefore, had two parallel lines of development. On 
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the one hand, there was the shipment of hardware, which lent the superficial imagery of 
invariability to the Western technologies; on the other hand, there was engineering 
expertise, embodied by traveling specialists whose primary mission was to mold their 
knowledge in accordance with local landscape.  
Water supply and drainage of better quality created their own problems. One of 
them was the increasing amount of domestic waste water. The two rivers that surrounded 
the Settlement were supposed to absorb all of the impurity, just as all engineers in Shanghai 
had envisioned. But Mother Nature had her limit. The creeks themselves were poised to 
become the miasmatic nuisance, the source of all diseases. The Yangkingpang Creek, the 
vital river that separated the British and French concession, was going to be the site where 
answers to this next set of engineering and medical questions would be found. It will be 
revealed that not only was engineering expertise grounded in local geographic reality, even 
scientific understandings were subject to local variation. 
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CHAPTER 4. CULVERT 
 There was a time when the British occupied only the furthest east strip of land in 
Shanghai and anything west of the Sichuan Road was “in the country”. During the later 
months of 1853, a Chinese force was stationed in Shanghai, headquartering at Sinza, the 
village to the northwest of the Settlement. The camps stretched from the present race course 
(or Recreation Ground) to the west side of the city. The troops, under the command of the 
Governor of Jiangsu, was in Shanghai for the purpose of retaking the city from the Triad 
rebels.180 
 The Chinese soldiers committed various cases of inroads into the foreign 
settlement. To stop the inroads, two young British officials suggested cutting “a broad 
ditch” to keep the Chinese men at bay. The governor was for a while in agreement with the 
foreigners on paying the cost. But eventually, nothing was done. The ditch that was chosen 
to be made broader was known as the Defence Creek. It was a waterway that ran from the 
Suzhou Creek in the north and the Yangkingpang in the South, making it a natural barrier 
for the British to repel pushes from the west. Tension kept mounting. On April 3, a Western 
man and a woman were attacked while taking a stroll, leading to foreigners armed with 
rifle rushing to the scene. The Imperial soldiers of Qing and the foreigners exchanged many 
shots. On the next day, the Consuls demanded that the Imperial troops withdraw and in the 
afternoon the naval landing parties and the Volunteer Corps were assembled. A force of 
two hundred strong, consisting of most of the able-bodied men of the Settlement, along 
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with a party of American marines and sailors from the U.S.S. Plymouth and a score of 
sailors from the merchant ships, formed a formidable force. But the Chinese troops did not 
back down. At the junction of the Defence Creek and the Yangkingpang, the Imperial 
troops came under attack of a joint force as the Triad Rebels and the foreigners found their 
common enemy. Drums of the rebels grew louder, and the American cannon bombarded 
the trenches on the other side of the Defence Creek. The Qing troops retreated westward 
when they lost their last ditch of defense. The casualty on the foreign side was slight. Two 
Volunteers and three from the American and British naval parties were killed.181 
 The foreigners came to realize that treaties alone could not safeguard their interest 
in the Chinese ports. Military establishments were needed. In 1861, the British finished 
deepening the Defence Creek and used the mud to fortify the west border of the Settlement. 
The work was for protecting the foreign community from the growing threat of Taiping 
Rebellion. In August 1860, when a rebel force approached the Settlement, a fire emblazed 
a village in the west. The fight continued for two days. The British was able to fend off the 
attack with their 13 in. shells, which caught the primitively equipped rebels by surprise. 
Another attack was planned some eighteen months later, but it was never carried out due 
to heavy snowfall for over two days. The foreigners took the possibility of invasion quite 
seriously. Fourteen redoubts were built across the Settlement at various locations. The 
junction of the Yangkingpang and the Defence Creek was one of the most armed spots.182 
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Figure 7 – Defence Creek and the Yangkingpang. Defence Creek was the river that 
ran north-south next to the Recreation Ground, and the Yangkingpang was north to 
the walled Chinese city in the south. Source: “Settlements Shanghai 1912”, 
maps.mychinastart.com. 
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 The Taiping Rebellion petered out, but the two creeks remained critical to the 
Settlement. They were God-given fortification against invasion. They were good for 
business. Via them a large amount of commodities were transported to the inner Settlement  
– coal, rice, wood, brick, hay, oil, tiles, etc. They were also the arterial passage for the 
transport of nightsoil. That is why even though the International Settlement had outgrown 
its natural limits, even though the two creeks had become offensively dirty, the authorities 
still hesitated to fill them in. Culverting the two creeks, particularly of the Yangkingpang, 
was more than just about ridding of the stench.  
4.1 Shanties of the Yangkingpang 
 For foreigners in Shanghai, the Yangkingpang had always been a nuisance. For one 
thing, it was a place where you found dead bodies floating.183 But the real eyesore was the 
Chinese shanties erected on the northern shore of the Yangkingpang. Before the Triad take-
over, this piece of land was designated exclusively to the British. The riot in 1853, however, 
rendered this rule pointless as thousands of Chinese refugees sought for asylum in the 
foreign quarter. Many of them never left. While some living in that region were of better-
off gentry class, most, as how the British saw it, took up residence there for no good 
purpose. The young Settlement saw a rapid increase in the number of opium shops and 
gambling houses. The land upon which these establishments and houses stood were 
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supposed to be for foreign use only, but the proprietors, eyeing on the large number of 
Chinese tenants, refused to sell the houses to foreigners. One upset foreigner argued: “The 
protection of our flag is now enjoyed by a set of the lowest characters, for the furtherance 
of their own vile purposes, and setting aside all other considerations, the proximity of such 
a class of men is highly objectionable and may lead to something unpleasant.”184  
 
Figure 8 – Shanties on the bund of a river. Source: Shanghais shehui kexue yuan, 4. 
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Nevertheless, the British authority formally gave up all exclusive claim to the 
locality for its own subjects in 1854. With the new order came freer commerce and seismic 
shift of urban landscape. Chinese godowns emerged in all directions. Chinese residents 
always managed to find shelter in the tiniest unoccupied strip of land. The high walls 
around the Chinese godowns and the perforated screens around the dwellings were 
believed to be intended to diminish the salubrity of the air foreigners breathe. Along the 
Yangkingpang, small Chinese dwellings were increasing to an extraordinary degree. Built 
within them were shops and market, which brought in traffic on the bund of the Creek. The 
situation in Shanghai reminded some foreigners of major European cities, but not in a good 
way, where “the palaces of the great and the hovels of the beggar jostled each other.”185  
Oddly, the Municipal Council did not do much to contain the problematic Chinese 
dwellings until the Chinese government requested help from them in clearing out the bund 
of the Yangkingpang. Chinese officials could not care less about the complaints from 
Westerners. Rather, they were concerned about the markets along the creek, which 
provided the Triad rebels who unlawfully occupied the city with goods and money. To 
eradicate the rebels, they needed to remove these shanties first. An unlikely political 
alliance was formed. The British authorities started tearing down the shantytown and the 
Chinese government supported it. In his proclamation to his fellow compatriot, the district 
magistrate Sun affirmed that the ground on the north side of the Creek was for the British 
to rent. Chinese were not allowed to build any more houses thereon. The English Consul 
apprehended the idea of hasted removal of people. A ten-day grace period was announced, 
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with January 18, 1855 being the final day before foreign officers sending people to do the 
job.186 
The proclamation from the Magistrate did not sit well with the Yangkingpang 
residents. Distress spread widely among the property owners. On January 13, five days 
before the proclaimed deadline, a man who was bound to lose $72 bargain money hanged 
himself. Two days later, another man hanged himself in his own house near the 
Yangkingpang Bridge. Resentment against foreigners started brewing. Condemnation was 
seen in posters: 
The uncivilized western barbarians, who in form resemble birds and beasts, 
and in disposition are like serpents and scorpions, were originally the 
monkeys and apes of foreign countries. They have now become the wolves 
of the central land, and clutch and devour everything that lies in their way... 
They dig up the graves and destroy people’s houses, so that the manes of 
the departed can with difficulty rest in peace, while women and children are 
cruelly exposed in the open roads, wailing in the most distressing manner. 
The white bones of the dead are broken in pieces and scattered about, the 
very sight of which pains the mind, and the mere mention of it makes the 
teeth gnash with rage. Now we able-bodied men are numerous as the trees 
of the forest… unite in the attempt to subdue these barbarians, plant in 
concert a righteous standard, and acting speedily accomplish a meritorious 
work, by reducing [their] houses to ashes, exterminating their whole race, 
and utterly destroying these hundreds and thousands of monkeys, at which 
time only the anger of all hearts will be appeased.187   
In spite of the inflammatory outcry, the work of removal met little resistance. By 
early February 1855, nearly all houses were removed.188 The British figured out a way to 
compensate the hurt and infuriated Chinese property owners. As soon as the order was 
restored after the flight of rebels, the whole land was sold for the benefit of those who had 
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been or were to be ejected. A sum of $40,000, obtained after the public auction at the 
British Consulate for the selling of these riverbank land, would be given to the owners of 
the land before the coerced removal. The Municipal Council asked the Chinese authorities 
to have the fund properly distributed.189  
4.2 First Attempt for Culverting, 1866 
The situation along the Yangkingpang remained problematic. Chinese tenants kept 
coming back. With them they brought their habits of water consumption. They drank from 
the Yangkingpang, did their washing there too. The Yangkingpang was being gradually 
filled up with rubbish that interfered with its navigation. 190 Foreigners contributed to 
pollution by building drains and dumping unwanted water in the Yangkingpang. 191 
Chinese peasants rode their nightsoil boats on the Yangkingpang. Leakage and unlawful 
dumping took place inevitably. The latrines and urinals that Municipal Council built on the 
bund of to reduce filth within the Chinese neighborhood certainly did not help with the 
cleanliness of water. 
In view of such rapid deterioration, the Municipal Council of the English Settlement 
reached out to the French Council on the other side of the Yangkingpang. Both authorities 
understood that a scheme was needed to reduce pollutants from all sides. The British 
proposed to bund the side of the Creek with granite, cleansing and deepening it, replacing 
flimsy bridges with iron ones. 192  They suggested levying dues on traffic through the 
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Yangkingpang to meet the expenses attendant on cleansing the channel. Less rubbish meant 
better traffic. Better traffic led to more revenue. That way, the cleansing of Yangkingpang 
could pay for itself. With some adjustment about exempting those who had already been 
charged for being next to and using public jetties, the resolution was passed, and was sent 
to the secretary of the French Council for their consent.193 
The French Council, however, could not afford the suggested improvement. The 
French Council was only able to open a credit for Tls. 2,500-3,000 for this project, whereas 
the proposed iron bridge at the mouth to the Yangkingpang alone would cost Tls. 11,000. 
The French also believed that dredging the Yangkingpang might not sound like a difficult 
task, but various kinds of cost could round up to a large sum. For example, in order to keep 
the water out of the channel during dredging, sluices would need to be installed at each end 
of the channel. They needed to import dredging machines from Europe at high cost. In 
addition, constant agitation of the mud and deposits of all kinds that formed the bed of the 
channel must give rise to noxious vapors which would doubtless produce severe maladies 
that would spread over the settlements. The French Council, instead, proposed to close up 
the Yangkingpang through its whole length, making a broad colleting drain through the 
center as far as practicable. The traffic of boats would come to an end, ending the nuisance 
created by nightsoil boats. Tramways with carts drawn by horses would substitute for the 
current transport of goods. Unlike the boats on the Yangkingpang that could only go with 
the tidal flow, the ground transportation could be carried out at every hour of the day, thus 
at less expense than by boat.194  
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The British community did not find the French vision acceptable. Some feared that 
a busy waterway like the Yangkingpang was irreplaceable; others suggested the cost of the 
proposed scheme would be somewhat about half a million of Taels, too hefty for 
ratepayers. One suggested that such drastic change to the landscape might be “most unjust 
towards the Chinese, on whose soil it must not be forgotten that we are living”. Others 
were more concerned that the loss of the water frontage would result in lowered property 
value. Not to mention that it remained uncertain whether a project of such scale, with the 
employment of perhaps hundreds of Chinese laborers, would be permitted by the Chinese 
authorities. 195  Given that the French authority saw culverting as the only worthy 
investment and rejected any other expedient measures to reduce the impurities, the proposal 
was shelved.196 
Three years later, in the early summer of 1866, the two authorities came together 
to dredge the troubled creek. Even the Chinese government joined in. The weather was 
getting warm, fear of poisonous vapor was growing, but the work proceeded in spite of 
protests from the medical community.197 About Tls. 10,000 was expected to be spent on 
cleansing and repairing bridges. The two councils agreed to split the cost of Tls. 5,000, and 
the Daotai agreed to contribute the remainder. In the end, the work was wrapped up in two 
months at a cost of Tls. 9,000, of which sum the Daotai contributed Tls. 4,000.198 It is 
worth mentioning that since March 1866 the British Council was already imposing 
wharfage dues upon cargos transported via the Yangkingpang. By August, the Council was 
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able to collect Tls. 1180.33 from a number of shipping companies.199 This sum certainly 
made the decision of dredging easier on the British side. In addition, local coolies were 
employed rather than European dredging machines. They had plenty of time to do the 
excavation when the tide was low. 
4.3 More Water, Less Nightsoil 
The nuisance of Yangkingpang was not only caused by the people, but also by tide 
and the sun. The reason why it gave off strong odor all the time was because for hours the 
riverbed was exposed. Filth rose up with the steam when heated by the sun. Therefore, 
physician R. Alex Jamieson proposed a permanent solution to the Yangkingpang problem. 
He suggested there to be locks at the upper and lower outlets of the creek to keep it full of 
water at all times. If it were kept full of water and emptied only at intervals, drainage matter 
would be unable to accumulate on the bed and be subjected to the action of the sun or the 
heated atmosphere.200 But Jamieson’s plan jeopardized the Yangkingpang’s role as the 
arterial waterway for trade. Blocking the Yangkingpang with any permanent 
establishments would almost certainly tank the business of a great number of Chinese 
boatmen. The backlash would have Chinese authorities involved, which was the last thing 
either Settlement ever wanted. The scheme, therefore, was never attempted.  
But the idea of securing more tidal water for the Yangkingpang was generally 
accepted. In the spring of 1878, the French Council suggested to the British Council that 
the dam now dividing the Yangkingpang and the Defence Creek be removed. It was 
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instructed by French physician Dr. Galle, who believed that the increased current of the 
Yangkingpang would prevent the accumulation of refuse matter coming from the 
slaughterhouses. Considering that the Defence Creek was entirely under the jurisdiction of 
the British Council, it was extraordinary that they agreed to remove the dam for the sake 
of common good.201 However, in November 1875 and in January 1877, the British made 
another two attempts to dredge the Yangkingpang with the French cooperation, all declined 
by the French Council based on financial concerns.202  
Another obvious hazard was the nightsoil boats staying on the Yangkingpang, 
which became increasingly bothersome in the 1880s. Nightsoil boats traveled with the tide. 
During the flow, they stranded in the Yangkingpang. Furthermore, peasants tended to 
collect till the tanks were full before sailing back. These factors resulted in countless 
nightsoil boats dwelling inside the Settlement for an upsettingly long period. One of the 
most affected business was real estate. T.W. Kingsmill, member of the Council and 
prominent naturalist and sinologist, argued that his land lots at the junction of Zhejiang and 
Songjiang Roads (aka. the northern bund of the Yangkingpang) was losing value because 
the Council allowed nightsoil boats to anchor right in front of his properties. Kingsmill 
complained that it was getting harder to obtain fair rentals on a land of which the price was 
diminishing.203 In March 1886, the Council decided to instruct the Police that all coolies 
carrying nightsoil along the streets of the Settlement in buckets which were not provided 
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with proper covers, were to be arrested and taken to the Mixed Court.204 But the nuisance 
did not end with this. In July 1886, the Council received letter from the Imperial Chinese 
Telegraph Administration, complaining of the offensive smell from the native boats which 
collected in the Yangkingpang between the Zhejiang and Fujian Road bridges, requesting 
the Council to order the boats to remove to some other part of the Creek. The chairman of 
the Council suggested that this was a problem that every Council struggled with in the last 
ten years. The Council informed the Chinese Telegraph Administration that the Inspector 
would be instructed to do all in his power to abate the nuisance. But nightsoil must be 
removed from the Settlement, it was impossible to prohibit loading in the Creek.205 
 
Figure 9 – The busy entrance of the Yangkingpang. Source: French, 51. 
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In the spring of 1887, the dredging of the Yangkingpang was successfully executed 
under the supervision of the French Council, although there had been complaints about the 
length of time the mud taken out was allowed to remain upon the banks before it was carted 
away. The dredging was completed at the cost of Tls. 3231.50. The British Council happily 
sent out a check to cover half of the expense.206 Dredging in 1887 helped clean the riverbed 
of the Yangkingpang and deepened the creek by four feet, but the problem of nightsoil 
boats continued. It was not that the Municipal Council did not tried. In 1889, it was 
suggested that arrangements needed to be made for having the nightsoil removed from the 
Settlement in hermetically closed buckets placed in drays, instead of having it put into 
boats on the Yangkingpang and Suzhou Creeks.207 But for the Municipal Council, the 
matter of nightsoil boats was largely out of their range of control. The Council could only 
enforce the rules and regulations on the coolies employed by the Municipal contractors, 
providing them with proper covers, but many employed their own contractors to remove 
the nightsoil. The Council had no jurisdiction over these laborers. Moreover, the 
Yangkingpang, the creek not the bunds, was after all a Chinese waterway, where 
technically the two concessions could only enforce rules with the Daotai’s consent.208 
4.4 Another Attempt for Culverting 
 Shanghai towards the end of the nineteenth century was experiencing a rapid 
growth. The urban scheme of the early settlers could no longer sustain the booming 
population. One of the thorniest issues was the shortage of space for decent roads. It was 
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then suggested that the Municipal Council should covert some of the rivers - once 
important, but now of little use – into long, culverted boulevard. The Defence Creek, for 
example, was once strategically crucial to the very existence of the Settlement, especially 
during the 1850s, but at present the creek silted up continuously, forming black, 
unpleasantly smelling mud that required constant sanitary attention. It seemed that the 
community could make better use of them if the creeks were turned into roads.209  
 It was under such circumstance that the question of filling in the Yangkingpang 
returned to the center stage after three decades. In 1897, solutions were being discussed by 
the British and the French Councils. The French revived the idea of filling in the Creek. 
The British Municipal Council, unlike their predecessor thirty years ago, showed certain 
interest in the proposal. By the end of 1898, the Council in principle adopted the idea of 
culverting the Yangkingpang. In May 1899, the Municipal Engineers of the two settlements 
were in the course of ironing out a feasible plan. The British Council proceeded with great 
cautiousness. The Council requested a report about the condition of Yangkingpang from 
its medical advisor. By the end of 1900, people were saying that the Council was preparing 
its 1901 budget, in which the conversion of the Yangkingpang into a closed sewer was 
expected to be included, with an estimated cost of Tls. 100,000. Accordingly, the French 
Council would bear half the weight. The planned culvert would be so large that the tidal 
flow would still be able to reach the creeks at the backs of the settlements, and the 
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unpleasantness of stranded nightsoil boats under people’s windows would be gone for 
good.210 
 This proposed scheme, however, was not passed by the Municipal Council because 
of the divided opinions on this matter. Some believed that culverting the Yangkingpang 
would not make it healthier. There were sixty-eight, and on the south side fifty-three 
surface drains that poured into the creek. Tidal water was necessary in dealing with this 
amount of waste water. Once the Yangkingpang was culverted, the volume of tidal water 
that was able to flush the creek would diminish, leading to worse accumulation of 
pestiferous substance. Others argued that the Yangkingpang furnished an extensive 
wharfage line, a convenient and secluded line for the landing of garbage and nightsoil. 
Culverting the creek would cause disturbance to the current arrangement of waste matters 
and bring the nuisance to the Bund, the finest architectural façade of Shanghai.211 It was 
thus suggested that the best improvement was to transform the riverbed of the 
Yangkingpang from mud to concrete. This way, not only would the settlements retain one 
of the most crucial waterways, but it would take fewer dredging to maintain its 
cleanliness.212 
 Those who supported culverting had their own reasoning. First, they did not believe 
culverting would impair the value of the Yangkingpang as a sewer. They argued that the 
volume of water that flowed up and down the Yangkingpang was not determined by the 
width of the creek. A moderate reduction of the section of the Yangkingpang would cause 
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a swifter current through it and therefore a better scour. Second, the traffic on the 
Yangkingpang was often congested and delayed because boats could only enter and leave 
the Yangkingpang when the tidal flow was proper. On a wide new boulevard, goods could 
be carried uninterruptedly. Third, repeated dredging had always been a threat to the health 
of the community. Medical community had complained in the past about the unseasonable 
excavations. In 1900, the French Council pointed out in their letter to the Municipal 
Council that the mud lying around unattended for weeks could inflict serious damage to 
the neighborhood near the bund before they were carted away. Frequent dredging also 
affected the current bunding on the British side of the creek. Therefore, it was concluded 
that the Yangkingpang was an insanitary open sewer. It consumed too much money and 
did not yield enough health benefits. With a slightly more spending the Settlement would 
be able to have a healthy, new, fine, wide boulevard.213 The cost was going to be hefty, yet 
affordable, and could hardly be better spent.214  
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Figure 10 – Yangkingpang. On the north bund, shown on the right, the British 
authorities had built embankment. The French did not. This is another reason why 
the British opposed to culverting. Source: “Shanghai zhi jinxi”, 1942. 
4.5 Fear of Sewer Gas 
The full-fledged debate over the matter of culverting the Yangkingpang took place 
at the Ratepayers’ Meeting in March 1902, where various concerns – economic, practical, 
medical – crossed paths. R. W. Little proposed the resolution to turn the polluted creek into 
a road and to have the expenses shared with the French Council. Little suggested that this 
would not only relieve foreigners of the sewer, but give them what they really wanted, a 
wide and excellent road that led into the Western district where the International Settlement 
had expanded into. Little estimated that the cost would add up to something like Tls. 
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200,000, of which the French was prepared to pay half. But it was certain that if the 
Yangkingpang was culverted, the land on either side will be very much increased in value. 
Therefore, it was fair that the owners of that land should be called upon to contribute to the 
expense. Little pointed out that this resolution was not instructing the Council to do the 
work, but merely drawing their attention to it, as an undertaking that was considered 
desirable by the ratepayers.215 
 The opposition came from many sides. First was sanitation and the fear of disease-
inducing gas in the drains. W. V. Drummond suggested that one of the most dangerous 
things they could do in a place like Shanghai was to have covered drains. The fewer the 
better. “Almost every drain,” said Drummond, “great or small, in a place like this, where 
there is practically no fall, is more or less a trap for typhoid fever and other diseases; and 
therefore I cannot but think that the utmost caution should be observed before we take any 
step towards covering this great, big, open sewer, the Yangkingpang Creek.” 216 Others 
pointed out that in a former report written by the Municipal Health Officer, it was said that 
it was better to have an open sewer than a closed one.217 
The fear of sewer gas seemed to be a deep-seated belief. Physicians of the 19th 
century divided into two groups, contagionists and anticontagionists. Contagionists argued 
that epidemic was transmitted by contact with a diseased person, while anticontagionists 
believed that the contact was not necessary. Foul air alone would cause infection. 
Putrefying substances, from feces to sewer muck, were believed to accelerate the spread of 
                                                 




disease. 218  In his book Sewer-Gas and Its Dangers, Chicago-based scientist George 
Preston Brown argued that chemists in London had studied the composition of sewer gas. 
They confirmed the existence of hydrogen sulfide and methane , etc., but the organism 
arising from decomposition of animal and vegetable matters remained to be identified. 
These substances were almost certainly harmful to human health. In this work, Brown 
argued that most toxins could be removed by bowel movement, but toxins of cholera and 
typhoid could survive the digestion. They would then enter the sewer with refuse and 
spread toxins to other places: 
“Many leading scientists discredit the germ theory of the spread of disease. 
They believe that chemical gases generated by disease in one organism may 
produce a ferment in another, and the result is the reproduction of the same 
disease… In many diseases the poison of the malady seems to be eliminated 
largely by the bowels, and the fecal discharges evolve gases, which are 
capable of propagating disease. This is particularly true of typhoid fever, 
and does not fail in the case of cholera…”219  
Brown’s book was written in 1881, a time when germ theory was just on the rise and a 
hybrid was created amidst the displacement of miasma theory. Nevertheless, the fear of 
sewer gas was not without its “scientific” explanations. The reasoning of Brown was 
obviously mirrored in many of the concerns the British in Shanghai had in the 1900s. 
Back to the problem of Yangkingpang, there was also the question of cost. The last 
dredging took in 1886-1887 cost the two Councils Tls. 3,331. An item like this spreading 
over fourteen years was small, comparing to the Tls. 200,000 estimated for culverting the 
Yangkingpang. Moreover, although a profit may come to owners of land on the creek in 
ten or twelve years, the lost would be immediate. This impact would particularly affect the 
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Chinese houses upstream because the value of them depended mainly on the presence of 
the Yangkingpang itself. It was a place used on either side as a wharf, and cargo of all sorts 
and kinds was taken there by boats from other parts of the Settlement and from up-country 
and discharged.220 
Before the final voting, Little pointed out that the British Health Officer might favor 
open sewers, but the Health Officers of the French Municipality were decidedly of opinion 
that the Creek was a great menace to the health of the French Settlement. Their opinions 
were worthy of respect too. Little emphasized that this resolution had no binding power. It 
was a gesture intended to encourage Council to take actions. He concluded: “What we 
really intended by the Resolution was to get an expression of opinion from the ratepayers 
that this work should be done and so strengthen the hands of the Council by saying they 
should do it…. I really do not think it is necessary for me to say anything more.” The 
resolution was then put to the vote. As the “ayes” appeared to have it, the motion was 
carried.221 
R. W. Little won the vote, but the Municipal Council did not have to take the 
resolution seriously. The sum for the purpose of culverting the Yangkingpang was not even 
appropriated in the 1902 budget. The Councils explained in the report that they regard this 
as an improvement only postponed; its advantages were so obvious that it was certain to 
be made before long.222At the Municipal Council’s meeting, which took place weeks after 
the Ratepayers’ Meeting, the issue of Yangkingpang was hardly mentioned. It was stated 
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that the creek was being “cleansed”. For months since the meetings earlier in 1902, the 
Yangkingpang was being dredged, deepened, with hundreds of tons of mud carted away 
by the Chinese coolies, and the bunding of the Yangkingpang continued as well. 223 In 
addressing the French, the Municipal Council said that “while a certain proportion of those 
interested regard the matter favorably there is no probability of any considerable financial 
contribution being made by them towards the cost of the undertaking”.224  
The matter was shelved for more than a year until it was brought back in the early 
summer of 1903. On June 18, 1903, a letter was sent to the Municipal Council, reiterating 
the importance and value of having the Yangkingpang culverted. The letter came from 
George McBain, a wealthy merchant who happened to live in a residence facing the creek 
in question. The Municipal Council had earlier called the culverting an “expensive luxury” 
that the municipality could not afford to indulge in. McBain then wrote to the Council, 
suggesting that the narrow streets and crowded dwellings and shops on the side of the 
Yangkingpang were undoubtedly capable of “communicating diphtheria, septic sore-
throat, typhoid fever, diarrhea, dysentery, and cholera, either through the air of by the 
agency of flies, mosquitoes, and similar means of convection to the residents and others in 
the vicinity.” McBain suggested that the culverting would cost the municipality some Tls. 
150,000 spread over two years, but it would give the Settlement some fifteen mow of 
ground for a road, which was as cheap as Tls. 10,000 per mow (1 mow = roughly 7,168 
square ft.).225  
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With the letter McBain enclosed a report written by Dr. Paulun, Decan J. Reid, 
M.B., and Ewart L. Marsh, M.B., D.P.H. three Shanghai-based medical men. In the report, 
they provided a more in-depth analysis of the composition of the sewage that poured into 
the Yangkingpang by the drains. Aside from the pollution coming from the contributive 
streams, it was apparent that a large portion of impurities in the Yangkingpang was made 
of liquid excrement. They wrote: 
In fact, if anyone will walk through the Chinese quarters of both Settlements 
in the early part of the day, he will [see] hundreds of nightsoil buckets being 
washed over the surface drains, a practice which must in the aggregate 
produce a large quantity of ordinary sewage. And as matter of observation, 
crude fecal matter can be seen any day in the Creek, especially at low tide. 
The state of the Creek, indeed, shows that the great source of the pollution 
is the [insoluble] organic matter which continues decomposing for many 
weeks. A portion of this matter also precipitated to the bed of the Creek, 
especially in the lower stretch near the foreshore, forming, with sedimentary 
matters brought down from the upper reaches, a black mud, which at all 
times, and especially in hot weather, gives off abundance of noxious gases. 
It cannot be claimed therefore that the air or the tides of the river are capable 
of playing any significant part in the oxidation of the mass of organic filth 
in the Creek. It is equally certain that the rise and fall of the tide can, in no 
way, under present conditions, effectively flush the Creek. Self-purification, 
therefore, if it exists at all, is so slight as to be practically inoperative. 226 
The doctors proposed to put a sewer 13 feet by 2.5 feet into the culverted Yangkingpang 
to receive the drainage from all outlets currently along the creek. They concluded that an 
open sewer was injurious to the health and an interference to the improvement and 
development of the Settlement.227 
The Council replied to McBain, stating that the proposed culverting was not 
calculated to be of benefit either to the public health or the general interests of this 
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community. The Council argued that among the death of natives, cases of diseases were 
few despite that they use the Yangkingpang water for potable or other domestic purposes. 
It proved that the condition of the creek was not detrimental to public health. 228 The 
Council invoked the Municipal Engineer’s report to counter certain medical beliefs they 
disagreed with. Charles Mayne, Municipal Engineer at the time, argued that the noxious 
gases bottled up in a trunk sewer 12 feet by 6.5 feet, into which all the large branch drains 
from the two Settlements would empty, would not improve matters because these gases 
might find their way back into the street. Mayne also argued that the British drainage 
system included sewer running north and south that had a free outlet into the open air. 
These outlets allowed a free tidal circulation right through the system. Blocking up all the 
openings at one end of this system with a trunk sewer must deteriorate the condition of the 
cross sewers generally. Plus, the proposed culvert would be the means of directly 
connecting the drainage system of the two foreign settlements, which would render the air 
in both systems of the sewers much worse.229 
Municipal Engineer’s report came under attack once the correspondence between 
McBain and the Council was published in The North-China Herald. Someone called out 
Charles Mayne flip-flopping on the issue of the Yangkingpang. In his earlier report, 
fashioned on December 14, 1898, Mayne extolled the proposed culverting as “the finest 
public improvement ever carried out in Shanghai.”230 In his most recent report on July 6, 
1903, where Mayne argued against combining the drainage systems of the two settlements 
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by culverting Yangkingpang, he astoundingly pointed out that “from the point of view of 
the French Council it would be a great public improvement”.  But why was it only a bad 
thing for the north of the Yangkingpang? 231 
4.6 Political Obstructions  
Some suggested that it was the pride of being British that was at play in deciding 
the matter of public health. A contributor to The Herald wrote a piece of satire:  
We are British; bred in our bones is the knowledge that our greatness is due 
to the silver streak between us and France… What if it were culverted? Dual 
control and daily disturbances with French Police, ordure roading at the 
Bund jetties, residential development in French hinterland, already a sore 
point; premier position of picturesque Maloo jeopardized. What one point 
in its favor? None. Let us cleanse, dredge, pave, bund, maintain, and never 
abolish our time-honored Settlement boundary, and let all interested 
landowners and Frenchmen with axes to grind go hang.232  
This administrative concern was corroborated by Charles Mayne’s earlier report. Mayne 
once said that if the Settlements north and south of the Yangkingpang were under the 
control of one authority, then the case for a boulevard would have been very much stronger. 
A similar rhetoric could be heard in 1863, when the American Concession merged with the 
British one, forming the International Settlement. At the time, protests were mainly about 
the Americans benefiting much more largely than the British.233 
Two months after the rebuttal against McBain’s request, the Municipal Council 
informed the French Concession that they concurred in the opinion that culverting the 
Yangkingpang would improve healthiness for foreign communities, but this was not this 
                                                 
231 Francis Ellis, “Letter to the Editor 2 - No Title”, The North-China Herald, Aug 21, 1903: 397. 
232 Ibid. 
233 “The Yangkingpang”, The North-China Herald, Sep 04, 1903: 487. 
 140 
debate was about. “The proposed improvement,” said the secretary of the Municipal 
Council, “while undoubtedly calculated to benefit in the marked degree the interests of 
owners of property situated in the rear of the French Settlement, would not serve as a means 
of egress or as a feeder to the outlying roads of this Settlement.” 234 The British authorities 
expected that a public thoroughfare as it was planned would attract traffic all across the 
city, from the already busy Bund and the Central District of the Settlement, to the newly 
developed French extension area in the west. The worsened traffic would harm the 
landowners and others in the Settlement. The Municipal Council then urged again that the 
joined work of dredging be resumed and carried out with the least possible delay. It is 
suffice to say that the overwhelming element in upholding the plan of dredging was that 
the merge of the two foreign settlements was set to bring about administrative challenges 
that the Municipal Council did not think it was ready for, or that the Council believed 
would diminish the current advantages they currently enjoyed over the French authorities.  
The French, on the other hand, was “unanimously of opinion” that the only solution 
calculated to satisfy the residents of these Settlements was the culverting of the 
Yangkingpang. Facing the reactionary British authorities, the French began to take the lead. 
In January 1904, the French Council put out a four-point scheme of culverting the 
Yangkingpang, which included a plan approved by Municipal Engineers of both 
municipalities, the French working on the west section of the Yangkingpang and the British 
working on the east, and each municipality would refund half of the cost incurred in work 
carried out by the other municipality.235 This proposal fell on deaf ears. Partly it was due 
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to that the Municipal Council of 1904 was on its way of leaving the office in summer. 
Partly it was due to the sudden death of George McBain, the most prominent proponent of 
culverting, on February 13, 1904.236  
The French, on the other hand, was not as adamant about governing the future 
boulevard as they were about culverting the Yangkingpang. They were reportedly 
unwilling to re-institute the police and sanitary work which had hitherto been jointly 
performed for the Yangkingpang. The bunding of the Yangkingpang continued till late fall 
of 1904, with zero signs of improvements made on the French side.237 For a brief while in 
November 1904, the two Councils seemed to agree on an alternative – to erect a system of 
sluice gates at suitable points on the Defence Creek and the Yangkingpang. It was cheap 
to maintain, it would keep the creek always half full of water, and it would flush them at 
each tide. Noticing that this was in fact an antique plan proposed by Jamieson in 1870, 
which never gained any interest. It was therefore not surprising when it was rejected by the 
harbor-master based on the serious impairment in navigation the sluices were to incur.238 
By the end of 1904, the French Council finally caved in. They sent in their engineer 
to work on a practical and economical solution to the Yangkingpang problem. They agreed 
to authorize the necessary credit. The expense was to be borne in equal parts by the two 
municipalities. The dredging and cleansing hence continued, marking another successful 
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cooperation since 1887. By the summer of 1906, tens of hundreds of tons of mud was 
removed from the Yangkingpang by the Chinese contractor at the cost of Tls. 0.16 per ton 
(same was done to the Defence Creek, which was paid for entirely by the Municipal 
Council). 239 Dredging indeed cost the Councils a lot less. Yet for many, whether the 
Yangkingpang should be culverted or not was simply a matter of dollars and cents. Stench 
might not be the cause of any disease, but it was still annoying and needed elimination. 
Such viewpoint was gaining ground when conditions of the Yangkingpang quickly 
deteriorated in merely three years. 
4.7 Need for a Boulevard  
From the second dredging of the Yangkingpang in 1887 to the last time in 1906, 
Shanghai had undergone tremendous growth. The Chinese population in the International 
Settlement increased from 125,665 in 1885 to 550,000 in 1905. In the French Concession, 
it rose from 41,166 in 1890 to 96,132 in 1905. As for the foreigners in Shanghai, there were 
a few more than four thousand living in Shanghai in the late twentieth century, including 
3,673 in the north of the Yangkingpang and 444 in the south. By 1905, the total number of 
foreigners jumped to nearly 16,000. 240  Shanghai was without a question the most 
successful treaty ports in China. With more people came more impurities. The second 
dredging of the Yangkingpang was able to keep the conditions of the creek above bearable 
for nearly two decades, but the effect of second dredging expired in merely three years.  
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A new change of policy might have caused the short-lived cleanliness of the 
Yangkingpang. In November 1906, the Municipal Council issued a new policy regarding 
the increasingly busy and unpleasant street scene along the Bund: the load of house refuse 
into boats stationed at the jetties on the Bund was, with one temporary exception, 
discontinued. House refuse from the Bund would now be collected by barrow and be loaded 
in the Yangkingpang.241 This decision was one of the measures to limit the littering of the 
Bund foreshore and to keep the decency of the first sight of the city. But it was done 
apparently at the expense of the environment near the Yangkingpang. Its shoreline 
remained the chief assembly point of nightsoil boats.  
By March 1909, proposal of culverting the Yangkingpang made its second return. 
At the annual Ratepayers’ Meeting on March 17, 1909 held in the Town Hall of the 
International Settlement, the resolution regarding the Yangkingpang was announced: 
considering the congested condition of traffic on the Nanjing road, and the present 
insanitary state of the Yangkingpang, the Council was empowered to enter into 
negotiations with the French Municipal Council to culvert the Yangkingpang. Morgan 
Phillips, the sponsor of the resolution, pointed out that now there were more practical 
reasons to culvert the creek. He said that the Nanjing Road was the only thoroughfare the 
Settlement had into the western districts. Now that the tramways were running and under 
construction, the Settlement needed more than one major east-west passage. Other roads 
in Shanghai rarely presented a carriage-way wider than forty feet. It was high time that the 
Council gave the community a magnificent roadway, which would be about one mile in 
length and over 100 feet in width, doubling the width of the Nanjing Road at the time. 
                                                 
241 “Health Officer’s Report for October”, The North-China Herald, Nov 09, 1906: 309. 
 144 
Phillips read to the gathering the special report of the Captain Superintendent of Police, 
which suggested that broad thoroughfare in the place of the Yangkingpang would 
practically solve one of the chief traffic problems of this settlement, namely that connected 
with vehicular communication between the Bund and the Western District. Once the creek 
was gone, more north-south passages would show up so that the congestion on the Bund 
would be entirely disposed of.242 
Phillips also addressed the issue of stench, suggesting that although it might not 
have caused disease yet, the current condition of the Yangkingpang was an embarrassment 
to Shanghai, the “Model Settlement”. “There are hundreds of persons,” Phillips said, “men, 
women and children… hoping to get some fresh air after an exhausting day, but there is 
waited from the [Huangpu] a most unutterable, indescribable [odor]. It paralyzes 
everything. It beats the Band. How can you expect music out of a trumpet which is filled 
with air like that [?] That is how it is done now in the Yangkingpang…” The speech drew 
loud laughter from the crowd, who were expressively in support of Phillips’ comment.243  
The issue of the Yangkingpang was so contended that the Meeting reconvened two 
days later. This round was made for opponents of culverting. Brodie Clark, a veteran trader, 
alluded to the impact the culverting would have on the boat traffic. Clark said he had been 
living near the creek for nearly twenty years. In no way did he suffer from it being a 
waterway. In fact, it had been a boom to the business. Clark said no less than 1,800 tons of 
traffic were conveyed by the route of Yangkingpang in one tide every morning. Some two 
hundred boats would be crossing the bridge at the mouth of the creek. He admitted that 
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there were times during the very hot weather, when the tide was at low water, the creek 
stank, but it only lasted for an hour or two. It was in no way a “plague spot”. Such a thing 
was so common that anyone who lived in China long enough would have to put up with 
it.244  
F. Anderson pointed to the unfair accusations flying around between the two sides. 
In private, proponents of culverting said those who opposed the scheme were narrow-
minded, jealous of the ample expansion that has taken place in the French Extension. The 
French might be able to build their avenues to the west in a straight line, but the British 
road twisted and turned for a good reason – Ratepayers’ Meeting, where property rights 
were honored, opinions valued. Jealousy surely was unnecessary. The foundation of 
opposition remained the four principles: defense, traffic, finance, and sanitation. He 
suggested that the Yangkingpang and the Defence Creek would come in necessary when 
the heart of the Settlement was under threat. As for traffic, he argued that a Yangkingpang 
Boulevard would not relieve the traffic; to the contrary once culverted, the boat traffic 
would be brought up to the ground, and people living in the poorest, dirtiest portion of the 
two Settlements would flock to the fine boulevard, like from Pahsienjao (八仙桥), an area 
at the intersection of the Yangkingpang and the Defence Creek mostly occupied by Chinese 
paupers.245  
4.8 The French System in Question 




In the neighboring French Concession, drains and sewers were arranged in a 
different way. The first key difference was to what extent the benefits of ventilating sewers 
should be believed. The French had a long history of building covered sewers. The first of 
these was built in 1370. In medieval France, building sewers was not a municipal duty. 
Many sewers were private, thus built and covered at the owners’ wish. In the middle of the 
seventeenth century, the Old Regime began enclosing sewers in Paris. By 1663, one-
quarter were enclosed. In the nineteenth century, the French began to worry about the waste 
matter rotting in the sewers and gave off miasma and airborne diseases before they could 
be flushed away. Their solution was an army of sewermen, who were contracted by the 
city to clean out garbage, sand, and rotting animal and vegetable matter with a two-meter 
pole with paddle attached at a right angle called rabot. Later, sluice carts were put to use, 
which could scrape away the accumulation along the sewer. During the reign of Napoleon 
III, civil engineer Eugene Belgrand designed a system that had discharge of all sewers 
going into three collectors and then into the Seine. The new sewer system was celebrated 
for its mechanical elegance. After 1854 water-borne diseases like cholera fell off in 
frequency and intensity in Paris.246 
The second difference between the French and the British system was whether 
sewers for refuse and domestic waste should be of its own system separated from drains 
for surface water. The descriptions about the French system in Shanghai was not abundant 
in municipal archive. The 1951 survey done by the Communist government revealed that 
the French sewer system had only one set of pipeline, which accepted both sewage and 
surface water. The French sewer very much relied on septic tanks. Human-generated waste 
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would go into the tanks. After a period of deposition, the waste water went into the 
combined sewer. The solid matter would be emptied with manual labor.247 
For the British, the French practices were highly questionable. Anderson pointed 
out that the French authorities had been for long instituting a new extensive sewage works 
without discussing with the Municipal Health Officer of the International Settlement. They 
had been transforming creeks into covered sewers over a very extensive area. They had 
also permitted sanitary appliances in houses, like plumbing fixtures, which had been 
strictly forbidden in the International Settlement. It was only after they had carried on this 
work and brought it to the borders of the International Settlement that they approached the 
Municipal Council and asked the system to be continued on the north side of the 
Yangkingpang. Anderson, quoting Col. E. C. S. Moore and his Sanitary Engineering, 
argued that a gravitation system of sewage for a perfectly flat and tide-locked city must 
not, under any circumstances, be recommended on sanitary grounds. The gravitation 
system was tried in Rangoon, Burma. In the end, they had to institute an exceedingly costly 
system of pumping sewage known as the “Shone System”.248  
Shone System invoked here was a late-19th-century British invention. It was 
invented by and named after engineer Isaac Shone. Shone was born in Wrexham, Wales, 
where the ground was flat and was prone to flooding. After resuming his grandfather’s duty 
at the Mining Engineering Agency in 1854, Shone came up a way of improvement without 
displacing too many existing drains. On September 5, 1878, Shone patented the pneumatic 
system he designed. With the installation of ejectors, waste water would be driven by 
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mechanical power instead of gravitation.249 By 1890, this system was in operation in many 
cities in England and America, with the capacity of pumping 9,000 gallons of waste water 
per minute. At Rangoon, Burma that Anderson mentioned, the British installed twenty-five 
Shone ejectors.250 It was estimated that one ejector was needed for every five thousand 
people, each costing £7,960 (Tls. 31,840).251 Population of the International Settlement in 
Shanghai had reached 550,000 by 1905.252 That means 110 ejectors across the Settlement 
at an expense of more than Tls. 3.5 million, a cost too astronomical to bear.  
 
Figure 11 – Shone System. Source: “New Inventions: The Shone Hydro-Pneumatic 
System of Sewerage”, The Sanitary Record, September 15, 1890: 151. 
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Anderson suggested that the British Council should wait to see the result before 
joining in. The current result of this new system seemed doubtful on the French side. If one 
went to the culverted French Bund at a low tide, he would not be able to linger long in the 
immediate neighborhood. It was due to the bottled-up noxious gases, which could not be 
properly ventilated like they were in the International Settlement where both ends of the 
drains were open. Replacing a 40-feet wide creek with 13-feet wide sewers would not 
permit the same amount of flow of water. “The fact that their system has been greatly 
extended” said Anderson, “is no reason why it should still be further extended… if we 
follow the French example here and convert our system of open creek drainage into sewer 
drainage, we shall find that putting sewage out of sight is merely the beginning and not the 
end of our troubles.”253 
4.9 Plural Vote 
The chairman then put this resolution to vote. He found it difficult to count the 
hands as the hands for and against the resolution were about the same number. The 
chairman then appointed Morgan Phillips and Brodie Clark as tellers. At that point, 
someone suggested since there difference between the two sides were not as discernable, a 
poll should be demanded. Wilkinson objected a poll, arguing that a show of hands would 
be able to show the feeling of the ratepayers. Others pointed out that a poll would take 
much time, even more so than the meeting itself had already done. Therefore, there should 
be a second show of hands to vote on the resolution. Chants arose in the town hall, crying 
“Divide! Divide!”. The ratepayers were then asked to divide – those “against” going to the 
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right of the hall; those “for” to the left. The Chairman asked Wilkinson and Anderson to 
act as tellers. Those who voted in favor of the resolution numbered 211 and those against 
it 185. The resolution was therefore carried.254  
However, this was not how the meeting ended. The announcement was received 
with loud and continued applause from the supporters of the resolution. Anderson rose to 
speak but his voiced was drowned with the applause which did not subside for several 
minutes. The opponents of the resolution insisted to call for a poll. Cries of “No, No” arose 
from the supporters of the resolution, “Let us leave the hall!” While many were beginning 
to leave, Wilkinson asked them to keep their seats and remained for the poll. By this time 
the doors of the hall had been closed and no one was allowed to leave. 255  
Wilkinson argued that after the declaration of the resolution carried, he had saw, 
and was told, that about forty voters had left the hall. He therefore called for the 
adjournment for the meeting. The chairman said Rule of Procedure of Ratepayers’ Meeting 
No. 8 said: After the doors have been closed no person shall be allowed to enter until the 
poll has been completed. “Looking at the rules of the procedure and the Land Regulations, 
on which our powers are based, that they provide for a poll following a show of hands. If 
we were to adjourn, we should have to begin again. A poll must be taken now or never… 
I am required to apply this rule and there must be a poll. It must go on.”256 The poll was 
then taken. After several attempts of nullifying the poll was defeated by the chairman, the 
result was announced: For, 311; Against, 411. In the shocking turn of event, loud applause 





rose from the side of the house against the proposition, whereas those who were in favor 
replied with hoots and hissing. The meeting was then adjourned.257  
The dramatic turn of event was subject to one special rule for the polling process – 
plural voting, a rule imitated that the number of vote a person had equaled to the number 
of lots of land he owned. In other words, polling was in favor of big landowners. Among 
the ratepayers who attended the meeting on March 19, there were some of the biggest 
landowners in Shanghai, including C. Iburg who owned 33 lots, Duncan McNeill, 31 lots, 
D. Landale, 27 lots, etc., all of whom opposed the plan of culverting. The closest thing the 
proponents of culverting got was C. W. Ure, who had 18 votes. That is why the opponents 
of culverting was able to win the poll by a margin of 100 votes after losing the show-of-
hand popular vote.258   
The 1909 Ratepayers’ Meeting gave rise to another wave of robust debate. This 
time, the debate focused on the internal political process of the International Settlement. 
Faith in the procedure of decision-making was weakened. Opinions began to emerge in 
The North-China Herald, questioning whether the Ratepayers’ Meeting was the proper 
place for making critical decisions. It was suggested that in almost any other town of the 
same size and importance as Shanghai, an issue like culverting the Yangkingpang would 
have been subjected to weeks of preliminary canvassing. Thus, the electors would vote in 
a comparatively cool frame of mind regardless of the heated debate. Shanghai should have 
a preliminary committee of investigation created, a body that would spend weeks on door-




to-door canvassing and would provide the ratepayers with a better overview on the issue.259 
Other complaints focused on the questionable procedure of voting, particularly the rule of 
plural voting. Some suggested the ratepayers make a clean sweep of the whole unsavory 
system by abolishing plural voting, reducing voting qualification, introducing elective 
auditors, and voting for councilors by ballot. “It will not be the first time” the author wrote, 
“where clinging to old privileges in an unsuitable environment has resulted privileged 
classes being swept away.”260 
4.10 Last Voice against Culverting 
Although the endeavor of culverting failed in 1909, the consensus was coming into 
being among the general public: the Yangkingpang had to go. One last vocal opponent was 
Thomas W. Kingsmill, the prominent sinologist, engineer, and former director of the 
Municipal Council. Kingsmill had been a staunch opponent of the culverting plan for years 
while arguing for re-engineering the creek. It was also known as “the Kingsmill scheme” 
– to keep the Yangkingpang open, but to cement the bottom of the channel. The fact that 
he possessed only one lot of land distinguished Kingsmill from others who voted in lined 
with the vested interest. After the controversial 1909 Ratepayers’ Meeting, the public were 
in distrust of the authorities. Kingsmill stepped in, trying to clarify a common 
misunderstanding about the stench of the Yangkingpang: 
“There is somewhat widespread idea that smells are in themselves a source 
of danger, and that all you have to do with them is to bottle them up… 
Practically, the smell is like a railway whistle; it is not dangerous itself, but 
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it gives warning of coming danger, which can by no means be averted by 
throttling the whistle, as our would-be wise heads desire us to believe.”261  
Kingsmill argued that bottling up the smells was to leave the real danger, the 
disease-laden germs, which had no particular smell, to find their way through the 
anastomosing sewer circulation to all parts of the Settlement. As the town sewers were for 
the most part under high water level, the rising tide acted as the piston of a pump to drive 
the disease germs to the higher level, which gave rise to outbreaks of typhoid fever. 
Culverting the Yangkingpang and the lengthening of the courses of the sewers would 
aggravate the danger. Kingsmill said that comparing to other cities of similar latitude, like 
Calcutta, Alexandria, and New Orleans, Shanghai had been enjoying favorable health for 
decades, which only proved that the stench alone was not the cause of disease.262 Kingsmill 
also pointed out that the French’s fondness of “Parisian boulevard” was to allow of large 
bodies of troops and artillery acting in case of popular disturbance. The International 
Settlement did not possess an arm force comparable in size to what the French had at home. 
It was also unwise to carry out such a financially unsound scheme in the present time of 
extreme financial depression.263  
Kingsmill was at the age of seventy-two when he made these remarks. He had spent 
decades in China and Shanghai where his influence could be felt in many places. He helped 
resuscitate and arm the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, the militia that defended the sovereignty 
of the Settlement. As a seasoned surveyor and architect, he participated in the building of 
the first Woosung railway line. He wrote prolifically for newspapers and scientific journals. 
                                                 




He was the vice president of the Royal Asiatic Society and donated 120 volumes of his 
collection to the library. That is why when weighing in on public issues, Kingsmill always 
commanded great respect. Kingsmill unfortunately fell ill in 1910. The ailment lasted for 
months. At one point he was hospitalized at the General Hospital for an infection of the 
heart, and then was removed to his home. He passed away shortly after six o’clock in the 
evening on July 26, 1910.264 The whole foreign community sorrowed for the great loss, but 
for the cause of culverting the Yangkingpang, the last standing obstruction disappeared. 
The state of the Yangkingpang kept turning for the worse. Silting made the creek 
shallower than ever. The creek was reportedly without water for twelve hours out of the 
twenty-four. Nightsoil boats which served both Settlements were aground on the pestilent 
mud for hours, and the combined effluvia were unbearable.265 Those who urged aggressive 
actions found a new rhetorical weapon – modernity. In 1913, the word “modern” was first 
seen used in The North-China Herald in condemnation of the status quo of Shanghai’s 
rivers: “Visit either of these odoriferous creeks at ebb-tide; their foulness staggers one, and 
leaves one to wonder greatly how, in a city which has every appearance of being modern 
and up-to-date, such terribly unhealthy and useless waterways are permitted to remain in 
existence.” 266  The idea of being “modern” was so vague that it imposed a sweeping 
negation of the existence of the Yangkingpang, detaching the creek from its economic and 
practical contexts. The problem needed to be solved, plain and simple.  
4.11 Culverting the Creeks 
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In 1914, the crusade against the Yangkingpang was renewed. To the west of the 
Yangkingpang, where the International Settlement met French Concession, a thoroughfare 
had been built. The two concessions had been jointly managing the police, traffic, and 
garbage disposal. This put faith in many about the future joint operation on a culverted 
Yangkingpang. Furthermore, placing two projected lines of tramways on the boulevard, 
seeing buildings grow on the ground adjoining the limit of the boundary, the Yangkingpang 
boulevard would sure set an example for the Chinese. “I feel convinced”, the editor of The 
North-China Herald wrote, “that [the Chinese] will be only anxious to help the 
municipalities by all means in their power in order successfully to complete an enterprise 
which would contribute to make our settlements finer, more agreeable and really worthy 
of their reputation as model settlements, not only in the eyes of the residents here, but of 
our transient guests.”267 
By May, a stage had been reached in the negotiations when both Councils agreed 
on the urgent need of the proposed improvement for the Yangkingpang. All that remained 
for discussion was the settlement of the details.268 One of the reasons the agreement could 
be reached quickly was that the French authorities were able to obtain cheap mud for the 
work of filling in while they were dredging from the Pootung Point (today’s 陆家嘴
Lujiazui). This greatly reduced the cost of culverting. Moreover, the French had reduced 
the drainage emptying in the Yangkingpang by laying new drains through the Chinese city 
in the south. They helped the Chinese culvert the moot and transform it into sewer, which 
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was able to drain a large Chinese area. This change further eased the sanitary concerns 
about using the Yangkingpang channel as trunk sewer.269 
As for the British authorities, C. H. Godfrey, the new Municipal Engineer, 
suggested that the Yangkingpang could not be treated independently of other systems. 
Once the Yangkingpang was filled in, the Defence Creek would be deprived of the tidal 
scour it received from the South. It would be cheaper to fill in the Defence Creek along 
with the Yangkingpang, instead of spending endlessly on dredging the Creek. This scheme 
was generally welcomed by the ratepayers in Shanghai, thanks to the improved finance 
conditions.270 Some expressed their concerns about whether the new boulevard should be 
free of tramway, or some arrangement was necessary between the two Council to properly 
regulate the new routes the nightsoil boats took, but no organized resistance was expected 
among foreigners heading to the special meeting of ratepayers, which was set to be held in 
the beginning of June. 271  
On the evening of June 4, 1914, a special meeting of ratepayers was held at the 
Town Hall. The meeting was supposed to begin at six o’clock, yet by five seats were 
already plentifully occupied. The chairman announced that the requisite number of votes 
was present, and hence began the meeting. The resolution on culverting the Yangkingpang 
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enjoyed almost unanimous support from the ratepayers. In 1909, the estimation stood at 
half a million Taels, and the Defence Creek was not even included. In 1914, the project for 
two creeks amounted to Tls. 200,000. The cost could also be covered by a fraction of the 
enhanced revenue – for example, charging the new shops long the thoroughfare for 
electricity, which was not as widely available in 1909. The ratepayers did not fight over 
this matter again. The resolution was carried with few dissentients.272  
The work of filling the Defence Creek was launched by the Municipal Council in 
late November 1914, starting from its northern end. The mud used for filling in was 
obtained from dredging the Suzhou Creek and from the foundations of the new municipal 
buildings. Unlike how things were done half a century ago, the pipes for drainage and 
sewerage could now be obtained locally as they were manufactured at the Council’s depot 
on the Fearon Road (九龙路 Jiulong Road). They were 4 ft. 6 in. in diameter and was made 
of reinforced concrete. To lay the pipes, the water of the Defence Creek was drained off by 
a 6-inch centrifugal pump and went into the Yangkingpang. A small dam was built on the 
southern end and it kept out the water on the Yangkingpang side. The trench into which 
the drain pipes went was about five feet wide and three feet deep. Large wooden piles were 
set up to prevent the sides of trench from falling in. Bricks were laid at the bottom of the 
trench. The pipes were about ten feet below the surface of the road and five feet below the 
bed of the original creek. The work gave employment to over two hundred Chinese coolies. 
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They used cheap appliances wherever possible. On average about seventy feet of pipes 
were being laid per day.273  
At Yangkingpang, substantial progress was made by the French Council. The work 
began at the east end of the creek near the Bund. The channel was free of water at low tide. 
Chinese coolies were then able to work for six hours every day, during which the seventy-
five coolies employed by the French Council were able to lay an average twelve pipes. The 
pipes laid were slightly bigger than those in the Defence Creek, each being 5 ft. long and 
4 ft. 6 in. in diameter, made of ferroconcrete. Manholes were constructed at crossroads, 
where men could easily descend by iron ladders to inspect the pipes. To squeeze the cost, 
the French Public Works Department had the pipes made by prisoners. About eighty men 
out of the four hundred or so prisoners were constantly engaged, and everything was done 
by hand without any assistance from plant or machinery. One pipe could be made at the 
cost of merely Tls. 12 and the prisoners carried them to the site for free. Cement poles for 
fencing purposes were also manufactured in prison at the small cost of Tls. 0.74 each. The 
North-China Herald sent in a reporter to see the pipes in the making. The prisoners 
appeared contented, almost happy. They entered into work with a zeal. They were also 
allowed to speak to each other freely. Cases of insubordination were said to be rare.274 
The work continued to 1916. In January, the two foreign councils had agreed on 
the name of the wide thoroughfare – Avenue Edward VII – to “perpetuate the local memory 
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of the illustrious sovereign”.275 By February, the thoroughfare began to take shape. With 
the exception of the Bund Bridge at the east entry to the creek, which would be scrapped, 
all the other bridged had been removed intact waiting to be used in the future. By July, the 
roadway was near completion. From the Bund to Tibet Road, the road was 110 ft. wide. 
On either side there was an 18 ft. footpath, while the carriage way was 74 ft., making the 
avenue the spacious roadway Shanghai had ever seen.276  
4.12 Conclusion: Reflexivity 
In its early days the Yangkingpang served defense purpose, but it later became the 
origin of insanitation. Chinese shanties occupied its shore. Discharge from the drains added 
to the pollution. The creek was filled with domestic waste. It was advised to use sluices to 
keep more water in the creek, or to drive out overstaying nightsoil boats to reduce the 
stench. Neither idea was carried out. 
Dredging had been the standard procedure to clean up the Yangkingpang because 
it was cheaper and easier to do. The British and the French authorities dredged the creek it 
in 1866, 1887 and finally in 1904. The alternative was culverting, favored by the French, 
yet unacceptable to the British. Stench was upsetting, but the British were more concerned 
about sewer gas finding its way to the streets and homes once it could not reach the open 
air above the Yangkingpang. At least stench did not give people cholera.  
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The opposition to culverting collapsed when several factors came together. The 
stench had become unbearable. A wide new road was badly needed now that the Settlement 
extended to the west. Cheap labor and material for culverting had become accessible 
locally. Obstructionist rules like plural voting, were widely condemned. By 1916, after 
more than half a century since the first proposal, the Yangkingpang was finally gone. The 
open sewer into which nearly two hundred drains poured into was now the new Avenue 
Edward VII with a trunk sewer beneath it. 
In his elaboration of science in the time of modernity, Anthony Giddens says that 
modernity is constituted in and through reflexively applied knowledge. Any given element 
of that knowledge can be revised. “No knowledge under conditions of modernity is 
knowledge in the ‘old’ sense,” says Giddens, “where ‘to know’ is to be certain.” Giddens 
argues that social practices are far less attached to tradition in modern social life. They are 
constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very 
practices. Their character is thus constitutively altering.277 The episode of culverting the 
Yangkingpang witnessed the shifting ground of medicine at the turn of the twentieth 
century. In French’s protest against dredging the Yangkingpang in the 1860s, they invoked 
the health concern about the mud sitting in the banks of the creek, which they believed 
could induce disease. In the early 1880s, when the British Health Officer halted the pipe 
laying of the Shanghai Waterworks Company during summer, telluric theory came into 
force again as he suspected spread of disease was associated to disturbance of soil. Since 
the mid-nineteenth century, sewer gas had been a consistent concern of public health. Part 
of the reason why waterworks was a necessity was for scouring the drains to prevent the 
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formation of sewer gas. In the late nineteenth century, advancement of germ theory in the 
Europe and the entrenchment of miasma theory gave birth to a set of medical belief that 
was neither the former, nor the latter, and sometimes a mix of both. Situated in a mesh of 
variety of perceptions, the potential harm of sewer gas became the focal point in addressing 
the Yangkingpang nuisance. The fear of the cholera-inducing gas was inexplicable to us 
today, yet the discussion on this matter lingered on to the 1910s, decades after the discovery 
of Vibrio cholerae as the pathogen. This dated theory did not lose its influence until one of 
its most prominent advocators died. 
The evolvement of medical theories in Shanghai proved that despite increasing 
institutionalization of the discipline in Europe, medicine at the turn of the century was still 
by large a product of locality in periphery – environmental conditions and the beliefs 
created to make sense of them. The popularity of telluric theories obviously arose from the 
constant excavation that occurred in large civil engineering projects in Shanghai at the 
time. As the city grew, Shanghai was troubled by polluted rivers. The constant presence of 
bad odor made it nearly impossible for local inhabitants to evade the discussion of miasma. 
The situation was further burdened by the flatness of Shanghai, an engineering challenge 
that could easily render drainage defective and allow sewer gas to be generated. This had 
been haunting foreign inhabitants of Shanghai ever since their arrival. In the end, what 
killed off miasma theory and its variations was not an intellectual or paradigmatic shift in 
medicine. It was the practical need of wider roads in Shanghai and a growing confidence 
in cooperation between the two foreign administrations. The uneasy process of medical 
community in Shanghai catching up to the up-to-date scientific framework in Europe 
showed that the diffusion and the internalization of knowledge was not driven solely by 
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the appearance of medical treatises, translated or not. Learning from containing the side 
effects of new engineering seemed to have played a bigger role in shaping the beliefs of 
the foreigners overseas. To reduce the perceived risks, an accurate scientific understanding 
was not a prerequisite. Rather, it was the reality of engineering techniques that generated 
the topics and set the agenda for the science and medicine community. 
 Culverting of the Yangkingpang ushered a new era of urban development when 
bolder moves were taken to change natural landscape of the city in human’s favor. In the 
meantime, another novelty was quickly gaining ground in Shanghai – the technology of 
water closet. In the past, merely bringing up the issue of defecation was considered 
unrefined and backward. Yet never had any other hydraulic technologies caused as much 
debate and disagreement among foreigners in Shanghai. Lay person believed they could 
simply flush away the nuisance. Only an engineer would know that the environmental 
impact of water closet was remained to be seen.  
 163 
CHAPTER 5. SEWAGE 
 In nineteenth-century China, handling fecal matter was a good business. In public 
space, pit latrines were set up at the obscure corners of the road, accommodating the need 
of those who walked by. The filth accumulated inside belonged to the owner of the latrine, 
who sold the nightsoil to peasants and coolies and had them empty the pit regularly. In 
private space, people used nightstools – wooden lidded drum-shaped bucket about sixteen 
inches high and a foot in diameter. Nightstools were painted purplish red or golden yellow 
as they were often a part of women’s dowry.278 These buckets were emptied every early 
morning by nightsoil coolies who then carried the buckets with a bamboo pole on their 
shoulder and sold the fecal matter to peasants. The peasants would ship tanks of manure 
back to their used-up farmlands by water and apply the matter as fertilizer. The principle 
was clear: no waste goes to waste, be it human-generated or otherwise. 
Nightsoil business did not enjoy much reputation but was nonetheless profitable. 
The coolies did not earn as much as latrine owners and foremen, but still they had the right 
to boss around residents and requested a tip from time to time. They roamed the city day 
and night, hardly ever embarrassed by their job. John MacGowan, an Amoy-based affiliate 
of the London Missionary Society wrote:  
“The nightsoil men with their open buckets would act as if the streets were 
their own for in loud voices that can be heard away down the narrow 
arteries, they threatened to bump up against anyone that will not get out of 
their way. This threat is so powerful that the densest crowd will scatter in a 
moment, and stand without a sound by the sides of the road.”279 
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 The practice of nightsoil collection varied. In some area it was a women’s job. In 
Fujian province, a long line of female nightsoil scavengers was a common scene:  
“They were a light-hearted merry party indeed. They all seemed to enjoy 
rude health and to have overflowing spirits, for they were full of laughter 
and jokes, and they made the road ring with the sound of their merry voices. 
It was a most pleasant sight to see so many women, with such happy faces, 
upon which care never seemed to rest. They were just like a pack of school-
girls let loose for their holidays.” 280  
In Shanghai, the nightsoil jobs were not gender specific, but almost all coolies were men. 
By the early twentieth century, nightsoil coolies were known as “Emptying Masters”.281 
The nickname speaks a ton about the extent to which the municipal authorities relied on 
the labor of nightsoil coolies. In the International Settlement, the Municipal Council did 
not seem to be interested in displacing the manual handling of waste matter for a long 
while. What contributed to the slow adoption of sewer and water closet in British 
Shanghai? Some suggest that it was because the British authorities joined in the Chinese 
customs for money as they received handsome deposit and monthly payment from the 
“Municipal Contractor”.282 But to imply that the manual refuse removal system was unique 
to China was misleading. This chapter reveals that the British authorities executed great 
cautiousness not because they were unwilling to give up the revenue generated by the old 
business, but because the old practices not only contributed to the final capacity of nightsoil 
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disposal, but they provided immediate benefits to local environment, which allowed the 
technological innovation to run its course. 
5.1 Regulating Nightsoil 
The British was not without their own tradition of collecting and using nightsoil. In 
medieval England, a coolie of such duty, known as gongfermor, earned a decent payment. 
They were recruited by city councils when pits became filled with dung. They would then 
carry the content of cesspool to suburbs and sold it to farmers.283 With the pressure of rapid 
industrialization in the nineteenth century, some areas in the British cities had become too 
populated to use cesspool properly. People began to dump their refuse into the sewers 
designed for surface water. The early sanitation campaigns in Britain, centering on the 
miasmatic idea that foul air made people sick, vigorously condemned practices of cesspools 
and gongfermors. Water closet popular among the affluent forced more refuse down the 
drains, further killing the business. By the mid-nineteenth century, the practice started to 
die out.284  
In China, the tradition went back much further. During the mid-Ming dynasty of 
the late 16th century, the Yangtze Delta had experienced what could be called the “fertilizer 
revolution”. The Book of Promoting Agriculture at Baodi (宝坻劝农书), written by an 
official working in north China but of south origin, kept a good record of where fertilizer 
could be found in the natural environment and how fertilizer could be made out of domestic 
waste and animal refuse. Incineration of grass roots, sludge at the bottom of the lake, 
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limestone could all be used to replenish the used-up soil. Feces of human, pigs, sheep, and 
cattle, even the bones of animals, should be put together in a special vault, waiting for it to 
“ripe”. Heating also helped with faster ripening.285 The Jesuit missionaries were amazed 
by the Chinese practices in conformity of nature that were able to avoid the exhaustion of 
soil and keep the cities from the infection of latrines.286 The north China later developed a 
tradition of making beancake, which consisted of the residue of soybean after the oil was 
extracted. Beancake was easier to transport and apply. It began to gain popularity in the 
Yangtze Delta during Qing dynasty. But nightsoil remained an indispensable source of 
fertilizer.287 
The long-established Chinese customs shaped the reality of the nightsoil business. 
Foreigners were the late comers. For a while, compromise needed to be made. First, there 
were the latrines. Foreigners found it impossible to use these primitive facilities. The Road 
Inspector and Nuisance Inspector therefore urged the Municipal Council to build large, 
better public restrooms. The Chinese quickly responded to the proposal by contacting the 
inspectors, offering their financial assistance. They demanded in return exclusive 
ownership of the nightsoil that came with these restrooms. 288  When the British was 
building its first public restroom on Shakloo Road in May 1862 on the land purchased by 
tax money, it immediately raised concerns that Chinese inhabitants nearby might take 
advantage of the restroom instead of using their own nightstools, or perhaps dumping their 
domestic waste there. The new facility, not yet equipped with water-carriage system, would 
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then be put under serious stress.289 By the end of 1863, the British built another three 
restrooms after experimenting with the first one.290 For each of these facilities, the Council 
needed to deal with individuals for the required land. For example, in 1863 a Chinese 
landowner agreed to offer half of his lot for building a public latrine. He fixed the price at 
Tls. 600. After negotiation, the Council was able to obtain the land at Tls. 400.291 
 Then, there was the rambling nightsoil coolies. In February 1864, the Municipal 
Council issued a series of rules in view of reforming the old practices. They planned to 
recruit a municipal contractor who paid the Council monthly in exchange for access to 
nightsoil within the Settlement. The municipal contractor would also be responsible for 
enforcing certain rules among his coolies. Pouring waste into river or into open ditches was 
strictly prohibited. Nightsoil collection could only go on before 7 o’clock in the morning 
and after 8 at night. The monthly fee for one nightstool was fixed at 180 to 200 cash (1 
cash = 1/1000 tael of silver). The municipal contractor was responsible for providing his 
coolies with ships and buckets. Occasions would arise when some households rejected 
municipal coolies due to their own arrangement. Under such circumstances, police would 
be sent in by the Municipal Council to enforce the new arrangement.292  
Cooperation between foreign power and local hierarchy formally began. By 1865, 
altogether 405 nightsoil coolies were working across the International Settlement. They 
were also employed in emptying public latrines and cleansing the street, which cost the 
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Council no additional charge.293 These rules might seem harsh for the contractor, but 
considering the profitability, people still fought for the job. In 1865, the Council received 
$435 per month from the municipal contractor; in 1866, with a new tender Kiu Ting Chow 
coming in, the Council was able to be paid $505 per month. Meanwhile, the Council was 
seeking to expand the system. They reduced the charge to the Chinese residents from 180 
cash per commode per month to 120 cash, encouraging the low-income to use the 
municipal coolies so that all nightsoil could be disposed properly. 294 They were also 
willing to arrest independent peasants who came to Shanghai, pretending to work for the 
municipal contractor, but were collecting nightsoil for their own benefit.295 It was not 
uncommon that the Council and the contractor would fight over every penny. 296 
Nevertheless, contractor’s monopoly over nightsoil was generally backed up by the foreign 
authorities. The system thus kept growing. 
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In 1878, the Municipal Council made rules into laws. An article regarding waste 
management was formally included in the mini constitution of the Settlement, Building 
Rule. Article VII of the Regulations reads as follow: 
“No privy, urinal or latrine for general use shall be erected in any part of the 
Settlements without the sanction of the Council first obtained, and said 
privy, urinal or latrine shall be erected in all respects in accordance with the 
directions of the Surveyor of the Municipal Council as concerns 
construction, drainage, ventilation and facilities for removal of soil, and 
shall at all times be kept in such state of repair as he may consider necessary 
of advisable; and the Council may at its discretion order any existing privy, 
urinal, or latrine to be closed or removed, on giving seven days’ notice to 
the owner or managing agent of same, and if necessary, in such a case may 
make compensation to the owner or lessee thereof, as the circumstances of 
the case may require.”297  
The Article VII empowered the municipality in handling the problematic Chinese 
latrines. An inexpensive latrine consisted of merely walls and a roof with some buckets in 
it. The bucket ideally were removed twice a day.298 In some cases, the latrine was made of 
bamboo and matting. 299  It was also discovered that some Chinese preferred relived 
themselves outside instead of inside the latrine. This made latrines nuisance to the 
immediate neighborhood. The landholders, therefore, became averse to selling portion of 
their land to the Council for the purpose of building public latrine.300 In a case in 1883, the 
Health Officer spotted a latrine at a Chinese shop Laou-kee-chong that was in such poor 
condition it had become a nuisance. The Officer stated that it must be regularly and 
thoroughly emptied and disinfected, otherwise the Council would obtain an injunction from 
the Court to compel the proprietor to carry out his instructions. The proprietor followed 
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through. He was warned that this establishment would be handed over to the municipal 
nightsoil contractor if it was not cleaned out every morning.301 
To address the shortage of clean restrooms, the Superintendence of Police of the 
Settlement suggested latrines of teahouses be opened to all passers-by for free.302 Because 
teahouses scattered thickly over the Settlement, the Municipal Council apparently stopped 
building more public restrooms. This led to a curious distribution of public restrooms in 
the Settlement. In the old English Settlement (Hongkou not included) were some fourteen 
latrines. They all situated to the west of Henan Road. On the east side of Henan Road, the 
most populous and business-centered area, no public restroom was to be found because the 
foreign banks employed enough coolies to keep the premises clean and free of odor.303 
This might be able to explain why modernizing the nightsoil business had not always been 
a primary concern of the Council. The wealthy and powerful were obviously spared from 
the insanitation that others had to endure on a daily basis. 
5.2 A Flawed Municipal System  
 The system headed by a municipal contractor, created in 1864, seemed to have 
given the Municipal Council considerable power in regulating the nightsoil business. But 
the Council soon began to realize that many owners of Chinese tenements did not switch 
to the system of municipal contractor. They still kept their own nightsoil workers to empty 
the nightstools in their buildings. By 1868 the municipal system was only able to cover 
slightly more than half of the households in the Settlement.304 To make up the loss of 
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revenue, the Council proposed to charge 120 cash, in the name of nuisance rate, for every 
commode in every household, regardless of who they sold their nightsoil to. It was roundly 
rejected. Those who found its own way of removing and selling nightsoil felt strongly 
against the Council’s intervention. Those who were in the municipal system felt being 
double-taxed. The Council argued that the sum collected would be used in scavenging the 
Settlement, a fair environment that all residents would be able to enjoy, therefore a flat rate 
on every household should be considered fair.305 
This dispute was eventually resolved under arbitration in 1869. The arbitrators 
decided that the Council had no right to intervene in matters on private properties. With 
land renters winning the case, the nuisance rate was never implemented and the Council 
lost up to $4,000 in revenue.306 The owners of large area of Chinese houses told the Council 
that their goal could only be achieved by material incentives. If the Watch Committee was 
willing to pay them what they received at present, if not more, they would be more likely 
to switch to the municipal system. 307  Meanwhile, there were mavericks like Thomas 
Hanbury, English banker and a prominent land renters in Shanghai, notifying the Council 
in April 1870 that he would sign a new private contract to have nightsoil removed at his 
properties on Zhili Road, Fujian Road, Wuxi Road, Henan Road, Fuzhou Road, and 
Shandong Road.308 Tension among land renters was brewing.  
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At the Ratepayers’ Meeting in May 1870, the budget for the upcoming fiscal year 
became the hot button issue. The Municipal Council foresaw a fall in nightsoil revenue – 
from Tls. 3,433 last year to Tls. 2,500. This was estimated on the basis of shrinking 
subscription of those who would have their nightsoil removed by the municipal contractor. 
It was then proposed to raise the tax by half percent on land rental to better carry out 
policies regarding sanitation, such as removing garbage and watering the streets. Raising 
taxes never sat well with ratepayers, particularly with people like Thomas Hanbury, who 
thought him understood the nightsoil business better than the Council. Hanbury said 
nightsoil in Shanghai was always saleable, and the account for its removal should be 
balanced by the sale. Hanbury believed that the Council was short selling its nightsoil. He 
knew four land renters who received more for the sale of nightsoil from their houses than 
the Council did for the whole of the rest of the Settlement. He then proposed to amend the 
budget by striking out the half percent raise on land rental. Hanbury’s allies pointed out 
that Nuisance Department received an income of altogether Tls. 9,000 in the previous year, 
Tls. 5,861 in fees and rest in nightsoil income. With this amount, the department was self-
supporting, and it was absolutely unnecessary all ratepayers should be taxed towards its 
expense.309 
F. C. Adams came to the Municipal Council’s defense. Adams said that two buckets 
of nightsoil was sold at 32 cash on the Yangkingpang, and 35 cash on the Suzhou Creek. 
If the Council was selling nightsoil for less than it was worth, Hanbury should inform them 
about the right price. The large Chinese property owners had deprived the Council of great 
portion of its revenue. They got the advantage of cleaner street but wished to throw the 
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burden of paying for it on the small properties, which were the only ones left to the 
Council.310 To this, Hanbury argued that the arbitration in 1869 had already settled the 
matter of nightsoil. Some proprietors might say, we will do so, under the Council’s 
supervision, others might not care for the trouble, and prefer that the Council should 
remove it, and to pay a fee for the purpose. Fee and a general rate of tax should not be 
lumped together. Hanbury contended that although he sold his nightsoil at a different price, 
he paid his own scavenger to clean the streets in his neighborhood. His properties were 
kept in beautiful conditions.311   
After a few back and forth between Hanbury and Adams on whether the street could 
be kept clean with Hanbury’s one scavenger, the chairman decided to proceed to put the 
amendment proposed by Hanbury to vote. It was lost by one vote – 88 vs. 89.312 The 
increased land rental immediately came into effect. In the following year, the Settlement 
indeed witnessed a declining income from nightsoil sales by Tls. 1,000. But the imposition 
of a half percent nuisance rate on the rental was able to make up for the loss.313 
5.3 Towards a Real Municipal System 
Municipal and self-employed nightsoil coolies working side by side caused another 
problem. Whenever the Municipal Council tried to reduce the offensiveness of current 
practices, it faced tough challenges in imposing municipal regulations on non-municipal 
nightsoil men. In March 1886, the Council instructed the police that all coolies carrying 
nightsoil along the streets inside the Settlement must be provided with proper covers. 
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Otherwise they were to be arrested and taken to the Mixed Court, regardless of whether 
they worked for the Council or not.314 In 1894, the air-tight galvanized iron buckets began 
to be used among some municipal nightsoil workers. The result was satisfactory.315 By the 
end of the year, the Council proposed to make a regulation that banned the wooden buckets 
currently in use. The new bucket would be made of iron and cost $2.20 each. A specimen 
one was on display at the office of the sanitary inspector so that the contractors would know 
the right model to buy for coolies.316 In April 1895, the Council discussed the most ideal 
type of bucket for Shanghai. It would not be too heavy, and the opening at the lid should 
not be too small. Three months later, the new scheme was implemented under the 
instruction of the Municipal Engineer.317  
On July 1, 1895, the new regulation came into effect. It required all coolies in the 
International Settlement to carry nightsoil in the new buckets. And that was when the strike 
began. The resistance was led by an old Chinese woman who was well known for her 
defensiveness against any interference with her pecuniary interests. Her nightsoil workers 
complained that the new bucket was too heavy. The old one weighed 12 pound, whereas 
the new one was around 30 pound. The non-municipal workers went on a strike the same 
day the new regulation came in effect. The situation was most acute in Hongkou, where 
nightsoil workers deposited a sting of about hundred full and empty buckets in front of the 
Hongkou Railway Station. Others sneaked into the police compound and left their foul-
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smelling loads inside. An altogether 115 nightsoil buckets containing nightsoil was placed 
in the compound. The nuisance did not cease until a constable was stationed at the gate.318   
In the central district of the Settlement, about nine hundred nightsoil workers, 
armed with bamboos, made a grand charge towards the police at the Laozha Police Station 
(Tianjin Rd. & Guizhou Rd.). The crowd was loud but little damage was done as they 
stopped shortly after entering the compound. The coolies then turned their attention to 
finding the previous municipal contractor who agreed to the Council’s decision before 
leaving the position. They tried to take him to a teashop where they believed they could 
force him to renounce the agreement. But the ex-contractor managed to escape and found 
shelter in the Laozha Police Station.319  
 The next day, July 2, the municipal contractor’s coolies resumed their duties, but 
private contractors’ coolies compelled them to continue with the strike. The Sanitary 
Inspector of the Municipal Council prosecuted a woman at the Mixed Court who was 
represented as being the principal intimidator. The woman allegedly refused to supply the 
coolies with the new pattern buckets, but she contended that her workers were prevented 
from working by other coolies. The new Magistrate, who spoke English, was not willing 
to deal with the case unless he could consult the British Assessor because the case involved 
the Municipal Council. But the Sanitary Inspector insisted that the strike had been on for 
two days and the weather was hot, a delay on the solution to this matter would cost the 
community its health. So the hearing continued. In the end, the woman was given another 
week to acquire the new buckets, and she was promised protection from the police to keep 
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harassment by other coolies. Still, she was angry, cursing the previous municipal 
contractor, slapping her knees while vowing vengeance. Another nightsoil contractor, Sah 
Doh-mau, who was behind the nuisance at the Hongkou Police Compound, was sentenced 
to two weeks’ imprisonment and had all his buckets confiscated. As they saw no hope in 
laying their hands on the previous municipal contractor, the angry mob of nightsoil workers 
gradually dispersed.320  
After the 1895 revolt was appeased, the municipal system began to take shape. 
Nuisance fee kept the government oversight going, and labor forces became more 
disciplined. Although no forceful action was taken in reaching the goal, the increase of 
contract fee over the years indicated a growing number of subscribers to the municipal 
system. For example, the new tender in 1873 was Tsang Ah Nook (曾阿牛) who paid the 
Council $345 per month in addition to a deposit of $1,000.321 In contrast, Sung Yuen Kee, 
the contractor of 1898, was willing to pay $3,200 per month.322 By March 1899, the 
Council could comfortably claimed that it had “the undivided control of the nightsoil 
collection by the nuisance branch”, and it had worked well with remarkably few complaints 
in regard to the service.323 
5.4 Banning Water Closets 
When the Shanghai Waterworks Company completed its infrastructure in 1883, it 
immediately came to the Council’s notice that people might take advantage of the water 
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supply by installing plumbing fixtures at home. Someone dubbed as “Sanitarian” in The 
North-China Herald warned the Council about the damage it could do once water closets 
were connected with the drains. Typhoid and cholera and other filth diseases would become 
the rule instead of the exception. He suggested that earth closets should be adopted. They 
could clean out refuse without having water-carriage system placing extra burden onto the 
existing drainage. He said in many of the provincial towns of England, the supply of dry 
earth, and removal of the soil, was undertaken by the sanitary authorities. Each closet had 
duplicate, air-tight, covered buckets, marked with the number of the house. One was 
cleansed, and filled with clean dry earth, to place in the hopper of the closet, and was 
delivered by cart early in the morning; the other was taken away at the same time to be 
emptied, cleansed, and recharged with dry earth, for delivery next morning. In Shanghai 
fine sifted earth was obtainable from foreshores in any dry days. “Sanitarian” claimed that 
he had an earth closet for the last ten years: five whilst in the English Settlement, and five 
in the suburbs. He found it far superior over the ill-smelling and unhealthy manual 
collection of nightsoil. Earth toilet would banish typhoid fever and probably cholera, if 
ratepayers, both foreign and native, were “compelled for the common good to use them.”324 
During the late nineteenth century, earth closet was for a while seen as the legit 
alternative to water closet. It was invented by Henry Moule, an English “divine inventor”. 
Moule was a Cambridge graduate. He worked as the vicar of Fordington. Dorset much of 
his career. He patented the dry-earth system in 1860 in pursuit of a better national health. 
Moule promoted his vision unwearyingly and argued that earth closet was better because 
water merely removed the waste, but earth absorbed and deodorized it. Moule’s invention 
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found an audience in North America where the United States and Canada, less urbanized 
than Europe, were in the process of replacing old-fashioned privy houses.325 In Shanghai, 
the earliest mention of earth closet was in October 1869. The Municipal Council at the time 
was having a trouble similar to the one in North America. They purchased and put in place 
some public urinals, but they did not work well. The Council was in the middle of selling 
and replacing them and that was the moment when Henry Moule and his alternative 
invention entered the dialogue.326 However, there was no evidence of general adoption of 
earth closet in Shanghai after 1869. Nor was it ever mentioned again in the press after 1883. 
Earth closet seemed to have been quickly forgotten. 
Water closet did not become immediately commonplace in Shanghai either. It was 
not until 1904 that nuisance caused by the increased usage of water closet caught the 
attention of the Health Officer. On April 27, 1904, the Watch Committee presented to the 
Council the Health Officer’s report. Edward Henderson urged the Council to stop further 
installation of water closet because overflowing cesspool was threatening the health of the 
community. The Council was ambivalent. While the directors unanimously agreed that the 
current drainage system was not built for water-closet discharge, it was not within the 
Council’s authority to prohibit people from using water closet on their own properties. The 
Health Officer suggested that Building Rule needed to be adjusted to execute the ban. But 
some worried that water closet without connection to drainage would only cause more 
hazard.327 On a different note, water closet undermined the existing nightsoil regime. The 
discharge contained too much water, making the waste less valuable than the nightstool 
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nightsoil of same weight. Cesspool was also difficult to deal with for nightsoil coolies 
compared to the old task of emptying a nightstool of waste into a bucket or a cart. 
Therefore, in July 1904 the Council was seriously considering charging water closet users 
to make up for the dwindling contract money.328 
Meanwhile, water closets were gaining traction. Entering the twentieth century, the 
Bund became the testing ground of various new types of architecture. As the buildings 
grew taller and finer, so grew the necessity of installing water-closet systems. In January 
1905, architectural agent Scott & Carter (玛礼逊洋行) applied to the Municipal for 
installation of a water-closet system at the new Palace Hotel (汇中饭店).  They were going 
to build a six-story tall building on the Bund for Central Store, Ltd. (汇中洋行). Health 
Officer Henderson pointed out the Public Health Department objection to this form of 
disposal and requested Scott & Cater’s reconsideration of the matter. The Council decided 
that in the wake of their introducing this installation, they would make a charge of Tls. 150 
per month for removal of the ordure.329 Amidst its emerging popularity, water closet was 
officially banned. On July 4, 1906, the Land Commission approved the Council’s 
amendment to Building Rule 76: “No connexion shall be made with any drain public or 
private whereby ordure will be discharged into the same. No water closet, cesspool, cistern 
or permanent receptacle for sewage or ordure shall be constructed or used” 330  The 
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Shanghai Waterworks Company even agreed that it would refuse to supply water to all 
houses outside Settlement limits where water closets were installed.331 
However, the application for water closet installation kept coming. In January 1908, 
the Council received another application for installing water-closet system at the Mrs. 
McBain’s residence in the Bubbling Well Road in the west extension of the Settlement. 
The prominent architectural and civil engineering company Atkinson & Dallas (通和洋行
) enclosed plans of an elaborate sewage device. The Works Committee was unanimously 
of opinion that no exception to the Building Rule on this point should be permitted, 
however perfect the proposed arrangement was. Otherwise, the case would be cited as 
precedent for like concessions hereafter. The application was therefore rejected.332 The 
only exception was the Shanghai Club. In November 1908, when erecting their new 
building, the Shanghai Club applied for the installation of a system of water closets. The 
old building of the Club has been so equipped for many years. Opinions were therefore 
divided among directors. They then decided that water closet be only applied on first and 
ground floor, but not in the bedrooms. The Council permitted the connection of the 
drainage of the new club building directly with the Huangpu River as heretofore.333 This 
decision was probably made due to the unique nature of the Shanghai Club. The Club was 
the place where foreigners gathered for drinking and party. Manual nightsoil disposal 
simply could not deal with the amount of discharge being produced every day. 
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Figure 12 – Long bar at the Shanghai Club. Source: “Shanghai Zonghui Dalou”, 
Wikipedia, https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/上海总会大楼  
There were three reasons why the Municipal Council was cautiously against water 
closet. First, it disturbed the municipal contractor system the Council painstakingly created. 
The contractor did not like diluted waste and cesspool. Record of contractors of the late 
1910s showed that they would charge the owner $1 per water closet for emptying 
cesspools. It was obviously troublesome for their coolies.334 Second, the existing drainage 
system was not ready for water-closet discharge. Drains made in the 1870s were for the 
sole purpose of draining storm water. Many were small and narrow – varying from 15 in. 
to 3 ft. 3 in. Large quantity of solid waste would leave the drains chocked up. Finally, the 
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concerns about river pollution. We have established in Chapter 2 that main drains ran 
across the Settlement and had their outlets north in the Suzhou Creek and south in the 
Yangkingpang. If water closets were connected to drainage, organic waste matter would 
flood the creeks. Considering how the British at home survived “the Great Stink” in the 
summer of 1858, to which the reckless use of water closet and cesspool contributed greatly, 
it was not surprising that those in Shanghai wanted as few water closets as possible in their 
neighborhood.335 
5.5 Lifting the Ban on Water Closet 
 The interest in water closet in Shanghai was reignited after a critical technology in 
waste treatment was introduced – septic tank. Septic tank was a sedimentation tank, which 
permitted the decomposition of solids or sludge in the absence of oxygen, leading to a type 
of fermentation. A septic tank was made in cement. It would have several outlets where 
processed water, with nearly all organic pollutants removed, was released back to the soil. 
The sludge could be removed and sold as fertilizer. In comparison, a cesspool drained 
waste matter by its porous brick wall, poisoning the surrounding soil, and needed to be 
emptied more regularly. Septic tank was thus a safer and more convenient alternative. In 
Britain, septic tanks gained wider popularity after 1895. It was then patented and improved 
in continental Europe. By World War I, approximately seventy-five cities and several 
institutions employed the latest Imhoff septic tank. It soon became the most popular 
method for preparing sewage for further treatment on both sides of the Atlantic.336 
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Figure 13 – Structure of the Imhoff Tank. Source: Asmus, 2019. 
https://www.wwoa.org/history/treatment/ 
 Septic tank made its brief first appearance in the record of Shanghai in 1913. The 
Banque de l’Indo Chine applied for the installation of water closet and septic tank in the 
new building, which would be four-story tall and located at the Bund. The Health Officer’s 
report on septic tank was read, but certain members of the Council did not think the 
prohibition on septic tank was reasonable. It was stated that such tanks were in use in the 
French Settlement and at other treaty ports like Hankou and Tianjin. They requested the 
Health Officer to produce another report on this matter. The new report was written in two 
weeks. It was then circulated at the meeting and had convinced the Council that it would 
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be undesirable to make any exception in the application of Article 76. The Council then 
declined the application of the Banque de l’Indo Chine.337 
 The real challenge to the water closet ban occurred in 1915. The McBain Company, 
after purchasing three land lots (50, 99 and 153) at the junction of the Bund and the 
Yangkingpang, commenced in 1913 the construction of what was later known as the 
McBain Building, a four-storied tall building situated at the most prominent location in the 
Settlement. On April 25, 1914, desiring to install in the buildings a water-closet system, 
the McBains submitted to the Municipal Engineer a diagram and particulars of the 
proposed system. Any suggestions were welcome, but the Council had not made any. The 
McBains sent in another application, particularly seeking for a permit. The Council on 
February 18, 1915, refused to grant a permit on the ground of Land Regulation Article 30 
and the Building Rule No 76, which was amended and announced to the public by 
Municipal Notification No. 1789. 338 Compared to the earlier applications, the case of 
McBain Building divided the Council further apart. Some urged changes to be made to the 
current rules because water closet was prerequisite to the modern hygiene. Another 
presented to the Council a letter signed by foreign physicians in Shanghai, in which they 
argued for the wide adoption of septic tanks.339 The Council consulted their legal advisor 
and was only told that Foreign Building Rule No. 76 was not legally binding.340  
 In July 1915, the McBain Company brought the petition to the Court of Consul, 
calling for the annulment of the Rule No. 76. They argued that if water closets and septic 
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tanks, which were in universal use in every civilized country, were a danger in Shanghai, 
they would not had proceeded with the petition. The current rules did not elaborate on how 
the system should be installed or where it should be installed. The prohibition was general, 
which was unreasonable. The McBain Company was entitled to the new system in a 
building, which could be described as one of the largest buildings, if not the largest, in 
Shanghai. The McBain Building was said to have over forty different establishments, with 
over forty coolies properly to carry out their duties. The building was an exceedingly high 
one. If nightsoil were to be removed manually, there needed to be a staircase provided for 
that purpose only, which was apparently impossible. Nightstools would meet food and 
other articles being carried in the staircase. The danger of flies was also inevitable. The 
McBain Company was able to obtain the opinions of four doctors, Dr. N. Macleod, Dr. 
Ziervogel, Dr. Goode and Dr. Marshall, all of whom had been asked to submit a report on 
the water-closet system by Moorhead and Halse, architects to the petitioner. They all spoke 
in favor of the system.341 
In response, the attorney for the Council stated that it was striking that so far as the 
proceedings have gone, no reference at all had been made to the question of the water 
supply of Shanghai. The question was simple: whether, as a matter of fact, the introduction 
of a system of water closets in Shanghai would, or would not, be likely to constitute a 
serious danger to the public health by reason of possible contamination of the water supply. 
It was the sole reason why the Council were in Court. Based on the operation of several 
existing water-closet system in Shanghai, they were extremely unsatisfactory and a danger 
to public health by contamination. The discharge was either poured down the surface 
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drains, from which it found its way into the river, or was placed in boats where it was 
dumped into the river halfway to the farmlands. Shanghai had an unusual arrangement 
regarding water supply. The intake at Yangtszepoo was situated within the very big town, 
not farther away. The quality of water supply thus depended on the effective collection of 
nightsoil and other waste matters. Changes in the present arrangements regarding sanitary 
matters was thus not advisable.342  
In defending the Municipal Council’s stance, Health Office Arthur Stanley argued 
that 1. Unless the waste was suitable for agricultural purposes it was practically impossible 
to prevent it going into the river. Water closet drainage had no local agricultural value and 
was rejected by the boatmen.  2. There had been water closets, cesspools or tanks installed 
before the prohibition came into effect. None of these installations, due to their defective 
working, could be recommended from a sanitary point of view. 3. There was no method of 
purification for water closet drainage applicable to the McBain Building yet known to 
sanitary science. Septic tanks did not do all the work. 4. The suggested “concrete container 
in the yard at the rear of the buildings into which ordure from commodes could be dumped” 
could not be recommended from a sanitary point of view and was, moreover, prohibited by 
the rule. 5. The alternative was the ordinary system in vogue in Shanghai applicable to a 
large building as to a small one. For example, at the newly built large The Victoria Nursing 
Home (on Henan Road), no nuisance was caused by adopting the ordinary method of 
disposal of ordure. Five ordinary ordure buckets held the day’s accumulation and were kept 
in a small fly-proof place in the yard below, ready for removal by the coolie each morning. 
But Dr. Stanley did admit water-closet system was more convenient, apart from the 
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question of disposal.343 The attorney representing the McBain Company had the following 
exchange with Stanley:  
“Do you really contend there is no advantage in a water-closet system over 
the commode system as regard public health?”  
 “Yes. The present system is extraordinarily well carried out by Chinese, 
and there is very little spilling.” 
“When these vessels are washed out, the dregs must go into the surface 
drains?” 
“No, they go into the coolie’s bucket.” 
“How do you know that?” 
“I have seen it. I have watched it many times.” 
“Are you prepared seriously to tell us that the coolies never spill the dregs 
into the surface drain?” 
“No, I would not say that. It certainly occurs sometimes, but I don’t think it 
happens very very often.” 
… “…[Has] it never occurred to you that there might be some method 
started in Shanghai of dealing with water closet drainage?” 
“Yes.”  
“A method such as has been suggested by my witnesses - a destructor or 
evaporator?” 
“Yes, but to me they are impracticable. I don’t think anything that has been 
suggested is a practicable scheme. I think if there had been a practicable 
scheme, we should have got it.” 
Dr. Stanley then referred to the London system, and said that the discharges 
there finally went into the river. They were treated in London, so far as he 
knew, by precipitation works.  
“And is that impossible in Shanghai?” 
“It is not impossible but impracticable.” 
“Why is it impracticable?” 
“… Shanghai is vastly different from other places in the world. The chief 
difference was in the supply of labor, and the most important thing to 
consider was the water, which was obtained from the river, though this was 
not an overwhelming obstacle. The scheme suggested by the petitioners was 
impossible with the present sewage system. My experience of the disposal 
of nightsoil was not limited to what a contractor said he would or would not 
do. The contractor and the boatmen might object to the proposed scheme on 
the ground that it touched their pockets.” 
“Is it not a fact that the only reason you know why this cannot be done is 
that the boatmen won’t take the stuff?” 
“No.” 344 




A. P. Wood, Secretary and Engineer-in-chief of the Shanghai Waterworks, also 
spoke against the McBain scheme on the ground of danger to the water supply. C. H. 
Godfrey, Municipal Engineer, speaking on the method of removal, said numerous 
complaints had been received from the Harbor Authorities and the River Police about 
dumping. Such unsatisfactory practices could not be eliminated. A proper sewage scheme, 
however, would cost millions of Taels.345 
In July, the Court of Consuls decided that Building Rule 76, the ban on water-closet 
system, was ultra vires. The Court held that such a prohibition was not within the authority 
given by the Land Regulation, and that the application of the by-laws would suffice to 
obviate any serious danger to the public health.346 However, the Court also contended that 
while the McBains were at liberty to proceed with the installation, the Municipal Council 
were fully entitled to refuse to receive into the boats used by their contractor the contents 
of the tank or cesspool connected with the proposed water-closet system. The McBains 
were bound themselves to the satisfaction of the municipal sanitary authority to provide 
for the periodical removal beyond the limits of the Settlement of all nightsoil collected on 
their new premises. 347 The dispute between the McBain Company and the Municipal 
Council might have shaken the legal framework that had long been containing the 
development of water-closet system in the Settlement, but technological changes were still 
faced with basic practical questions – like, where should the waste water go? 
5.6 Dealing with Toilet Discharge 
                                                 
345 Ibid. 
346 Ibid. 
347 “Local Affairs”, The North-China Herald, July 17, 1915: 133. 
 189 
 After the unfavorable ruling, the Municipal Council struggled with the inevitability 
of water-closet system. Applications and inquires had been received by the Council, 
requesting the Building Rules Commission to draw up new rules with respect to water 
closets and to incorporate them in the revised code. However, C. H. Godfrey, the Municipal 
Engineer, argued that the innovation of water closet was too gigantic an experiment for the 
city, and a too expensive one. Godfrey said: “In my opinion the adoption of a general 
sewage disposal scheme for Shanghai is unnecessary and impracticable. I do not say that 
from an engineering point of view it is impossible - there is no such thing as an engineering 
impossibility provided the necessary funds are forthcoming.” 348  
Godfrey mentioned the recent practices in England – the borough of Cheltenham, 
in the valley formed by the semicircular sweep of the Cotswold hills, had a sewage farm. 
The farm was situated some distance from the town, on which cabbage, roots, etc., were 
grown with great success and sold for fodder, making the farm a source of income to the 
ratepayers. Godfrey suggested that the Municipal Council should obtain a large tract of 
land and farm it by strictly controlling the disposal of sewage. This system, which would 
cost ratepayers far less than a general water carriage system, would be able to rid of many 
very real dangers to health. Godfrey admitted that the feasibility, both engineering and 
financial, of a project of such scale could not be understood with his expertise on this 
matter. He suggested the Council to reach out to experts who enjoyed global acclaim to 
address the issue.349  
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 A series of measures were taken in 1916 to curb the rapid development of water-
closet system. In February, the Municipal Council began to impose special fees on water 
closet users – Tls. 2 per water closet, and Tls. 20 per septic tank.350 A special committee 
was created under the Building Rule Commission to assess the effectiveness of septic tank. 
After two months of investigation, the committee had it verdict: septic tanks were not safe 
to public health because the so-called bacterial process was ineffective in removing all 
impurities. 351  At the end of 1916, the scheme of waste disposal had emerged. After 
consulting directors, engineer and surveyors, legal advisers, chief officers of the Fire 
Brigade, architects, and property owners, the Council put forth the revised code of the 
Building Bye-laws. It stated that water closet effluent must be conveyed into airtight and 
watertight cesspools. No form of treatment by sedimentation or filtration or treatment by 
bacteriological method of excremental matter from water closets shall be permitted in the 
Settlement.352  In other words, the ban on water closet was lifted, but septic tanks were still 
forbidden. 
The public had their own take on the unfriendliness the Council held against septic 
tanks. Some said that the Municipal Council reportedly received a comfortable sum at the 
rate of Tls. 90,000 per year. This money was virtually collected from the ratepayers’ 
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pockets, since monthly fees had to be paid by each household to the coolies. Therefore, the 
sum ought to be employed for the comfort and safety of the population of Shanghai. The 
municipal revenue accumulated over the years should be enough to go a very long way 
towards the cost of construction of a sewage works. “The question which now presents 
itself is:” the author in The Herald wrote, “whether a sewage works is justified, because it 
eliminates any profits accruing from the disposal of the residuum. The dollar again enters 
into the discussion, and that seems to us to be the greatest obstacle to an adequate and 
rightful solution of the whole affair.”353 In the eyes of the general public, the Municipal 
Council’s prolonged resistance against house drainage system was not a matter of 
sanitation or cost; it was solely determined by the wish and will of the Council and the 
influence of the vested interest. “If not enough, other municipal expenses ought to be cut 
down,” someone wrote in The North-China Herald, “A safe system of house draining is of 
more importance than an expensive Municipal Band.”354 
 The public also expressed their loss of faith in the old manual system of nightsoil 
disposal. Stanley’s defense of the old practices was shredded in the press. The health 
regime of the Municipal Council was under attack. Some argued that while waiting for the 
right tide, nightsoil farmers formed a floating population who lived and defecated over 
these creeks. This was equally injurious to the quality of water supply.355 Others said a 
large proportion of nightsoil coolies emptied about fifty percent of all fluid matter into the 
drains and took almost only the solid matter.356 Not to mention that in spite of the Council’s 
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attempt in regulating the working hours of nightsoil coolies, most of the city still needed 
to endure the parade of countless evil-smelling nightsoil carts every morning. “It seems 
preposterous,” someone wrote in The Herald, “that the Health Department should allow 
these crazy, ramshackle hand-carts to be used and that the unsavory work should not all be 
complete in the early hours of the day when few people are about, instead of being 
continued up to close on ten o’clock in the forenoon.”357 
5.7 Help from Outside: The Fowler’s Report 
 The Municipal Engineer, C. H. Godfrey, had for some time suggested that the issue 
of waste disposal could only be solved under the help of experts outside Shanghai. Now 
that the reputation of the Health Officer Arthur Stanley was damaged, the Municipal 
Council had to look outside. Godfrey recommended Gilbert Fowler, a bacterial chemistry 
professor at Manchester University, as the candidate for the job. In April 1917, the Council 
had agreed to pay Fowler £525 for traveling and composing a report.358 Fowler at the time 
resided and worked in India. Due to conflict of time, Fowler did not arrive at Shanghai 
until June 1918. At the first Municipal Council’s meeting he attended on June 19, Fowler 
made some preliminary instructions for the system in Shanghai, including separation of 
“trade effluent”, i.e. industrial waste, from domestic waste and replacing iron buckets with 
enamel ones.359 
 The most important instruction from Fowler was the employment of “Activated 
Sludge Process” in the treatment of waste water. Fowler was a specialist and the self-
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claimed inventor of this process.  In his early works, Fowler already demonstrated 
sophisticated understanding of aeration and its application in sewage treatment. He also 
had envisioned a treatment plant that consisted of sedimentary, anaerobic, aerobic, 
chemical clarification processes.360 When he was visiting the United States in 1912, Fowler 
ventured to the pioneering experiment station in Lawrence, Massachusetts, where he had 
his eureka moment. After returning to Britain, Fowler initiated a series of experiments at 
Manchester’s Davyhulme sewage works. After sedimentation, sewage was aerated in the 
presence of a bacterial sediment or sludge. The effluent became extraordinarily clean. 
Fowler had his new equipment designed and manufactured. The city of Manchester 
purchased them and had them operating between September 20 and 26, 1913. Another 
scientist Walter Jones patented the Activated Sludge Process in October 1913, which 
consisted an aeration tank, a final settling tank and a pump for return of sludge. In 
November 1913, Fowler and his associates presented publicly the first of his Manchester 
studies, suggesting that effluent could be free from bacteria after six hours of aeration. 
These inventions and discoveries were followed by a string of scientific literature and new 
patents applications. Activated sludge plants were installed in England. From 1914 to 1921, 
at least seven of this kind was built across the country.361 Shanghai might be slow in its 
adoption of water closet, but as for the sewage treatment technology, it did not come in late 
at all.  
 In Shanghai, Fowler spent more than a month investigating local conditions. During 
this time, the Health Officer and engineers of the Shanghai Waterworks Company provided 
                                                 
360 Fowler (1902), 1-20; Fowler (1911), 280-311. 
361 Benedickson, 219-220; Melosi, 111. 
 194 
very complete statistics regarding the bacteriological and chemical information of the 
Huangpu River and the current arrangement of water supply at Yangtszepoo. In his final 
report, Fowler addressed a dozen of important questions that had been left unanswered for 
years. First, water-closet system. Fowler concluded that the extension of water carriage of 
sewage in Shanghai was inevitable, to which septic tanks should give way to. Vacuum tank 
wagon would be employed in emptying the existing septic tanks. The Municipal Engineer 
should be instructed to prepare plans and estimates for a system of separate sewers, 
discharging into ejectors from which the sewage would be forced by compressed air to a 
suitable area of land for treatment. At least 300 acres of land for this purpose needed to be 
acquired. For every hundred thousand people a million-and-a-half-gallon tank is required. 
The sewage would be treated by the “Activated Sludge Process”. It would produce an 
effluent which could be absorbed by the land and be turned into the river without nuisance 
or danger, and a sludge which could take the place of the nightsoil for peasants. Second, 
the source of water supply. Fowler had examined the water of the Yangtze, taken several 
miles above its junction to the Huangpu. It was better than the current source of water but 
was still subject to pollution. There was no practical source of water in Shanghai like the 
one in Lake Katrine or Lake Thirlmere, the purity of which was incomparable. Therefore, 
if Shanghai were to keep its present source of water supply, no discharge of unpurified or 
imperfectly purified sewage into the river should be permitted on any extended scale. This 
objection to discharge into the river needed to be reinforced by the necessity of 
safeguarding supplies of fertilizer to the surrounding country. More observations and 
analysis should be done in laboratories. Third, the persisting drainage problem. Fowler 
recommends that the present sewers be only used for rain water and that garbage be 
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excluded therefrom by screens and catchpits. The smaller creeks in the inhabited districts 
of Shanghai were at present a frequent cause of nuisance. They should be either inverted 
in cement concrete or completely culverted and transformed into sewer, whichever the 
local conditions may render most economic or desirable. Finally, Fowler called for a Joint 
Board for water supply and sewage disposal, which should comprise representatives from 
all bodies concerned, including the French Concession and the Chinese City.362 
After Fowler’s departure, the Municipal Council had some further discussion on 
the matter. The Municipal Engineer C. H. Godfrey expressed his agreement regarding the 
character of effluent after the “Activated Sludge Process”. He suggested that the effluent 
remained a danger of disease producing organism that could reach waterworks. Therefore, 
the location of treatment plants needed to be carefully thought out. Godfrey also suggested 
that 300-acre land for the plant was necessary. Fifty acres would be sufficient.363 Starting 
from the summer of 1919, the Municipal Council had been trying out the new system of 
sewage disposal. In August, the Municipal Engineer, C. H. Godfrey published in the 
Municipal Gazette the report on the proposed sewage disposal system. Godfrey had 
recently visited America, and the information he had gained there gave the matter its 
practical aspect. A small experimental plant was built by the Public Works Department and 
the result had been satisfactory. Fowler’s idea was to include not only the International 
Settlement, but the French Concession and Chinese City as well. But local economy and 
politics had ruled out such possibilities. Godfrey said that with a population smaller than 
Shanghai, Cairo had just completed a sewerage scheme costing £2,000,000. Shanghai 
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needed to be prepared for bigger figures when contemplating future sanitary 
arrangements.364 
5.8 The Creation of Water-Carriage System  
Shanghai was partly following through on Gilbert Fowler’s instructions. In the fall 
of 1919, Godfrey reported that experiments of the Activated Sludge Process had been 
carried out on a small scale for nearly four months. A primitive plant was able to deal with 
4,000 gallons of water closet sewage a day. A clear effluent with a pale yellow tinge was 
of little or no noticeable smell. The Council was recommended to replace the current 
experimental plant with another one, still experimental, but on a commercial scale, and to 
employ a chemist who had experience in matters such as sewage disposal and water 
supply.365 In November 1919, Godfrey polled the Central District and estimated a total of 
1,382 water closets and 575 baths to be installed.366 By March 1920, the handcarts of the 
Health Department and the vacuum tank wagons of the Public Works Department were 
employed in emptying cesspools, particularly in the eastern portions of the Central 
District.367 In September 1920, when Godfrey returned from his trip to India and Burma 
after examining the water supply and sewer system there, the total number of basins (toilet, 
bathtubs , etc.) in the whole of the Settlement had increased by at least 1,000, still all 
connected to cesspools, which had to be emptied at no longer periods than every three 
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days.368 In January 1921, the Council approved a scheme for a sewerage system that would 
deal with the sewage from the portion of the Central District east of Henan Road. The 
matter was of urgency.369 
Meanwhile, engineers in Shanghai joined the discussion about the effectiveness of 
various sewage treatment. At the Engineering Society of China’s meeting in March 1921, 
a paper on “The Present Aspect of Sewage Disposal with Special Reference to Shanghai” 
was presented. The sewer consisted for the most part of 9 in. diameter concrete pipes. The 
main sewer would run via the Bund, Huangpu Road, Nanjing Road, and Dixwell Road to 
the Disposal site. The size of this would increase from 12 in. diameter at the Bund to 1 ft. 
6 in. by 1 ft., egg-shaped after it left the Central District. The pipes would be laid so as to 
ensure a self-cleansing velocity to the sewage. They would travel by gravity from pump to 
pump en route, with the exception of the lengths crossing the Suzhou Creek, the Hongkou 
Creek, and others. Pumping mains were provided over these crossings. Pumping stations 
would be provided at six localities en route. They would be constructed underground, and 
no public inconvenience would be resulted. It had been decided to use the Stereophagus 
type of centrifugal pump, the special feature of which was that it did not become choked 
by the passage of ordinary solids. The impeller, which was conical, had a number of spiral 
blades, which, working against a straight cutting blade, provided an action which had been 
likened to that of a mowing machine. The pumps would be automatic in their action and 
would be electrically driven. In that same report, sedimentation tank was demerited, 
including septic tanks and other two special forms of tanks invented by Dr. Travis and Dr. 
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Imhoff (Figure 13). Aeration was regarded as the only viable measure in sewage 
treatment.370  
On July 20, 1921, the Public Works Department presented the comprehensive 
reports on the subject of sewage disposal to the Municipal Council. The scheme provided 
for the conveyance of sewage to three disposal sites. The Northern works situated on the 
land to the rear of the Rifle Butts, the effluent to discharge into the Sawginkiang (沙泾港
), a main stream in Hongkou area. The Western works was situated on land closely 
adjoining Brenan Road (长宁路), the effluent to discharge into the Suzhou Creek. The 
Eastern works was to be situated towards the eastern end of the Eastern District, the effluent 
to discharge into the Huangpu. Each of these works would receive sewage from a certain 
section of the Settlement, with the Northern one managing mostly waste of Hongkou, the 
Western one of the western extension, and the East one of the Central District of the 
Settlement. The report explained why they planned to build three treatment plants, instead 
of treating the whole of sewage at one site. It was because to pump sewage in any great 
quantities from the north to the south of the Suzhou Creek would be costly. The current 
arrangement was more economical. Godfrey suggested that for the completion of the work 
of the Central District, it would be necessary to provide an appropriation of Tls. 50,000 in 
the 1922 budget. The total cost of the project, including land purchase, stood at 3,870,000 
(see Figure 14).371  
                                                 
370 Ibid. 
371 More details about the scheme was provided in the report, especially regarding the layout of sewers and 
pumps. In Central District, the pump would be solely dealing with the portion east of Henan Road. It situated 
at the junction of Bubbling Well Road and Tibet Road. The sewage would gravitate thereto by two main lines 
of sewers, a 12-in. diameter sewer traversing Hankou Road and Tibet Road picking up the sewers in the area 
 199 
 
Figure 14 – The estimated total expenditure of the sewer system. Source:  “Sewage 
Disposal”, The North-China Herald, Sep 17, 1921: 894. 
                                                 
south of Nanjing Road, and a12 in. diameter sewer via Ningbo Road, Lloyd Road, and so to the pump 
chamber, dealing with the sewers north of Nanjing Road. The subsidiary sewers flowing into these main 
sewers would all be 9-in. diameter. In the Western District, sewage travel westward via Bubbling Well Road, 
Hart Road, Yuyuen Road and Brenan Road to the site of the Disposal Works, subsidiary main sewers entering 
at the junctions of Mohawk Road, Burkill Road and Gordon Road, with Bubbling Well Road. Two 4-inc. 
pumps would be installed at the junction of Weihaiwei Road and Mohawk Road, the sewage being conveyed 
through a 12-in. diameter pipe to join the main sewer in Bubbling Well Road. In the Eastern District, west of 
MacGregor Road (Lintong Road), a 12-in. diameter main sewer would be laid in Broadway (大名路), passing 
along Chaoufoong Road, East Yuhang Road, Tungchow Road, East Yalu Road and Urga Road through the 
join the main sewer in Dixwell Road, this latter conveying the sewage through to the site by the Rifle Butts. 
Two pump stations would be necessary, one with two 6-in. pumps at the junction of Tongshan Road and 
Chaufoong Road, and the other with three 6-inch. Pumps in Urga Road close to where this road crosses the 
Sawginkiang. The subsidiary sewers would all be 9-in. diameter. East of MacGregor Road development was 
chiefly confined to the vicinity of Yangtszepoo Road, and though there are some very large industrial works 
in this area, it may be impracticable to provide a water carriage system of sewers for some years. In the 
meantime, it may suffice to convey cesspool sewage to the nearest completed main sewer by tank wagons. 
See “Sewage Disposal”, The North-China Herald, Sep 17, 1921: 894. 
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 By mid-1926, the construction was near its completion. At the Eastern District 
Works, four more longitudinal walls had been poured to the aeration tanks, making a total 
of sixteen. At the power house, the concrete walling and columns had been poured up to 
the low roof level. At the Western Treatment Works, the preparation of the Power House 
was in hand and the steel was being prepared.372 By the end of 1926, the Engineering 
Society proudly claimed that a modern system of sewerage, commenced five years ago, 
was put into operation this year. The system was capable of dealing with the whole of the 
International Settlement and the total cost had been somewhat more than three million 
Taels. The sewage was pumped in stages by means of automatically controlled electrically 
driven pumps and was treated by means of the activated sludge system at two large 
treatment works situated in the Rubicon Road and near the Point. The effluent obtained is 
very satisfactory. The engineer even suggested that these works were on par with the latest 
practice in Europe and America.373 
By 1930, Public Works Department and Health Department were jointly handling 
a disposal of nearly 1,000 tons of refuse every day.374 There were 19 of pumping stations 
in existence, each of which was fitted with electrically driven centrifugal pumps, dealing 
with the flatness of Shanghai. The total length of sewers laid to date was 50 miles.375 A 
traveler’s note in 1930 recorded the art of the sewage farm in Shanghai. “The task of 
standing over its tanks and admiring the system whereby air compression separates the 
actuated sludge from moderately clean water, thus saving the Municipal Council enormous 
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expenditure on sewage transport and long distance dumping, demands some display of 
heroism.”376 What was also recorded was an ongoing Chinese festivity at one of the sewage 
works. It was a feast day of local importance. A fat smiling Taoist priest was in charge of 
an amazingly kaleidoscopic marionette show. The works was decorated with gaily colored 
paper streamers. The works was open to all Chinese visitors. They could even take a 
curious glance at the engines in the engine room.377  
5.9 Conclusion: Expert Systems 
Nightsoil was an established business in China. Property owners tended to find their 
own coolies to have the nightsoil removed at a lower price. Intervention required stronger 
execution and tactical arrangement with the native forces. During the last decade of the 
century, the Municipal Council not only expanded its involvement in nightsoil dealings by 
raising taxes, but also stood firm against the 1895 nightsoil coolie riot and brought the 
agitator to justice. By 1899 the nightsoil business of the whole Settlement was under 
control of the municipal contractor, whose monopoly was granted by the British authority. 
The Council’s rejection of water closet, however, was not because of its reliance 
on contractors. Water closets were not suitable for Shanghai’s hydraulic system, in which 
intake of water supply was too close to the core of the city. Contamination of water supply 
would be unavoidable if toilets were widely in use. From 1906 to 1915 water closet was 
prohibited by law. But the ban was lifted in 1915 when the court decided that the Council’s 
prohibition was ultra vires. Water closets began to gain ground. 
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For a while, septic tank was believed to be the ideal devise to treat toilet discharge. 
A fierce debate on its effective arose led to the employment of Gilbert Fowler in 1918, a 
hydraulic engineer known for his promotion of “Activated Sludge Process”. Fowler’s 
report instructed the Council to phase out septic tanks and adopt a water-carriage system. 
The construction of the three treatment plants lasted from 1921 to 1926. Shanghai was 
finally endowed with the full set of city water technologies. 
When the Health Officer and the sub-committee of nightsoil could not reach an 
agreement on the effectiveness of septic tank, the Municipal Council decided to consult 
experts from outside Shanghai and China to have this debate settled. This was not the first 
time that the foreign concession sought for external advices. They had done so for building 
drainage and waterworks. But contracting Gilbert Fowler was a move of different nature. 
During the early stage of engineering development in Shanghai, individual proprietors 
were capable of building their own drains. As the city grew, municipal coordination in 
building a drainage system became necessary. Yet a thirty-year-old engineer (E. H. Oliver) 
and a part-time health officer were able to do the job. In comparison, building and operating 
waterworks needed more experience and that is why Engineer-in-chief had played a critical 
role throughout the history of Shanghai Waterworks Company. Sewage system in Shanghai 
was by far the most complicated of them all. Unlike drainage and water supply, a sewage 
system needed a higher level of interconnectedness and compatibility with the preexisting 
ones. It required more careful measurement of capacity because the waste it carried would 
have an immediate impact on the environment. It also pertained to expertise beyond that 
of an engineer because understanding chemistry, such as the effect of anaerobic and aerobic 
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reactions, became increasingly important in making the right decision. It was the turning 
point when the Shanghai-based specialists struggled to keep up with the global trend.  
Anthony Giddens uses expert system in describing such sophistication: systems of 
technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the material 
and social environments. He suggests that expert systems is a disembedding mechanism as 
it removes social relations from the immediacies of context and provides guarantees of 
expectations across distanciated time-space. 378  This summary, when applied to 
engineering realities, is only partially correct. Each component of the system had already 
been scientifically approved and could be put in place regardless of local conditions. The 
principles of septic tanks and activated sludge process would not be affected by change of 
location. The social context in which they were created was no longer significant in its 
diffusion. However, building expert system relied on intensive reconfiguration of social 
relations. Gilbert Fowler recommended that a body of representatives be formed in 
instructing the building of sewers so that inhabitants in the British, French, and Chinese 
settlements could enjoy a homogenized underground system. Although the construction of 
sewage system fell short of this vision, it showcased the influence infrastructure could have 
had over the political structures.     
Technological progressions in Shanghai had hitherto been little involved with the 
actual members of Chinese society. That was no longer the case. When all infrastructures 
were put in place, their nature was bound to change – they became the artwork open to 
interpretation, the Holy Grail people fight for, the threads woven into the tapestry. In the 
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following chapters, we will explore how these technologies made up the strategies taken 
by the native nationalist forces and how the Westerners strived to keep their advantages.  
 205 
CHAPTER 6. MUNICIPALITY 
 On June 28, 1888, Robert E. Wainewright, legal advisor of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, was standing at the Mixed Court, representing an employee in 
trouble, David Main. Main allegedly assaulted a Chinese man named Chao Yung-chang 
who ran a hot water shop at the back of the Mixed Court. Hot water shops used to have 
their supply of water from rivers, but more were now piped and buy their water from the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company. Chao’s premise was one of those. The incident happened 
on the 21st of June when David Main came to his place and notified him about the 50-cent 
rate surcharge. Chao, unhappy with the change, agreed to pay only 20 cents more per 
month. He said he would only agree to pay the full amount if all the other hot water shops 
consented to the increase. At that point, Main stopped reasoning with Chao. He went to the 
valve near the shop, in his hand an iron rod with which he was turning off the water. Chao 
said he attempted to stop Main, and Main struck him with the iron rod over the eye and on 
the head and kicked him two or three times. Chao was covered with blood and was sent to 
the hospital. Chao said he was unable to attend to his work on account of the injury in the 
past days. He could not afford the increase because his business was very dull recently. 
Chao said he had paid 5 Taels for putting up the water pipe and fittings. He begged Main 
not to close the tap as would have no water supply for the shop.379 
Wainewright, however, accused that the whole story was a fabrication. He was 
stunned by the theatrical performance of Chao’s. What happened was that Chao insisted 
on paying only 20 cents instead of 50. Main suggested it was not sufficient, then went to 
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turn off the water with the key. Chao rushed at him, seized hold of it, and they had a struggle 
and the key was wrenched away from Main and flew up. The end of it struck Chao in the 
face, hence he was covered with blood. The wound was inflicted by Chao upon himself. 
Two other Chinese were called as witnesses. Ma Wang-kung, who kept a cake shop next 
door to Chao’s hot water shop, said that he saw that they had a disturbance. They did not 
actually fight – Chao did not strike the Main, but Main struck Chao first on the hand and 
then the head with the iron rod. Shun Ah-loh, the shoemaker living next door to Chao’s 
shop, said that he was taking his little boy out for a walk when he saw the European strike 
the Chinese man twice, with the key. He then rushed into his own house. His little boy was 
frightened. He did not see anybody touch Main.380 
The Acting Assistant Judge, J. C. Hall, was presiding over the case. Hall concluded 
that the complainant’s action was only natural in resisting a high-handed attempt to take 
away his means of livelihood. Hall said this was a matter of public interest and the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company should treat their customers with a proper consideration. He held 
that Main’s attempt to cut off the water was a trespass under the circumstances. He fined 
Main the maximum sum allowed under the statute, i. e. £5, or in default six weeks’ 
imprisonment with hard labor.381  
The verdict was sit well with foreigners in Shanghai. They lamented that the Acting 
Assistant Judge knew too little about “the dark ways and vain tricks of the Chinese.”  
People said that Chao was virtually heard saying, “All right, cut it off.” Hence, Main went 
to carry out the threat. Chao did receive a blow on the forehead, but it was trifling. Main, 




on the other hand, had his clothes all torn. The charge of trespassing was also ridiculed 
because the valve the Main was turning was out in the street, in front of the hot water shop, 
not within the realm of it. “When Mr. Hall knows Chinese witness a little better,” the author 
in The Herald wrote, “he will know that the fact that three witnesses give the same evidence 
against a foreigner, should excite strong suspicion that the evidence is trumped up, instead 
of being taken as an indication of its truth.”382 
 
Figure 15 – Diorama of a hot water shop. Courtesy of Author at Shanghai 
Technology Museum of Water Supply. 
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David Main, a native of Aberdeen, was one of the earliest employees of the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company. He left Scotland in 1872 and came to Shanghai to join 
his brother, James Main, to assist in the erection of the first waterworks in China. The 
enterprise of the Main brothers eventually gave way to the creation of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, and David Main ended up joining the new company on its 
formation in 1881.383 Main had the background of a typical Shanghailander. He was young, 
of British heritage, energetic and entrepreneurial, spending years living in Shanghai, yet 
still inexperienced in handling his Chinese neighbors. The International Settlement was a 
place where nine out of ten inhabitants were Chinese, yet only foreigners could call the 
shots. The cultural barrier, worsened by imbalance of power, was not brought down by the 
advent of new technologies. In this chapter, we would delve into the process in which water 
supply and the associated administrative measures slowly became an integral part of 
Chinese life. Technology prowess and administrative power were equally important in the 
rise of the public health regime. To govern a city as diverse as Shanghai, the Municipal 
Council and the Shanghai Waterworks needed each other.  
6.1 Selling Water to the Chinese 
 On April 26, 1883 in London, a special meeting of the shareholders of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company was held. The completion of the water supply system in Shanghai 
was within sight, and the construction took less time than expected. But one major issue 
remained unsolved. The Company must break into the native market to survive, but how 
should they sell water to the Chinese who were accustomed to drinking from rivers and 
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wells? Some suggested that the Municipal Council should include at least one Chinese 
director so that less obstruction could be expected from the Daotai, for he would tend to 
believe that the Chinese must have indubitable proof of the water being innocuous before 
he would vote for its general use. Some foreigners saw it as a way to take away the 
representative power from the conservative mandarins dictated by Beijing and to hand it 
over to liberal-viewed Shanghai-based merchants.384  
In fact, the Daotai was not entirely hostile to the novelty. The native water supply 
had many problems. Sediments were so common in the water that the natives had become 
skillful in applying alum to induce flocculation to clear it up. The river water was also 
subject to salty tide actions. It was said that when the salty tide reached the rivers, every 
house had to drink salty tea and eat salty conge.385 The Daotai would surely prefer a native 
waterworks to be built. He might even have expressed his interest in attending the 
inauguration if such ceremony was held in the Chinese city. Some foreigners saw this as 
an opportunity. If the Company could make the Daotai a client, it would surely change the 
Chinese mind that a foreign company could be trusted in carrying out a mission of such 
scale and of public nature.386 The invitation extended to the Grand Secretary Li Hongzhang 
for the opening of the Waterworks at Yangtszepoo in July 1883 was probably for the same 
purpose – to convince the Chinese, from reformist officials to ordinary users, that water 
fashioned by foreigners was not disruption to the nature, but gospels for better health and 
greater convenience. 
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  The problem, however, was that a life style as such was not affordable to many. 
When the waterworks advertisement appeared in the vernacular Chinese papers, people 
flocked to the office to enquire into the terms and arrangements the Company proposed. 
But inquiries soon died down. The reason was that the Company intended to charge the 
sum of fifteen cash for two buckets of water and three cash for the coolie, making the sum 
total for every two buckets of water eighteen cash; if the water was from the Huangpu 
River or Yangkingpang, it only cost three to five or six cash for two buckets for those who 
lived near, and fourteen cash for those who lived afar. The Chinese believed that when 
water of Huangpu was consumed along with tea, boiled and distilled, it was as pure as 
water from the waterworks. “My countrymen’s ideas of economy far outweigh their care 
for health and cleanliness.” the author ‘A Chinese’ wrote in The North-China Herald.387 
 Unable to lower the price just for the Chinese customers, the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company again resorted to appealing to officials and expected a trickle-down effect that 
might loosen up the grip of old habit. The members of the Company sent around a present 
of a few sample buckets of clear water to the Daotai, the Zhixian (magistrate of a prefect), 
the Marine Subprefect, the French Mixed Court, and the English Mixed Court. The gifts 
were received with polite gratitude, and the coolies who brought the water were presented 
with handsome tips. Judge Chen of the English Mixed Court, however, refused to receive 
such present. Chen explained to the Company that he had been drinking the muddy water 
of the Huangpu all his life. He did not intend to take up something this new at his old age. 
Chen said the crystal water might be good for his goldfish, but he himself enjoyed water 
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with a little substance in it.388 By the end of the year 1883, the Company still had a hard 
time finding Chinese customers. Even among those buckets collected from the water of 
hydrants, nine out of ten went to foreigners who had not yet piped their houses.389  
It was later discovered that the aversion among Chinese, apart from higher price, 
was due to rumors that was meant to scare them away. For example, some rumor had it 
that the foreign water was drugged with opium and if one drank the water, it would cause 
the addiction similar to the one to opium. Others said the foreign water was poisoned. If 
raw alum was put into the water, it would turn black the next morning. Some people 
believed that there were two dragons fighting each other inside the water pipe, or that the 
water pipe was so close to the gas pipeline that the water coming from underground was 
poisoned by the gas. More outlandish ones suggested that some person had been drowned 
in the water tower, or the water at the height of the water tower must have been spoiled by 
lightening. The Company was able to spot one source of rumors. It was a Ningbo man, 
Ying Changfu (应昌福). Upon the completion of the water supply in the International 
Settlement, Ying thought of registering a company to obtain the monopoly of supply of 
SWW water to the native city. But some enterprising Chinese had formed a company of 
this kind already. Ying then used his utmost endeavors to sabotage their business. Being a 
Ningbo man, Ying found many fellow townsmen among water coolies in the Settlement. 
They were concerned about losing their business when the monopoly of such Chinese 
company was realized. They then helped spread the rumor to tarnish the name of the 
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foreigner-made water. 390 The Shanghai Waterworks Company, in reaction, asked the 
Chinese magistrate of the Mixed Court to issue a proclamation to quiet the fears and 
rumors.391  
 
Figure 16 – Illustration of the working of water supply. The Chinese explanation 
was to educate the Chinese on the matter. Source: “Zilaishui zhi li (futu)”, 1881. 
6.2 Promoting Water Supply by the Municipal Council 
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The persistence of Chinese habit was not only a problem for the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, it also drew attention of the Municipal Council because the 
insanitary practices posed an immediate danger to the foreign community. At the Council’s 
meeting in 1884, T. W. Kingsmill pointed at that the sources of native water supply were 
often only steps away from the terminations of the various roads. The drainage went into 
the Suzhou Creek and the Yangkingpang at the same sections. The water coolies were 
dipping their buckets into the contaminated water at the drain mouths. At the northern end 
of Shanxi road, drainage went through a decayed timber trunk into the Suzhou Creek under 
the jetty. The stench under this jetty in warm weather was unbearable, yet down the 
unpaved slope at the side large numbers of water coolies were constantly to be seen dipping 
their buckets into the slack water. Kingsmill said it would be advisable to restrict the times 
of drawing to the period of flood tide. Water carts of the native coolies needed to be kept 
clean, and at intervals disinfected with Condy’s fluid or other effective preparations. 392 
Health Officer Edward Henderson said it was true that water carriers were utterly 
indifferent at where they filled their buckets. He had seen supplies taken from the center of 
floating garbage. Water coolies preferred the mouth of a drain because it was much closer 
for them. Henderson did not believe that it was practically possible to restrict the water 
coolies in filling their buckets to certain states of the tide. He argued that the only efficient 
remedy was for the Municipal Council to buy from the Waterworks Company the right to 
supply the whole native population with pure water from fixed hydrants erected at suitable 
points in the public streets. Henderson suggested that this purchase might lead to higher 
taxes briefly, but the health of foreigners in Shanghai was intimately bound up with the 
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health of the natives. Zymotic diseases - fevers, cholera, and the like invariably developed 
first among the Chinese. Any measure that restricted the development of disease in the 
native population diminishes the risk of extension to foreigners.393 
In late 1884, the Health Officer grew increasingly concerned about the use of the 
water taken from the Suzhou Creek and the Yangkingpang for native consumption. The 
Company did not rule out the possibility of selling Municipal Council at a lower rate, but 
the rate must be mutually agreed.394 In February 1885, the Council voted to enter into 
negotiations with the Company with a view of securing a supply of pure water to the native 
population. The motion was carried under the condition that ratepayers of the Settlement 
would not have to bear any pecuniary responsibility.395 But the Council quickly abandoned 
the idea due to its embarrassing financial position. Alex McLeod, president of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, suggested that the real problem lied at the gatekeepers of the 
Chinese property. Water, which was supplied at 8 or 10 cash for two buckets, cost the 
natives at the end of an alleyway sometimes twice or three times that sum. McLeod 
suggested that the Council ought to publish the rate of water supply in certain districts in 
the Settlement so that the public could become aware of the origin of high price.396 
To regulate the price of water for native population, the Municipal Council 
proposed two experimental measures. First, the Council could allow a servant of the 
Company to accompany the Municipal Tax Collector to make enquiry from house to house 
as to whether water supply was needed, at what prices were they charged, and if there was 
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any grievance about the present supply. Second, the Company would be permitted to 
distribute notices under the Municipal Council seal, stating that intending customers could 
contract directly with the Company or with the Council through their tax collector, and that 
their contract would be subject to no additional squeeze. The rate would be collected like 
ordinary taxes and the tax collector would be the only person authorized to collect the 
money.397 
Meanwhile, the Shanghai Water Company was becoming more ready to take on 
missions other than earning profit. At the fifth annual general meeting in 1885, months 
after the Council’s proposed cooperation, Chairman of Board E. F. Duncanson contended 
that by far the promotion of fresh water to the native population failed largely due to 
Chinese’s inertia of mental constitution, which was the same mentality that made him “eat 
his favorite shark fins putrid, and scorn every egg laid in the present century”. 398 
Duncanson suggested that a growing native market would generate higher dividend for 
shareholders, but the Company also had innate moral obligations in defending sanitation 
in the East: 
“Think for a moment what improved sanitation means. It means the 
reduction of the death-rate from a larger to a smaller figure - the 
preservation of so much life in which the happiness of any one of us may 
be bound up by the closest ties which unite social or family life. Bear with 
me for a moment while, in all seriousness, I point the moral of this last 
remark. Are we not at this very moment deploring the loss of one whose 
name has been a household word in the East during the lifetime of the 
present generation, whose keen insight, dauntless courage, and 
inexhaustible energy and industry, displayed in so many fields both in China 
and Japan, have stamped themselves indelibly upon the histories of these 
Empire? Death, which Sir Harry Parkes had faced in many forms, some of 
them inexpressibly terrible, came to him in the subtle guise of typhoid 
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poison. I shall not suspect of any unworthy motive in thus referring to its 
latest and most distinguished victim in China. If in his varied career, he was 
witness to and even an active participator in the stirring scenes which come 
in the train of war, his large intelligence and active kindliness of disposition 
were ever enlisted in the arts of peace, and in the promotion of those works 
which conduce to the welfare, the comfort, and the happiness of 
mankind.”399  
After the meeting, the establishment in Shanghai immediately took on a more active 
role in promoting service to the Chinese. They managed to obtain the service of, not a 
municipal tax collector, but a police officer to go around with their men soliciting 
customers. Tickets began to show up over the doors of the houses, denoting whether water 
was supplied by contract, by ticket, or from pipes. The Company even supplied the pipes 
at their own cost.400 In November 1885, the Company was granted the permission by the 
Daotai to lay the water pipes in the Chinese city.401 In the summer of 1886, the Chinese 
living at the upper end of Tibet Road was able to enjoy free supply of fresh water from the 
hydrant. The Company used the scene as an expressive suggestion to the ratepayers that 
free supply of water would be beneficial to the entire Settlement. 402 After an intense 
summer of campaigning, it seemed that general trust in the water produced by the Company 
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was formed. It was dubbed as “the self-coming water”. Waterworks water became 
commonplace among hot water shops. For a while the Company provided the supply for 
free; in return, these shops announced to their customers that they sold nothing but 
waterworks water.403 
 
Figure 17 – Illustration of water fountain for Chinese. Source: “Zilaishui guan 
(futu)”, 1883. 
6.3 Relocating the Company to Shanghai 
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As all Shanghai-based branches were engaged in all ways possible to sell fresh 
water to the Chinese, the necessity of having a company headquartered in London was 
called into question. An anonymous shareholder lamented in The North-China Herald that 
while the Directors in Shanghai deserved to reap some benefit for their energy and zeal, a 
Board in London did not deserve to have the income they enjoyed.404The feud between the 
operatives in Shanghai and the directory in London was not new. In October 1884, the 
Board in London was to add another member. The decision faced strong criticism from 
Shanghai. They felt that if there were to be an additional director, it should be added in 
Shanghai where the increasing business needed to be attended.405  
When the growth of native market fell short of expectation, call for the 
abandonment of the directory in London grew louder. On August 30, 1886, a meeting of 
shareholders was held in Shanghai. Thirty members attended the meeting, including Alex 
McLeod and the only Chinese shareholder, Show Foong. It was formally proposed to 
transfer the head office and the directorate from London to Shanghai. It was suggested that 
to have the head office in Shanghai had been the plan since the Company was launched. 
The mission of the London office was completed. A registered office and a secretary would 
remain in London to attend to the transfer of shares, but the main body of the directory 
should be relocated in Shanghai. The proposition was carried unanimously.406  
The letter of proposition was signed by fifty-six shareholders, representing some 
2,700 shares. Upon receiving the letter in October, the Directors in London accentuated 
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that there had long been misapprehension as to how the expense of the London 
establishment affected the dividends. The proportion borne by this expense to the total 
annual expenditure was indeed 6.25% in 1884 and 6% in 1885. But in general, the London 
directory agreed with the idea that the disappearance of prejudice among the native 
population was subject to the Company’s ability in producing a larger and more 
remunerative demand for its supplies of water. Thus, a focus in Shanghai was desirable for 
business. The proposition was approved.407 Overall, the Shanghai Waterworks Company’s 
nature was undergoing significant changes. In 1885 the directory at London did not hold 
back to declare that their sole object is a handsome dividend.408 Now that the business of 
water supply had made inroads into local society, a change of tone was necessary. 
Foreigners in Shanghai had noticed that though in its constitution a private association of 
shareholders, the Company had become so much mixed up with public interest.409 
The campaign to attract native consumers resumed. On October 13, 1886, the 
Daotai of Shanghai, accompanied by a few officials, visited the waterworks in 
Yangtszepoo. They were warmly received by the directors and the management of the 
Company. The Daotai inspected the filters and machinery and expressed satisfaction with 
all he saw.410 In May 1887, the Company obtained the consent of the Daotai to lay mains 
across the walled native city, up to the gates in the south.411 The Municipal Council, around 
the same time, erected a public drinking fountain at the end of the Peking Road in the north. 
The fountain was placed upon one of the pillars near a public garden. It was meant to lure 
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in more native in the northern part of the Settlement. The Company provided the related 
devices and services at the cost of only Tls. 9.412 
The service of in Shanghai spread steadily across the Chinese section of the city. 
During the first year of operation, the Company lost Tls. 5,000 due to the unsuccessful 
campaign of supplying the Chinese with water. By 1887, positive signs began to show. In 
March 1886, only 806 native houses were supplied with water. In the same month 1887, 
the number grew to 1,020. The monthly receipt from the Chinese houses rose from $607 
in 1886 to $1,044 in 1887. The number of houses supplied from street hydrants also 
increased – from 1,288 in 1886 to 1,507 in 1887. The total net income from all native 
sources was $27,000, which included $13,000 from houses supplied with hydrants and 
$12,900 from direct supply to the native houses.413 By May 1887, the transfer of the 
Company’s headquarter was completed. The Shanghai Waterworks Company finally lived 
up to its name in the literal sense.414 
6.4 Endeavors to Acquire the Waterworks, 1888 and 1891 
Water system in French Concession was considerably different from that of their 
English neighbor. For a while, the French Council did not charge residents for using water. 
Water was provided by the authority at fountains and hydrants that were made by the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company. On February 4, 1885, the French Municipal Council 
authorized the fund for the land required for their own waterworks.415 Yet by the 1890s, 
the project was going nowhere. Reliance on the British water continued. In the end of 1897, 
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the French waterworks was finally commenced.416 An agreement was reached between the 
French Council and the Shanghai Waterworks Company in 1899. The Company would 
keep supplying the Concession until the French waterworks were in operation. In the 
meantime, the French authorities would buy out all the pipes laid by the Company in the 
Concession for the lump sum of Tls. 35,000.417 
The construction went on for five years, which was unnecessarily long considering 
the size of the plant. On January 4, 1902, the inauguration of the new waterworks took 
place at the pumping station at Dongjiadu (董家渡). Consul-General for France, Chairman 
of the French Municipal Council, and the Daotai of Shanghai attended the ceremony. It 
was declared that there would be no competition between the French waterworks and the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company. The General-Consul praised the Daotai as enlightened 
man. Rhetorically, the water supply brought the two settlements together as one 
community, but in reality the French did intend to supply the neighboring Chinese town.418 
The Shanghai Waterworks Company, however much public interests they were 
involved in, was still a private, profit-driven enterprise. While pursuing a moral goal of 
modernizing the Chinese habits, the Company never shied away from the best financial 
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gain. This pursuit often pitted the Company against the Municipal Council. For example, 
when the two sides signed the contract in 1880, the Municipal Council asked for the supply 
of 150,000 gallons of water per day. By 1886, the Company reported that the Council was 
using more than what was agreed upon and should pay Tls. 8,000 for the additional supply. 
The Council insisted that according to their calculation the amount of water used was less 
than was provided for by agreement. Both sides released data in The North-China Herald 
in hope to gain more support from ratepayers.419  
At the Ratepayers’ Meeting, the opinions were divided. There were those who 
thought the Company was entitled to the additional remuneration for the quality municipal 
improvements they made happen – few cases of fire, lowered rates of insurance, and 
cleaner roads. But the opponent suggested that these improvements were irrelevant. What 
was at the heart of the argument was the discrepancy between the figure of the Council and 
that of the Company. J. W. Hart, chief engineer of the Shanghai Waterworks Company, 
suggested that the way the Council calculated those numbers were unfathomable, but it 
was most likely that only the quantity of water received into the watercarts each day was 
included. But large amount of water was wasted when the carts were being filled, like in 
case the hydrants were left open. The quantities wasted was unknown. There were forty 
cases of fire during the past year, in all of which great amount of water was used but was 
not counted towards municipal usage. Hart estimated that the water used for this purpose 
alone was about half a million gallons. Hart then argued from 1880 to 1886, the population 
in the Settlement increased 22.5% and the houses 32%. The Company met this increased 
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requirement but received no increase of revenue. The amendment of paying the Company 
additional Tls. 8,000 was then put to the vote and was lost by a narrow majority.420 
 This dispute was eventually up to arbitration. On September 6, 1886, it was 
announced that the Company should be paid by the Council the extra amount of Tls. 8,000. 
The umpires argued that the limit of the amount of 150,000 gallon of water per day, 
stipulated in the 1880 agreement, did not mean that as long as the Council used less than 
55 million gallons within a year, they did not need to pay for the extra. The original contract 
was clear on that. Therefore, the arbitration went in favor of the Company.421 
The 1886 dispute was a legal landmark that solidified the Company’s position 
against the Council when their interests conflicted. In 1887, upon the expiration of the 
previous contract, the Company suggested that they were ready to furnish a daily supply 
of 200,000 gallons instead of 150,000 gallons per day for municipal purposes. In order to 
acquire the service, however, the Council had to pay an extra Tls. 2,000 per annum, or an 
altogether Tls. 10,000 every year. 422  The demand spurred some harsh words from 
ratepayers. The directors of the Company were called out for “issuing edicts as absolute as 
the ukases of the most autocratic Czar”. 423  The Company was also criticized for its 
overreach in private life. For example, the Company forbid consumers to sell water to the 
water coolies, but the coolies came for water anyway. The customer was liable to have his 
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supply cut off if any exchange took place. Any change to the tap needed the permission 
from the Company’s engineer. Meanwhile, the Company did not bear the responsibility of 
piped water causing damage to the customer’s house. Ratepayers began urging the 
municipality to look into the possibility of acquiring the works and conduct them on sound 
liberal principles.424 
Following the popular demand, the Municipal Council began looking into the terms 
and conditions on which they could acquire the whole water supply of the Settlement. The 
agreement between the Council and the Company never closed down on the possibility of 
a buy-off. It only required one-year’s notice in writing of the intention before the expiration 
of the contract.425 At the meeting of Council in February 1888, it was formally suggested 
that now that the incoming Council should consider the advisability of taking advantage of 
the option of acquiring the undertaking for the ratepayers.426 In April, the Council wrote to 
the Company and inquired into the possibility of total acquirement. But apparently the 
Council narrowly missed the one-year window. The directorate outright cut off any further 
discussion by invoking the Article VIII of the contract and said that they were “not at 
present prepared to make any other proposals on the subject”.427 
The hybridity of private business and public interest continued. Compromises were 
made by both sides. The Company often had the upper hand in fixing the price of municipal 
supply; 428 but the Council would have the right to direct the Company to expand their 
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services into places where material incentives were inadequate.429 The cooperation brought 
about immediate, visible benefits to the entire community. At the end of the 1889, the 
Council was pleased to learn from the Health Officer that the death rate in 1889 was the 
lowest recorded in the last twenty years, two per ten thousand lower than in 1875. 
Henderson suggested the Council should exclude all other sources of water supply than the 
Shanghai Waterworks’.430 
 The Municipal Council launched another acquisition in late 1891. In October, the 
Council formally informed the Company about the intent of acquiring the land, buildings, 
machinery on March 31, 1893, ten years from the date fixed for the completion of the 
works.431 On November 24, the Company made their demands after serious consideration 
about the matter. They fixed the price of their property and business at no less than two 
million Taels.432 The exorbitant price triggered backlash from ratepayers. They had very 
different estimation about the assets of the Company. Some suggested that according to the 
published accounts of the Company, the assets were valued at Tls. 731,444; even with the 
land included, the value was far below two million Taels. Others suggested the value 
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should be fixed by arbitration, which according to some estimation was around 1.5 million 
Taels, giving the shareholders a net return of over Tls. 200 a share, Tls. 40 more a share 
than its current value.433 At the Ratepayers’ Meeting on February 29, 1892, it was agreed 
that as the price proposed by the Company was far beyond what the ratepayers were willing 
to give, they had no resolution regarding it to submit.434 This marked the second failed 
attempt of acquisition by the Municipal Council. The first time in 1888 was thwarted by 
legal technicalities, whereas the 1892 endeavor was tanked by the disinterest among 
majority of ratepayers. A municipal water supply became an increasingly intangible idea. 
6.5 Publicness of Water Issue 
 The monopoly enjoyed by a private company did not change the reality that water 
supply was a matter of great public interest. While the Shanghai Waterworks Company 
was profiting for supplying clean water, it also bore the burden of a public venture. People 
living in Shanghai believed that some authority needed to be appointed to test the water 
supplied by the Company. The analysis should be done monthly, with the samples taken 
indiscriminately across the city.435 In April 1892, the Company offered to have their testing 
results published in The North-China Herald to earn the trust.436 In January 1893, however, 
people noticed cloudiness of water in Shanghai and demanded explanations. The Company 
reported to the Council multiple possible reasons that might have contributed to the 
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impurity – a recent leakage that caused the closing of two of the filter beds, a constant 
deposit of sand in the Yangtze water, and sediment accumulated within the mains flushed 
down to taps. The Company argued that despite the unpleasant outlook, the water supply 
was actually innocuous and was well fitted for ordinary domestic purposes.437 In order to 
ease the public anxiety over the quality of water supply, the Municipal Council decided to 
assume the duty of oversight and regularly published the results of laboratory work, with 
the first report published in The North-China Herald in January 1893.438 Water sanitation 
had become a mission of municipality. 
 
Figure 18 – Laboratory of the Shanghai Waterworks Company. The laboratory 
remains in operation today. Courtesy of author. 
Another issue that pertained to people’s everyday life was the operation of washing 
houses. As the British water supply was gaining ground, Chinese businesses took little time 
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to capitalize on the trendy foreign novelty. Many of washing houses, for example, 
disseminated cards, proclaiming that the water they used was provided by the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company. However, the investigation in 1898 launched by the Council’s 
Board of Sanitation discovered that among those who advertised about having Shanghai 
Waterwork’s water, few actually had it. Of the eleven wash houses in the neighborhood in 
the western district, only one had the Shanghai Waterworks’ pipe laid on. The best water 
supply of some twenty washing houses in Hongkou came from a creek covered by some 
fifty beggar boats where vegetable scum and other waste matters floating around. Many 
shop owners could not read their own cards because they were illiterate, and the cards were 
in many cases made up by middlemen for advertising purposes. The Board of Sanitation 
vividly reported the inner working of these washing houses: 
“Soiled articles of clothing, linen, etc., are tied up in bundles and carried 
thus or in baskets to the wash houses which are the washermen’s dwelling 
houses. Until the baskets are next required, they are used in some instances 
as cradles for the infant of the household wrapped in its inches thick of dirty 
clothing… Wrung out of pond or creek water the clothes are dried in the 
open air in fine weather; in wet weather they are dried in the houses chiefly 
in the room where ironing and starching are carried on, a room almost 
invariably occupied as a bedroom… The workers, having spread out the 
shirt, on an ironing board which is used in its hours of leisure as a bed, dips 
his mouth and often the tip of his nose into a dish of water, sucks up and 
squirts the mouthful over the shirt front, and having ironed it, deposits the 
finished article in a cupboard, if there be one, in most instances on a 
neighboring bed… The cleaned articles are sent home in the baskets 
previously referred to at the door of one of the places first inspected were 
seen a number of towels drying on the ground at the edge of a stinking open 
drain with garbage scattered around. These towels are no doubt destined to 
wipe clean hands and faces.”439 
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Twelve essential requisites for the proper washing of clothes were then proposed, 
which included concrete or stone floors, well ventilated wash rooms, water supplied by the 
Shanghai Waterworks, separation of soiled and cleaned clothes and so forth. Squirting from 
the mouth was prohibited and liable to penalty. The Council also banned eating, sleeping, 
and dwelling in the workplace.440 The Municipal Council was aware that regulations as 
such would not be able to change the dirty habits of washer. A small, modern, municipal 
laundry was then erected in Hongkou (on the Rifle Range Road), leased to a Chinese 
businessman named Seou Kok on stringent conditions. The hope was that the public would 
decide for themselves where they wanted their clothes washed. In this municipal laundry, 
only waterworks’ water was used. Floor was made of cement and was well-drained with 
troughs. The ironing room it was in neat condition. Nonetheless, one year into the 
experiment, the Council found out that foreigners still patronized the old-fashioned 
washing houses weekly where suspicious water was used.441 
 In February 1899, the Council was suggested to have all washing houses 
licensed. 442 Of course, one of the prerequisites for a municipal license was that only 
waterworks’ water was used. Or even have water meter installed to make sure that the 
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water was not used over and over again.443 In June, the Council, with the approval of the 
Ratepayers’ Meeting, issued a set of rules to the washmen in the Settlement, which 
stipulated that the immediate surroundings of the laundry be healthy, that the laundry be 
built of stone or brick and be well ventilated and drained, that a copious supply of 
Waterworks water be in use and other rules and so on. The wealthy Chinese merchants 
took advantage of the sanitary reform and built new washing houses of approved pattern 
during the ensuing months. The Municipal Council published the licensed few washing 
houses in The North-China Herald in October 1900 and called for all unlicensed ones be 
closed down as soon as possible.444  
The municipal intervention in this business was not welcomed by all. Some felt that 
the rules were unnecessarily specific. If the customer was happy with what he got, it should 
not matter if the floor of the washing house was made of cement or not. Besides, few could 
afford to comply with these rules. In the end only corporate bodies prevailed.445 In fact, the 
course of “natural selection” did seem like something the Municipal Council was after. 
There was no evidence that the Council forcefully pushed anyone out of business. All they 
did was publishing the list of licensed washing houses every month for the public to see. 
By November 1901, the Council had licensed thirty-four establishments, and a few 
unlicensed ones were still in business. The Shanghai Waterworks Company generously 
reduced the price of water from 50 to 30 dollar-cents per thousand gallons to licensed 
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laundries. This not only eased the burden of those businesses that were undergoing sanitary 
reconstruction, but also helped stabilize the cost of washing for patrons.446 
6.6 Specialization of Health Officer 
 At the turn of the century, when the Municipal Council was busy bringing order to 
the Chinese laundry businesses, a change in the institution was also underway – the 
specialization of the position of Health Officer. When Municipal Surgeon Edward 
Henderson first filled the position in 1868, he virtually volunteered. The title won him 
respect and influence, but the duties as Health Officer ate up a great deal of his time. 
Therefore, in early 1870 when the annual budget was under discussion, Henderson 
proposed to the Municipal Council a grant of Tls. 500 for his work as Health Officer. The 
Council immediately agreed and appropriated the sum from the Sanitary Department.447 
But the position remained to be two jobs at one. By the time Henderson retired in 1896, 
the salary for Municipal Surgeon/Health Officer had risen to Tls. 4,000 per annum.448 
Henderson’s dual responsibilities basically defined this job. At the Ratepayers’ 
Meeting in 1896, the duties of a “Municipal Surgeon” was defined explicitly for the first 
time, which included the collection and arrangement of statistics bearing on the health of 
the population, inspection of nuisance, advising to prevent and limit epidemics, advising 
regarding disinfection, drainage, and ventilation in public buildings, native dwellings, etc. 
In addition, Surgeon/Health Officer had special duties such as care and direction of a 
laboratory, where the chemical and bacteriological examination of air, soil, water, milk, 
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etc. was carried out, and researches made for the detection of the causes of disease, to assist 
in its early diagnosis or to ascertain definitely its character (diphtheria, and cholera, 
anthrax, rinderpest, etc.). Manufacturing of the various anti-oxides and vaccination would 
be part of the work done at this laboratory. He had also medical and surgical charge of the 
Municipal Staff and Police force, but not of their families, and visit and gave advice 
regarding police cases when required. For a job as a surgeon, the duties regarding public 
health were overwhelming.449  
 After Henderson retired in March 1896, the vacancy was quickly filled by Dr. 
Taylor Grant in June. The Municipal Council was expecting Grant to fill in Henderson’s 
shoes, and for a while he seemed to be the perfect successor. Grant was diligent and 
professional. He assumed the duties as soon as he arrived. He submitted a report to the 
Council in less than a year, in which he elaborated on the necessity of Vaccine Institute, 
the threat of diphtheria, and the general work of his laboratory.450 However, by the summer 
of 1897, the trust between the new Surgeon/Health Officer and the municipality 
deteriorated. Grant faced serious accusation of receiving money from a company 
Butterfield & Swire in form of “Bill of Health”, which led to an investigation into the 
matter by a sub-committee of the Municipal Council.451  
Municipal Surgeon/Health Officer was supposed to serve in the interest of the 
Council and public health. What Grant was accused of was downright bribery. Grant was 
called into Council for a meeting, with the presence of his lawyer. The Council decided to 
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terminate the contract immediately and passed a resolution, asking the resignation of Grant 
within seven days. Grant refused to comply. He said that this case was about his character. 
He would not resign until all suspicion regarding his professional integrity was cleared.452  
When Henderson’s retirement was approved on March 10, 1896 at the Ratepayers’ 
Meeting, his company, Henderson, Macleod & Miles (HMM), was requested by the 
Council to find in England and brought to Shanghai a medical man to perform the duties 
of Health Officer. 453 HMM was the major, if not the only, pharmaceutical and surgical 
company in Shanghai, and Taylor Grant was its long-time employee. When Grant was 
hired by the Council in June 1896, he was relieved from the duty at HMM. In the eyes of 
Henderson, Grant was a young doctor over whom he could still assert certain level of 
control. But Grant staunchly rejected Henderson’s influence and claimed that he now he 
only had the Council to answer to.454  
Grant argued that the Bill of Health did not start from him. Henderson had been 
charging Tls. 5 for each of his inspection for years. It was merely an expression of gratitude 
for his service from the companies. It did not in any way impair his judgement. Grant’s 
argument was most likely true. Considering Henderson for some years had been working 
as Health Officer without being paid properly, it was only natural that Henderson claimed 
some benefits as the head of HMM. The whole Grant scandal was caused by the unclear 
definition of the job of Health Officer. The Council, however, was determined to remove 
Grant from the position. Henderson was asked to carry on the duty of Health Officer until 
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the arrival of a new and duly qualified man.455 After losing the municipal appointment, 
Grant returned to his job at HMM. Henderson ordered Grant to resume his duty as the 
Health Officer. But he would no longer carry the title. Every move of his must be approved 
by Henderson.456  
The scandal became a magnet of attention. Many people felt for Grant because his 
work as Municipal Surgeon so far was generally considered satisfactory. Some believed 
that such trivial matter should not make up the reason to dismiss someone of such important 
job. Some believed the money was not worth the job. Unless the Council was to provide 
necessary allowance, no able person would apply for the job. Others believed that the 
design of the authorities of Health Officer was flawed to begin with, especially considering 
that for the time being it was Grant who did the work and Henderson who signed all the 
reports. The candidate would better be selected by a London Committee of old 
Shanghailanders as how the excellent Municipal Surveyor was found.457 
In September 1897, the Finance Committee of the Municipal Council had decided 
to terminate the agreement which the Council and HMM entered into in March 1896. The 
new Health Officer would be engaged in England. Unlike Grant who worked for both the 
Council and a private company, the new Health Officer would be engaged through the 
Council’s agents as a municipal employee. He should receive his authority, salary, and 
instructions directly from the Council, as a public servant. In a separate agreement, the 
Council asked HMM to continue to perform the duties of Municipal Surgeons, attending 
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the health of the employee of the Council, including their families, hence the separation of 
the duties of Municipal Surgeon and Health Officer. The total expenditure for the Surgeon 
and the Health Officer would not exceed the amount authorized by the Ratepayers, i.e. Tls. 
7,000 per annum.458  
6.7 Arthur Stanley and Modernization of Public Health 
By March 1898, the Council had secured the service of Arthur Stanley, a British 
doctor who received his M.D. in London.459 Stanley was known to be a rigid, scientific 
man, who was more interested in laboratory work than in networking with peers in sports 
clubs. He formally assumed the duty of Henderson on March 21, 1898. Stanley visited, 
accompanied by the Municipal Engineer, the garbage shoots in Hongkou and ascended the 
Suzhou Creek to view the spots where garbage was deposited. He visited the 
slaughterhouses and cattle sheds, the factory for concrete ware, the cholera isolation 
hospital and the proposed vaccine station. He inspected the most unsanitary neighborhoods 
between the Peking Road and the Suzhou Creek and in the West Hongkou. He made his 
first Health Officer’s Report on April 11. This report was the first of its kind to include 
registered deaths, cause of death, infectious diseases notification, in and out of patients at 
Lock Hospital, native dairies, lab work with specimens taken from the throats and blood 
of patients, and quality of milk. Monthly report from the Health Officer henceforth became 
a tradition.460  
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 Stanley was a pioneer in modernizing public health in Shanghai. He was about 
thirty years old when he started his tenure as Health Officer. He was energetic, strong-
willed, and became the first Commissioner of Public Health. During his first summer in 
Shanghai, he launched some unprecedented initiatives in Shanghai. For example, in July, 
he drew up a notice of measures for the prevention of epidemic and contagious diseases, 
in English and Chinese, and ordered them to be distributed to householders throughout the 
Settlement. Unlike his predecessor who tended to blame the outbreak on poorer districts 
where sanitation was problematic, Stanley put much emphasis on precautious measures 
that could be easily done by any individual, such as boiling and filtering drinking water 
through a Berkefeld or Pasteur filter, keeping vegetables on a table that was solely for food, 
and plunging fresh vegetables and fruits into boiling water for a short time before eating 
them. Stanley also called for the use of crude Jeyes’ Fluid, a good and cheap disinfectant 
added in the proportion of a teacupful to a gallon of water, in the cleansing of yards, drains, 
nightsoil buckets and other places where refuse might accumulate.461 In May 1899, Stanley 
oversaw the creation of Pasteur Institute at Shanghai where inoculation against rabies were 
tried on rabbits to select the best preparation for the vaccine.462 In March 1901, he initiated 
the employment of steam disinfector at the General Hospital in cleaning bedding and 
clothing.463 Riding the tide of germ theory, Stanley displayed a progressive understanding 
of disease and nuisance. He once wrote in his 1903 report: “The inspector of nuisances of 
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a few years ago, when nuisances were confused with stinks, was a mere smeller, an 
inspector of stinks.”464  
Stanley was extremely vigilant against epidemics in Shanghai. Using statistics 
carefully collected over the years, Stanley was able to make the case that although Shanghai 
was exposed to threats of more kinds of diseases, foreign death rate remained only a little 
higher than that for England and Wales – 18.1 per thousand vs. 16.9 per thousand in 1901. 
But considering the less than average proportion of elderly in Shanghai, this number was 
still high. He thus recommended to the Council the adoption of the proposed Infectious 
Disease bye-laws, which would make it mandatory for Chinese servants working in foreign 
households to get vaccinated. His department generously provided the Chinese with free 
vaccines.465 The turn of the twentieth-century saw the rise some new disease, among which 
were malaria and yellow fever, both mosquitos-borne. Stanley keenly followed the steps 
taken in other mosquito-infested areas like Panama and southern ports of the United States 
and formed a mosquito brigade in the summer of 1909 in aim of exterminating mosquito 
population in Shanghai. He also made filling in ponds a portion of the routine work of his 
department. 466 In 1911, Stanley participated the creation of the first Chinese Isolation 
Hospital. The hospital was established on the North Henan Road Extension at a former 
residence of Chang Chi-pao, a Chinese merchant who generously offered his house for the 
purpose when approached by the Hospital Committee. The medical staff of the hospital 
consisted of four Chinese doctors (one of them was a woman) and three foreign doctors. It 
was designed to remove native prejudice against foreign medical methods. In his speech, 
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Stanley said that the establishment of the hospital indicated to him a new China from the 
medical point of view. The difficulties which foreigners had in matters of plague 
prevention would be largely minimized.467  
Stanley stroke a fine balance between introducing general principles of disease 
control and approaching the Chinese community with cultural sensitivity. In his 
observation of the Chinese philosophy of medicine, he realized that the Chinese valued 
hygiene in their own ways. Their “drug-shops” contained an immense number of drugs and 
preparations, and were the most elaborately ornamented of all shop; they also spent a large 
part of his income on medicine. 468  He saw the confusion of tongues and mutual 
misunderstanding in a city as heterogeneous as Shanghai a major impediment to better 
public health. He said the ignorance of modern methods among the Chinese must be met 
by education and soft-handed compulsion. 469  He engaged in person in educating the 
Chinese on the prevention and cure for tuberculosis. In the spring of 1911, Stanley 
delivered a fortnightly series of lectures on “Health and Sanitation” and plague prevention 
at the large hall of the Chinese Y.M.C.A. The audience was almost entirely Chinese. At 
the time, Manchuria was being affected by pneumonic plague, which made Stanley’s 
lecture more relevant than ever. He introduced the three types of plagues – bubonic, 
septicemic, and pneumonic – to the audience. He talked about tuberculosis and the 
measures for prevention, such as quarantine, timely reporting to the authorities, and 
exterminating rats in the house. The speech was frequently met with loud applause. In the 
winter of 1912, Stanley delivered another series of lectures on tuberculosis. He pointed out 
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that there was no effective cure for TB other than by rest, good food, open air and sunlight. 
But as to public measures, Stanley said it was essential to establish a TB office with an aim 
of early diagnosis and treatment of the disease.470 Stanley even published an article in 
China Medical Journal in 1915 on the topic of how to initiate public health work in Chinese 
cities.471  
Arthur Stanley was appointed at a time when epidemiology was on the rise. He 
became the key figure in modernizing the public health regime in Shanghai. The effect of 
his contribution was hard to measure. It was even harder to assess Stanley’s influence 
among young Christian Chinese. But many desirable changes happened under Stanley’s 
watch, including new quarantine establishments and scientific recording of disease. With 
the help of Stanley’s lectures, China was making progress in medical education and was 
on track of producing its own health officers.472 Stanley, in his own word, was “a man 
gentle in manner and firm in action”.473 It was his attentiveness and execution that greatly 
expanded the municipality’s involvement in public health matters. 
6.8 Final Attempt on the Municipal Water Supply, 1922-1928 
 As public health was becoming a municipal matter in Shanghai, people’s interest 
in the municipal water supply was rekindled in the late 1910s. Over the summer of 1917, 
the Municipal Council had been increasing its already large financial interest in the 
Waterworks Company. The intent of this move was clear: given that the Shanghai 
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Waterworks was a joint stock company, the Municipal Council was aiming to take over 
the company by owning the majority share. Shanghailanders was strongly in favor of 
municipal ownership because many believed the Company was overcharging their water 
and the rate would be reduced by half if water supply became a public undertaking.474 The 
tension between the two sides was running high.475  The Council later appointed two 
directors to “assist” in the guidance of its affairs.476 
 The Company was aware of that the Council was buying its way into a full 
municipal ownership. Hence in March 1918, it announced an increase in the capital from 
£400,000 to £1,000,000 by the creation of an additional 30,000 shares of 20 pound each. 
The directors ordered 3,000 shares to be issued immediately. By diminishing the proportion 
of the Council’s shareholding, the Company would be able to remain its status as a private 
enterprise. In order to keep up the proceeding of acquisition, the Council would have to 
spend more money on buying the created shares, a move that most ratepayers would not 
be pleased with.477  
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The Council appointed a special committee to study the desirability of the purchase 
of the Company by the municipality, only to find that the Council was not financially sound 
enough to entertain the idea of taking over all utilities. The special committee was thus 
disbanded. Years later, the Council managed to gain control over electricity, which led to 
a substantial drop in the rate in 1915. The Council grew confident in doing the same for 
water supply. Therefore, the Special Waterworks Committee was resuscitated in 1922.478 
The negotiation went on for months. By February 1921, the Company seemed to be very 
open about the idea of municipal acquisition, but the Company had already grown so big 
that its fittings department and shipping department had already become and registered as 
their own companies. In order to obtain full control over water supply, the Municipal 
Council needed to summon a huge sum to purchase all three undertakings.479 The very big 
scheme of municipal purchase began to sow doubts among ratepayers. “Public officials are 
not deterred by expense in quite the same manner as a Company,” someone wrote in The 
Herald, “…Within five years from now, either the ratepayers will have to find a huge 
deficit, or the water rates will be enormously increased.”480  
At the ratepayers meeting of 1923, it was announced that the figure at which the 
directors of Shanghai Waterworks Company were prepared to sell the total undertaking 
would be approximately Tls. 14,950,000. The Council believed in principle that this 
essential public utility should be taken over by the Council, but the figure seemed “like a 
fairy tale”. 481  Nonetheless, three resolutions were passed regarding the municipal 
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acquisition of water supply, which authorized the required fund and enabled the Council 
to run the business in line with the 1915 agreement between the Council and the electricity 
company.482 
 During the year of 1923, the Company’s revenue saw a steady fall. It was due to 
the inability of the Company to collected revenue commensurate with the increased cost of 
water supply at the rates fixed by the 1905 agreement. The Company was therefore anxious 
too and became more open a municipal take-over. The Council adjusted its offer – the price 
of the Company would be arrived at on the basis of 15.3846 years’ purchase of the profits 
earned during the year 1922.483 At the Ratepayers’ Meeting held in April 1924, the new 
price of the Company’s assets was accepted, and the Council was enabled to purchase the 
entire establishments. The two sides finally entered a real negotiation.484 
 In March 1928, the eleven-year-old controversy came to an end. The final 
agreement consisted of 32 folios. This agreement did not make the Company a municipal 
undertaking but made the Council a major shareholder of the Company. The finance of the 
two became intertwined. This change of ownership lent the Council’s power of control 
over the Company in the interests of ratepayers, limitation of dividends, and what was to 
become of the Company’s subordinate undertaking - the supply of baths, basins, taps, towel 
rails, drying cupboards, dish drainers and the like.485 The Council was now entitled to have 
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appointees on the Board of Directors to guarantee that public interest was properly met.486 
Meanwhile, the Council became more active in investing in the Company to pump up its 
stock value. After all, the Council was among the biggest beneficiaries if the Company 
grew. In 1928, the Council was considering purchasing 17,600 shares of the Company’s B 
issue, the cost of which amounted to Tls. 141,980.487 Over the years, the Council kept 
funding the Company. When the World War II ended, an investigation found that the 
Council had bought in shares in total worth of £129,820, or more than half a million 
Taels.488 
In contrast, from 1902 to 1908, the French waterworks underwent rapid growth 
during which principal mains were laid inside and outside the Concession.489 But the 
business ran into stagnation after 1908. The Council handed the establishment to a 
company created in Paris in January 1909, which would take charge of electric light, 
tramway and water altogether in the French Shanghai. Numerous complaints about the 
deteriorating quality of water was received during the transition.490 The filtering system 
kept falling behind the development in pumping. Since 1914, the waterworks was 
producing more than its proper capacity. In the fall of 1920, two fire occurred in the 
Concession. Poor water supply of the French failed to deter the flame.491 Publicness of 
water service and greater good for the community had been the focus of municipality. But 
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despite “always having the interests of the public at heart”, the French waterworks 
remained unsatisfactory.492  
6.9 Conclusion: Trust  
Water supply in Shanghai used to be a luxury for foreigners only. But an expansion 
into the native market was inevitable due to both business and public health concerns. The 
Shanghai Waterworks Company had to deal with rumors among commoners and 
indifferent mandarins. It eventually secured the Municipal Council’s support in promoting 
their business. By 1887 the Company, headquartered now in Shanghai, had gain popularity 
among the natives. 
With more hydraulic projects at its disposal, the Council became increasingly 
involved in public health matters and its administrative measures had become centralized. 
The Council took charge of water analysis. Chinese washing houses were being licensed 
to be kept in order. With an emphasis on data collecting, the new, specialized Health 
Officer Arthur Stanley modernized public health practices in Shanghai. He educated young 
Chinese on epidemiology and about preventive measures, many of which centered on water 
supply and waste disposal.  
To stimulate a sense of trust among Chinese was not easy. In the case of potable 
water, the presence of waterworks and water tower might not be the best promoter during 
earlier days because they were symbols of alienness that put people off. The fact that these 
establishments were run by foreigners added to the strangeness of water coming out of 
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pipes. The Shanghai Waterworks Company fought the battle on two fronts: on the one 
hand, it needed to win over consumers who were under the influence of misinformation 
campaigns by the water carriers; on the other hand, it relied on the Municipal Council and 
the inherent top-down institutional authority to gain subscribers. Over time, it was the taste, 
cleanliness, and convenience of tap water that won most of its customers. The trust was 
built through bodily experience for which a higher level of intellectuality was not a 
prerequisite. As for the medical knowledge preached by Arthur Stanley, the dynamic of 
that diffusion among young Chinese, many of whom were perhaps Christian, relied almost 
entirely on the institutionalization of Western medicine where consistent exposure to the 
information could be maintained by various institutes in their various forms (medical 
school, church, book store, lectures, clinics, apprenticeship, etc.). In this case, a uniform 
framework of knowledge and epistemology was a must. The faith in these institutions were 
not a bodily experience, it laid in the explanatory power of principles and knowledge. 
We tend to think that in conditions of modernity, trust exists in the context of the 
general awareness that human activity is socially created.493 In the case of the Chinese 
becoming used to running water, this observation did not apply. The trust in the engineering 
system was based largely on the quality of final product. Being able to realize the better 
quality of tap water had little to do with intervention of modern social institutions. The 
acceptance of it eventually took place on the level of individuals. It was consumers who 
were making informed decisions regarding their daily necessities and well-being. The 
growing acceptance of Western medicine in the early twentieth century was, on the other 
hand, more of a social construction. People of any nationalities could be taught and trained 
                                                 
493 Giddens, 34. 
 246 
to believe that the up-to-date science was most reliable before they could have access to a 
laboratory to prove any of what they were told. This discrepancy in the dynamics behind 
the prevalence of products of modernity points to the loophole in the conventional 
modernity theory. Many things of modern creation can be lumped together under the 
banner of modernity, but they were not of the same nature. During the late nineteenth 
century, before tap water became a staple of modern life style, the trust in the water and 
the system behind it must come from physical, tactile, and gustatory experience. Although 
tap water and germ theory were both considered creation of modern era, the process of 
accepting the former was much less “modern” than that of accepting the latter. 
The Municipal Council attempted several times to acquire the waterworks, but the 
Company maintained its status with both legal and financial measures. Although a 
municipal supply never came to realization, the adhesion between the Council and the 
Company grew stronger. The robust system of water supply laid the ground for an 
increasingly powerful municipality. But it was also this codependence and co-construction 
of technology and governance that made the water establishments an easy political target.   
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CHAPTER 7. POLITICS 
 Foreigners in Shanghai had a long history of building roads outside the limits of 
Settlement. For example, in 1860 the Qing army built two roads to reach the base of Taiping 
Rebellion. One of these roads started from the Jing’an Temple and ended in Siccawei and 
the other connected the Jing’an Temple with Fanwangtu Road (梵皇渡, and later 万航渡
路 ). All places mentioned were at least three miles west to the limit of Settlement. 
However, after the Rebellion was put down, the British who allied with the Qing 
government felt entitled to some of the wartime infrastructures as they contributed to their 
creation. In 1866 and 1869, the two roads were taken by the Municipal Council without 
permission from the Chinese authorities. This marked the beginning of what was later 
known as “the building of extra-Settlement roads” (越界筑路).494  
The illegal expansion of the Settlement was met with protest from time to time, but 
short-lived anger did not undermine the British presence in these extra-Settlement areas. 
The Council considered their control legitimate. For one thing, Chinese roads were too 
poor for foreigners to commute. It was said that there were two kinds of Chinese roads, 
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one of which readily became a stinking abomination, the other was made to look at and 
when used speedily became useless. It was up for the Council to pave, sanitize, and police 
the new roads. The other thing was public health. Foreigners grew increasingly concerned 
about the risk of epidemics originating from the crowded, filthy Chinese villages in the 
city. Edward Henderson said in 1898 that for a long while, the Settlement was busy setting 
sanitary matters straight within the boundaries, but now it was imperative to look outside 
in view of disease control. The Municipal Council even sent the formal request to Beijing, 
asking the Foreign Ministry to press on this issue so that an imperial permission would be 
acquired.495 Entering the twentieth century, the Municipal Council endeavored to make use 
of the vast undeveloped area in the west by connecting them with tramways. From 1901 to 
1905, the Municipal Council built Brenan Road, Hongqiao Road, Rubicon Road and 
Edinburgh Road, which were eight to ten miles west of the Settlement.496  
Water infrastructures the British built earlier became a convenient tool in extra-
Settlement disputes. For example, a skirmish in 1907 happened between a Sikh constable 
and a Chinese man outside the Settlement. The Sikh officer claimed that his actions were 
legitimate because wherever water pipes were laid outside the Settlement, and in case of 
residents using Waterworks water, the police would give protection, as circumstances 
therefore arose. The Daotai insisted that although his predecessor was warmer to foreign 
undertakings and permitted the temporary laying of water pipes outside the Settlement for 
the convenience of native residents, to claim any sort of authority over the land was an 
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aggression on Chinese sovereignty. The Council dismissed the complaint, insisting that the 
grounds upon which such actions were taken were unassailable.497 
 During the final years of the dynasty, the Qing officials came to realize that if the 
service of water supply provided by the Shanghai Waterworks Company could be used as 
the ground for extra-Settlement expansion, so could a Chinese enterprise that fashioned 
water of the same quality be used against their illegitimate claims. That was the moment 
when water technologies were transformed into political ammunitions.  
7.1 The Inland Waterworks Company 
Without pressurized water supply, the Chinese city was continually dogged by fire 
incidents. In the winter of 1884, a fire was caused by the upsetting of a lamp in a charcoal 
shop near the bank of the Huangpu River. Sixty to seventy houses were destroyed after 
enduring flames for nearly three hours.498 On the night of February 1, 1886, fire broke out 
near the East Gate of the native walled city. The natives hurried to the scene. People were 
knocked down and trampled on; coolies carrying water were knocking their buckets against 
the shins of the sightseers; guild men with their myriad lamps were rushing along followed 
by soldiers and city watchmen. The late arrival of the native fire engine was heralded by 
the clashing of gongs and a good deal of shouting. This fire, caused by the upsetting of a 
kerosene lamp, consumed one hundred houses.499 However, with a few exceptions when 
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foreign fire brigades were allowed to help, the Chinese city kept saying no to the proven 
convenient foreign technologies. 
In 1890, a new Daotai was appointed. His name was Nie Jigui (聂缉椝, 1855-
1911). Daotai Nie was distinctly more favorable to the European improvements than his 
predecessors. In their negotiation with the Shanghai Waterworks Company, the 
representative of Chinese authorities expressed their support for a scheme of water supply. 
But for the moment, they did not wish for a general supply of water. They planned to have 
the two yamens, the Daotai’s and the city magistrate’s court and office buildings, supplied 
with waterworks water.500 The record was unclear on whether the two yamens were piped 
with small mains as it had been agreed, but a general water supply was yet in existence in 
the Chinese city. Tragic fire incidents were not uncommon in Shanghai, yet no further 
actions were taken in pursuit of native water supply.501 Some foreigners felt so frustrated 
that they doubted whether Chinese would ever accept these new technologies:  
“It was once pithily remarked that the Municipal Council of Shanghai are 
the best missionaries in China. But in the [proselytizing] sense the mission 
of our Council is not more successful than the religious missions are. Native 
officials who pass through Shanghai, even if they condescend when here to 
use a brougham instead of a chair when making calls, are just as 
conservative as ever when they get back to their posts in the interior. 
Electric lights, waterworks, and carriages may be very well in a foreign 
settlement, they persuade themselves, but are not wanted in a Chinese city. 
How many foreign ideas have been put in practice in the native here?”502 
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 The Chinese efforts in building their own waterworks finally began in 1892. A local 
merchant recommended Tang Jiechen (Tong Kid-son 唐杰臣, 1862-1904), comprador of 
British company Jardine Matheson Co. (怡和洋行), in his petition to the viceroy about 
opening a Chinese waterworks in the Chinese city. The capital of the proposed company 
was Tls. 300,000. Tong and another merchant would be paying for two-thirds of the sum, 
and the rest would be raised locally. The proposed waterworks would be the only one at 
the time not located outside the Chinese settlement, hence the name of the company the 
Inland Waterworks Co. 503  On September 16, 1899, a Saturday morning, the Inland 
Waterworks opened its door. Many constructions were still underway, but the town office, 
which was on the Chinese Bund, and the engines and boiler houses were ready for the press 
to see. The Inland claimed they would erect a water tower, which would be made of steel, 
80 ft. high, supporting a tank 20 ft. in diameter. The tower would be capable of holding 
50,000 gallons of water. Two settling tanks, three filter beds, and a clear water reservoir 
were under planning. 504 Champagnes were popped at the ceremony, but it was not until 
1902 that the company was finally put in shape. In April, the shares of the company, with 
a capital of Tls. 1,000,000 divided into 20,000 shares of Tls. 50 each, were allotted.505 
Saying that the Inland Waterworks Co. was a Chinese enterprise might be 
problematic. The company was a result of Chinese money and American technologies. 
Tang Jiechen and the local government, represented by the Daotai, were two principal 
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directors. Foreign press attributed the successful launching of the Inland Co. to Tang, 
whose ability and energy navigated the new enterprise in the official and commercial world 
of China. But the core technologies of the company were all imports from the United States. 
The engines were supplied by the Cincinnati-based Laidlaw, Dunn, Gordon Co., the cast-
iron pipes by R. D. Wood & Co., Philadelphia, and the hydrants and valves were purchased 
from the Kennedy Valve Co. in the state of New York, which is still in business to this day. 
The technical body of the company was also administered by foreign specialists. The 
company hired two foreign engineers, Atkinson and Dallas. The general manager Lehmann 
came from a German company, Arnhold, Karberg & Co. (瑞记洋行). Fowler of the 
Laidlaw, Dunn, Gordon Co. would be the engineer in charge of the Waterworks upon its 
completion. Blechynden and Ord of the Shanghai Engineering, Shipbuilding & Dock Co. 
were contracted for erecting the machinery and water tower and laying the pipes.506 
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Figure 19 – Illustration of the Inland Waterworks Company. Source: Gan Chen, 
1909. 
The Inland Waterworks Company was created to compete with the Shanghai 
Waterworks Co. The late Qing elites counted on their fellow countrymen to cancel their 
subscription to the British business switch to a Chinese one. But the company struggled 
with winning enough subscribers. The business remained stagnant for more than a decade. 
The embattled enterprise caught a break after being purchased by the Republic government 
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in March 1915.507 Within a year, it was resold to a wealthy native merchant Yao Mulian (
姚慕莲, 1876-1950). The company was not fully straightened up until the 1930s.508 During 
the early twentieth century, the Shanghai Waterworks Company faced much more 
formidable challenge from another Chinese enterprise in the north of Shanghai – the Chapei 
Waterworks and Electricity Company. 
7.2 Creation of the Chapei Waterworks  
 In the fall of 1909, Daotai Cai Naihuang (蔡乃煌, 1861-1916) asked permission of 
Viceroy Zhang Renjun (张人俊) to construct waterworks in Chapei, the booming industrial 
and commercial hub on the north side of the Suzhou Creek, in opposition to the 
International Settlement. The Viceroy approved for waterworks in Chapei as it was both 
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practically valuable and politically important. He ordered Daotai Cai to fashion a report on 
the matter with the help of the Chapei Constabulary.509 The report found that among the 
7,025 families residing in the district, some 2,000 were using the Shanghai Waterworks’ 
water. The director of the Chapei Constabulary estimated that once a Chinese enterprise 
was around to replace the service provided by foreigners, the residence, almost all of them 
being Chinese, would revert to use of Chinese water. But after consulting the local gentry, 
the officials discovered that the current arrangements with the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company for water supply in that district was enabled by local authorities in view of 
improvements in the police and sanitation. The local authorities said that the agreement did 
not violate local sovereignty.510 
 
Figure 20 – Chapei district and its position in relation to the International 
Settlement. Source: “National Archives (United Kingdom)”. 
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The Chapei scheme continued nonetheless. Unlike the Inland Waterworks 
Company, which was funded by the locals, the Chapei waterworks was a project of national 
significance. Viceroy Zhang obtained the permission from the Qing court for native 
waterworks to be built to address the “insufficient supply of water”. He suggested to the 
throne that the Shanghai Daotai and the local gentry had come to the conclusion that it 
would be advisable to construct Chinese waterworks in Chapei than to make arrangements 
for a water supply with a foreign company. The enterprise was commenced in 1910. To 
ensure that the Chapei waterworks was to be a symbol of national pride, the government 
would order machinery from the Kiangnan Arsenal, a home-grown military and industrial 
compound in Shanghai created during the 1860s.511  
However, the Engineer-in-Chief of the Chapei waterworks, Max Engel, a former 
employee of the Shanghai Waterworks Company, was a foreigner. By April 1910, after 
surveying the place, Engel chose a site near the Guangdong Cemetery on the bank of the 
Suzhou Creek. Although the Suzhou Creek was immediate to the busy towns, the water 
was believed to be of enough depth that it would be clear. The proposed scheme was 
simple: the establishment would comprise of a water tower, two filter ponds and one 
purifying pond, for which 20 mow of land would be acquired. Two sets of pumping engine 
were to pump 600,000 gallons of water in 24 hours and an electric dynamo would be 
purchased that brightened up the district with 2,000 lights. It was estimated that machinery, 
land and buildings would cost about Tls. 200,000 and another Tls. 200,000 for service 
pipes. It was suggested by the Viceroy that capital required should be loaned, half by the 
Ministry of Commerce and half through the Daotai from private sources, bearing interest 
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at 7 per cent. Shares would be issued to raise stock to refund the loans after one year.512 
The Qing government permitted the loan from the Ministry of Commerce.513 
 As for the general manager of the Chapei waterworks, the Qing officials felt that 
the position had to be held by a competent Chinese. Enter Li Pingshu (李平书, 1854-1927), 
a Ningbo native who enjoyed a reputation of capability in the Chapei district. Li’s interest 
in water supply started in 1883 when he set up a shop to have hydrant water supplied by 
the Shanghai Waterworks sold to the French Concession and the native city in buckets. 
Seeing water supply as a boon to the Chinese, Li petitioned to the Daotai to have the pipes 
coming into the Chinese city. The scheme failed the last minute, but Li’s passion for 
utilities did not stop there. 514  In 1910, when Li was visiting Nanjing attending an 
exhibition, he had the chance to meet Viceroy Chang and was asked by the latter to 
establish the works. Upon his return to Shanghai, Li consulted Daotai Cai and decided to 
take on the matter.515 By May 1911, the reservoir and the electric power station was near 
completion.516 The construction was behind the schedule since the original scheme set the 
date of completion at the beginning of 1911. But given the prospect of an unprecedented 
home-grown enterprise, Li came out unscathed as the project slowly dragged on. The 
waterworks were completed around the late summer of 1911. It had the capacity of supply 
two million gallons of water a day. The opening ceremony took place in October and was 
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honored by the presence of a large gathering of guests. The total expenditure, as reported 
by Engel, was Tls. 470,000, 17.5% higher than the original estimate.517  
Within a month, the Xinhai Revolution broke out. The Qing regime was 
overthrown. The birth of Republic of China ended the monarchical tradition of China. The 
country went into a period of anarchy. The climate was harmful for business, especially 
those who were guaranteed funding from the old government. When the disorder ended, 
the newly-born Chapei Water and Electricity Company, overspending its budget before 
completion, found itself in debt of over Tls. 200,000. At the time, nobody had a definite 
idea about how dire the crisis was, except for Li Pingshu. Li was the one who put the 
company together, reputable and capable, but also was the one at fault for the financial 
predicament, which would not reveal itself until years later. 
7.3 When Pipes Met 
 Since its creation, the Chapei waterworks was on a collision course with the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company (SWW). The Municipal Council was determined to 
protect interest of Shanghai Waterworks in the north. In March 1911, the Council protested 
to the Consular Body on the subject of SWW under threat. The Consular Body accordingly 
agreed not to allow any interference with the mains already laid by the SWW.518 When the 
Chapei waterworks began laying pipes in the district, many consumers of the SWW 
transferred to the Chinese supplier. The SWW urged the Council to enforce the early 
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agreement about their exclusive right in supplying houses on extra-Settlement roads. The 
dispute was subject to arbitration, and the result was in the SWW’s favor.519  
The existing rules put the operation of the Chapei Company under constraints. In 
March 1912, the Chapei Company was in the middle of laying water mains in the bed of 
the old Wusong Road on the north bund of the Suzhou Creek. Wusong Road crossed paths 
with the North Sichuan Road Extension, and the Sichuan Road was a critical roadway 
running north and south in the International Settlement. The “Extension” in the name 
indicated that this section of the Sichuan Road was not within the boundary of the 
Settlement. Nonetheless, the Shanghai Waterworks Company had for years provided the 
residents with tap water, effectively putting the North Sichuan Road Extension under the 
jurisdiction of the Municipal Council. The Chapei Company needed to open a trench in the 
Wusong Road at the juncture with Sichuan Road in order to reach further east. They 
considered it was duly authorized to do so because the work was operated outside the 
Settlement. The Shanghai Waterworks Company, however, claimed the move was 
disputable. Fearing having to pay for the alleged damage, the Chapei Company took the 
matter to the Mixed Court. The conflict quickly escalated. The tension over sovereignty 
issues became palatable in the room.520 
 The Chapei Company argued that Wusong Road was a public Chinese road on 
Chinese soil under Chinese jurisdiction. It was a main native road from time immemorial, 
connecting Shanghai to the exit of the Huangpu River to the Yangtze. The Council, 
however, argued that in the past forty years, the Wusong Road had not at any time been a 
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public Chinese road in that it was not constructed or maintained by the Chinese 
government. Prior to 1867, foreigners had the old Wusong Road widened by acquiring land 
from native owners. Rent was paid in 1867 by the Council to the Chinese authorities. Since 
then, considerable sums were spent from time to time by the Council in repairing the road. 
As for the North Sichuan Road Extension, the Council claimed that it was constructed by 
them in the year of 1903 and had ever since been repaired, controlled and policed without 
any involvement from the Chinese authorities. Therefore, the right to permit the opening 
of the North Sichuan Road Extension was solely vested in the Council and the Chapei 
Company had no authority to open such road without their consent.521 
The attorney representing the Chapei Company argued that although the old road 
was widened by foreigners, the actual purchase of land never happened. The lands were 
taken by foreigners but were never paid for. The Road was allowed to go into complete 
disrepair since 1870 and was never used by foreigners, making it de facto a Chinese road 
again. Two aged persons were brought out as witnesses. They recalled the history of the 
road quite differently from what the Council was claiming. Max Engel, engineer-in-chief 
of the Chapei Company, was called in as witness. He said that the refusal of the Council to 
allow the Company to lay their pipes prevented them from supplying the eastern district 
with water. That district was very densely populated and the houses were flimsy structures. 
Thus, there was a special need of water in case of fire. The refusal of the Council caused 
the Company considerable loss and added to the anxiety over fire incidents. At current 
status, the fire appliances which had been laid down east of the Sichuan Road were of no 
practical use. The attorney pointed out that the only section that would be affected was a 
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junction as wide as the North Sichuan Road Extension itself. He said that the Chinese 
authorities were showing every disposition to endeavor to administer the district to the best 
of their lights at all events, and so they should receive encouragement from their foreign 
neighbors.522 
The Council argued that they opposed the application of laying pipes for two 
reasons. First, under by-law ten attached to the Land Regulations, the Council had made 
an arrangement with the Shanghai Waterworks Company in July 1905. They should allow 
no person to open the roads under their control except the Shanghai Waterworks Company. 
Second, the Council denied the application because what the Chapei Company aimed to 
achieve was pointless. Before the commencement of the Chapei Company, the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company was supplying water on the east side of the North Sichuan Road 
Extension, which the Chapei now sought to come into. They were asking the permission 
to duplicate the supply of water when people were already quite able to obtain a sufficient 
supply. The Council also pointed out that whether the old Wusong Road was Chinese soil 
was questionable. In 1867, the Daotai asked the Council to pay rent for the said road. If it 
was not for rent, the Daotai could have said “I will take it back.” 523  
The Chapei Company argued that even though Shanghai Waterworks Company 
was authorized to lay pipes, it did not prevent others to lay pipes on the same road so as to 
supply thoroughly a district. The Chapei had a superior right to the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company in that it was their district. They had the right from the Chinese government to 
supply that district. The Shanghai Waterworks Company might have acquired some right 




to lay mains along a certain road, but not a general right to supply the whole district. The 
Chapei Company had unquestioned and unquestionable rights to supply the whole of that 
district of Baoshan (east to Chapei and north to the International Settlement) and to lay 
their pipes there.524  
The Court did not announce the verdict immediately. Pressure was mounting for 
both sides. Some of the SWW’s customers in the district had transferred to the Chinese 
company in protest. On the Chapei’s side, their attorney suddenly died of angina pectoris 
at his residence on the night of April 5.525 Now that a legal victory seemed unattainable, 
the Chapei authorities ramped up its force to claim what they believed they rightfully 
owned. At the annual meeting of the China Association, it was reported that the Chapei 
Constabulary had stationed armed policemen with rifles and ball ammunition a foot from 
the North Sichuan Road Extension. The aggressiveness was believed to be an attempt to 
influence the case.526  
In June, the Court found that neither party had any absolute prescriptive right to the 
land in question. On the Chinese side, the authorities never repaired the road, leaving it in 
the hands of the foreign neighbors. When the Northern Sichuan Road Extension was built, 
the Chinese authorities never brought up any claim of ownership of the land affected. 
However, the supposed right the Municipal Council claimed was not sound either. No proof 
could be provided for legit purchase, let alone the ownership that extended to the subsoil. 
Therefore, it was decided that neither party should interfere with the other except in the 
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way of legitimate competition. The judgement pointed out that the absence of fire hydrants 
of the Shanghai Waterworks Company in the area (Baoshan district) the Chapei intended 
to reach was due to the opposition of the local authority, of which the head of Chapei 
Company was also head. Since there was a large area to be served close to the waterworks, 
the Company insistence on going into the east district looked motivated by politics instead 
of business and public demand.527  
The Court ruled that the Chapei Company enter into an undertaking with the 
Municipal Council not to prevent, hinder, nor interfere with in any way except by 
legitimate competition the operation of the Shanghai Waterworks Company to the east of 
the North Sichuan Road Extension; the Council shall issue the permit applied for to the 
Chapei Company. The operation at the crossing shall be confined without the assent of the 
Council; the Chapei Company shall deposit with the Court the sum of Tls. 2,000 as security 
to make good any loss or damage suffered by the Council owing to delay in operations or 
failure to make good the roadway after operations are ended.528 
Foreigners were concerned about the possibility of the Chapei Company advancing 
their business by receiving political favors from the Chinese authorities. Some pointed out 
that the cooperation between the Chapei Constabulary Office and of the Local Government 
Office of Chapei was a clear indication that the “legitimate competition” was to completely 
protect the Chapei Company from competition.529 These concerns were legitimate. A few 
days after the judgement was out, Max Engel, the engineer-in-chief of the Chapei 
                                                 
527 “The Chapei Judgement”, The North-China Herald, June 08, 1912: 653. 
528 “In the Court of Consuls: Judgement”, The North-China Herald, June 8, 1912: 720. 
529 “Municipal Affairs”, The North-China Herald, June 22, 1912: 809. 
 264 
Company, wrote to request the Municipal Council to issue the permit in accordance with 
the judgement. The permit was granted. However, when the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company appealed to supply water to two British Lots in Chapei, they were refused by the 
Chapei Board. In his letter to the Shanghai Waterworks Company, the Chinese engineer of 
the Chapei Board stated that a monopoly had been granted to the Chapei Company. The 
Municipal Council was infuriated. The Council said that until the Chapei authorities issue 
the permits the SWW applied for and guaranteed that no such obstacle be placed in the 
application for permits in future, until they showed that they were honestly prepared to 
abide by the decision of the Court of Consuls, no permit would be issued to the Chapei 
waterworks for extension of their pipes across the North Sichuan Road.530 
In September 1912, the Municipal Council formally rescinded the permit. The 
negotiation ran into a standstill.531 It was not until March 1913 that the Chapei Company 
figured out a way to circumvent the obstruction. Laying pipes across North Sichuan Road 
Extension could not be attempted, but the waterways remained legally Chinese territory, 
free of foreign intervention. The Chapei Company utilized the creek which was crossed by 
the bridge in Northern Sichuan Road Extension and laid a main along the riverbed. Li 
Pingshu was the one who came up with the clever scheme and the construction was quickly 
wrapped in merely days.532 However, after finally reaching the eastern Baoshan district, 
the advancement of the Chapei Company faltered. This was most likely due to the debt that 
had plagued the company for long. The crisis underneath started manifesting itself.  
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7.4 Ownership of the Chapei Company: From Private to Public 
 The Chapei Company was caught in between its own aggressive expansion and the 
Municipal Council’s obstructionism. It was rumored in the summer of 1913 that Li Pingshu 
had gone to Osaka, negotiating a big loan from Japan to save the Company. The security 
was said to be the waterworks.533 Li had always been a complicated figure, whose ties 
reached far beyond the business world. Li’s political career started in the 1870s when he 
rose to officialdom in prefects of Canton Province. He was dismissed by the Qing court for 
abrasiveness in dealing with the French imperial expansion in Canton. Moving back to 
Shanghai, Li was inspired by the presence of the British-run modern utilities. He paid a 
visit to the waterworks with his fellow village man Yao Angu, whose brother Yao Langu 
was an employee of the Shanghai Waterworks Company. That was the beginning of Li’s 
interest in water business and Western technologies. Before leading the project of Chapei 
waterworks, Li was already in contact with several managerial and engineering talents. 
Under Li’s recommendation, one of them were sent to save the Inland Waterworks 
Company, which was on the verge of bankruptcy in 1902.534  
Li remained active in politics. He participated in the Xinhai Revolution in 
Shanghai. After the military occupation he was appointed by the military governor Chen 
Qimei (陈其美, 1878-1916) as the head of the Civil Bureau of Shanghai and Chief of the 
Chapei Police.535 However, with the rise of conservative Yuan Shikai as president of the 
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Republic of China, close allies of revolutionary Sun Yat-sen’s fell out of favor. Yuan made 
a deal with the foreign authorities in Shanghai to the effect that Chen Qimei and Li Pingshu 
were deprived of rights to reside in the International Settlement. Fearing for his safety, Li 
fled to Japan, abandoning his duty at the Chapei Company.536 
 The Chapei Company’s difficulties caught government’s attention. In March 1914, 
Han Guojun ( 韩 国 钧 , 1857-1942), civil governor of Jiangsu province, ordered the 
Company to forward a report about its operation since its inception. It was found in the 
accounts that a sum of Tls. 400,000 was borrowed from a Japanese firm, of which the 
directors of the Company were not aware. Even the foreign chief engineer, Max Engel, 
could not shed any light upon the loan. The Company addressed to Li Pingshu, who was 
in Japan, a letter seeking further information about the loan. Li said that the Company after 
the revolution was indebted to the Chinese government to a large extent. Since the Chapei 
Municipal Council had no funds to spare, it became his responsibility for the continuance 
of the Company. That was why he turned to foreign money for help. Directors of the Chapei 
Company was deceived and upset. They urged the civil governor to summon Li to 
Shanghai.537  
Japanese authorities were swift to prey on the vulnerable Chapei Company. Later 
in March, Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai said that Li Pingshu had mortgaged the 
works to a Japanese firm, Okura & Co., and unless the loan was repaid, Okura & Co. would 
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exercise their right to take over the works.538 The Jiangsu government had been thinking 
of selling the company to the Japanese, but after investigating the condition of the Chapei 
Company, the local merchants said that the property, even in its entirety, was insufficient 
to pay off the loan debts.539 The Chapei Company was not alone in this unfortunate trend. 
In Beijing, the Peking Waterworks too was in the course of being transferred to Arnhold, 
Karberg & Co. (德商瑞记洋行), a trading company registered in Germany. This project, 
initiated by Yuan Shikai, approved by Empress Dowager Cixi in 1908, was in the Chinese 
hands for less than four years. The future of the Chapei Company looked gloomy.540  
 As the investigation went on, more disgraceful details about Chapei’s finance were 
exposed. The Peking Daily News revealed that when the idea of Chapei waterworks was 
first conceived, it was proposed to enter into an arrangement with the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company for the supply of water. But the negotiation fell apart. Li Pingshu 
estimated that the project would cost Tls. 500,000 now that the company was completely 
on its own. Daotai Cai suggested that Li should apply for a smaller amount because he was 
afraid that the Viceroy might not approve the scheme if the cost was too great. They fixed 
the price of the project at Tls. 200,000, with the Tls. 200,000 for service pipes removed. 
By the time when the project was completed, the total expenditure, according to engineer 
Max Engel, was Tls. 470,000.541 
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The Chapei Company was heavily in debt before the turmoil of 1911 Xinhai 
Revolution. After General Chen Qimei forcefully occupied Shanghai, the Company turned 
to the military governor for help. Chen suggested that the Chapei Company could mortgage 
its property to Okura & Co. The agreed loan was Tls. 200,000 at first, but Chen wanted to 
take advantage of the moment. He asked the company to request a larger loan from the 
Japanese and planned to divert some of the money to his arsenal. The proposed amount 
thus rose to Tls. 330,000. Okura & Co. only agreed to loan Tls. 300,000. This sum was not 
spent on any improvements of the service. Tls. 210,000 were used to square up the debts, 
Tls. 60,000 to pay back the payment of advances made by the Daotai’s treasury. In 1913, 
the mortgage increased to Tls. 400,000. Since then, no interests had been paid to Okura & 
Co.542 
 The Chapei Company was meant to be China’s monument of national pride. After 
it fell from grace, the government decided to intervene. In April 1914, Department of 
Industry of Jiangsu Province (江苏省实业厅) bought out the Chapei Company. The 
provincial government paid instantly Tls. 60,000 to the Okura & Co. and promised to pay 
up the rest of the debt in the coming years. Li Pingshu escaped the punishment. He returned 
to China safely in 1916. His company, in the meantime, changed its name into Jiangsu 
Province Chapei Water and Electric Company.543 
7.5 Ownership of the Chapei Company: From Public to Private 
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 The governmental control over the waterworks did not lead to improvements in 
services. Fourteen months into the new ownership, the quality of water supplied by the 
Chapei Company deteriorated. The population in the district was increasing, but the 
capacity of waterworks was not. The Chapei Company petitioned in June 1915 that the 
Company’s waterworks should enter an agreement with the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company to obtain a supply of water from the International Settlement. Governor of 
Jiangsu, Qi Yaolin (齐耀琳, 1862-1949), refused to grant the petition as it would embarrass 
the sovereignty of the new republic.544 
By 1918, the Jiangsu government was on its way of abandoning the Chapei 
Company. They thought about granting a charter to a private company working in the same 
capacity of the Chapei Company. Jiangsu Provincial Assembly sanctioned the proposal of 
replacement. Upon hearing the news, the gentry of Chapei sent a delegate to Nanjing to 
oppose the proposed new company. They believed that this creation would be redundant. 
They argued that once they took over the Chapei waterworks, they would be able to put it 
back in business.545 
However, there was a reason why the government would rather have another 
waterworks built than giving up on the Chapei Company. An investigation by the Chinese 
press discovered a reserve fund amounting to several tens of thousands of dollars in the 
Chapei Company. But the sum had not been spent on any needed improvements or 
extensions. Public bodies of Chapei submitted a joint petition to the Governor of Jiangsu, 
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requesting permit to use this reserve. The inquiry was never answered. The manager of the 
works, who was appointed by the Jiangsu government, grew so frustrated that he submitted 
his resignation. The Chapei gentry was worried that once the manager was gone, they 
would not be able to carry out any real improvements: “If nothing is done, these provincial-
owned industries, we are afraid, cannot last long, however well preserved.”546 
Government’s involvement in the Chapei Company proved to be more trouble than 
help. Obstructionism associated with bureaucracy was best exemplified by the following 
story. On January 15, 1922, manager of the Chapei Company Feng informed Governor 
Wang about the pressing need of a larger trunk pipe to connect the waterworks with the 
commercially developed yet far away Baoshan district in the north. Feng stated that due to 
the long-distance water supply in Baoshan was not pressurized enough to fight fire. The 
supply to Baoshan was at the center of controversy in 1913 when the Chapei Company 
bypassed the obstruction of Municipal Council to pipe the district. Almost ten years had 
passed, supplied remained inadequate. Feng reported that Chapei Company would call for 
a bidding for the proposed 150,000 feet-long trunk pipes. Since the Chapei was technically 
a government franchise, Feng was seeking permission from the Governor. On March 2, 
1922, after a month of search for the qualified tender, the Chapei Company had selected 
the candidates. Feng suggested that considering the scale of the proposed project, it would 
be better if the provincial government could send in their agent to oversee the process. On 
March 8, the bidding began under the oversight of Commissioner Yu, representing 
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Department of Industry of Jiangsu Province. The contract went to a foreign bank who 
offered to build a steel pipe at low cost.547  
However, the Governor’s Office became furious. They said the special agent they 
sent was still on his way to Shanghai when the bidding ended without his presence. The 
Company was scolded for the contempt against the government. The Company was even 
ordered to retract the result and hold another bidding with the presence of the special agent 
sent from the Governor’s Office. Feng tried to make the case that a second bidding would 
be a bad idea in that the lowest possible cost of the project was already exposed to all 
candidates and if the current tender lost its bid, struggles and skirmishes were bound to 
occur. Not to mention how much credit the government would lose in reversing a process 
of such gravity. Hubris of the governor prevailed. At his insistence, the process was 
reversed and redone in June.548  
The Chapei Company remained in the hands of the government for another year. 
Due to the arrested development of their waterworks, the company had to purchase water 
from the Shanghai Waterworks Company. This arrangement was done behind closed doors, 
otherwise it would deal a huge blow to the Republic government whose entire legitimacy 
was founded on the idea of sovereignty. The consumers, who were drinking water 
fashioned by the British company, had to pay ten cents more for each gallon than they paid 
the Shanghai Waterworks Company. This “temporary” arrangement lasted well into the 
summer of 1923.549 The terrible quality of water pushed the people to their limit. The water 
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provided was said to be green in color. Little fish, shrimp and insects were reportedly found 
in his tap water. 550  Not only was the water hard to swallow, the supply for fire 
extinguishing was also in question. On the evening of March 10, 1924, a silk filature in the 
district was burned to the ground. Most of the workers lived in the workers’ quarter inside 
the building. The police had to break the lock for those who were lucky enough to escape. 
Fifty-two people died, thirty-nine wounded. Fire brigade reportedly could not find a source 
of water that was adequately pressurized. A general strike swept the Chapei district in 
protest of the inept Chapei waterworks.551 Although it was found out that the problematic 
design of the workers’ quarter was the primary reason for the high death toll, merchants of 
Chapei accused the provincial government’s arrogance of leading the Chapei waterworks 
to the “most corrupt and darkest place”. The governor should be held responsible for the 
“utmost tragedy in Shanghai’s recent history.”552 
Underneath the dissidence was a power shift between Chapei district and the 
Jiangsu province. Chapei merchants had long been yearning autonomy for their district. 
After government’s acquisition of the Chapei Company, commerce in Chapei had grown 
steadily. The provincial government of Jiangsu at one point almost authorized the 
establishment of Chapei’s own Municipal Council. But the governor went back on his word 
at the last moment. This was the real momentum behind the general strike. Those who 
expected to move up in the would-be Council closed their shops in protest. The strike went 
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on for days. A mass meeting was held on the afternoon of March 22. Various resolutions 
were passed including taking possession of the Chapei Company along with its water and 
electricity plants if the provincial authorities refused to hand them over. A group of one 
hundred “special constables” was formed, who wore badges inscribed “Chapei Public 
Bodies’ Peace Maintenance Officers.” Under the pressure of public agitation, the Jiangsu 
governor announced that the demands of the merchants would be acceded to. April 30 was 
fixed as the date for handing over the two services of Chapei Company to local control. 
The news spread across Chapei. People celebrated the victory with fireworks and 
parades.553 
The transition of Chapei Company was not finalized until the end of August 1924. 
During the five months, the government’s stance remained highly unclear. They kept 
picking on the draft agreement and was concerned that the Chapei merchants would be 
slow in paying the full amount. These actions deepened the division between Chapei 
district and the province.554 In fact, the Chapei merchants had raised $2,000,000 capital 
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shortly after the victory of general strike and expected to double this sum for improving 
the efficiency of Chapei’s service. Their plan included addressing the water pressure issue 
by erecting a new water tower 180 ft. high, with a capacity of 450,000 gallons. 555 
Unfortunately, the Chapei Company barely catch a break. Merely one month after the 
company was privatized, war broke out in Shanghai. From September 3 to October 13 
1924, numerous battles occurred across the Yangtze delta between warlords of Jiangsu and 
those of Zhejiang. The key purpose of this war was for the Jiangsu warlords to seize the 
military control over the Shanghai area and to drive out the Zhejiang influence. Due to the 
disturbance, the Chapei Company was not able to make any substantial improvements. The 
water supply remained a major trouble for the local inhabitants. The negligence of the 
Company even led to cholera outbreak in Chapei in the summer of 1926, which would be 
explored in the next chapter. 
7.6 Rise of Nationalism 
 While the two Chinese waterworks struggled, the Shanghai Waterworks kept 
expanding its service. Pipes were laid not only across the Suzhou Creek into the north, but 
also beyond the west border of the Settlement along the major roads like Bubbling Well 
Road. The ample water supply brought about better sanitation and increasing revenue, and 
helped the Municipal Council projected political influence to the surrounding areas. 
Foreigners who lived outside the Settlement paid their taxes, but had no representative in 
the Council in deciding the tax rate because the rules forbid those who lived outside the 
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Settlement to be elected to such positions.556 This issue caused some minor complaints, but 
did not prevent more foreigners from settling down in extra-Settlement areas. The 
Municipal Council managed to occupy large area in the western area amidst the chaos in 
1924. By claiming administrative rights over the roads and villages some five miles west 
to the limits of Settlement, the British authorities transformed the vast rural area into its 
western district.557 The political landscape underwent major changes when the Nationalist 
troops, led by the young general Chiang Kai-shek, the revolutionary disciple of late Sun 
Yat-sen, captured Shanghai in 1927. The old, weak, greedy, and deeply unpopular local 
government was unseated. Chiang Kai-shek’s army had yet swept away the warlords in 
northern China, but the nationalist sentiment was already on the rise. 
After occupying the Chinese sections of Shanghai, the Nationalist regime solidified 
their control by launching a purge of the union leaders and communists, who helped 
organize strikes in support of the new regime merely months ago. Special Municipality of 
Shanghai was then created to oversee all Chinese districts. The new government sent in 
senior Health Officer, Dr. Liu Hsin-tz, to meet the board of trustees of the Chapei 
Company. Liu inspected the waterworks and offered some suggestions. Liu said that 
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considering currently only one filter was in proper working order, the Company should 
immediately repair the other two it had for the sake of sufficient filtering of water. He also 
advised against mixing of unfiltered water with pure water. To kill all poisonous matter in 
the water, Liu suggested applying gas in the filtered water in addition to existing measures. 
Liu said that if the Company was not able to fashion enough water during the summer, then 
water should be obtained from other waterworks companies to meet the additional 
demands. The newly forged Department of Public Utilities then was put in charge of the 
routine report on quality of water of both the Inland Waterworks Co. and the Chapei 
Company, signaling a more centralized control over the Chinese water supply.558 Dr. Liu 
revisited the Chapei waterworks within a week to ensure that all his previous advices were 
implemented. The Chapei Company was scolded for its slow action, but reforms took 
time.559 By the end of 1927 the Chinese water supply in Shanghai had seen a steady decline 
in the number of bacteria.560 
The Nationalist government proceeded to challenge the legality of foreign water 
supply in the disputed areas. In July 1928, the Kuo Min News Agency reported that the 
headquarters of the Shanghai and Wusong Gendarmerie and the Special Municipality had 
requested Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of Jiangsu to send a dispatch to E. S. 
Cunningham, Senior Consul, to ascertain the truth of various reports to the effect that the 
waterworks of the Municipal Council had been laying pipes beyond the Settlement limits 
in the western part of the city. The Nationalist government requested the foreigners to 
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refrain from carrying their activities beyond Settlement limits without first obtaining 
permission from the Chinese authorities.561 
 The North-China Herald, however, had very different findings. They reported that 
the Shanghai Waterworks Company had heard nothing about the alleged complaint and 
had received no protest from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. The Herald suggested 
that the Kuo Min News Agency might be sending out “a little intelligent anticipation”. The 
Herald also suggested that the Shanghai Waterworks Company had no mains outside the 
Settlement limits. The said roads where pipes were laid were either under the control of the 
Municipal Council, or Chinese roads where pipe-laying was authorized by Chinese 
authorities. For example, there was indeed a considerable mileage of mains in Chinese-
controlled roads – north of Zhaofeng Road (兆丰路/高阳路) and beyond the limits of 
Settlement. However, these mains were laid under Chinese permits and was requested by 
the Chinese consumers. The service of the Shanghai Waterworks Co. was deeply 
appreciated. Nationalist’s propaganda might not be able to convert many of them to a 
Chinese water supply.562  
 In the summer of 1928, the Shanghai Waterworks Company’s extra-Settlement 
activities caught the attention of the Nationalist government. As new foreign houses were 
erected on the Fahua Road, the Company was laying distributing main along the adjacent 
Columbia Road to supply water to those new premises. Upon learning the news, the Bureau 
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of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist government filed in a formal protest to the Senior 
Consul. This move caught the Municipal Council by surprise because up until 1928 the 
procedure had not been seriously questioned.563 Picking the fight in the western area must 
be a premediated move. In the northern area, it would be unrealistic to cut off the British 
water supply without expecting backlash from the large number of paying customers. 
Unlike the entrenched network in the north, the ongoing construction in the west was 
vulnerable to political interception. The Council maintained that it was their right to permit 
the Shanghai Waterworks Company to lay mains under the current regulations, but the 
Nationalist government did not wish to authorize the construction as their predecessors had 
done. 
 In the morning of October 18, 1928, at 8 a.m., a number of uniformed Chinese came 
over the railway from the west and arrived at the site of construction on Keswick Road, 
one of the extra-Settlement roads in the west. They ordered the coolies to stop. The 
appearance of these men wearing uniform came as a complete surprise to those who were 
working on the site. For a while the construction stopped. Noticing the incident, the 
representatives of the Shanghai Waterworks Company went to the police. The foreign 
police force responded by placing patrols on Keswick Road near the excavations to ensure 
the safety of the pipes lying there. The next day, on October 19, a police officer affiliated 
with the Second substation of the Sixth District proceeded to the scene and intended to stop 
the work again. He was blocked by several foreign officers of the western district. He said 
that he had received orders to prevent work being continued in Keswick Road. The 
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inspector-in-charge of the Bubbling Well Station told him that the work would continue 
unless they received a letter from a responsible person, and formal negotiations must be 
done with the Municipal Council. The foreign police then communicated with the 
headquarters of the native police. It was unclear whether there had been coordination 
among police forces in those districts, but no further interference was seen after that day.564 
The young Kuomintang (Nationalist) party members in Shanghai could not 
stomach the blatant violation of China’s administration rights. In their petition to the central 
government in Nanjing, these young men said: “The Kuomintang is advocating every day 
the abrogation of unequal treaties and if a strong protest be not lodged against the British 
imperialists for roads in Chinese territory and endeavors are not made to secure the 
rendition of these roads how can we enforce the policy of the Kuomintang and comply with 
the wishes of the people?” They demanded that the roads be taken over and constructed by 
the Chinese authorities, that the foreign police withdraw from these roads, and that 
protection of the lives and property of foreign residents on the sides of these roads be 
undertaken by Chinese authorities; that an annual land tax on these roads be paid to the 
Chinese authorities, instead of to the Municipal Council; and that all the wicked members 
of the gentry and local chiefs who worked in conjunction with the foreigners for the sale 
of land be arrested and ordered to reimburse the price of the land or to have their estates 
confiscated.565 
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The Nanjing government was not called into action by the young, vengeful party 
members, but to battle the unjust foreign interests the Kuomintang did have a plan for 
Shanghai. In July 1929, Nanjing elevated Shanghai from “Special City” to “Greater 
Municipality of Shanghai”. Large land in Hongkou was saved for the new administrative 
core, soon to be decorated with magnificent office buildings and museums. The 
architecture would be in full-fledged Chinese style, positioning the Greater Shanghai as 
national monument in opposition to the neo-classical, colonial-style Bund. The plan 
relocated the political center to the north so that the expansion of the International 
Settlement could be countered. Starting from the summer of 1930, the Greater Shanghai 
municipality became increasingly combative in disputed sovereignty claims in the northern 
part of the city. The feud over the Northern Sichuan Road Extension was revived. 
In July 1930, the Greater Shanghai government installed police station in alleyways 
where foreign patrols existed, demanding the Shanghai Municipal Council to withdraw and 
surrender their rights in that area. They issued a notice to the residents living in one of the 
alleyways off North Sichuan Road Extension (Yu Chin Fang), saying that their alleyway, 
part of the Chapei District, was entirely in Chinese territory and that the Chinese authorities 
alone should have the right to police the place and supply them with water. All residents 
must in future obtain their water supply from the Chapei Company instead of the Shanghai 
Waterworks Co.566 The Shanghai Waterworks Company did not take the gesture seriously. 
Around this time, the Shanghai Company was in the process of installing water meter for 
Chinese customers to cut back the waste. A representative of the Greater Shanghai 
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Government said that he had been instructed to cut the pipe inside the premises as soon as 
the meter was put in place. The Shanghai Waterworks Co. decided to proceed in spite of 
the warning. The meter was then installed in the disputed alleyway in the presence of 
representatives of the Shanghai Municipal Police (foreign) and the Chapei Police. It was 
reported that the Greater Shanghai government warned the tenants to store a sufficient 
supply and then without noticing the Shanghai Waterworks Company, they sent in people 
to cut off the water supply on July 8.567 
Foreign press and Chinese officials told very different stories about the Yu Chin 
Fang Alley controversy. Some said that after the supply was cut off, tenants in the alley 
had to draw water from public supply like from hydrants in the street. The Chinese 
authorities were rude, invasive and unreasonable. But according to the Bureau of Public 
Utilities of the City Government of Greater Shanghai, the water in the area was shut off in 
the early morning, not by Chinese authorities, but by Shanghai Waterworks Company, for 
the purpose of installing the water meter. Since the Shanghai Company did not give the 
tenants previous notice of their intentions, the Bureau of Public Utilities had to connect 
these houses with the Chapei mains immediately. Due to a breach of the Bureau’s 
regulation in the practices of the Shanghai Company, it was prohibited from reconnecting 
those houses. The Bureau insisted that they had warned against installing the meter, and 
the tenants were not without water supply except for the short period when reconnection 
to the Chapei water was arranged.568  
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The alleged breach of regulation was never specified by the Chinese authorities. 
The dispute was about water supply on its face, but the real target was the Cathay Land 
Company. The Cathay Land Company was registered in the British Consulate. It owned 
more than a hundred Chinese houses beyond the Settlement’s limits. Since the Company 
was registered in a foreign consulate, its property lay beyond the jurisdiction of Chinese 
authorities. The Company had been paying taxes to the Municipal Council in order to 
secure water from the Shanghai Waterworks Company. The Greater Shanghai government, 
however, considered the area owned by the Cathay Land Company under the sphere of 
action for the Chapei waterworks. They insisted that it was their right to cut and reconnect 
the water supply because the property, occupied by Chinese tenants and outside the 
Settlement, was under Chinese jurisdiction.569 The strategy was clear: given that extra-
Settlement rights could not be materialized without the involvement of private land 
companies, if the Cathay Land Company caved under pressure, the Chinese authorities 
would win this case and all cases alike without the trouble of strenuous legal battles. 
7.7 Battle against the Surcharge, 1930-1931 
When the struggle over the extra-Settlement roads was in full swing, the ripple of 
the global depression reached Shanghai, compounding the politically-charged relationship 
between the Shanghai Waterworks Company and its Chinese customers. In August 1930, 
the Shanghai Waterworks Company announced that there would be a surcharge of 25 
percent on account of the rising prices of the pipes due to the 35 percent depreciation of 
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value of silver on the global market.570 The Nationalist administration came quickly to 
condemn the surcharge, claiming that the waterworks is a public utility, which should never 
be regarded as a trade to make good profits. Since the company had an immense income, 
it would be more advisable to cut down its expenses than to impose an increase.571Then 
there was the bottom-up Chinese Ratepayers Association of the International Settlement, 
which began their negotiation in early September. They strongly protested to the Company 
while seeking a reconsideration from the Council. They also decided to issue a circular 
letter to all the Chinese organizations and residents in the Settlement for a united front.572  
For the Chinese customers, they felt the surcharge was illegitimate by many 
measures. First, an increase of rate violated the agreement the Company and the Municipal 
Council entered in 1929. That agreement provided that no increase be made within two 
years. It also set up an extremely complicated procedure to discourage any surcharges. That 
procedure had not been invoked, thus the current proposed surcharge could not be 
implemented.573 Second, the Company failed to enforce any rules regarding the dividends 
of shareholders, such as for example, setting up Equalization of Dividends Account and 
Tariff Revision Suspense Account in preparation for a bad year. It was therefore in this 
unfair obligation to guarantee the interest of shareholders no matter how unfavorable the 
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business was that year.574 Third, the Municipal Council was accused of being too involved 
in the Company’s business. Chinese Realty Association suggested that since 1927, the 
Municipal Council had been guaranteed the interest of 9 percent on the Company’s share. 
On the London market, the most common annual return was about 7.2%. The return of the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company, however, amounts to more than 10% for 1928 and 
1929.575 Finally, The Chinese felt that if the Company truly wanted to cut the expenditure, 
they could have installed more water meters. But when Chinese customers requested, they 
were often rejected. The rent in the Settlement was high. Water rate in proportion to rental 
was thus more profitable than metered rate. This made many Chinese believe that the 
Company cared only about profit, rather than their mission of public service.576 It was 
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pointed out by the Chinese associations that the rate of increase of production was about 
22% while the increase of expenditure was about 45%. They called the British ways 
“incompatible with the principle of scientific management”.577  
On the other hand, for the Shanghai Waterworks Company, the surcharge was 
necessary and unavoidable if the quality of water supply was to be maintained. First, the 
rising cost of production was significant. In his sit-down interview with The China Press , 
president of the Company C. D. Pearson said that that the economic crisis resulted in an 
all-encompassing price surge that affected imports like machinery, alum, and chlorine. 
Even coal, which was produced in China, was expected to rise in price due to the metal 
involved in its production.578 Second, the Company said that the accusation about the lack 
of reserve was untrue. The surcharge was proposed because the reserves accumulated on 
Equalization of Dividends Account and Tariff Revision Suspense Account were not 
sufficient to meet the deficiency. Finally, the agreement between the Municipal Council 
and the Company in 1928 provided that the rate would be subject to revision at such periods 
as may be from time to time agreed upon by the parties thereto. Therefore, the surcharge 
did not violate the 1928 agreement.579 
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The dispute over surcharge lasted for months. In September, the Chinese 
Ratepayers’ Association appointed a seven-person committee to study the water supply 
situation and the proposed increase.580 They urged the Council to inspect the books and 
financial records of the Company so that the Council could clarify the issues regarding the 
dividends.581 Meanwhile, the Chinese Realty Estate Association was urged to publish an 
advertisement advising all Chinese building owners to refuse to make any new agreements 
with the Shanghai Waterworks Co. if the Company insisted on imposing the increase.582 
The Council made several major compromises to ease the tension. They adopted one of its 
members’ suggestion and drew up a statement in Chinese to explain why the raise was 
necessary. The Council was also ready to make the figures of the Company open to 
inspection by a delegation from the Chinese Ratepayers’ Association if it so desired. They 
even expressed willingness to embrace a Chinese member on the board of directors of the 
Company.583 
On December 1, the Chinese Realty Owners Association decided unanimously to 
reject the demand of surcharge.584 Merely days later, the Shanghai Waterworks Company 
cut off the water supply of several Chinese residents who refused to pay increased rates. 
An emergency meeting was called with the presence of representatives of the Chinese 
Ratepayers Association and of the Chinese Realty Owners Association. The anxiety might 
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seem widely shared among Chinese, but in his interview with The China Press , C. D. 
Pearson, suggested that there were only two Chinese consumers whose supply was shut 
down. Pearson said “it is unfair to continue supply to consumers who will not pay their 
bills at the expense of those who do” as he pointed out a large number of consumers were 
paying the surcharge, realizing that it was justified and had been approved by their 
representatives. “Non-payment is due in nearly every case to outside influence.” said 
Pearson. The Chinese Ratepayers Association, however, dispatched urgent telegram to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Ministry of Interior. The Municipality of Greater 
Shanghai was also called in. The matter of water rate surcharge escalated and was now 
passed to Nanjing.585 In the telegram sent to Nanjing, the Association greatly inflated the 
size of population affected by the disrupted service saying 1,000,000 residents in the 
Settlement were endangered.586 
The Nanjing government stepped in for intervention. On December 12, 1930, the 
Municipal Council held a special meeting in particular regarding the issue of disputed water 
rate surcharge. The meeting was attended by high-ranking officials from both Britain and 
China – Consul-General Brenan on the British side and Chevalier Chen (陈介, 1885-1951) 
and Y. F. Lieu of the Foreign Ministry of Republic of China. Thirteen councilors attended 
the meeting, including representatives from the Chinese Ratepayers Association, and they 
discussed for more than two hours. It was decided that a special committee be organized 
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to study the issue of water rate. This committee would compose of foreign and Chinese 
members, including special advisor to be invited from abroad. For the time being, the water 
supply would be resumed for those whose service was discontinued. But the surcharge, 
approved by the Municipal Council would stand.587 The Chinese Ratepayers Association 
protested and urged the Council to cancel the surcharge in order to “live up to the public 
trust placed in the Council”.588 Nevertheless, they agreed to pay the surcharge within days. 
But as soon as the committee found out that the present surcharge was unwarranted, the 
extra sums that had been paid needed to be refunded to the subscribers.589 
The cut-off of water supply for those who failed to pay the surcharge lasted for only 
four days and affected only two subscribers.590 But the political implication was important. 
It was the first time that the Chinese organized from bottom up, in working with the 
government, to bargain with the British authorities and companies on the terms most 
familiar to the foreign businessmen. They demonstrated sophisticated understandings of 
the inner working of the companies and their contracts. The protest was barely a success, 
but the Chinese merchants was able to insert themselves into the procedures that followed. 
In February 1931, the Chinese Ratepayers Association petition the local Chinese 
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authorities to call for revisions of the agreement signed between the Council and the 
Company. But the secretary of the Shanghai Waterworks Company suggested that the 
agreement with the Council had eighteen more years to go and no changes could be made 
according to law.591 The Chinese ratepayers were left with one hope to stop the surcharge 
– the special committee of water rate. 
7.8 The Hill Report and the Controversial Meter System 
 The special committee of water rate did not begin their investigation until May 
1931 after the Municipal Council finally secured the service of a qualified expert – 
Nicholas Hill, the president of the American Waterworks Association. Hill was the chief 
engineer of the New York City Water Department and held the same position in Baltimore. 
Hill had experience with the water system in each of the forty-eight states and was 
identified prominently with 350 water projects in major cities of the United States, Canada, 
and Cuba. Hill was also member of the American Institute of Consulting Engineers, 
American Society of Civil Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, American Society for Public Improvements and 
the National Conference on City Planning. In order to afford Hill’s six-week stay in 
Shanghai, the Municipal Council paid him Gold $12,000 and covered all expenses incurred 
during his trip.592 
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 Making his first visit to the East, Hill arrived in Shanghai September 2, 1931. He 
was treated like a star. The moment he settled down he was asked by the press about his 
judgement regarding the quality of water in Shanghai. “I have not had time to review the 
situation,” he said. The eminent engineer declared that in his estimation, Shanghai water 
was as safe as that found in most parts of the world. He said he would not hesitate to drink 
that which comes from hydrants in all parts of the city. “Processes of filtration and 
sedimentation make the water pure beyond danger of disease.” Hill said.593 The Chinese 
merchants wasted no time to make their case. Before his mission began, Hill was invited 
to a dinner party by T. D. Woo, managing director of Bank of Communication and C. C. 
Woo, manager of Kincheng Banking Corporation. Woo made a public speech at the party 
that night. In addition to praising the importance of Hill’s mission, Woo repeatedly hit the 
point about how politically consequential Hill’s investigation would be. He also did not 
shy away from hinting at favorable outcome because the Chinese comprised the majority 
of population in the Settlement and many of them were poor: “It is of course an important 
procedure in Mr. Hill’s investigation to scrutinize closely the technical aspect of the 
problem; however, I believe the examination of the administrative aspect is of still greater 
importance because the fixing of water rate is largely a financial matter rather than a 
technical one.”594 
 Hill began his probe shortly after, with a promise that he would be just and fair to 
both sides. He finished his report in about five weeks. By October 15, it was viewed by 
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members of the Municipal Council.595 Upon its release to the public, the report dominated 
the press for the rest of the year. Hill presented a handful of important findings and 
suggestions in his report. The most important one, of course, was his verdict that the water 
rate in Shanghai was “not excessive”. Hill discovered that apart from the rise cost of labor, 
58 percent of the total increase in the cost of water delivered in recent years could be traced 
to the enhanced cost of gold in order to pay dividends in sterling (he also pointed out that 
the Company was now on their way to secure new capital in silver so as to stabilize the 
rates and reduce the production cost). As for the present cost of water to the consumers, 
Hill invoked the situation in the United States where the courts had reiterated countless 
times the rule that a public utility was entitled to earn a fair return on the fair value of its 
property, used and useful for the public service. Hill believed the same could be applied in 
the present instance. In the case of Shanghai, the value of the Waterworks property was 
Tls. 26,250,000 as determined from the books of the Company. Hill suggested that a fair 
rate of return on this value was 8.5 percent: “If we are to estimate fair return upon the 
theory that the Company should bear the hazard of exchange…, then a proper allowance 
must be made for surplus sufficient to maintain a proper reserve for equalization of 
dividends as well as to care for other reserves and for minor fluctuations in production cost 
depending upon variations in cost of labor and materials.” – hence 8.5 percent, which 
included 6 percent Debenture interest on 50 percent capitalization-average on full 
capitalization, 9 percent Dividends on 50 percent of capitalization-average on full 
capitalization, and 2 percent for surplus on 50 percent of capitalization-average on full 
capitalization. On the basis of 8.5 percent, the gross revenue required in 1931 to yield a 
                                                 
595 “Hill’s Report on Waterworks to be public tomorrow”, The China Press, Oct 15, 1931: 1. 
 292 
fair return on the fair value of the property should be Tls. 4,309,978. The sum according to 
the tariff agreement between the Council and the Company was Tls. 4,316,163. Such return 
was approximately the same as the ascertained fair return on the fair value of the property. 
“There is no ground, therefore, for assuming that the existing rates and charges of the 
Company are excessive.”596  
However, Hill did suggest that the books were kept in silver and all capital 
expenditures were recorded in silver. The rise or fall of silver currency was intrinsically a 
speculative element, the risk of profit should not be borne by the consumer. Hill 
encouraged the installation of more meter and abandoned the old ways of paying water 
rate. He especially called for cheaper or free installation for the poor and the low-income 
households. Hill said that considering the finance of a great many Chinese inhabitants in 
the Settlement, the discrimination in favor of the poor and small consumers was “an 
economic necessity”.597 
The Municipal Council adopted most of Hill’s advice and issued a series of new 
policies, which included a scheme for the meter system. However, beginning in May 1932 
the Shanghai Citizens Federation, the Chinese Ratepayers Association and the Realty 
Owners Association reversed their previous opinions and appealed to the Shanghai 
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Waterworks Company for the halt of the meter system plan.598 For the authorities of the 
Settlement, the metering system was expected to save about Tls. 250,000 annually if fully 
adopted. By far the Council and the Company had largely rely on educating the public in 
the economical use of water, but the metering system would no doubt provide more 
effective results in reducing wastage, which had been proven successful in the neighboring 
French Concession.599 But for the Chinese realty owners whose properties were occupied 
by a large number of poor tenants who had been enjoying unlimited water usage as long as 
they had paid the percentage, the reform was about to be devastating financially. For 
example, Shanghai Hwa An Marine and Insurance Company, an agent of rent collection 
for fifty-two houses located in the Eastern District of the Settlement, suggested that the 
aggregate monthly rent previously amounted to $981, of which water rate amounted to 
$73.57. The metering system was in place since June, and the monthly water bill was 
$346.75, nearly five times heavier than before.600  
The meter system sparked reactions across the Chinese community. On June 22, 
1932, realty owners in both the International Settlement and Chapei district held a meeting 
to discuss their remaining advantage against the Shanghai Waterworks Company. The 
Realty Owners Association notified the members to dig their own wells to get “natural 
water” as a protest against the Company.601 Inside the Municipal Council, the Chinese 
members too were venting their dissatisfaction. Under the pressure of their fellow 
countrymen, the Chinese council members turned back on their earlier position and said 
                                                 
598 “Federation Requests Ratepayers to Buck New Meter System”, The China Press, May 14, 1932: 3. 
599 “Checking Waste”, The North-China Herald, Aug 17, 1932: 246. 
600 “Companies Protest New Meter System: Exorbitant Rates for Water Charged, Is Claimed”, The China 
Press, Sep 22, 1932: 11. 
601 “Realtors urge digging wells: advice given to protest against increase in water rate”, The China Press, 
June 23, 1932: 3. 
 294 
the Hill report was not well-researched. They suggested that Hill’s sojourn was too brief to 
enable him to get acquainted with local conditions. The adoption of a general metering 
system would discourage the poorer consumers from using tap water, diminishing the 
benefit of public health. Chairman of the Council, however, pointed out that it was the 
Chinese Ratepayers Association who proposed the introduction of a general metering 
system in the first place. Hill’s report was a confirmation of what had been decided on. 
Thus, the new policies regarding water supply would not change.602 
  The Council was indeed contemplating a solution that could assured a cheaper 
water supply for Chinese tenants of houses of low rental.603 The wealthy Chinese also 
initiated their own special committee to look into the costly introduction of the meter 
system.604 But these proceedings were too slow to prevent physical confrontation. On 
February 8, 1933, at Shuncheng Alley in Yangtszepoo District, a violent exchange 
happened between the Chinese residents and Company’s employers. At 10 o’clock in the 
morning, several workers of the Company came to the Shuncheng Alley to cut off the water 
supply because of the late payment. The Chinese residents there, who had little idea why 
their landlord did not pay the Company, tried to persuade the workers not to cut off their 
supply but was refused. A free-for-all fight ensued during which several Chinese were 
wounded. Facing an infuriated mob of Chinese residents, the workers retreated from the 
scene.605 The Chinese Ratepayers Associations urged that the Company adopt peaceful 
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means in coping with the disputes because the frustration of the poor Chinese residents was 
understandable given that they now had to pay four or five times the original sum.606 
Within ten days, more incidents of this kind were reported in the east part of the 
Settlement. Residents in Wei Shui Fang alleyway off Zhejiang Road, San Hsing Fang 
alleyway off Tangshan Road and San Sin Fang alleyway off Paoding Road all suffered 
from abrupt termination of their water supply. The Municipal Council not only ignored the 
petitions from the two Associations of the Chinese, but sent out policemen to accompany 
the workers of the Shanghai Waterworks Company while the latter were having the water 
pipes removed in those places. 607  On February 18, 1933, at 11 o’clock one hundred 
representatives of the residents affected by the Company’s doing gathered in front of the 
Municipal Building of the Settlement. They were told that the authorities would try to seek 
an early settlement of the dispute. The Realty Owner Association submitted a petition to 
the government of Greater Shanghai and sent in eight delegates urging for governmental.608 
Two days later, the Company sent mechanics to open public hydrants on street in the 
Yangtszepoo district to supply Chinese residents in several blocks where water was cut off. 
With the water provided from hydrants, the Municipal Council was virtually buying water 
for the upset Chinese tenants in order to ease political tension.609  
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Despite the setbacks, the installation of meter system was proceeded with 
encouraging results. The installation started as early as January 1932. The International 
Settlement was divided into twenty-five sections for the purpose. Fifteen sections would 
be fixed up with water meters by June next year. About 90 percent of the Chinese 
consumers had been paying their bills based on the meter system. 610  The Company 
submitted more than one scheme in favor of the poor Chinese tenants to the Council for 
their consideration, but the disconnection in the east continued.611 
On the night of February 23, 1933, a mass meeting was held at 8 o’clock. A special 
committee was organized by the tenants affected by the cut-off. A united front was formed 
by the government of Greater Shanghai, the Bureau of Social Affairs, the local Kuomintang 
branch, the provisional board of city councilors of Greater Shanghai, and the Chinese 
Ratepayers Association and the Shanghai Citizens Federation, with the sole purpose of 
pressuring the Shanghai Waterworks Company to restore water supply in the eastern 
district.612 In March, representatives of the Municipal Council, the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company, the Chinese Realty Owners Association, and the Chinese Ratepayers 
Association gathered together. The meeting was mediated by wealthy and influential 
Chinese and by commissioner of public utilities of the Municipality of Greater Shanghai.613 
The final scheme of payment was released in early April. During this experimental period, 
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the rules were set up as such: (1) Rentals between $125 and 150: allowance per house per 
month 11,000 gallons, minimum charge $8.25. (2) Rentals between $70 and $80: 
allowance per house per month 9,500 gallons, minimum charge $5.63; Excess consumption 
to be charged for at $0.95 per 1,000 gallons. (3) Rentals between $45 and 50; allowance 
per house per month 7,700 gallons; minimum charge $3.56; excess consumption to be 
charged for at $0.46 per 1,000 gallons. (4) Rentals under $10: allowance per house per 
month $3.5. $0.178 per 1,000 gallons for excess consumption.614 
The final scheme of payment proved acceptable to the Chinese. By October 1933, 
a total number of 6,300 meters were installed. The Company provided posters to the 
property owners, alarming the tenants that wasteful use of water must be paid for eventually 
by themselves. The Company also agreed to install separate meters to selected houses 
where water was being used for non-domestic purposes such as hot-water shops, laundries, 
bean curd shops and dye works. Where property owners desire it, the Company was also 
willing to install a meter to every house within a block of Chinese property, and to directly 
collect the water rate from the tenant. The charges made by the Company were higher in 
the case of the well to do, but the domestic supply to those living in low rental premises 
was only $0.02 a day for a quantity sufficient for good sanitation or $0.17 for a thousand 
gallons. This charge was reportedly the lowest known for any large city obtaining and 
unfailing supply of pure and wholesome water.615 
7.9 Shanghai Western Waterworks Company: A Joint Venture 
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The relationship between the Shanghai Waterworks Co., the Municipal Council, 
and the Nationalist government of Greater Shanghai remained operable throughout this 
period of political wrestling. President of the Shanghai Company H. Martin Little once 
said: “Our relations with officials of the city government, the directors and officials of the 
Chapei works… have continued to be most friendly.”616 Despite the Nationalist’s effort in 
containing the extra-Settlement roads in the west, the Municipal Council’s special revenue 
from these roads kept growing. From 1916 to 1941, the percentage of this sum in the total 
revenue rose from 0.69-0.73% to 3.73-3.89%, indicating a general economic growth in the 
west despite the disputes over certain roads.617 
The growing presence of Japan in Shanghai might be another reason why the 
Chinese and the British could still work together. Sino-Japanese relation never recovered 
after Japan invaded and staged the autonomy for Manchuria in 1931. Increasing tension 
between the two Asian countries prompted Chiang Kai-shek to prepare for the worst 
scenario. On January 6, 1932, Shanghai welcomed her most important mayor in modern 
history – Wu Tiecheng (吴铁城, 1888-1953). Wu was a veteran revolutionary and a trusted 
ally of Chiang Kai-shek. Apart from the mayoral power, Wu was also made the 
commissioner of Shanghai and Wusong Constabulary. The Japanese military in Shanghai 
was on the verge of clashing with the Chinese. The battle broke out on January 28, 1932. 
Nationalist army was not able to retain control over some of the strategically important 
spots. China and Japan made peace in March. The subsequent negotiation was mediated 
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by Britain, France, America and Italy. Japanese was able to expand its control in the areas 
north and east to the International Settlement, i.e. the areas where the Chapei Company not 
long ago reclaimed its economic rights. The British interest in north Shanghai was under 
threat. As a result, the dispute over extra-Settlement roads – between Range Road and 
Dixwell Road along the North Sichuan Road Extension – was finally settled in July 1933. 
Mayor Wu declared in a press interview that the municipal tax would be collected by the 
Bureau of Public Safety beginning in autumn and those defying such payments would be 
severely prosecuted. The disputed area would be fully under police protection of the Chapei 
Bureau of Public Safety and enjoy supplies of public utilities from only the Chapei 
Waterworks and Electricity Company.618 In the wake of Sino-Japanese confrontation, the 
Shanghai Waterworks Company willingly retreated from the contentious area. The 
Company turned their eyes on the developing western district.  
The idea of a waterworks in the west first emerged when an advertisement was seen 
in local Chinese newspaper in 1930. The Nationalist government invited Chinese 
merchants to invest their capital in waterworks business in western area, namely in the 
Fahua, Pusong and Caojing Villages. Those who were interested in investing were required 
to apply to the Bureau of Public Utilities before September 30, 1930.619 But the plan of a 
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Chinese enterprise was not followed through. The Nanjing government then sought the 
help of the Shanghai Waterworks Company. The Nanjing government had a vision: 
although for the time being, British technologies were still indispensable, this proposed 
company would eventually be a Chinese one. The former Commissioner of Public Utilities 
handed to the Shanghai Waterworks Company a set of seventeen principles in June 1932, 
laid down by the central government. The negotiation was put on hold and then resumed 
in 1935. The seventeen principles included: the Shanghai Western Waterworks Company 
needed to be registered with the Chinese government before registering at the British 
Consulate; the Company shall be reorganized after thirty years as a Chinese company; In 
the allotment of the Company’s shares Chinese shares shall absorb 51% and foreign capital 
may only be subscribed by individuals; Besides a general manager of British nationality, 
the Company shall set up the office of President which shall be filled by a Chinese; Above 
the Board of Directors the Company shall set up a Board of Supervisors, the members of 
which shall be appointed by the Chinese Government; The new Company shall pay 
annually to the City Government of Shanghai a certain percentage of its annual income as 
royalty.620 
Despite the British’s urge to amend some of the principles, the agreement of the 
scheme of Sino-British waterworks was a political victory for the Nationalist government. 
In February 1935, the commissioner of the Bureau of Public Utilities told The North-China 
Herald that after years of negotiation, a Sino-British waterworks company for the western 
district was to be formed. The initial capital would be $3,000,000. Once the company was 
founded, it would be for the City Government of Greater Shanghai to grant a franchise for 
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the supply of water to the district.621 Unfortunately, the “Golden Decade” of the Nationalist 
regime was marching towards its end. The Second Sino-Japanese War would break out in 
two years. The planned Sino-British waterworks was never materialized to the scale as 
proposed. During and after the war, some engines were erected near Fahua village, but the 
capacity of the waterworks was so underdeveloped that only the immediate neighborhoods 
could enjoy the fresh water. 
7.10 Conclusion: Nation-State 
The early history of the Inland Waterworks and Chapei Company showed how 
difficult it was for Chinese to run a large business at the turn of the century. The Inland 
was never a commercial success before the 1930s. As for Chapei, the government buy-out 
did not change the climate of the business world. The facts that Li Pingshu mortgaging the 
Company for a foreign loan was unknown to the directors was suggestive of the lack of 
transparency in the supposedly modern corporation. Politicians prioritized their own 
interest at the expense of the Company’s improvements made sustainable business model 
even less attainable. The virality of a water company was not defined only by engines, 
machinery, and pipes, but also by managerial skills in balancing budget and in maintaining 
a comfortable distance with the government. 
Nonetheless, the Chapei waterworks became a good alternative for consumers. The 
Chinese authorities were then able to remove British influence by replacing the water 
supply on the extra-Settlement roads rather than displacing it altogether. The result of Yu 
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Chin Fang Alley dispute showcased what political goals could be achieved when a 
determined Chinese authority worked with native water industry. From the bottom-up 
perspective, Chinese property owners, already proficient in Western ideas of law and 
accounting, had learned the art of politicization. In their resistance of water rate surcharge 
and the introduction of meter system, the foreign authorities and company made significant 
political and economic compromises under the pressure when Nationalist government 
became frequently invoked in civil disputes. 
Capitalizing on sentiment of nationalism, weaponing the native waterworks in the 
fight over sovereignty, determined to back up the claims of their wealthy fellow 
countrymen, the Kuomintang showed foreign powers in Shanghai that this government was 
different from its predecessors. In the negotiation regarding the creation of Shanghai 
Western Waterworks, they even managed to make a deal with a British enterprise that not 
only uphold the sovereignty of the republic, but also mutually beneficial.  
Historians tend to see nation-state as the main actors behind events, but in the story 
of this chapter, what type of institution played a bigger role in securing the business interest 
is debatable. On the Chinese side, the interest was obtained with help from both the 
government and companies, whereas on the British side, such interest enjoyed less 
governmental protection. The Shanghai Waterworks Company was on their own in most 
cases in their battle against economically savvy Chinese and the Municipal Council of 
International Settlement tended to stay neutral in general. There were certainly practical 
concerns behind these decisions, among which the first and foremost was the fact that the 
Settlement was an enclave on the Chinese land, with an armed force that seemed 
increasingly insignificant as opposed to the Chinese military. The Mixed Court, despite its 
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composition of foreign judges, was not keen on advancing the interest of one foreign 
company at the cost of political congeniality in general. Compromise and generosity were 
at times necessary because the institutional arrangements of the Company and the 
Settlement put financial gains before sovereignty and nationalistic pride.  
This brings us to the question: if nation-state was not always the main actor, who 
else was able to initiate activities of similar scale? Anthony Giddens has a fairly mechanical 
take on the concept of nation-state, which shed light on the nature of business competition 
between the Chinese and the British. Giddens suggests that nation-state is a type of social 
community which contrasts in a radical way with pre-modern states. Nation-states 
concentrated administrative power far more effectively than traditional states were able to 
do and can mobilize social economic resources beyond those available to pre-modern 
systems.622 At the core of the political competition over water supply was the capability of 
institutional power.  
In the case of water supply, it was obvious that the Chapei Company lacked the 
same institutional capability of the Shanghai Waterworks Co. The relationship between the 
Chapei Company and the government was a source of its problem, not a solution. Before 
Chiang Kai-shek’s clique took over Shanghai, the previous government drains the 
Company’s funding for their own military projects, completely irrelevant to the Company’s 
development. The new Nationalist government was willing to work with native property 
owners in their bargain with the Shanghai Waterworks Company. Nonetheless, the 
institutional sophistication of the Company did a great job defending itself. They opened 
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their books to the Chinese, hired an expert from overseas and let the native oversee the 
process, yet the result was still acceptable, if not favorable. That is why the nation-state on 
the Chinese needed to press the Shanghai Waterworks Company to win the natives some 
favorable terms while the foreign governments played a significantly less visible role. Not 
that the distance kept the British government from intervening, but the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company, with an institutional network channeling various talent and money 






CHAPTER 8. CHANGE 
No word in traditional Chinese medical nomenclature could accurately point to 
Asiatic cholera. The closest term was huoluan (霍乱). In its literal meaning, huoluan meant 
excessiveness and disorder, which was suitable for diseases causing vomiting and diarrhea. 
Symptoms of huoluan ranged from chest pain to abdominal pain to fever, many of which 
were not associated with Asiatic cholera – what huoluan refers specifically to today. During 
Qing years (1644-1912), a variety of new terms sprung from the use of huoluan, such as 
“wet huoluan”, “melon-pulp infection”, “huoluan with twisted tender” , etc. Asiatic cholera 
might be among them considering muscle cramp was one of the diagnostic characters. 
Cholera had its origin in South Asia since time immemorial. Historian Li Shan 
suggests that although there were earlier records showing diseases similar to cholera had 
reached China in the sixteenth century via sea, the first documented cholera outbreak took 
place in Canton in 1820, as a part of the 1817-1824 global pandemic.623 China was since 
inflicted by nearly every cholera pandemic. Herbal pharmacists kept treating what they 
believed to be huoluan. It was not until the 1930s that medical men and women of the 
Republic of China realized that Asiatic cholera was something of its own kind.624 
 Before germ theory, the best Chinese treatise on cure for huoluan was Essays on 
Huoluan (霍乱论), written and complied by Wang Shixiong (王士雄, 1808-1868?), a 
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pharmacist of Zhejiang origin who visited Shanghai in the 1860s. Wang’s work did not 
differentiate Asiatic cholera from diseases of similar symptoms, but it made two substantial 
progress in understanding cholera. First, Wang noticed that even though most huoluan were 
not contagious, occasions rose when the disease spread across an entire city. This kind of 
huoluan was often seen with twisted tender. He observed two outbreaks up close, one in 
Hangzhou in 1837, the other in Ningbo in 1862. In both cases patients suffered from muscle 
cramps. Second, Wang refuted the idea that some huoluan were incurable. Before Essays 
on Huoluan, some earlier Chinese medical treatises argued that if the patient suffered from 
diarrhea, weak pulse, bad breath, and inability to speak, he could not be cured; shrunk 
scrotum was also believed to be a sign of death. Wang disagreed with these claims. Wang 
believed that there was a cure for all cases as long as it was carefully prescribed for the 
conditions of the patient.625 
Wang’s prescriptions for the two dozen huoluan he sorted out consisted of the most 
valuable part in Essays on Huoluan. Even without any knowledge of the real pathogen 
Vibrio cholerae, Wang was able to provide relief for many cholera-related symptoms. From 
silk worm feces to dragon’s bone, from licorice root to gypsum, their effects in reducing 
the seriousness of symptoms have now been clinically proven. They took effect in three 
ways: as antispasmodic that reduce cramps and bowel movement, thus less diarrhea; as 
disinfectant that killed Vibrio cholerae and other bacterial pathogens or contained the 
infection; as concoction that replenished sick bodies with electrolyte, thus slowing down 
the dehydration. Among the sixty-four key ingredients chosen and created by Wang, 
thirteen were antispasmodic, fifteen electrolyte, and twenty-five disinfectant. Among the 
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disinfectants in Wang’s treatise, virgate wormwood herb, tatarian aster root, cassia twig, 
medicinal evodia fruit, and baical skullcap root had been most effective in killing the 
infectious Vibrio cholerae.626 
The traditional Chinese herbal medicine maybe helpful, but the late imperial society 
was logistically unready to help to the sick population. In some cases, the best the 
government could provide was money and coffin.627 Plagues were so commonplace and 
natural to the Chinese they were not seen as immediate threats. For example, in spring of 
1902, Asiatic cholera reached southwest of Guangxi province. When local gentry were 
busy funding pharmacies and feeding refugees, the emperor was communicating with local 
administrators about seizing the moment and eliminating the rebels when they were 
weakened by the epidemic.628 Even if the Qing government wished to contain the disease, 
they did not have the expertise to do away ordure and stench – like Edwin Chadwick, 
Joseph Bazalgette, John Snow, and Henry Whitehead achieved in London in the 1850s, 
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even though none of them fully understood how cholera transmitted. Germ theory was not 
the prerequisite in combating cholera, technocratic-engineering systems were. In this 
chapter, we focus on the early-twentieth-century Shanghai where a conjunction of political 
willpower and engineering capacity modernized how Chinese saw, understood, and 
addressed disease, insanitation, and impurity. 
8.1 Cholera Outbreaks in Shanghai 
 Cholera first showed up in Shanghai in 1862 and it hit the city hard. The ending of 
Taiping Rebellion drove hundreds of refugees from ravages of war to the foreigner-
administered city. Large numbers of Qing’s Imperial Troops came along, creating an 
unusual favorable condition for the prevalence of cholera. The British Forces suffered 
severely. Two hundred soldiers in two regiments of the line died of cholera. On H.M.S. 
Euryalus, the death of twenty men and two officers in one day wiped out one-third of the 
crew. The treasurer of the Municipal Tax Department was killed, marking the most high-
profile death of that episode. Among the natives, the epidemic became unmanageable. 
During the three weeks of outbreak, seven to twelve hundred Chinese died daily according 
to the record of the Native Hospital. On July 14, fifteen hundred died within twenty-four 
hours.629 The Municipal Council created Nuisance Department in response to the outbreak. 
The sole responsibility of the department was to scavenge the roads and to manage waste 
matter.630  
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Cholera appeared in Shanghai again in 1875. During the spring, a body of native 
troops marched through the streets of the International Settlement without alerting the 
British authorities. A camp was formed in the immediate neighborhood of Shanghai. For 
Edward Henderson, the Health Officer appointed not long ago, this was his first test. 
Henderson paid a visit to the encampment, inspected the conditions, and produced a report, 
in which he pointed out that the land in the immediate neighborhood of Shanghai was 
unsuited for camping ground. Large bodies of troops stationed in the marshy and muddy 
rural Shanghai during spring and summer was never a blessing to the public health. 
Henderson suggested that the soldiers needed to be fed and clothed adequately and the land 
needed to be raised and drained, but such arrangements for a Chinese army on the march 
were unrealistic. The fact that the troops were expending their labor on constructing a 
permanent encampment at Fenghuang Shan meant that less sufficient labor could be spared 
for sanitary measures. In the native hospital on Shandong Road, a large number of sick 
soldiers were in terrible condition. A great many were suffering from a low form of 
malarious fever, which “in its most serious manifestations closely resembled Typhus”.631 
Cholera showed up amongst foreigners in Shanghai that summer. Henderson 
believed that cholera was an extension of the illness among the natives. He reminded the 
public that serious danger existed in the improper removal of nightsoil. Henderson recalled 
an incident in which one of the coolies, urged by the reiterated complaints of his employers, 
fearing of losing his wages for not fulfilling his duty, emptied several boatloads of nightsoil 
into the Suzhou Creek. Over the year 67 foreigners died, fixing the mortality at 22.3 per 
1,000. The year of 1875 was the last time when cholera affected a large number of 
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foreigners in the Settlement, but the epidemics kept haunting the Chinese who were far 
worse off to take on the disease. Shanghai experienced another horrifying cholera season 
in 1887. Inside the International Settlement alone, 194 Chinese died in August, and another 
162 died in September. In 1890, 605 out of 160,000 Chinese were killed.632 
At the turn of the twentieth century the cause of cholera remained obscure to many. 
Robert Koch discovered (or rediscovered after the original, but forgotten, discovery in 
1854 by Italian scientist Filipo Pacini) and identified Vibrio cholerae as the pathogen of 
cholera in 1883, but scientific discoveries alone would not free the public from fear of a 
disease of such rapidity. Many chose to believe that there were more to the cause of cholera 
than bacteria. A general distrust in germ theory could be seen among British living in Asia. 
In Hong Kong, when cholera hit the port in 1894, the British were apparently in belief that 
rain would able to weaken the epidemic because it flushed away deposit in the drains that 
emitted virulent gas. When that failed to happen, they then argued that even with the street 
drains cleansed by rainwater, the private houses remained the origin of disease because 
hundreds of them had “the old-fashioned porous blue-brick drains, thoroughly saturated 
with pestilential matter.”633 When the infantry who engaged in sanitary work in Hong 
Kong in 1894 fell sick after they left, the Daily Press did not hesitate to say that it was 
important and essential that Europeans should exercise the greatest care, “for the theory 
that the plague was not contagious or infectious is quite exploded.”634 We see earlier in the 
culverting of the Yangkingpang the British were still in fear of sewer gas more so than the 
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polluted water itself. Up until the mid-1910s many British were still convinced that better 
ventilation was the better solution to many diseases.  
When cholera appeared in Shanghai again in the summer of 1926, the treaty port 
had undergone tremendous change. Four waterworks were in operation in all corners of the 
city. Drinking tap water or collecting water at hydrants had become norm rather than 
novelty. The Yangkingpang and the Defense Creek that reeked of ordure disappeared. 
Flush toilets graced the tall, fine neo-classic buildings on the Bund. While hundreds of 
septic tanks were still in use of holding the discharge, a water-carriage sewer system was 
near its completion. When cholera hit Shanghai in 1926, for the first time foreign and 
Chinese authorities across the city had a clearer idea about what they were engaging and 
what needed to be done. 
8.2 Chapei Waterworks Scandal, 1926 
The first case of cholera in 1926 was reported in June. It was a man from Chapei 
district, who was admitted to the Settlement’s hospital. The number of cases increased 
rapidly in the following month. By July 17 the disease was considered epidemic, which 
was defined in the Sanitary Regulations for the Port of Shanghai as the occurrence of an 
average daily number of three new cases for one week. During July, the total number of 
cases among the Chinese was 1,399. Nearly 60 percent of the cases originated from the 
Chinese territory. Chapei alone contributed 520 cases. The Northern District of the 
International Settlement which bordered the Chapei District was also impacted. The 
foreigners knew very well in the 1920s that the outbreaks of cholera were usually due to 
contaminated water supply. Considering how Chapei was disproportionately affected, 
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suspicion fell upon the water fashioned by the Chapei waterworks. The Health Department 
of the Municipal Council sent in investigators, accompanied by agents from the Chapei 
Company. Samples were taken from the intake at the Suzhou Creek, from the filter beds 
and from a tap from the mains. The samples were then examined in the Municipal 
Laboratory. Vibrio Cholerae was found to be present in all of them.635  
 
Figure 21 – Beggar boats on the Suzhou Creek. Source: “Sinza Bridge over Soochow 
Creek, Shanghai”.  
 The Chapei Company acted responsibly. They immediately invited the chief 
engineer of the Shanghai Waterworks Company to inspect their plant and received 
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recommendations on the measures to right the wrongs. The inspection disclosed that the 
problem lay in the source of water, the Suzhou Creek. When the Chapei waterworks was 
conceived, it was believed that that section of the Creek where the intake would be was 
deep enough to provide fresh water. But by the 1920s it had been severely polluted. Both 
the creek and the banks were swarmed with beggars, living either on boats or in huts. The 
waterway was used as an open sewer by them. The Chapei Company was suggested to use 
chlorination to disinfect the water for now, and to consider move the intake to another 
location free of sewage contamination. Some engineers pointed at the mains instead of the 
works as the source of troubles. Although they had not been thoroughly examined, it was 
possible that there was a layer of filth, caked more or less hard, inside the mains that 
infected the water as it ran by. It would be impossible to clean all mains or to even relay 
them in short. Travelers were thus warned against the impurity in food and drink. The 
Municipal Council, in the meantime, offered cholera vaccine in the Municipal Laboratory. 
Once inoculated, people could be immune of cholera for months.636  
 When The North-China Herald was closely following the incident, the Chapei 
Company worried that the disclosure would bring down their business. The manager of the 
Company S. C. Chu wrote to The Herald, complaining that their report was exaggerated. 
Chu argued that the difficulties in the past few years needed to be considered. The 
Company was transferred to the current management two years ago from the provincial 
government. The waterworks was “poorly equipped because of lack of fund”. The war 
between warlords in 1924 made it more difficult to restore the waterworks to its fullest 
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capacity. Chu said that in The Herald’s earlier report the water tanks of Chapei were said 
to be cleaned only once in one or two months. Chu said this was untrue and the tanks were 
cleaned once in six days. At present as the alum dosage has been applied, they were cleaned 
once in a week. Chu also suggested that the saying that chlorine had been unknown to the 
Company was untrue as in last year two chlorinator sets were ordered and one was 
immediately put to use last July. Chu insisted that the recent measures taken by the Chapei 
Company was the “result of a keen realization of responsibility demanded by the occasion 
and not in deference to attacks based upon exaggerated statements”. Chu suggested that 
the Chapei Company had a plan for the future. They had purchased more than 150 mows 
of land (about 25 acre) near Wusong for building new waterworks. New machines from 
abroad was also purchased. A new intake in the Huangpu River was to be built. Finally, 
Chu pled for “constructive criticism”:  
“If there is such a thing as Sino-foreign cooperation at all, it should be 
executed in a spirit of mutual encouragement and constructive criticism, and 
certainly it is unfair to deal a blow to any attempt in this direction by means 
of rabid and vitriolic writings.”637 
In response, The North-China Herald stood by its criticism. The English newspaper argued 
that the problematic quality of water was not new. Hundreds of Chinese lives were lost due 
to a product unfit for human consumption, but one of the chief employees received an 
absurd salary of Tls. 1,000 a year. The Herald said that the Chapei waterworks crystalized 
the indifference Chinese officials held for public welfare: 
“Abolish the neglect, cleanse the plant, maintain proper supervision, and the 
water will cease to disseminate cholera. Voila tout. What criticism could 
have been more constructive? ... If constructive criticism is asked for, the 
                                                 
637 “Correspondence: The Chapei Waterworks Company’s Answer to Statements in Our Columns”, The 
North-China Herald, Aug 21, 1926: 357. 
 315 
first that might be offered is that Chinese in management of public affairs 
should admit that they may occasionally deserve to be criticized.”638 
The public opinion on the negligence of the Chapei Company was mixed. The well-
traveled foreigners said Shanghai’s native water supply was far better than those in 
Nanjing, Suzhou, Zhenjiang and other towns where nightsoil boats were uncomfortably 
close to water carts and the loading of water and sewage were taking place side by side.639 
Some believed that the harsh tone was unnecessary in criticizing the Chapei Company. 
Expressions like “the notorious Chinese proclivity for allowing everything under their 
charge to go wrack and ruin” was hard to swallow. 640  But there were also opinions 
expressed that given the central fact that hundreds died due to the water supply, raising of 
side issues or irrelevant matters served only to hide the ugly truth. In a civilized country, 
the man responsible would be run in for manslaughter, but not in China according to their 
legal system.641  
The medical community had a firmer opinion on the positive effect of the British 
engineers and English press. It was believed that the scandal of the Chapei Waterworks 
might never have been suspected if it were not for the disclosures made by foreigners. 
During the cholera outbreak in 1926, Shanghai saw an increasing number of foreign 
educated doctors participating and bringing about changes in disease control. It was pointed 
out at the biennial conference of the China Medical Association that China needed to enter 
the age of “modern medicine”, which entailed not the cure, nor even the prevention of 
disease, but the creation of health and the creation of perfect harmony with the 
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surroundings. Foreigners, many of whom were alien to the climate of China, had a much 
better chance to survive in the cholera season than the Chinese. It was owing to the adoption 
of rules of cleanliness regarding food and drink. This understanding of healthiness 
underscored a clear departure from the traditional wisdom that one would be less likely to 
fall sick if he was indigenous to the soil and was accustomed to the atmosphere. Now that 
technology of water supply was well-established, healthiness at any part of the world 
became achievable and manageable as long as individual consistently practiced what was 
in line with the bacterial understanding of the disease.642 
8.3 Government Intervention 
Despite the Chapei Company’s endeavor in mending its public image, the regional 
government began their intervention in late August. Head of the Hu-hai District (which 
included Shanghai) ordered Magistrate Feng of the Baoshan District to make a thorough 
investigation of the Chapei Company. Feng was reportedly horrified over the affair. The 
Chapei Company was under the pressure coming from both the Baoshan magistrate and 
the Director of the Port of Shanghai and Wusong V. K. Ting to conduct an immediate and 
thorough reform. The embattled company had to propose to appoint C. D. Pearson, 
Engineer-in-chief of the Shanghai Waterworks Company, as advisor.643  
Chinese authorities even created a new department – the Department of Health of 
the Directorate of the Port of Shanghai and Wusong. The first director of that department 
was Dr. Hu Hou-ku, a Johns Hopkins alumnus. Hu specialized in public sanitation and had 
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experience working for the State Board of Health of Tennessee and as Assistant Director 
of the Public Health Demonstration Service in Beijing. A clear sign of bringing 
authoritative power to the public health regime was making the commissioner of police a 
nominal head of the department. Inside the department there were three divisions: Street 
Cleaning and Sanitation, Vital Statistics and Communicable Disease Control, Medical 
Service and Laboratories. All existing departments of the Chinese districts in Shanghai 
were to merge into the organization. It was also given the responsibility of inspecting the 
Chapei Waterworks and other utility works. The new Department of Health would be given 
a budget of $160,000 annually, of which 80 percent was to be utilized for street cleaning. 
To recruit qualified personnel, Hu started a training school. A Board of Health, consisting 
of nine prominent Chinese doctors, was created as the advisory to the department.644 In the 
1920s, Shanghai had no registration for either disease or physicians. Nor was there law or 
regulations for the department to depend upon. The Department of Health was meant to 
lead in these issues, but with Shanghai coming under Chiang Kai-shek’s control in 1927, 
the cause was interrupted.   
Chinese and foreign authorities had produced several reports on the cholera incident 
at the Chapei waterworks.645 The most influential one was written by Wu Liande (伍连德, 
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1879-1960). Wu, whose father was a Chinese goldsmith, was born in Penang, Malaya. He 
was the first Chinese to graduate in medicine from Cambridge. Wu majored in 
epidemiology and bacteriology. During his days in Europe, Wu had the privilege of 
working at School of Tropical Medicine in Liverpool and the Pasteur Institute in Paris. In 
May 1908, Wu was invited to work for the Qing government in army services. He was 
entrusted in 1910 with the task of inspecting, treating and preventing bubonic plague in 
northeast China. The plague was wreaking havoc along the railways, wiping out one village 
after another. Wu and his team brought the plague under control in merely four months. 
The high death toll of Manchurian plague and the success of Wu’s measures caught 
international attention. Wu was rewarded with countless positions at universities and 
associations across and beyond China.646 When writing his annual report on the general 
matter of disease control in China in 1926, Wu had the case of cholera in Shanghai 
included. The report was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 20 and was 
later translated and sent to the Municipal Council in early November. 647  
In this report, Wu mentioned that this was not the first time the Chapei waterworks 
caught his attention. In the previous year of 1925, Wu requested samples of water from the 
Company be bacteriologically examined for cholera organisms. Vibrio cholerae was 
already found in the sample from Suzhou Creek, although the tap water proved to be free 
of pathogen. Wu argued it was necessary to summon a Cholera Prevention Conference 
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across authorities in Shanghai to discuss matters like the study of epidemiology of cholera 
in China, early preventive measures, and examination on fecal matters. Wu suggested that 
intensive study of suspected sources of cholera needed to be done throughout the year, e.g. 
water, human carriers, flies, food, etc. As early as in spring, prophylactic measures needed 
to be taken, among which the most critical was mass inoculations. When cholera cases 
began to show, non-endemic areas needed to be notified so as to limit its spread to other 
localities. Mass fecal examination was necessary at ports and railway centers. Wu 
suggested that in treaty ports, Shanghai particularly, cooperation among Chinese and 
foreign authorities was essential in all health matters.648 
The Republic government created the National Quarantine Service in 1930. Wu 
Liande was appointed director. National Quarantine Service headquartered in Shanghai. 
The organization was national in the sense that it had an all-Chinese staff and that it 
returned the power to the Chinese government in matters of quarantine control in treaty 
ports. On the other hand, National Quarantine Service was also international. It was linked 
by cable to the League of Nation’s Eastern Bureau of the Health Service. Wu himself was 
made a member of the Advisory Board of the League’s Far Eastern Epidemic Bureau.649 
When cholera arose in Shanghai in 1932, the Chinese health regime under Wu Liande had 
become so powerful that the National Quarantine Service was leading the concerted 
campaign across the administratively divided metropolis.  
8.4 Anti-cholera Campaign and Central Cholera Bureau, 1932 
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 In 1932, cholera appeared in Shanghai unusually early. The first case was reported 
on April 26. A laborer named Hu Mingcai, age 40, residing at Chapei, was admitted into 
the Tibet Road Infectious Disease Hospital. Hu was treated immediately with saline 
infusion and returned home safely after he recovered. Another two cases occurred on April 
29 and May 1. Both patients were cured. The fourth and fifth patients came from Ferry 
Road (西康路) and Cater Road (石门二路) of the International Settlement. They were also 
treated successfully. But the number of cases began to increase since May. Over the 
weekend of May 28, 30 cases were reported in the Settlement, 7 in the French Concession 
and 28 in Chinese territories. By the end of May, cases of cholera mounted to 98. Most of 
the patient ranged from 21 to 40 in age.650 
The Municipal Council had its Health Department sending out two mobile vans to 
travel throughout the Settlement. They were attended by three doctors. Residents could get 
inoculated against cholera in the van. A direct phone line was provided to places of 
employment of more than 20 person in case they requested preventive services. The 
Municipal Council opened up 12 clinics where vaccine against cholera was provided 
freely.651 In the Chinese settlements, upon predicting an epidemic, the Bureau of Public 
Health of Greater Shanghai vaccinated 76,000 persons against cholera in ten days, all 
injections free of charge.652 The number of people who received preventive treatment rose 
significantly in three municipalities by the end of May: in Greater Shanghai 97,117 were 
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inoculated, in the International Settlement, 27,855, and in the French Concession, 4,125 in 
April and 9,218 in May. During this time, there were a handful of cases that appeared on 
the sea. For example, a Chinese sailor, Wu Dah, age 42, employed on S.S. Sithonia which 
arrived at Shanghai from Australia on May 18 was admitted on May 28 to the hospital and 
then transferred to the Municipal Isolation Hospital on May 29. He was diagnosed of 
cholera and soon died on June 2. There were also cases of Japanese seamen falling ill 
during their stay in Shanghai. The National Quarantine Service fumigated and disinfected 
the ships where cholera cases were reported to prevent the disease from spreading 
abroad.653 
The investigation showed that most who contracted cholera were laborers, who 
drank unclean and unboiled river water. A primary source of pollution to the river was 
garbage disposal. The loading of garbage boats of all settlements in Shanghai amounted to 
1,500-2,000 tons every day - 700 ton from the International Settlement, 500 from the 
French Concession, and the other 500 from the Greater Shanghai Municipality. Not only 
were the antiquated garbage boats prone to leaking, in some section of the Huangpu River 
garbage was not properly buried. At Longhua, for example, most garbage was dumped 
overboard during the night. The filth was silting up at low tide and flushed back to the river 
at high tide. It was later revealed by The China Press that the Greater Shanghai Municipal 
Government was paid $200,000 yearly from garbage contractors for the privilege of 
dumping the waste of the two foreign settlements near Longhua – $120,000 paid by 
contractors in British settlement, $80,000 by the ones in the French Concession. While 
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government and contractors were filling their pockets, the poor were drinking untreated 
water taken near floating garbage and living under the threat of all sorts of bacterial 
infections.654 
In view of the increasing prevalence of the disease, Wu Liande, head of the National 
Quarantine Service, suggested that all cholera cases came from slums where clean water 
was unattainable, such as Beixinjing (北新泾), Caojiadu (曹家渡), Pudong (浦东) and 
locations along the Suzhou Creek. Wu requested that clean water be made available to 
those population at the cheapest rates. 655  Most poor population lived in the Chines 
territories, but the government of Greater Shanghai said that situation was as such because 
a great many poor people were forced out of the foreign settlements recently and then into 
the Chinese area. Therefore, even though the Greater Shanghai produced the cheapest and 
equally good water supply, it was open to assistance from foreign authorities in providing 
cheap water supply. In early June, the Central Cholera Bureau was formed. It comprised 
China’s National Health Bureau and the health departments from the three authorities in 
Shanghai.656  
Under the instruction of Wu Liande, the Bureau began its discussion on the matter 
of providing the poor with cheap water. At 10 a.m., June 13, 1932, the Central Cholera 
Bureau had its first meeting in the Administration Building of the International Settlement. 
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Among the attendees were C. Harpur, commissioner of Public Works of the International 
Settlement, L. Louzier, engineer-in-chief and head of the French Concession Public Works 
Department; Hou Ki-houm and Shang Nyi of the Greater Shanghai Public Works and 
Police Health Department, and Captain E. B. Green, Harbormaster. The meeting was held 
under friendly circumstances. The issue with garbage disposal was recognized. All 
representatives pledged their help in correcting the problem as they would employ police 
force at the site of disposal to supervise the operation.657 Regulating garbage disposal, 
nevertheless, was too slow a change to control cholera. By late June, Shanghai saw another 
hike in cases of cholera with 240 new cases reported in a month.658  
8.5 Free Water Supply to the Poor Chinese 
The Central Cholera Bureau convened a second meeting. Wu Liande again 
appealed to all waterworks company in Shanghai to reduce water rates in order to make 
pure water affordable to poor residents.659 By the end of June, altogether 706 people in 
Shanghai were infected and cholera began to proceed to the outskirts. The Bureau of Public 
Health of the Greater Shanghai despairingly admitted the inability in coping with the 
situation. The battle against the Japanese in 1931 depreciated the finance of the government 
and the two Chinese waterworks. The Chinese government did not have the reserve to build 
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long-distance water transport and the waterworks were incapable of giving much 
charity.660 
The Chinese government had to call on various chambers of commerce, ratepayers 
associations, and business organizations to use their influence in adopting concerted 
measures in providing cheap or free water for the inhabitants of the poorer districts. The 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce became the first organization to respond. The Chamber 
announced in early July that it would assist with the installation of a number of street 
hydrants immediately at strategical points in the poor sections of the Greater Shanghai.661 
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Public Health of Greater Shanghai dispatched fifty “sanitary 
police squads” to disinfect all wells and creeks within the territory, each squad consisting 
of two sanitary policemen and a coolie. The policemen would measure the size of the wells 
in their assigned area, then pouring in proper amount of bleaching powder, chlorinate of 
lime and other disinfecting chemicals, all supplied by the Bureau.662 
When the total number of cholera infection mounted to 1,020 in July, including 
four cases of foreigners, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement remained 
awfully quiet on the issue of cheap water supply. The Municipal Council released a 
communique via its public health department, which gave valuable instructions on the 
prevention of cholera, including preparation and consumption of food and drinks, warning 
people against eating uncooked food, etc. But the Municipal Council did not seem 
interested in providing water to the Chinese in that a popular belief was that the Chinese 
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would not take advantage of the new, free water facilities. Some diehard conservatives 
mocked the Greater Shanghai municipal government: “Well, they have promised to erect 
public hydrants, we shall see if they carry out their promises.”663 
In early July 1932, the Shanghai Waterworks Company finally announced their 
plan to supply the poor with free water. “We shall be pleased to supply the poor people of 
the International Settlement with all the water the Bureau of Public Health may see fit to 
advise giving them. It is really a small matter.” said C. D. Pearson, engineer-in-chief and 
manager. To prevent unnecessary waste of water a nominal cost was to be levied or tickets 
be issued to deserving classes. The hydrants in the Chinese territory was then opened to 
the native. The Greater Shanghai government started an educational campaign to acquaint 
the native population with health facts in relation to cholera and cleanliness of food and 
water. The Municipal Health Department reported that the poor people of Chinese areas 
had recognized the danger of using cholera-infected water. A large number showed up at 
the hydrants. 664  During the warmest season, from July to September, the Shanghai 
Waterworks Company kept supplying the poor Chinese with free water in the Eastern and 
Western districts, effectively checking the rising cases of cholera.665 
The campaigns against cholera was preemptively arranged in 1933. The Central 
Cholera Bureau had its first meeting of the year on May 8 at the Chinese Red Cross 
Hospital. Attendees included representatives of the three municipal health bodies, the 
National Quarantine Service, the Chinese Red Cross Society, the Railway Administration 
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it”, The China Press, July 07, 1932: 1. 
664 “Poor will get free pure water from waterworks”, The China Press, July 08, 1932: 1. 
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and the National Health Administration, Nanjing. The representatives agreed that the 
preventive campaign in 1932 was a success. In 1933, similar arrangements were to be made 
with furtherance on some critical fields for cooperation. For epidemiological study, an 
intensive research needed to be undertaken with respect to the incidence of the various 
strains of Vibrios, the sources of infection (with special attention paid to water, flies, fruits 
and cold drinks), and the question of bacteriophage. Such work would be coordinated 
between the laboratories of the three municipalities so that duplication could be avoided. 
For the report of early cases, the hospitals in the three municipalities would work as one, 
with even private practitioners included. For mass inoculation, it would be more available 
in all three areas. The National Quarantine Service and the Railway Health Service would 
work together to examine and inoculate passengers, crews and employees wherever 
necessary. 666 
As for the cheap water supply to the poor, the Central Cholera Bureau requested in 
June a continuance of the free water supply given last year by the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company. One of the medical representative of the Shanghai Company informed the 
Municipal Council that the Company was more than willing to continue a free supply of 
approximately the same quantity of water as last year in districts where residents had no 
piped water.667 Notice that the Shanghai Waterworks Company remained the only water 
enterprise among four that could afford the charity. In July, Wu Liande sat down with The 
China Press and propagated the rules to be observed: Never drink any water other than that 
from the waterworks, and when in the country, drink only boiled water. Eat no raw 
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vegetables or fruits, unless they are guaranteed to be free from contamination. Eat fruits 
only after they have been soaked in boiling water for a short while. Eat sparingly of cold 
things, and in the case of ice cream and cold drinks, always be sure of the cleanliness of 
their sources. He also indicated appreciation for the free water services provided by the 
foreign companies and suggested the Chinese to use drinking fountains more, which would 
certainly diminish all forms of diseases like cholera, dysentery, typhoid and enteritis. Wu 
also encouraged people to get vaccinated before summer, a service provided in all clinics 
in all three settlements.668  
By September not a single case of cholera infection had been reported from any 
part of Shanghai. The year of 1933 was regarded as cholera-free, which had not happened 
since 1918. According to the Report of Central Cholera Bureau, Shanghai set up 20 
temporary hospitals in the summer, fully staffed and specially equipped for the treatment 
of cholera. The epidemiology committee of the Bureau closely studied water of various 
parts of Huangpu River, Suzhou Creek, Yangtszepoo, etc. as well as the many shallow 
wells abounding in this district from which the poorer classes still drew their supplies. No 
Vibrio cholerae was found. The propaganda committee sought out people from all walks 
of life to promote inoculation and healthy consumption of water and food.669 
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Table 1 – Morbidity and Mortality Rate in all settlements in Shanghai. Source of 
data: Shanghai Weisheng Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui, 
http://www.shtong.gov.cn/dfz_web/DFZ/Info?idnode=67805&tableName=userobjec
t1a&id=65065  
After the successful anti-cholera campaign in 1933, directors of the Shanghai 
Company again approved of a free supply for the poor population in 1934.670 The free 
supply was made available from June 28, 1934. The Municipal Council noticed that not 
only had the Chinese population learned to take advantage of the seasonal cheap supply, 
but those who obtained their supply from wells started requesting chlorination for them to 
use and became more cooperative in assisting the officers responsible for the duty of 
disinfection by informing them the exact location of various wells. 671  Thanks to the 
concerted efforts across the settlements and the engineering capability of the British, 
Shanghai was able to maintain a reasonable morbidity and mortality from 1934 to 1936. It 
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was not until 1937 when the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out that a sharp increase of 
infection and death was seen (see Table 1).  
The government of Republic of China made substantial progress in modernizing 
measures of disease control. The underpinning of the cause was a conjunction of political 
cooperation and engineering techniques. The creation of National Quarantine Service and 
the Central Cholera Bureau certainly helped with synchronizing the actions of the three 
authorities and sharing of critical data among them. But these organization themselves did 
not possess any centralized executive power. The functioning of health regime during 
Shanghai’s cholera season depended on the kindness of the two foreign authorities and the 
generosity of the Shanghai Waterworks Company. When the Nationalist government put 
forth an ambitious social engineering program without the backing of real engineering 
infrastructures, like the New Life Movement, it was bound to fall short of its goals.  
8.6 New Life Movement 
On February 17th, 1934, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek spoke in front of 
thousands of soldiers at his headquarter in Jiangxi Province, inaugurating a mass 
mobilization – the New Life Movement. Later, from mid-February to late March, Chiang 
delivered another four public speeches of similar scale, elaborating his vision for the 
movement and his conceptualization of the term “new life”:  
The New Life Movement is the revolution of life for all Chinese. Through 
most straightforward and most expedient ways, it would eliminate the habits 
that are not suitable, and adapt our life to the time and conditions we live 
in. In short, the Movement is to rationalize the life of the Chinese in line 
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with our inherent morality --- etiquette, justice, integrity, and 
conscientiousness.672 
 The New Life Movement came into being in the middle of Kuomintang’s ferocious 
military campaign that aimed to eliminate the Communists bases inside the hilly, southeast 
Jiangxi province. Victory of the fifth and the last encirclement was within reach. Yet the 
Kuomintang sought not only to take back the lost areas, but to win over the heart of peasants 
who had long been lived under Communism regime. An ideology of disciplines, deeply 
rooted in the Confucian traditions, needed to be created to counter the revolutionary 
tendency. The New Life Movement was to reinvigorate Chinese’s “inherent morality” --- 
etiquette, justice, integrity and conscientiousness. The new life was in fact the old life of 
ancient Chinese sages. Once the inherent morality was restored, China shall be able to 
relive its heydays.  
In practice, the New Life Movement was a pedagogical program that intended to 
regulate and reshape people’s daily behavior with indoctrination and penalty. Chiang and 
his think tanks came up with a set of detailed guidelines for every aspect of life by 
intersecting the four Chinese virtues with eating, clothing, living, and transporting. In 
government agencies and schools, “good” habits were intensively promoted. For example, 
when the Movement first began in Jiangxi province, Chiang Kai-shek made this remark 
with respect to the righteous way of washing one’s face: 
“Everybody in Japan, from all social ranking, washed his face with cold 
water in the morning and in the night. It has become a common habit 
nationwide. If one breaks this rule, he will be regarded as barbaric and 
unpatriotic. Washing face with cold water is invigorating and refreshing. It 
also strengthens one’s skin against coldness. And most importantly, it saves 
time. This habit, trivial as it is, brings about great benefits. That is why the 
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entire population in Japan practice it. In China, our troops, our schools, how 
many of them can do the same? … Either one skip it because there is no hot 
water, or wait hours for water to be heated. We can simply tell from this 
fact that our nation is no match to the Japanese. Not through comparing 
wartime performance, we are inferior to them simply because of our daily 
life. So, if we are to reinvigorate our nation, to redeem ourselves from 
humiliation, we don’t have to talk about guns and cannons. Let’s talk about 
washing face with cold water. If we cannot beat the Japanese in this tiny 
matter, what else could be expected?”673 
 In a country as weak and poor as China in the 1930s, the only resource that a 
political head could expect to command was indeed a uniformed willpower across the 
nation. Ideology was the cheapest tools of engineering. It cost little to create and transport. 
It was a convenient expression of authoritarianism, regardless of its actual effect. For 
Chiang Kai-shek at the time, immediate acquirement of real engineering prowess was out 
of reach. He thus went with social engineering. Comment on the rise of Germany after 
World War I, Chiang said: 
“When we talk about reforming society, reinvigorating a country and 
nation, it cannot be achieved with only military power. How to succeed? 
Briefly speaking, the first is to equip ordinary ones with national morals, 
and the second is to equip them with national knowledge. … As we know 
it, after its defeat and the Treaty of Versailles Germany could not lift a finger 
without the allies’ interference and suppression, especially so in military. 
The German Army was capped at 100,000 in number. Comparing to other 
powers, it was nothing. Nonetheless, they managed to rise again within 
merely fifteen years on par with the most powerful nations on earth. How 
did they do that? … In contrast, Chinese army were tens of times in number. 
We too have navy and air force. Germany has a population of 60 million; 
we have 400 million… But how come they are able to demand equal 
military power and to abolish indemnity as they wish?... How come 
Germany was able to rise to equality without military forces but China 
cannot even with military? It was nothing but better morals and knowledge 
of the German.”674  
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 In Shanghai, however, the New Life Movement was not spurred by ideological 
wrestling but was driven by desire for better public health in a rapidly developing city. The 
Movement was commenced in Shanghai in the most metropolitan fashion possible. From 
April 9 to 15, 1934, the city enjoyed a movie festival, dubbed as the “New Life Movement 
Propagating Week”, where slogans of the Movement were seen everywhere, even on the 
silver screens. The Joint Pledge of New Life was aired on the radio. The packages were 
stamped with special postmark. Fifty thousand leaflets were distributed, 120,000 
pamphlets of Joint Pledge printed. Tens of thousands of Shanghai natives paraded with 
lanterns in their hands.675 Due to weakened presence of opposition to the Nationalists 
within the perimeter, the New Life Movement in Shanghai was not as much about the 
orderliness and uniformity as it was about practical guidelines for better hygiene. 
 The New Life Movement Commission composed a series of new rules regarding 
the cleanliness in public space. These rules bore great resemblance to the regulations put 
forth by the Municipal Council in the 1860s, which included (1) In streets, every household 
must ensure that the section in front of them be kept clean. (2) Pouring waste water or 
disposing garbage in the streets were forbidden. (3) The shops were ordered to fix their 
signs if broken. (4) Advertisements would be washed off the wall if not properly posted. 
(5) Leaving clothes to dry in main streets was not allowed. (6) Peddlers selling snacks must 
bring their own broom and dustpan to clean up the scene. In view of a shortage in public 
latrine, the Commission instructed teahouses and bars to open their latrines for public to 
use. They also suggested that these latrines be cleaned with limewater every day.676 In 
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regulating cleanliness in private space, a myriad of rules were created to police even the 
most trivial things. Among them were manner issues, such as munching with mouth shut, 
taking off the hat when entering a room, and staying in line when boarding bus and ship. 
That being said, the Movement did offer health benefits by urging people to drink boiled 
water only and by organizing campaigns eliminating flies and mosquitoes.677  
 Nevertheless, the New Life Movement was non-compulsory in nature. Despite the 
fact that the service corps in Shanghai amounted to four hundred and seventy-two groups, 
with overall four thousand two hundred and seventy members, none of these groups had 
operable authority. They consisted of people of very different background: boy scouts, 
teachers, merchants, local security guards. In their realm of jurisdiction, they were asked 
to correct misbehaviors from sloppy outfit to spitting, from urinating in public to underage 
smoking, from walking on the wrong side of the road to refusing to get inoculated.678 Not 
only did it take time for these behavioral changes to happen, but the New Life Movement 
was brought to an abrupt end in 1937 when the war with Japan broke out. Historians thus 
had a hard time trying to assess the actual result of the New Life Movement since many of 
its goals simply could not be measured by numbers.   
Intellectual engagement had to dwell on the nature of the movement. Arif Dirlik 
suggests that the New Life Movement was both conservative and revolutionary in that it 
was couched in traditional terminology, yet the terminology were given radically new 
meanings that fit best with the political needs.679Lei Hsiang-lin argues that the Movement 
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was at first Chiang’s idea, but was immediately developed by others who intended to add 
a layer of nationalism to the Confucian familial values.680 This view could be corroborated 
by Lloyd E. Eastman’s founding that a radical youth group “The Blue Shirts Society” 
within the Kuomintang openly demanded a strong leader for China as powerful and 
forceful as Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin.681 Ruth Rogaski briefly mentioned the New Life 
Movement in her contention of hygienic modernity. She suggested that the Movement 
claimed to be a mass movement, but it primarily reached individuals who were already 
encompassed by state-affiliated organizations such as youth groups, government offices, 
hospitals and schools. It had little impact on the actual urban environment.682 
Considering Rogaski defined modernity as uniformed sense of purpose held by 
state and individuals, her discounting the New Life Movement as a successful state-
sponsored campaign was puzzling. In the areas where sanitation was not concerned, the 
Movement was able to make many individuals fall in line with the vision of the state. For 
example, the Commission in Shanghai organized a group wedding in 1935 to challenge the 
traditional familial framework in which marriage was situated. The wedding took place in 
the city square witnessed by hundreds of fellow citizens. It was hosted by the mayor of 
Shanghai instead of head of family. Fifty-seven couples swore their oaths in front of mayor 
and the head of social bureau. The purpose of the wedding was to cut the luxurious and 
wasteful ceremonies and to redirect the familial ties towards the image of state. The 
purpose might sound politically charged, but these weddings became so popular that the 
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government had to hold them more often, from four times a year to a monthly thing.683 In 
this sense, the New Life Movement was to some extent successful in modernizing familial 
traditions by infusing nationalistic values into the most traditional practices. The 
Movement just failed terribly at public health. The political nature did not lead to the 
failure. Some forms of modernization could be materialized simply with social relations 
engineered by the authorities, whereas modernization of public health, like we have 
established with the anti-cholera campaign in 1932, must be achieved on the ground of an 
entirety of infrastructural technologies. 
8.7 Water Closet Revolution 
 What perhaps made a more significant impact on the behavioral change towards 
modernity was the prevalence of water closet. The Chinese in Shanghai had learned the 
better way of domestic waste disposal from their affluent foreign neighbors. Water closets 
was made an indicator of living a modern life. When Gilbert Fowler was contracted by the 
Municipal Council and traveled to Shanghai in 1918 to address the sewage problem, he 
suggested that the demand for modern sanitary plant in houses must be acknowledged as 
inevitable: “It is a question rather of amenity than vital statistics, and is one with the 
demand for better housing, for pleasant gardens, and for smokeless skies; it is, in fact, part 
of the impulse which separates cultivated or so-called civilized man from the cave 
dweller.” 684 According to the municipal record in February 1920, there were altogether 
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579 water closets in the busiest and finest Central District of the Settlement. The Palace 
Hotel alone had 121 water closets put in place.685  
 
Figure 22 – The Palace Hotel. Source: “The Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels – A 
Brief History”.  
Along with the booming water closet market was a flourishing business of popular 
readings. Elites had been learning their news from the very serious North-China Herald 
since the previous century where municipal data and record of Council’s meeting was 
published regularly. Ordinary people in Shanghai had created their own sources of news – 
illustrated books, collection of photographs, novels, compilation of anecdotes and so forth. 
Every week a collage of stories was selected from across China and from the world and 
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spread in the alleyways and at the teahouses. These printed materials appealed to the basic 
human need of curiosity and entertainment. No topic was off the limit. At an age when 
censorship was sparsely imposed, water closet and restroom were commonly used for a 
good laugh. Humor drew upon all sorts of social realities. What made a public restrooms 
and water closets good joke material was the tension between reclusiveness and publicness. 
Four sources of comedic effect will be discussed hereafter.  
8.7.1 Restroom as Social Space 
First, public restroom could never be limited to its function as a place of relief and 
convenience. As people came in and out regularly, it was bound to become a social space 
where opinions were stated and dialogues were recorded. In the age before social media, 
writings on the wall was the best weather vane to tell the cultural and political climate at 
the time. Due to the nature of anonymity, public restroom became a forum most suitable 
for freedom of speech to prevail. The “restroom literature” thus became the finest record 
of subaltern reactions to many hot bottom issues at the time. 
A good example would be the following piece of literature written in a restroom of 
a foreign bank on the Bund. In those places, foreigners and Chinese employee were treated 
differently. They were paid differently. They used separate restrooms. The Chinese 
restroom thus became the place where discontent was vented.686 At the corner of the 
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restroom, someone drew a figure of modern woman, with her lips and nails painted red. 
On the side of the figure was where the dialogue was carried out. Gender, sexual tension, 
hardship and inflation, and random comments, all were published in the magazine: 
“What Miss Li? Nothing but an empty vase. I work day and night, only to 
receive 150,000 yuan. How about her? She is taken in and out in the 
manager’s car. She sits at the desk, pretending to be working. If she is not 
reading newspaper, she is doing her knitting. When it comes to the end of 
the month, she earns 50% more than I do. Sigh. Where should I even 
begin?” 
“She is such a pheasant. She does not like the manager because he is so 
much older, but she loves the money so she sucks up to him. In fact, she is 
in love with the younger business partner of the manager.” 
“You two above. You are just here complaining because you don’t even get 
to enjoy the smell of a girl.” 
“You shameless brown-nosed suck-up. You can’t have the best part of a 
fish, so you are just drunk in clam soup.” 
“Haha. Don’t hide in the dark and hurt others with your writings. If you are 
a real man, let’s have a drinking contest tomorrow at second floor of 
Xiaoguanghan.” 
“Little Ding was so busy flirting with the foreign chick last night!” 
“The cost of tram tickets and stamps just keeps getting higher. I heard that 
there will be another spike very soon. People cannot afford to ride trams. If 
they walk, they might get a couple of calluses. But the price of shoes and 
socks are also shockingly high. Sigh. It’s so hard to get by in a day and age 
like this.” 
“Meal plan is going to be 2000 yuan per person. How can we even live like 
this?” 
“My neighbor is playing mahjong again. Gosh! I will lose another night of 
sleep.” 
“The noise of radio is giving me headache. I heard radio was invented by 
McCartney. Weird! McCartney is supposed to be the material for spring 
coats. How can a piece of cloth invent radio?” 
“Traditional breakfast costs at least 200 yuan. Boiled water is 100 yuan per 
ladle. One pack of cigarettes is 500 yuan. What is the use of earning 100,000 
yuan every month? My wife can only eat cold wind to live on.”687 
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Figure 23 – Secrets in the restroom. A variety of activities were taking place, 
including reading love letters, stealing, creative writing, cramming for exams, hiding 
from work duties and so forth. Source: Tian, 1937. 
Most restroom literature were coarse and vulgar. Middle school students were best 
at toilet jokes and they proudly describe fecal matters in all ways they found funny.688 
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There was even report about illustrations of sexy women cut from magazines and pasted 
to an entire wall at a middle school.689 There were also poetic pieces to read from time to 
time. The following poem was seen on the wall of a restroom in a school, lamenting 
refugees’ hardship and teachers’ low payment: 
Those descend from the sky, are they doves or are they crows 
Those refugees on the ground, they don’t get to eat the relief, they eat dirt instead 
Monarchy and democracy fight all the time. How to mediate the differences? 
Dear American dollars, I love you more than I love my country. 
Teachers work more than one job otherwise they will starve to death.690 
Political comments that were less subtle were not uncommon in the restrooms. After the 
World War II, China entered another stage of power struggle between the Nationalist Party 
and the Communists. The left-leaning students would write down slogans such as “Pursuit 
of Democracy, Down with Dictatorship” and “Find some conscience in you and deliver 
our fellow countrymen in northern Jiangsu out of misery.691 It would be much more risky 
if such comments were made out in the public. 
8.7.2 Restroom, Toilet, and Gender 
The second source of humor about toilets and restrooms was the issue of gender. 
Public restrooms for women’s convenience were still unheard of in the beginning of the 
twentieth century. Women were bounded by domestic sphere, thus the only places where 
women’s restroom existed were the places that women were “allowed” to visit, such as 
temples. A story in 1909 suggested that behind one of the Buddhist temples in Beijing there 
was a women’s restroom. It received a regular flow of women pilgrims. A man unfamiliar 
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with the streets was passing by the temple one day. While looking for men’s room, he 
accidently invaded the area for women. He was shouted at by several middle-aged women 
and was accused of looking their way into the restroom more than once. It was thus 
suggested that some distance needed to be kept between men’s and women’s rooms to 
prevent moral corruption.692  
In Shanghai, women’s restroom was seen in cinemas, theaters, and ballrooms. They 
were usually delicately adorned. Female attendant, usually an elderly, was hired to keep 
the place clean. Dancing girls mistreated by their partners or customers came in to weep. 
They sometimes vent their frustration at the attendant by yelling at them.693 In places of 
pleasure, hygiene in the women’s rooms were not so carefully maintained. Women were 
suggested against using these restrooms because it was believed that if they did not cover 
the toilet seats with paper, or if they sat on it for too long, they might be poisoned by the 
foul air and contract syphilis.694 
Women’s pursuit of their own public restroom started in the late 1920s.  The first 
petition was seen in 1928 when the Department of Public Works of Jiangsu province 
requested permission from the government to build public restrooms for women in the 
street as a symbol of gender equality.695 The Department of Public Works was urged by 
the Women’s Association in Jiangsu, headed by Mao Yanwen (毛彦文, 1898-1999), a 
liberal-minded young political leader. Mao was born in 1898 into a gentry-class family. 
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She obtained her early education in various women’s schools where she received modern 
education. After being transferred to Jinling Women’s College, Mao was elected head of 
branch of feminist movement. 696  In 1934, another petition was made to Zhejiang 
government. It was written by a group of women in Nanxun, a wealthy town known for its 
quality silk. It was pointed out that in the town of Nanxun, it was hard for women to use 
the latrines without running into men. Women running business and rural women who 
carried heavy weight would have nature calling when walking in the city. If they relieved 
themselves in the street, they would feel embarrassed, met with scolding, subject to sexual 
harassment. Therefore, it was necessary to build some restrooms for women only. In their 
signatures, this group of women called themselves “female citizens”, showing kindred 
spirit in engaging modern politics. 697  The reaction among ordinary men was not so 
friendly. On the one hand, there was the tightening budget. On the other hand, it was 
mockingly suggested that in the age of Republic of China, genders were equals. Even if a 
woman was being watched while she went, it would not hurt her in any way. In case a man 
acted indecently towards the women, he shall just be forced to drink a large cup of dog’s 
urine.698  
The regional governments, however, went along with the popular requests. In 1935, 
Nanjing, capital of the Republic of China, saw the erection of one of the earliest public 
restrooms for women. It was praised by the press as a kind gesture for people’s well-
being.699 In Fujian province, the government ordered that all passenger ships and cargo 
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ships of the capacity of twenty people and above be equipped with a bucket exclusively 
used by women in the back of the ships.700 The development of women’s restroom in 
Shanghai was hard to track. But a change in the culture was still visible. By the end of 
WWII, it was obvious that that women needing their own restroom was generally accepted. 
In a news report that discussed the Japanese use of toilets in Shanghai, they were ridiculed 
by the press because the Japanese men and women allegedly used the same restroom. 
Women walked right into the stall after the man finished before her, with no sense of shame 
or embarrassment. They even looked at each other through the mirror when they were 
relieving themselves.701 
8.7.3 Government’s Overreach in the Restroom 
The third source of toilet humor came from making fun of the government’s 
overreach. Restroom was a place where no activities of personal hygiene should be 
bothered. People took advantage of this character. Students at school went into the restroom 
to light up a cigarette on the sly. At midnight students gathered at the stinky yet well-lit 
restroom for the exciting game of gambling.702 It was supposed to be exempted from 
surveillance and interference.  
Since the beginning of Republic years, the sanitation of restroom had always been 
the issue that the government wanted to address. In 1912, the new government of Baoshan 
village attempted to buy out all privately-owned public restrooms and assigned them with 
one government-sponsored cleaner to maintain its cleanliness.703 After Chiang Kai-shek’s 
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expedition, government offered extremely detailed guidelines for building and maintaining 
public restrooms. In 1928, the Nanjing government started promoting the “Java latrine” as 
the standard, expedient restrooms. Java latrine was cheap and easy to build, with a hole of 
12 in. × 20 ft. The collected filth needed to be dug out only once a year.704 During the New 
Life Movement, governments of various cities actively engaged in the business of 
restrooms. In Guangzhou, the government urged all private owners of restroom to register 
at the Bureau of Sanitation, otherwise their properties would be confiscated.705 The local 
government in Jiangxi province issued standardized blueprint for all future public 
restrooms. 706  In Nanjing, the government intended to take over all the sub-standard 
restrooms in 1934.707  
When a site of privacy was met with growing intervention, humor became the way 
to offset the authoritarian nature of regulations. People made fun of the extreme policies 
and pointed at the superficiality of those campaigns. A good example would be the 
following article that joked about a possible “restroom charter” for middle schools. The 
“charter” stated that the schools received a diminishing tuition from students due to the 
dull economy. Many students went to the restroom before coming to school so that 
nightsoil could be sold by their family. If the school needed additional revenue, they should 
set up a scheme that demanded students to go in the restrooms at school so that the school 
could capitalize on the nightsoil revenue. The “charter” assign nightstools to each student 
and would evaluate their performance based on the quantity and quality of their 
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nightsoil.708 Another piece was seen in the magazine in 1939, stating that stocking among 
rice merchants was causing a spike in food price. Therefore, the best way to survive was 
to eat as little as possible. It was thus stipulated that one could only defecate once and 
urinate four times every five days. Special agent had been appointed to oversee this matter. 
Those who broke the rules would be liable to punishment.709 The presence of the New Life 
Movement and a series of attempts in regulating restrooms across the country might 
presented a seemingly strong authoritative power, yet the resistance from the bottom, in 
the form of humorous popular literature, suggested otherwise. The absurdity of the articles 
above was the lively demonstration of the contempt of overreach held by even the lowest 
rank of society. 
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Figure 24 – Java Latrine. Source: Wei, 1928. 
 
Figure 25 – Design for Public Restroom in Nanchang (1). Source: “Zhangze: 
Nanchang shi gonggong cesuo gaizao banfa”, 1934. 
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Figure 26 – Design for Public Restroom in Nanchang (2). Source: “Zhangze: 
Nanchang shi gonggong cesuo gaizao banfa”, 1934. 
 
Figure 27 – Design for Public Restroom in Nanchang (3). Source: “Zhangze: 
Nanchang shi gonggong cesuo gaizao banfa”, 1934. 
8.7.4 Toilet as the Symbol of Modernity 
Finally, as water closets became prevalent, toilet became nearly an interchangeable 
term for modernity. On the one hand, it was the representation of a convenient yet luxurious 
life style. Attacks on the water closets were the attacks on urban modernity itself. This 
analog was used by conservatives who had doubts about the direction the country was 
going at. In an article published in 1934, the modern fixture and the water-carriage system 
were described as the “urban chemical pool”, whereas rural outdoor toilet that disposed 
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fecal matter into a lake for fish to eat was praised as natural and comfortable.710 Even as 
late as in 1947, there were still voices heard about the superiority of traditional waste 
disposal. Flushing away the human excrement was believed to be wasteful. In contrast, in 
the town of Shaoxing, Zhejiang, there was pit latrines every five or ten steps of the way. 
“China sits on the cornerstone of agriculture,” it went, “Even at the capital, there were 
surrounding regions where fertilizers were preserved on site. What is bad about that? For 
us little people, what smell is there to complain about?”711 
On the other hand, water closet could be new, non-traditional, and Western in style, 
but it remained the vessel that held excrement. It was thus the perfect metaphor for 
ostentatiousness. For example, Chinese students who received their education in the West 
and Japan were often mocked for their affection for flush toilet. They complained about 
China’s backwardness every time when they could not find a flush toilet nearby. An article 
published in 1936 called out the pretentious young people and argued that the best way to 
show one’s privilege was to help the less privileged. Their obsession would be much 
justified if they helped erect public restrooms with plumbing fixtures in shantytowns in 
Shanghai.712 Water closet was also used in political sarcasm that made fun of the corrupted 
government officials who pretended to be of integrity: 
“Old-fashioned nightsoil bucket has all of its matter out in the open, and 
you can smell it. When people accuse it of corruption, the evidence is right 
there, just like the old-fashioned bureaucrats who declare themselves that 
‘people everywhere enter officialdom to get rich.’ Nowadays, civil people 
use ‘flush toilet’. It holds waste matter but can be flushed away and hidden 
without a trace. It might look clean on the outside, but inside it is 
bottomless… I am not a fan of ‘flush toilet’. This is not in view of 
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preserving established culture, but because the old-fashioned buckets are 
plain, true, transparent and lovely… Don’t pretend to be clean on the outside 
while being filthy on the inside. The truth will reveal itself when you take 
in too much and have the drain clogged.”713 
Water closet was not only used as a straw man of modernity, it was also used as an 
indicator of Shanghai’s better quality of life compared to the rest of China. This aspect of 
water closet was highlighted when the wartime Nationalist government, based in the 
southwest hilly city Chongqing, sent their agents to work in Shanghai after the war against 
Japan was won. For example, when the Kuomintang branch in Shanghai was under 
reorganization, some party cadres were sent from inland provinces. These cadres had no 
experience living a comfortable city life in the past eight years of war. They had no 
knowledge of water closet. Some of them even used bamboo slat to wipe themselves clean 
after the relief. During their inspection in Shanghai, three cadres reportedly were so amazed 
by how clean water was inside the toilet bowl they stuck their heads into the bowl to see 
where the water came from. Some of them even mistaken the water closet as water fountain 
or reservoir. It was only after they were told about what water closet was for that they were 
embarrassed by their earlier reactions.714  
 Not only did inland Chinese fail the litmus test of modernity, so were the Japanese 
during occupation time. After the Japanese went to war with the Western powers, they 
seized the buildings on the Bund that belonged to foreign banks. After 1945, these 
buildings were returned to their previous owners who only to find that toilets on all floors 
were filthy and broken. Many of the toilet seats were removed. The Chinese press ridiculed 
the barbaric habit of the Japanese, suggesting that the Japanese could only go when they in 
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squat position. That was the reason why so many toilet bowls were destroyed. The Chinese 
press, drunk in pride and victory, called the Japanese style “cock on a rack”715 
Ironically, the prevalence of water closet and public restroom in popular literature 
did not mean that the majority of populace were able to enjoy the cleanliness and 
convenience. The shortage became even more acute when a great many of latrines were 
destroyed or went out of order during the war. It was said that every morning around 5 to 
6 o’clock, one could almost certainly find a pile of dung on the side of the road.716 People 
jokingly ran for city councilor on the promises of more public restrooms.717 Some even 
presented radical ideas of urging those who have flush toilets at home to list their address 
in the newspaper and rent their facilities five minutes every day to the public.718 With 
respect to the functioning restrooms, people needed to pay an exorbitant amount for entry, 
often in the name of toilet paper. A pack of toilet paper could cost 200 yuan, earning 
millions of dollars for the contractors.719 For ordinary people in Shanghai, the modern life 
style remained symbolic. 
8.8 Conclusion: Reskilling in Everyday Life 
 Entering the 1920s, Shanghai housed nearly three million people and a full set of 
urban water infrastructures – drainage, water supply, culvert, and water-carriage system in 
the making. The availability of these technologies tantalized authorities, Chinese and 
foreign, to impose sweeping public health measures, hoping that they would obtain better 
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results than their predecessors. Modern disease control did become more effective, whereas 
the results of sanitary campaigns launched for political purposes were debatable. 
 The Chapei waterworks scandal in 1926 was the first recorded water-borne 
epidemic in Shanghai. Chinese traditional pharmacists had long been dealing with cholera 
in their own effective ways, but dealing with Vibrio cholerae infested at the Chapei 
waterworks required a different set of skills. The creation of the Department of Health in 
1926 and of the later National Quarantine Service was the embodiment of growing state 
intervention in public health matters. In the anti-cholera campaign in 1932, Wu Liande and 
the new government agencies played a critical role in coordinating disease control 
measures across districts. But coordination alone would not reduce the cases of cholera 
infection. Clean water delivered to the targeted population as the authorities requested was 
the key component. It was backed by the engineering prowess of the Shanghai Waterworks 
Company, which remained most critical to the success of the anti-cholera campaign. 
The New Life Movement and the growing popularity of water closets in Shanghai 
were a pair of cases that demonstrated the boundaries of political influence in private, 
bodily matters. The former was a top-down social engineering that aimed at achieving 
uniformity across the society, operating with little help of water-related technologies, 
whereas the latter was a bottom-up assimilation into a technological system that was 
completely mundane, requiring little interference from state power. Eventually, the New 
Life Movement produced at most bland results, while water closet prevailed in gearing 
both discourse and reality about hygiene, gender, and space towards a framework that we 
are accustomed to today.  
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During the Golden Decade of the republic years, more Chinese were able to enjoy 
the convenience of water technologies. Tap water became ubiquitous, and so were the 
water closets, although to a lesser extent. They were consistently employed in disease 
control and various state-sponsored sanitary campaigns. The availability of water 
technologies revolutionized how impurity and cleanliness were perceived, identified, and 
managed. Shanghai witnessed the slow formation of a uniformed conceptualization of 
hygiene among urban inhabitants. While some of the changes could be attributed to policies 
and campaigns, among ordinary people it was in their daily interaction with these 
technologies that they began to give up the old customs willingly. 
In his contention of modernity, Anthony Giddens discusses deskilling and 
reskilling in everyday life. He suggests that since modern social life is such a complex 
affair, there are many “filter-back” processes whereby technical knowledge, in one shape 
or another, is reapproriated by lay persons and routinely applied in the course of their day-
to-day activities. The interaction is strongly influenced by experiences at access points.720 
A lay person did not need to understand the chemistry behind the process of decomposition 
or the physics behind functioning pipelines to be able to “survive” in the early twentieth-
century Shanghai. The spirit of these knowledge was packed in the form of machines and 
fixtures. When people flushed away their ordure, they did not think about the massive 
expert system behind it, or to which nation-state the system belonged to. People were 
relieved from their duty of emptying nightstools every early morning. However, knowing 
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how to operate himself around a plumbing fixture needed a new set of skills. These skills 
were neither means of survival, nor of intellectual complexity.  
On the users’ end, using flush toilet did not require a prior knowledge in science 
and medicine. The expert system of water closet was designed to be of greatest convenience 
so that more people would use them. And the expert system behind water closet, once put 
in place, would only want to incorporate more people and household because it would be 
much costly for the industrial solution to be maintained if the installments were left unused 
or underused. The operation of the mechanical system of waste disposal was indeed 
mechanical, with little social forces at play. The perception of it, however, was not. A 
modern, up-to-date urbanite who agreed with the scientific ethos behind the expert systems 
would be fine around the system without actually knowing what they were and how they 
worked. The reliance on the systems was based on trust.  
The trust here was different from the trust in tap water in Chapter 3. Trust in sewage 
system was not based on bodily experience, but based on internalization of the faith in 
specialists and a vague understanding of their expertise and the complication of the 
problem. This understanding was kept vague intentionally because the more one learned 
about the technical details, the more disturbing it tended to be. To facilitate the trust, all 
users needed to know was that the problem was too complicated for them. In this sense, 
people becoming bodily attuned to the waste disposal system was a dual process. On the 
one hand, it was driven bottom-up by the increasingly easy availability of access points – 
i.e. the prevalence of the new installments; on the other hand, it was driven by the ideology 
of modernity, which was not entirely imparted by the state, but picked up in day-to-day 
routines. Modernity only became ideology when it was convenient for urbanites to explain 
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away their ignorance of the expert systems and their willingness to relinquish control of 
such systems. The ideology hence was purposefully vague and encompassing so that it 
could incorporate as many aspects of life as it could. The uncertainty they felt about the 
systems was set off by the cultural superiority that they enjoyed when someone free from 
the control of these systems, a peasant from hinterland for example, crossed their path.  
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION 
 Through his examination of the history of water supply in three American cities – 
Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago - Carl Smith argues that a city is an “infrastructure of 
ideas.” It is a gathering of people, a layout of streets, an arrangement of buildings, and a 
collection of political, economic, and social institutions. Smith sees the infrastructure of 
ideas and the actual physical and social infrastructures as in a form of cocurrence. The 
former neither precedes nor follows the latter, but the two are inseparable.721 However, I 
intend to focus my attention specifically on the engineering aspect of the history of 
Shanghai because for too long the figures who were most facilitative to the creation of 
water supply and sewage disposal in Shanghai had been left in the shadows. 
My emphasis on engineering does not preclude a discussion of social relations. It 
would be hard to argue that engineering a nineteenth century city did not require an 
institutional setup that enabled the travel of knowledge and the moving of specialists. In 
the case of Shanghai, many foreign engineers and scientists contributed to the creation of 
city water system, including: Joseph Gibbs, John Clark, Edward Frankland, Charles 
Hawksley, Nicholas Hill, and Gilbert Fowler. Without a professionalized community of 
engineers, it would have been an insurmountable difficult for the British in the Far East to 
reach, consult, and contract the specialists from across the ocean. Foreign engineers in 
Shanghai went on to form their own association: the Engineering Society of Shanghai, a 
forum where local achievements were applauded and where recent development of 
knowhow were introduced and discussed. The infrastructure of knowledge, ideas, data, and 
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technologies augmented by the British Empire was indispensable in the creation of water 
system in Shanghai. 
 That being said, applying Smith’s argument to a Chinese city may not produce the 
same result. The reason is simple: a Chinese city had a much more limited record on the 
building of physical infrastructure than most Western cities. This shortage of material leads 
to a bias in investigation that disproportionately focuses on the social aspects of 
infrastructure and institutions – schools, hospitals, books, diaries, correspondence, 
scientific journals, translation, government institutions, labor market, pamphlets and 
posters, newspaper and its advertisement etc. Intellectuals, politicians, educators, and 
consumers take the center stage, while engineers, entrepreneurs, craftsmen, and others who 
build and engineer the city are dropped from the story. Ideas and social infrastructures for 
their transmission are deemed the deterministic factor in the process of change, whereas 
engineering works are seen either as a natural result of change of ideas, a manifestation of 
progress, or a backdrop of political and business activities. In the view of some, physical 
infrastructures were nothing but tools or manifestations of ideas, while modernity could be 
achieved through education, aspiration, scientific indoctrination, and social mobilization. 
However, I argue that this explanation is insufficient. 
The concept of modernity in the context of early-twentieth-century China is closely 
associated with consumption. Karl Gerth suggests that the joint endeavor of the 
government and the market created a version of modernity for women that was considered 
authentic because it was not about keeping up with the Western-style fashion, but about 
nationalistic consumption, as practiced in Japan and the West. Gerth contends that the 
ideological desire for a wealthy and powerful state could be built among consumers 
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through the activities of consumption and spectacles of commodities. “Participants in the 
[state-sponsored exhibitionary] movement did not simply wait to recover sovereignty from 
the imperialist powers;” Gerth says, “rather, they began actively to construct it from below 
in the minds of Chinese consumers through these nationalized visual and physical 
spaces.” 722  Dong and Goldstein also look to the consumption of modern facilities in 
everyday life as an antidote to the false binary of modern-tradition. They use the concept 
of everydayness to frustrate the tendency to devolve into “moderner than thou” rhetorical 
assumptions and to situate the development of centralized urban development in particular 
contexts. Nevertheless, the collection of theses they provide examine how the Chinese 
reacted to everyday modernity – most of them were utilities – and how their perceptions of 
modernity changed over time. Little attention is given to the production of these goods and 
as to how these modern fixtures and installments became available there in the first 
place.723 
Shanghai is an excellent site for the examination of modernist production because 
it is blessed with abundance of technical records thanks to the continuous and meticulous 
publication of The North-China Herald. By following the doings of engineers and 
entrepreneurs, we can recalibrate Smith’s contention in the context of China while 
separating the physical infrastructure from the social one, at least to certain extent. This 
chapter, therefore, casts a different mold for the term “modernity.” The technocratic-
engineering systems are not the result or the expression of social construct. Rather, the 
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systems alone, as well as the story of them coming into being, are worthy subjects of 
historical interrogation.  
9.1 Modernity Revisited 
This dissertation explores the history of city water technologies in Shanghai from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century and the ways these infrastructures 
– drainage system, water supply, culverted rivers, water closet, and water-carriage sewers 
– played a role in the shaping of the cityscape, economics, and politics of Shanghai. 
Chapters 2-5 discussed the engineering history of city water projects in Shanghai, each one 
discussing one component of the system – drainage, waterworks, culvert, and sewage 
treatment. Despite their status as the embodiment of state-of-the-art Western knowledge in 
science and medicine, it was the most mundane of concerns that facilitated their adoption 
in Shanghai. Accurate scientific reasoning did not have to predate the engineering of the 
city. Rather, engineering tended to be governed by its own logic, which was founded on 
practicality, multi-functionality, and cost-efficiency of the schemes. 
Chapters 6-8 discussed the influence a variety of authorities intended to impose on 
the city water infrastructures and on the society, including the councils of the two foreign 
concessions, early Republic provinciality and entrepreneurs, and Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalist government. The systemic, centralized, legible physical nature of the 
infrastructures enticed politicians into a vision where the society was to be run in a similar 
way. All the authorities mentioned above made attempts to achieve sovereign control in 
their own ways over the water system and over the society in general. They succeeded to 
varying degrees through measures such as licensing, monitoring, legal battles, epidemic 
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control, and hygienic campaigns. Yet the most effective change came out of the growing 
prevalence of new fixtures and installments, which managed to revolutionize people’s 
behaviors even in the most private social spaces.  
To engage with mainstream theories of modernity, I apply Anthony Gidden’s 1990 
theoretical model to each chapter, making use of the following elements that I consider 
suitable for the story of this research: expertise, globalization, reflexivity of modernity, 
expert system, trust, nation-state, and reskilling in everyday life. These terms sometimes 
point to emerging new actors and phenomena in the society, but as I have elaborated at the 
end of each chapter, the reality of late nineteenth century often infuses these words of the 
1990s with new meaning, or in some cases, questions their general validity. By connecting 
these dots, I am able to retell the story within the conventional theoretical framework of 
modernity while highlighting the variation and multiplicity of specificities of the past that 
the day-to-day use of the word “modernity” cannot currently afford to bear. 
As the British settlement developed in Shanghai, expertise of engineers went on to 
become the most important ingredient in keeping the booming town in order. The 
knowledge of lay persons saw its limit in envisioning and constructing a drainage system 
suitable for Shanghai’s extreme geography. But such division in intellectuality did not 
mean the instant creation of an abstract system of knowledge and information that could 
impact to the local from afar. In the story of engineering works of the late nineteenth 
century, globalization meant an established shipping network through which the movement 
of machines became easier and faster. However, the local knowledge acquired by engineers 
on the ground remained critical in the successful implantation of technology. Shanghai 
Waterworks Company’s scheme worked because of the company’s successful recruitment 
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of an engineer who was willing to spend his time studying Shanghai. At the same time, the 
municipal scheme failed through because they were unable to recruit someone of their own 
to study in China. In the case of culverting the Yangkingpang, we again saw the weakness 
of the primitive global knowledge regime that had yet institutionalized their clutches in 
areas beyond the Western world. Germ theory, miasma theory, and everything else in 
between were still in competition with one another in Shanghai, decades after the dispute 
was virtually settled in Europe. Even when the decision of culverting was made in 1914, it 
was not because of an improved understanding of medicine. Rather, it was for practical 
need of a wider road. This reflexivity did not happen within the academic, disciplinary 
boundary. Rather, the intellectual progression was driven by pressure arising from the 
increasingly complicated local conditions in an increasingly large city. 
When an expert system like sewage disposal in Shanghai became so inclusive that 
heterogeneous types of knowledge like chemistry, microbiology, physics, mechanical 
engineering, and industrial design were combined into one establishment, the knowledge 
of these works had to become increasingly abstract so that it could remain legible to lay 
persons and experts alike. Trust in such a system in the 1920s was based on the awareness 
that these new, unfamiliar constructions, not directly visible to most, were the result of 
institutionalized knowledge. People trusted the sewage disposal system not because they 
understood it or they could see it, but because of the exact opposite. In comparison to the 
sewage disposal system, the 1880s implementation of tap water happened in another 
context of interaction. Being able to distinguish the better water did not require any 
intellectual abilities. Neither did being financially capable of purchasing the better water. 
Shanghai natives staring drinking tap water was a process of bodily adjustment, facilitated 
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by financial incentives provided by the Shanghai Waterworks Company and, to a lesser 
extent, institutional guarantees from the Municipal Council who combined tax collecting 
and water subscription service into one. 
Although the conventional narrative looks to nation-state as the primary unit of 
action due to its unprecedented capability of mobilizing resources, the political struggle 
between the Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai showed that on the ground it was not 
simply the nation-state but a multitude of institutions vying for supremacy: entrepreneurs, 
magistrates, tenants, property owners, soldiers and police, politicians, party, grass-root 
associations, etc. The competition was about larger institutional organization and farther-
reaching influence so that the business interests generated by the water infrastructures 
could be better secured. In such situations, the nation-state could well be involved, but it 
could also stay aside if the corporation’s institutional being was robust on its own.  
Finally, there was one additional actor historians tend to forget: the things 
themselves. Change could happen when top-down forces took action in epidemic control, 
such as the 1932 anti-cholera campaign and in mass mobilization such as the New Life 
Movement, but change could be more effectively induced when people’s behavior was 
disciplined not by authorities but by things – fixtures, devices, hardware, etc. Social 
engineering of the New Life Movement fell short of its goal because while state employed 
great manpower in policing and disciplining unhygienic behaviors and customs, the 
government did not build enough hydrants, latrines, food stations, and hospitals for the 
public to use. In contrast, the growing prevalence of flush toilet during WWII managed to 
bring visible changes in people’s behaviors and in their perception of these behaviors. They 
were not obliged to act by the rules in seclusion, but they did nonetheless. People were 
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reskilled through the consistent interaction at the access points and acquired new meanings 
to make sense of these adaptations.  
As helpless consumers, people in Shanghai restructured their relinquished control 
over expert systems into a term that projected sense of superiority towards the others – 
those who were equally ignorant about the inner working of the technocratic-engineering 
systems as they were, but were not reskilled enough to culturally adapt to the new material 
setting. Modernity as ideology, therefore, was not an aspiration for average consumers. It 
was a capitulation. 
9.2 Hydraulic Modernity Revisited 
We have hereby revealed the duality of the term modernity. From an engineering 
perspective, it means progression of expertise, characterized by vast engineering systems 
and the delicate interconnection between them. From the viewpoint of consumers, it means 
cultural adaptation to new sets of code of conduct, hygienic behaviors being one of them, 
and the sense of superiority built on and assured by the trust in numerous expert systems, 
or by the ignorance of them. The former version of modernity is tangible, grounded by 
local conditions, embedded in concrete geographical and geological context. It only 
became abstract and ideological when the systems grew to such extent that it brought a 
significant chunk of population into subscription or interaction, and when bodily 
adjustment was accepted as the new norm. Previous scholarship has overwhelmingly 
focused on the latter. To assume that consumers enjoying modern life styles is the same as 
engineers pioneering innovative techniques is to turn a blind eye to the heterogeneous 
nature within the concept of modernity and the social context, distinct from each other, 
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within which various actors operated. Conflating the two aspects by force can only result 
in a reductive version of modernity, which may be good at describing development, but 
not at explaining why the development happened and why it happened the way they did. 
One would probably be told that things happened because of the aspiration of modernity, 
not because of the acts that comprise it. To break away from this closed cycle of reasoning, 
we need better terms to further break down the components behind advancements in 
engineering, medicine, and the progression of people’s behavior and values. This 
dissertation aims to address the first half of these inquiries through what I will term 
‘hydraulic modernity.’  
Hydraulic modernity refers to the process in which practical aspects of the 
technocratic-engineering system of city water – like scale, physicality, and financial 
sustainability – dictate the pattern of engineering works and consequently impact the way 
government and markets are organized. The rules of how technocratic-engineering systems 
operate are rooted in the materiality and practicality of the system, rather than being 
imposed from the outside by intellectuals or politicians. The “things” – works, pipes, 
fixtures, and stations – lay the groundwork and set the rules for government intervention. 
Only within the spatial and economic limits allowed by the engineering feasibility can the 
authorities have its political influence materialized.  
My argument traces the development of hygienic modernity by measuring two 
criteria: capacity and homogeneity. The former is the indicator of maximum output of an 
engineering system and the latter refers to reduction of the number of heterogeneous 
interest groups inside a technocratic-engineering system, done in order to lower the risk of 
malfunction. Using these two criteria offers at least three advantages in the discussion of 
 364 
history of technologies. First, the word modernity ceases to implicate an inaccurate 
demarcation in time that separates the modern from the pre-modern. Second, it provides a 
clearer picture of how the patterns of superstructures are subject to the mechanical features 
of engineering works. Finally, it refutes the simplified argument that the nation-state was 
“the owner” of technologies and restores the social and technical complication in the 
diffusion and the assimilation of technology. 
9.2.1 Capacity 
 Hydraulic modernity is about maximizing the capacity of an engineering system 
without exhausting the environment. This pertains to both the mechanized and the manual 
parts of the system. Previous scholarship often speaks highly of the innovation that the 
West brought to China, but the reality is that the traditional Chinese practices remained 
vibrant and reliable throughout the century of technological revolution. The old and new 
ways of doing things coexisted. This is best shown in the case of nightsoil management in 
Shanghai. Even before the construction of a water-carriage sewer system, Shanghai 
experienced fewer outbreaks of cholera and typhoid comparing to cities of similar latitude. 
The careful collection of human-generated waste as fertilizer must have helped by reducing 
the effluent pouring into the adjacent rivers. While an increasing number of flush toilets 
were installed in marble-faced buildings in the Central District, the system of municipal 
contractor and nightsoil coolies was still largely in place in Shanghai. Manual labor was 
especially needed in emptying the cesspools and septic tanks in areas where vacuum 
wagons had little financial incentive to go. 
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The manual system was cheap and eco-friendly, nevertheless it could only handle 
a limited amount of waste matter before the system reached its limit. This was indicated by 
severe river pollution since the 1910s. As was shown in the debate of culverting the 
Yangkingpang, more cases were spotted and reported to the authorities, in which nightsoil 
coolies failed to fulfill their duties to remove the ordure and appeared to be dumping their 
buckets of waste into various water bodies. The situation became even more acute when 
the use of flush toilet added voluminous unwanted water to the ordure, making them 
undesirable to the peasants. The system ran into a technical deadlock that it could not 
resolve without outside intervention. In comparison, the water-carriage system could deal 
with a significantly larger amount of waste matter. This, however, did not mean the 
“modern” system was innately better with respect to public health. A water closet without 
a proper receptacle was no less of a danger than an outhouse unattended. Without treatment 
plants built in proper locations, the water-carriage system would easily stress the 
environment. The advantage of the mechanized system was not its ‘modernity’ but its 
larger capacity, given the permit of economics, technologies, and environment. 
Hydraulic modernity is thus not situated on the linear timeline of technological 
progression. It is a metric on which a combination of systems, labor-intensive and/or labor-
saving, are measured in their capacity of completing their designated tasks. This capacity 
does not answer to political will, but to the pressure of overpopulation and to the extent of 
environmental stress that the surroundings of the city can bear. In this sense, to declare 
China as being pre-modern compared to the West is misleading and unfair. Shanghai at its 
size in the mid-nineteenth century did not need a mechanized system. The capacity of the 
old system was well above what was needed. This is proven by the water samples the 
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Municipal Council sent to London in the 1870s when the commencement of waterworks 
was underway, all of which were free of sewage matter. In fact, Western cities around the 
same time were employing labor-intensive systems of waste removal as well. The City of 
New York in the early nineteenth century was still dependent on manure sales to maintain 
the cleanliness in the streets.724 In London, sewage was not defined as pollution until 1834 
when a parliamentary select committee on metropolitan improvements used it to refer to 
specifically to household cesspool discharges and street runoff. Until then, a sewer was 
considered more like a drainage ditch than an underground pipe.725 No city was born 
modern. It only became modern when it had to. 
 Another expression of capacity is multi-functionality of a system. If a technocratic-
engineering system can fulfill more than one task without compromising its assigned 
specialty, it is certainly preferable. A good example would be the fate of the earth closet, a 
scheme for waste removal that relied on removable buckets to promote cleanliness.  When 
the idea of earth closet was introduced to Shanghai, it was also gaining popularity in rural 
America and in some big American cities. In the 1870s, officials in Washington D.C. and 
Savannah investigated earth-based disposal system which would include a private 
company in charge of supplying and removing the buckets as needed. The renowned 
sanitarian George E. Waring Jr. purchased an interest in Henry Moule’s patent of earth 
closet and tirelessly promoted its usage in rural regions as a generator of fertilizer. Maureen 
Ogle argued that this enthusiasm waned because America of the 1870s had a deeply 
embedded belief in progress. Few sanitarians expected Americans to abandon technologies 
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that embodied modernity in favor of old-fashioned arrangements like the earth closet.726 I 
would argue that regardless of the belief in progress, the earth closet was bound to fall out 
of favor because the water-carriage system was part of a better multifunctionality.  
Water supply provided by mechanized waterworks was multi-functional. As is 
shown in the case of Shanghai, pressurized water could be used in extinguishing fire, 
delivering potable water, scouring drains, even dispersing an angry mob in the street. 
Flushing away ordure in a second was merely one of its many functions. In contrast, the 
earth closest system was designed for a single task. The prevalence of the water-carriage 
system was not a result of ideological context of the academic universe, but a natural 
outcome based on practical calculations. This kind of calculation does not require the 
parties involved to be equipped with a set of abstract values historically built in the Western 
civilization. The wisdom is programed in human nature. Even at the height of its popularity, 
the earth closet did not gain ground in Shanghai, but the water closet did. Some systems 
won out not because they were labeled as modern, but because they did more things and 
made more economic sense than others. 
9.2.2 Homogeneity 
As for the social implication of water engineering, hydraulic modernity was about 
streamlining the operation of water infrastructures, i.e. the reduction of actors involved in 
the process. It was, in other words, about homogeneity. Homogeneity in many cases leads 
to an increase in the capacity of the system, but the purpose of homogenizing the process 
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is not about boosting the output, rather it was to make the risks of malfunction predictable 
and manageable. 
In the case of Shanghai, we witness the growing presence of the Municipal Health 
Officer. During the years 1881 and 1882, when pipe laying was under way, the Health 
Officer was powerful enough to halt the work for months based on sanitary concerns. This 
could be easily mistaken as a sign of political authority over the engineering work. The 
truth is that the Health Officer’s power was greatly boosted due to the fact that the 
construction was carried out by a single company, the Shanghai Waterworks Company. 
Some thirty years prior to the founding of the company, pipe-laying and drain-building was 
performed by native labors under the employment of individual landowners. The 
Municipal Council simply could not bring these actions under their control even with rules 
written in the Land Regulation. The increasingly influential public health regime in 
Shanghai relied on the reality that the system building had become centralized and that 
there were fewer random individual actors that the Health Officer and the Municipal 
Council needed to engage. In the following years, the job of Health Officer became more 
manageable, especially when Arthur Stanley assumed the title. While Stanley’s endeavor 
in standardizing the public health policies and procedures should not be understated, it is 
also fair to say that his job would be much more challenging if hundreds of household, 
including various hospitals and nursing homes, received their water from coolies instead 
of from a single waterworks company. 
Another example would be British India, where the appearance of sewerage system 
in Bombay and Calcutta showed up even earlier than in American cities. These 
infrastructures had been serving the European quarters of the cities already through the 
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1860s, but the long tradition of organized religion created a special form of heterogeneity 
within the society. According to Hinduism, the Ganges River had fallen from the sky when 
Vishnu Purana washed away the dirt and sins by her touch. Releasing sewage into the 
Ganges was culturally far more upsetting to the Indians than polluting the Yangkingpang 
was to Shanghai natives. In Calcutta, the European businessmen found septic tanks a 
desirable solution to the issue of refuse in their increasingly crowded factories. But when 
septic tanks released the treated water into the Ganges, the natives saw it as a serious 
religious offense. The Septic Tank Committee of Calcutta had to consult scholars and 
pundits on the scripts for a religious explanation as to why the treated effluent would not 
ruin to the Ganges.727 Taken at face value, this example seems to suggest that religious 
tradition overwhelmed urban development. Yet the compromises were not made at the 
expense of the waste removal system, but that the religious ideas needed to be reorganized 
in a way that fit the practical needs of the populace. The usage of septic tanks could not be 
displaced because the need of these fixtures at overpopulated factories was absolute. 
Homogenizing thus did not take place by abandoning necessary engineering arrangements, 
but that religious disagreement had to conform to practical concerns. 
The real struggle with homogeneity did not come from outside the system. The 
interest groups stemming from inside always posed a bigger challenge. For example, in 
exploring the Mombasa water-supply project, Justin Willis argues that the British officials 
had to form an alliance with the African “big men on the spot” so that state power could 
take charge to bring policies into being in spite of the political frictions.728 David Mosse 
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presents a similar case in south India with the history of irrigation when engineers were 
changing the way water flowed and creating new interest groups. In this case, state power 
did not present itself as a uniformed political force. Rather, the conceptualization of water 
rights originated from chaos after several arbitrary court judgements. In order to ensure 
their own rules, the British authorities needed to help elect those who favored their rule. 
The rationalized system of governance that resulted was not imposed from the top. Rather, 
the system arose out of this hybrid of agencies amidst the practices on the ground.729 
Homogeneity is not the result of political will alone. This idea of utility of the 
people, by the people, for the people was not new. In the early twentieth-century America, 
the ownership of waterworks was already linked to the public’s collective character and 
integrity. But Puritan teaching in condemning the evil nature of an economy in which 
individuals did not have to look out for each other did not prevent the formation of a private 
company that took charge of the business of water supply in Boston.730 To make public 
spirit a reality, engineering prowess is a must. In its early years, the communists in 
Shanghai took over the entire system of water and waste and established a fairer way of 
distributing fresh water with state-issued tickets, and accelerated the process of culverting 
dirty waterways that had plagued neighborhoods for decades. While political will was 
critical in the execution of these policies, it was the existing systems built over the years 
by a variety of authorities that made centralization in the 1950s possible. Without them, 
homogeneity imposed by statecraft is meaningless, sometimes even counterproductive. 
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The Maoist regime learned the hard way in the following decades when projects of 
collectivization failed one after another as they went beyond the permit of engineering.  
9.3 Beyond the Reach of State 
Controlling individuals’ habits and behavior is a tough challenge for any state. 
Nationalists had many ideas about how to build the best privy, yet the authority was 
somehow powerless in preventing promiscuous defecating (Figure 28). Similarly, the 
American sanitary regime in the Philippines might have been able to collect plenty of 
information on diet and nutrient through the feces of natives, but their intervention into the 
native’s bodily disposition was only mildly successful. 731  In the space of seclusion, 
conformity to the modern code of conducts was especially weak. The lukewarm results of 
the New Life Movement proved the ineffectiveness of inculcation, even with propaganda 
machine at its full force. How, then, did the change of hygiene behavior happen, and why?  
I argue that the notion of localization of technology forced this change in behavior. 
Bodies are no more than another place where technology travels. Thus, localization has 
two features. First, behavioral change is induced through constant interaction with the 
engineering system at the access point. Technologies cannot be localized if the accessibility 
of the material embodiment of them is inadequate. Second, habits take time to form. As the 
water supply in Shanghai took years to be integrated as a taken-for-granted part of social 
life, body re-engineering toward flush toilets as the only acceptable cultural norm took 
even longer. 
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Figure 28 – Promiscuous defecation during the Republic. The cartoon is titled 
“Where is the bathroom?” and depicts the difficulty in enforcing rules to eliminate 
the unsanitary practices. It also reflects the acute shortage of public restrooms. 
Source: Bao Sheng, 1941. 
Localization of technology is designed to refute the conventional notion that 
technologies travel between countries or nations. Indeed, localization entails a movement 
of and internalization of know-how. This movement, however, does not go between nation-
states or civilizations. When the water tower was inaugurated in Shanghai, the monument 
drew a crowd (Figure 29). This surely can be interpreted as a cultural shock among the 
Chinese, but similar fanfare took place in the West too. When a pumping station and water 
tower were completed in Chicago, Americans were amazed by its cream-colored limestone 
façade and its appearance of a medieval fortress. This was also true of the pump station in 
Philadelphia. The square in front of it, decorated by a pine statue of the Water Nymph and 
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Bittern, immediately became the favorite gathering spot of the wealthy.732 In New York 
City, the Croton Reservoir embodied the city’s mid-nineteenth-century aspirations to 
cosmopolitanism. In the painting by Augustus Fay, the Reservoir sat in between the rural 
area where brick houses were in the near and the growing urban architecture inched towards 
the Reservoir from afar.733 If engineering caused a “cultural shock” that only took place 
between the West and China, then none of the above should have happened.  
 
Figure 29 – The opening of water tower. Source: Tian Ying, 1887.  
                                                 
732 Smith, 47-48, 71-73. 
733 Soll, 29-30. 
 374 
 The point of celebration in these examples was not the nationality of the 
technologies, but the technology itself. Technology embodies the presence of know-how 
and attracts public interest just as any artwork would do. In the same vein, a technology 
does not become localized because it ceases to be alien, it becomes localized because it 
loses its aura of novelty and became internalized as one of the countless engagements with 
things in a day. In today’s Shanghai, a sizeable portion of population still live in areas 
where nightstools are common. This is largely due to the fact that their neighborhood was 
not profitable enough to be piped in colonial days. However, it is unlikely that there will 
be a debate today about the sanitary benefits of water closets. Few urban Chinese today 
find it okay to defecate in the street, not because they are told not to, but because the 
omnipresence of plumbing fixtures generates a network of rules for behavior. Defecating 
in the street no longer implicates a shortage of devices, but a lack of knowledge of the 
existence of these devices. The variety of scientific explanations and social interpretations 
regarding this device has gone extinct over the years and the cultural universe of toilet 
collapses into one single trajectory of progress that points to the full replacement of 
nightstools. It has become irrelevant that the water closet was a Western invention; average 
Chinese people today no longer think about that fact. 
9.4 Conclusion: Modernity as a Western Project 
In his work on the embankment of the Thames, Dale H. Porter contends that 
cleanliness is in the eyes of the beholder, and there is a difference between the dismal levels 
of sanitation and public health that historians perceive in hindsight and how most 
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contemporaries perceived them. 734 This thesis endeavors to recover technological and 
scientific understandings of the environment during the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
century so that we can contextualize and make sense of the choice of technology the people 
made in the moment. Technology transfer from the West to Shanghai did not lead to 
immediate displacement of old practices because the new and the old each had their own 
merit in the given economic and geographical circumstances. This approach is thus able to 
restore the complexity of engineering process by bringing practical concerns and material 
constraints into the discussion. It also avoids a teleological summary of why the society 
progressed the way it did.  
My work reveals a variety of curious decisions made by the British in Shanghai. 
These decisions took place in a technical and social context that may no longer make sense 
to us today. The fact that the early British struggled with building a drainage system with 
a proper gradient, that the Chinese drains worked better in the rivery land of Shanghai, that 
the waterworks was built for flushing the defective drains, and that the British still believed 
in the miasmatic cause of cholera in the 1910s all point to the reality that the colonial rule 
did not bring a totalizing modernity. The British, although fluent in engineering know-how, 
were not versed from the beginning in its application to a specific locale. In the early era 
of modernity in the late nineteenth century, space should not and cannot be cancelled, 
especially when the technologies being relocated were still in primitive stage. 
Shanghai was endowed with the advanced machineries imported from the British 
Isles. The shipping of machineries was one-sided, but the Chinese metropolis was an 
                                                 
734 Porter, 55. 
 376 
important site of knowledge development, on par with London, Glasgow, Calcutta, and 
Mombasa, where new engineering know-how arose from geographically specific localities 
and medical theories competed with each other to enter the circulation of scientific ideas. 
In his investigation into the history of gravitation schemes of water supply across the 
British Empire, John Broich points out that projects of water supply were undertaken 
simultaneously in Britain and in its colonies. The transformation of urban life was 
replicated in Britain and the empire and often by the very same individuals and on the same 
grounds of sanitary and moral theory. The practical challenges engineers were facing and 
the reformative social effect by the environmental solutions were nearly identical. 
“Therefore,” writes Broich, “Bombay and Manchester were ‘colonized’ in the same 
way”.735  
Nevertheless, it would be futile to discredit the influence and contribution of the 
Westerners in Shanghai in the making of a modern city. Engineering projects in Shanghai 
were made possible by techniques in machinery, long-distance shipment, institutional 
connections between the core and the periphery (albeit primitive), and transcontinental 
business networks, all of which were creations of the West and had no parallel elsewhere 
in the world. Anthony Giddens points at two distinct organizational complexes of particular 
significance in the development of modernity: the nation-state and systematic capitalist 
production. Both have roots in specific characteristics of European history.736 We have 
solved the myth about the nation-state as the primary actor in the international exchange 
by illustrating a variety of organizations coordinating with one another so as to reach the 
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maximum institutional capacity. As its replacement came corporations and their engineers, 
which enabled the movement of technologies around the world, funneled millions of 
sterling pounds in from Britain, adapted to the institutional settings in Shanghai, and fought 
back when their interests were at risk. The corporations too were the creations of the West. 
Reassessing the role of the nation-state in the historical discourse of colonial Shanghai does 
not mean that the Chinese in Shanghai would develop in the same direction and to the same 
level without intervention from or engagement with the West. It just means that instead of 
framing the process of modernity as a clash between civilizations, we need to pay more 
attention to the actors – people, group, and things – who brought about meaningful changes, 
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